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The Western armies lose no matter how big and well-equipped they are because the insurgents are fighting on home ground

I will never kneel before such a destructive force (as the Taliban), declared Ashraf Ghani, the soon-to-be ex-president of Afghanistan. We will either sit knee-to-knee for real negotiations at the table, or break their knees on the battlefield. Good luck with that, Ashraf.

General Sami Sadat, still commander of Helmand province as I write this (although perhaps not by the time you read it), was equally confident, but warned that the safety of the world is at stake: This will increase the hope for small extremist groups to mobilise in the cities of Europe and America, and will have a devastating effect on global security.

And how did it all come to this? Ashraf Ghani pointed out that it is obviously Americas fault. The reason for our current situation is that the (US decision to withdraw) was taken abruptly, he told parliament on Monday.

Well, fair enough. US forces have been in Afghanistan for a bare twenty years and the treacherous cowards are already quitting. Donald Trump signed a treaty with the Taliban eighteen months ago promising that all US troops would leave Afghanistan by the 1st of May this year. Short notice indeed.

Im tempted to go back into the archives and find similar brave declarations of imminent victory by South Vietnamese generals (followed by similar predictions of global disaster if they are abandoned) in the final weeks before the helicopters started plucking Americans from the US embassy roof in Saigon in 1975. But its a nice day and I cant be bothered.

President Ghani, General Sadat, and all their friends are reading from the same old script, just 46 years later, and once that final scene has played out in Kabul theyll go and live in the United States. (Dont worry. Theyve saved up enough money.) The only real surprise here is how thoroughly Western armed forces managed to forget their own history.

Im not talking about the old history, when three invasions of Afghanistan at the height of British imperial power (1839-42; 1878-80; 1919) all failed to achieve their objectives.

Im not even talking about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979-89 when the United States helped the Taliban and similar Islamist groups to do to the Russians exactly what the Taliban have now done to the Americans themselves.

The problem there was that Americans did not see Russians as Western, although viewed from a low orbit they are virtually identical. US generals, therefore, believed that some essential difference between the two armies protected American troops from the fate of the Russians.

Never mind all that. The really unpardonable mistake was forgetting all the lessons Western armies had learned from a dozen lost guerilla wars in former colonies between 1954 and 1975.

France in Algeria and Indochina, Britain in Kenya, Cyprus and Aden, Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, the proxy wars in Rhodesia and South-West Africa (as they were then known), and the United States again in Indochina. All the wars were lost, and yet the defeated imperial powers didn't lose anything except face.

Western armies really did learn the lessons of those defeats. As a young man in the 1970s I taught military history and strategy in the Canadian Forces Staff College and then at Britains Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. The doctrine I taught was a) Western armies always lose guerilla wars in the Third World, and b) it never really matters.

The Western armies lose no matter how big and well-equipped they are because the insurgents are fighting on home ground. They cant quit and go home because they already are home. Your side can always quit and go home, and sooner or later your own public will demand that they do. So, you are bound to lose eventually, even if you win all the battles.

But losing doesnt matter, because the insurgents are always first and foremost nationalists. They may have picked up bits of some grand ideology to make them feel that history is on their side - Marxism or Islamism or whatever - but all they want is for you to go home so they can run their own show. They wont actually follow you home.

By 1975 this hard-earned wisdom was the official doctrine in almost every army in the Western world, but military generations are short. A typical military career is only 25 years, so by 2001 nobody remembered it. Their successors had to start learning it again the hard way. Maybe by now, they have.

(Gwynne Dyer's new book is 'The Shortest History of War'. The views expressed are personal.)

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Afghanistan: How Did They Think It Would End? - Daily Pioneer

The Taliban escalated its nationwide offensive in Afghanistan on Sunday, renewing assaults on three major cities and rocketing a major airport in the south amid warnings that the conflict was rapidly worsening.

As Afghan government forces struggled with a resurgent Taliban after the withdrawal of US-led foreign forces, hundreds of commandos were deployed to the economically important western city of Herat, while authorities in the southern city of Lashkar Gah called for more troops to rein in the assaults amid fierce fighting.

In Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand once the focus of UK military efforts eyewitnesses described street fighting, bodies lying in the open and Afghan government and US airstrikes raining down on Taliban positions.

According to reports from the city, Afghan forces remained in control of the city centre late on Sunday.

The current focus of the Talibans efforts appears to be a number of key provincial capitals, not least in the countrys south, with the ambition that the fall of Kandahar or Lashkar Gah would rapidly topple the five surrounding provinces.

The capture of any major urban centre would also take their current offensive to another level and fuel concerns that the army is incapable of resisting the Talibans advances.

The spokesperson for the Afghan armed forces, Gen Ajmal Omar Shinwari, told a press conference on Sunday that three provinces in southern and western Afghanistan faced critical security situations.

Aid agencies are also fearful that the fall of a major city would worsen an emerging humanitarian crisis that has already forced large numbers to flee their homes.

The aircraft are bombing the city every minute. Every inch of the city has been bombed, Badshah Khan, a resident of Lashkar Gah, told Agence France-Presse by phone.

You can see dead bodies on the streets. There are bodies of people in the main square.

The Taliban also struck the sprawling Kandahar airport in southern Afghanistan with at least three rockets overnight, the insurgent groups spokesman said on Sunday, adding that the aim was to thwart airstrikes conducted by Afghan government forces.

Kandahar airport was targeted by us because the enemy were using it as a centre to conduct airstrikes against us, said Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson. Afghan government officials said the rocket attacks forced authorities to suspend all flights and the runway was partially damaged.

Airport chief Massoud Pashtun said two rockets had hit the runway and repairs were under way, with planes likely to resume service later on Sunday.

The facility is vital to maintaining the logistics and air support needed to keep the Taliban from overrunning the city, while also providing aerial cover for large tracts of southern Afghