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How should the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations engage with the new Taliban government in Afghanistan? How will these decisions impact Afghanistans stability in the next five to 10 years? To date, many analyses have focused on the short-term implications of the Taliban takeover. However, relatively little thought has been given to policy interventions that can bring long-term stability to Afghanistan. The U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Department of Peace Operations should analyze how a multinational peacekeeping operation (PKO) can play a critical role in stabilizing Afghanistan. Empirical research provides compelling evidence on how PKOs support peace settlements and protect local civilians in the fragile time period following conflict termination, leading to durable peace. While several recent works have analyzed an Afghanistan peace operations viability, the idea has received relatively little attention in broader policy discourse. Given PKOs proven track record in stabilizing post-conflict states, the U.N. Security Council should seriously consider whether a PKO can provide a credible monitoring and verification mechanism to help stabilize Afghanistan.

Based on the Talibans consistent demands that all foreign forces depart Afghanistan, a third-party monitoring force may not be feasible. However, with dire economic and humanitarian crises facing Afghanistan, the Talibans need for external support might provide a window for a coordinated effort by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to convince the Taliban of the benefits of a PKO. A successful PKO would depend upon the right conditions and the right force structure, and must deal with the risks posed by spoilers like the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

An Afghanistan PKO would be a new type of peace operation. PKOs traditionally provide monitoring and verification capabilities to support internal peace settlements between mistrusting former combatants at the conclusion of civil conflicts. However, the Talibans recent military victory obviates the need for a more traditional intra-Afghan peace settlement. Rather than monitoring and facilitating trust between former internal combatants, an Afghanistan PKO would foster trust between the Taliban and other states and international and non-governmental organizations. Given reports of reprisal killings and human rights abuses (despite the Talibans pledges to avoid such practices), international donors are understandably wary of resuming financial aid to a Taliban-led regime. However, if credible third-party monitoring forces were in place to verify that external aid was being responsibly spent and Taliban commitments were being honored, then international donors might be more likely to resume financial assistance. A PKO also provides a reliable mechanism for the donor states and organizations to verify the Talibans pledge that Afghanistan will not be used as a terrorist safe haven, as recent reporting indicates. Such trust-building measures might facilitate diplomatic recognition by some states, who are waiting to see how the Taliban will govern.

A PKO could also play a critical role in fostering intra-Afghan trust between the Taliban and millions of Afghan civilians who are living in fear and skeptical of the new regimes promises. Rather than taking an active part in hostilities and applying coercive military force, traditional peace operations are based on three foundational principles: impartiality, host nation consent, and the non-use of force (beyond self-defense). Neutral peacekeepers would be ideally positioned to facilitate peace between the Taliban regime and remaining resistance groups by supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts, thus strengthening post-conflict peace duration. Increasing trust between former government officials, urban residents, and the Taliban could mitigate Afghanistans refugee crisis, which is predicted to worsen in the coming months. Without external support, international isolation of the Taliban regime in the face of mounting humanitarian disaster will spell calamity for millions of innocent Afghans and threaten the Talibans nascent sovereignty.

Assessing Taliban Consent and International Political Will

The first and most important condition for a successful PKO is the consent of the Taliban. Deploying multinational troops without consent from the de facto government would amount to an invasion, not a PKO. The Talibans insistence on the departure of all foreign forces from Afghanistan seems to make consent unlikely. However, as the Taliban assumes governance responsibilities, their clear need for continued external support may provide donor states, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations with critical leverage to recommend a PKO. The fact is that, in addition to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, the Taliban stand to benefit from a PKO that facilitates expanded international assistance. Inducing the Taliban to see that such an operation could be in their interest would require a coordinated international pressure campaign orchestrated by a diverse array of state and non-state actors.

Specifically, top donor states, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international governmental organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund could withhold financial aid, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic recognition, conditional on the Taliban consenting to a U.N.-led multinational PKO. While the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan lack histories of robust cooperation with one another, their interests align when it comes to the question of stabilizing Afghanistan. As Afghanistan teeters toward humanitarian catastrophe, the subsequent second- and third-order effects such as millions of Afghan refugees, continued disease transmission, and the creation of terrorist safe havens risk regional destabilization. These risks provide strategic incentives for the U.N. Security Council and Afghanistans neighbors to support stabilizing policy interventions. Coordinated action among this broad, international coalition could persuade reluctant Taliban leaders.

Despite a PKOs obvious benefits, and the clear risks posed by international isolation, Taliban consent to a PKO risks the organizations internal legitimacy. While the Taliban are frequently cast as a unified organization, some analysts have pointed to the groups diverse and disparate assemblage of various armed groups from across Afghanistan. It remains to be seen if Taliban unity, which was boosted by opposition to U.S. and NATO forces, will persist after those forces withdraw. Given the existential threat of organizational splintering, Taliban leaders must balance their need for internal legitimacy amongst Taliban ranks (and between moderate and radical elements) against international legitimacy and external demands for the Taliban to protect human rights, civil liberties, and Afghanistans democracy.

Overall, a PKO with credible monitoring and verification capabilities aligns with the Talibans long-term interests by facilitating trust with skeptical Afghans, donor states, regional neighbors, and international and non-governmental organizations. Enabling international humanitarian relief will be critical to stabilizing Afghanistan by providing urgently needed aid to millions of Afghans facing famine, drought, a pandemic, and displacement. Despite these clear benefits, Taliban leaders will be wary of consenting to a PKO, which risks alienating the groups radical elements and organizational splintering. If the United Nations wishes to deploy a PKO to Afghanistan, it will need to carefully craft the missions force structure and mandate in a manner that facilitates intra-Taliban legitimacy.

Structuring a Peace Operation for Success

Peace operations vary widely in size, composition, and force structure based on their specific mandate. PKO force structure considerations would likely be critical to obtaining Taliban consent. An Afghanistan PKO would require adequate resources to credibly fulfill its mandate while balancing the Talibans internal legitimacy concerns. A large PKO with a robust mandate that includes civilian protection is likely a non-starter. A lightly armed observer mission, concentrated in the main cities is most realistic, given probable Taliban doubts.

The U.N.s Department of Peace Operations has the experience and capabilities to manage such a complex mission. A force of 10,000 to 12,000 peacekeepers, spread between Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif would provide a credible PKO with geographic coverage across Afghanistan. These four cities alone contain approximately 12 percent of Afghanistans total population. Given widespread doubts over the Talibans recent pledges, stationing peacekeepers in major cities would be critical for the Taliban to build trust with donor states and international organizations. It would also build trust with vulnerable Afghans who previously supported or worked in the government of Afghanistan. From a humanitarian perspective, the PKOs presence in major cities would increase international and non-governmental organizations access and ability to provide aid to millions of Afghans.

This PKO is also ideal for the missions force protection requirements. As is evident with Kabuls recent U.S. and NATO evacuation, Afghanistans geography creates large risks for external forces mobility and their ability to resupply and evacuate casualties. Militants can isolate and cut off disparate peacekeeping units by controlling key chokepoints, such as airports or Highway 1, posing a large risk to units based away from major cities. Concentrating the PKO in a few major cities with large transportation nodes will similarly ease the missions logistical burden, which is a formidable challenge with Afghanistans geography.

Though beneficial from force protection and logistics perspectives, concentrating peacekeepers in cities reduces the missions monitoring and verification capabilities in rural Afghanistan. Urban PKO units will have limited ability to travel significant distances beyond their local regions, degrading the missions ability to patrol in rural areas and deliver humanitarian aid across the entire country. Despite these shortcomings, PKO force protection concerns may outweigh mandate considerations in a necessary trade-off to keep the missions risk profile suitably low to attract troop-contributing countries.

This limited geographic reach is especially problematic if the PKOs mandate includes verifying that Afghanistan is not being used as a terrorist safe haven. However, new technology provides options to mitigate these risks. Specifically, the PKO could be supplemented with unarmed and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, extending the missions monitoring capabilities into the countryside and mountain ranges. Though it seems improbable that the Taliban would accept foreign intelligence systems, if these assets were operated under the auspices of the U.N. Department of Peace Operations, it should assuage Taliban concerns. Deploying with these capabilities would be critical to monitoring rural Afghanistan and strengthening the PKOs verification credibility. As suggested by recent research, integrating new technologies would allow an Afghanistan PKO to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities without significantly increasing the number of peacekeepers.

As with all peace operations, selecting donor states and PKO leaders that are acceptable to combatants is critical. In the case of an Afghanistan PKO, Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, or Bangladesh would be potential troop contributors. Interestingly, the Taliban previously proposed a majority-Muslim peace operation as a transitional force in 2009. These countries and Afghanistans neighbors should play an active leadership role in overseeing the PKO. Given these states interest in attaining regional stability, political will might be present for sustaining the PKO. For obvious reasons, the United States, NATO members, and partner states who supported Operation Enduring Freedom should not play a role in the PKO. While these states can offer support through PKO financing and applying international pressure to induce Taliban consent, their direct participation would detract from the missions neutrality and impartiality. The Taliban will also be apprehensive about formally incorporating gender considerations into a PKOs mandate. However, compelling research highlights the importance of deliberately utilizing female peacekeepers and these considerations should not be overlooked when resourcing the PKOs composition in a manner that protects Afghan women.

Research indicates that PKOs must be adequately resourced to fulfill their mandates. Under-resourced PKOs have routinely struggled to accomplish their mandates, as was the case with the ineffective United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially deployed in 1988, the mission was mandated with three core tasks to monitor: (1) non-interference and non-intervention by the parties [Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, and the United States] in each others affairs; (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and (3) the voluntary return of refugees. Deployed with only 50 total peacekeepers and without an intra-Afghan peace settlement, this severely under-resourced peace operation failed to provide a credible monitoring and verification capability needed for intra-Afghan parties to overcome mutual mistrust. Following the Soviet Unions withdrawal, spiraling violence between various Afghan militias significantly increased risk to peacekeepers, sapping the political will of troop-contributing states. The mission ended in 1990 as Afghanistan devolved into civil war. Under-resourced PKOs were also incapable of fulfilling their mandates in Rwanda and Bosnia, with horrific consequences.

The Risk of Spoilers

Even if the U.N. Security Council and Afghanistans neighbors can induce Taliban consent for a peace operation, the mission will still be vulnerable to spoilers parties threatened by peace settlements that employ violence to undermine internal peace processes. As seen with the tragic bombings at Kabul Airport on Aug. 26, spoilers will continue to play an active role in Afghanistan and these groups would almost certainly target peacekeepers. Though the Islamic State in Afghanistan is the most prominent threat, radical Taliban factions may also serve as spoilers in the same way that splinter factions have done in other post-conflict settings. Beyond targeting the PKO, spoilers may target remaining international and non-governmental organizations to discredit the Taliban-backed regime. In addition to extremist groups, criminal organizations are taking advantage of Afghanistans instability to settle scores and disrupt competitors, making attribution of attacks difficult. While these spoilers pose a certain risk for a PKO, their presence simultaneously highlights the need to have impartial third-party observers on hand who can investigate attacks and credibly attribute spoiling attacks. The risk posed by spoilers increases PKO force protection requirements, further strengthening the case for a mission that is concentrated in large cities that can leverage existing military bases.

Conclusion

Complex trade-offs dominate many aspects of this proposal. An Afghanistan PKOs size would be directly linked to the missions monitoring and verification capabilities. However, the mandates scope and the missions size must be constrained in a manner that enables Taliban internal legitimacy and consent, while still providing a credible peace operation that will assuage international concerns and incentivize Taliban compliance with their stated promises. Further, the PKOs risk profile must be low enough to gain and sustain troop-contributing countries support. While Taliban consent to such a mission would significantly reduce risk, the persistent threat of spoilers like Islamic State in Afghanistan will increase force protection considerations importance while simultaneously limiting the missions geographic reach. I argue these trade-offs can be carefully balanced in a manner that produces a credible PKO and a limited mandate.

Beyond trade-offs, a critical question is: Why should the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations cooperate with the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan? While a PKO paired with conditional foreign aid would be a vital step in stabilizing Afghanistan, it would simultaneously enable a Taliban-led regime to consolidate power in a manner that is not aligned with democracy, civil liberties, or womens rights.

The answer is that continued civil conflict and humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan carries significant concerns. Beyond the normative considerations regarding the safety and security of 39 million Afghans, there are clear strategic imperatives for a stable Afghanistan. The widespread abandonment of Afghanistan following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal offers an instructive lesson for world leaders today. Isolating a Taliban-led Afghanistan risks continued civil war, state failure, and humanitarian disaster. Further, this isolation will likely strengthen radical sects within the Taliban. Extremist organizations may take advantage of the security vacuum, risking further regional destabilization in South Asia.

While Taliban rhetoric diminishes a PKOs feasibility, coordinated effort across groups such as the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank might increase the likelihood of the Taliban government consenting to a U.N.-led PKO. Following four decades of persistent conflict, creative and proactive steps ought to be considered to bring stability to Afghanistan. Decades of research suggests peace operations monitoring and verification capabilities can overcome post-conflict mistrust and assist in providing Afghanistan lasting stability.

Ryan C. Van Wie is a U.S. Army Infantry officer who has deployed to Afghanistan. He has a masters degree in public policy from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and his research focuses on civil conflict dynamics and military force structure. This paper only reflects the authors views and does not represent the views of the U.S. Army or the U.S. government.

Image: U.S. Army National Guard (Photo by Sgt. Heidi Kroll)

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Could Multinational Peacekeepers Prevent Worst-Case Outcomes in Afghanistan? - War on the Rocks

How did a small group of Islamic students go from local vigilantes to one of the most infamous and enigmatic forces in the world? The Taliban is a name that has haunted the American imagination since 2001. The scenes of the group's brutality repeatedly played in the Western media, while true, perhaps obscure our ability to see the complex origins of the Taliban and how they impact the lives of Afghans. It's a shadow that reaches across the vast ancient Afghan homeland, the reputation of the modern state, and throughout global politics. At the end of the US war in Afghanistan we go back to the end of the Soviet Occupation and the start of the Afghan civil war to look at the rise of the Taliban. Their story concludes Throughline's two-episode investigation on the past, present, and future of the country that was once called "the center of the world.

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Afghanistan: The Rise of the Taliban : Throughline - NPR

Then-President George W. Bush speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast in 2003. (J. Scott Applewhite / AP Photo)

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The American national security establishment has little aptitude for winning wars, but it is very good at defending its political power. The swift collapse of the Afghan government in August, with the leaders like Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani fleeing as its army surrendered to the Taliban, should have been an occasion for soul-searching among Americans leaders. After all, building a viable, non-Taliban government in Afghanistan has been a project carried out by four presidencies over nearly 20 years, at the cost of more than $2 trillion and nearly 2,500 soldiers. The number of Afghans who died in the war of the last two decades is difficult to establish with certainty, but best estimates are in the neighborhood of 240,000with perhaps 70,000 of those civilians.

By any measure, the effort to create a viable Afghan state was a major political project, supported not just by a bipartisan political consensus but also numerous NGOs and, intermittently, aided by American allies. Yet the Afghan government was revealed in the end to be a Potemkin regime, one that fell apart almost as fast as a house of cards encountering a gust of wind.

You would think that so massive a failureone that implicated so many leaders and institutionsmight lead to some reflection on all that had gone wrong. But such a level of mature introspection isnt common to the national security establishment. This clubby collection of military and civilian policy-makers, think tank wonks, and upscale journalists is sometimes called the Blob. (The term was popularized, if not coined, by Ben Rhodes, an adviser to Barack Obama). Its an apt metaphor; like the fabled movie monster, the foreign policy Blob may look amorphousbut still always oozes in the same general direction.

The Blob quickly decided that the end of the Afghan debacle, rather than a moment for self-reflection, presented an ideal opportunity to slime Joe Biden. The quickly formulated Blob consensus went something like this: The mission in Afghanistan didnt fail. The situation on the ground had stabilized with the Afghan government supported at a manageable cost by a few thousand US troops. Afghanistan was well on its way to becoming a viable long-term ally like Japan, South Korea, or Germany. Biden, hypnotized by the slogan end the forever wars, was guilty of a premature withdrawal. MORE FROM Jeet Heer

To make sure Biden received the requisite lashing, the media dug up all the ghouls who launched Afghanistan and earlier wars: John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blaireven the prince of the undead himself, Henry Kissinger. Variations of this critique were made by everyone from Ryan C. Crocker, ambassador to Afghanistan under Obama, to Council on Foreign Relations President Richard N. Haass. Writing in The New York Times, Crocker argued, Bidens decision to withdraw all U.S. forces destroyed an affordable status quo that could have lasted indefinitely at a minimum cost in blood and treasure. Haass tweeted, The alternative to withdrawal from Afghanistan was not endless occupation but open-ended presence. Occupation is imposed, presence invited. Unless you think we are occupying Japan, Germany, & South Korea. And yes, withdrawal was the problem.

These arguments are so flimsy as to barely need refutation. Theres simply no rational comparison between the American presence, however contested by some locals, in Japan, Germany, and South Korea and two decades of ferocious blood-letting in Afghanistan. The minimum cost of Afghanistan is true only if you ignore both that American casualties over the last year are down because of Donald Trumps agreement with the Taliban to withdraw US troopsand that Afghan casualties remain numbingly high. As Joe Biden rightly said in an August 31 address, Theres nothing low grade or low risk or low cost about any war.

What Biden could have added is that his critics are willfully dishonest about the history of the warand the nature of the status quo before the collapse. One of the very best guides to that history is the blockbuster Afghanistan Papers report that Craig Whitlock released in The Washington Post in 2019 (now available in expanded form as a book). Current Issue

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Based on an internal autopsy of the Afghan mission commissioned by the Pentagon titled Lessons Learned, The Afghanistan Papers make clear that the war was lost from almost the very startand that the Afghanistan war was unwinnable because the United States lacked the knowledge and capability to build a legitimate or even viable government.

Instead, administration after administration kept kicking the can down the road by pretending the facade of a viable regime was the real thing. As MSNBC host Chris Hayes rightly observed, the philosophy behind Americas nation-building effort was fake it till you make it.

In 2015, Army Gen. Douglas Lute, who served as Afghan war czar under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, told government interviewers, We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistanwe didnt know what we were doing. He added, What are we trying to do here? We didnt have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking.

The Afghanistan Papers paint a grim picture of a mission lacking in any clear focus leading to the creation of a make-believe government, a phantom local army, and a status quo maintained by massive American-directed killing. As Whitlock notes:

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In the Lessons Learned interviews, however, U.S. military trainers described the Afghan security forces as incompetent, unmotivated and rife with deserters. They also accused Afghan commanders of pocketing salariespaid by U.S. taxpayersfor tens of thousands of ghost soldiers. Whitlock adds, None expressed confidence that the Afghan army and police could ever fend off, much less defeat, the Taliban on their own. More than 60,000 members of Afghan security forces have been killed, a casualty rate that U.S. commanders have called unsustainable.

Reading The Afghanistan Papers illuminates the rapid collapse of the American mission: It fell apart because it was always one big lie. The title of the original Pentagon report now takes an ironic air: Lessons Learned. The cynical and calculated freakout over Bidens wise decision to withdraw makes clear that the Blob will never learn any lessons.

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Americas Afghanistan Amnesia - The Nation

Seventeen years after the Bonn Agreement under which a new interim administration was established, .

. Unemployment rates are high. The countrys rapid population growth places pressure on service delivery and .

Declines in grant assistance accompanying the drawdown of international security forces has weakened demand and led to a broad and sustained economic slowdown.

While much progress has been made, institutions do not adequately mediate competition and conflict over resources, protect property rights, or keep citizens safe.

that are difficult to generate.

In this context, how can economic development be achieved in Afghanistan?

The Afghanistan to 2030 report highlights a set of priorities for economic development in Afghanistan, taking ongoing fragility as a given.

The report answers the following questions:

The report finds that .

This would require policy measures to support households and businesses deal with the risks of insecurity. It would also require a balanced growth strategy, involving increased public spending on human capital, improved agricultural productivity, and the mobilization of new investment in the extractives sector.

The report draws on several background papers that are available below.

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Afghanistan to 2030: Priorities for Economic Development ...

Kabul,2 September 2020 The Steering Committee of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank, today held its annual meeting virtually. The Committee is co-chaired by H.E. Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, Acting Minister of Finance, and Henry Kerali, World Bank Country Director for Afghanistan.

Ambassadors and representatives fromdonor countries and organizations discussed the role of the ARTF in moving forward the Afghan Governments development agenda. They also reviewed the progress of the trust funds financing strategy over the 13971399 fiscal years as well as the Partnership Framework and Financing Program (PFFP) and discussed future financing and programing beyond 1399. ARTF funds a large part of Afghanistans national budget and the implementation of Afghanistans National Development Strategy. Through the ARTF, the Government works with international partners to reduce poverty, deliver essential services, sustain civilian budget operating costs, and implement key reform efforts.

We are incredibly grateful for ARTF recent donations in response to COVID-19. We especially appreciate your generosity, efforts, and the commitment youve expressed to our community during these uncertain and challenging times, this year, our gratitude goes even deeper. Your support to fight COVID-19 helps us lead the way in responding to this unprecedented global health crisis. We are honored by World Bank that has reached out to us in so many ways through some major programs such as, REACH, ERHSP and EATS ). said Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, Acting Minister of Finance.

As Afghanistan is going through a difficult political and economic situation imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, ARTF provides significant support to the Government to maintain service delivery and pursue its development goals,said Henry Kerali, World Bank Country Director for Afghanistan. ARTF is the largest and longest-standing single country multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank on behalf international partners to ensure continued support to the people and Government of Afghanistan.

The Steering Committee discussed ARTF priorities after 2020 under the Partnership Framework Financing Program and endorsed annual updates to the PFFP. Members committed to continuing their strong partnership under the ARTF to promote good value for money in the delivery of ARTF-financed programs, strength administrative capacity and implement anti-corruption measures.

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About the ARTF: The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Steering (ARTF) is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank on behalf of 34 current and past donors. It provides on-budget financing to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistans development and reform priorities, and it is the single largest source of such funding to the Government.

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Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Steering ...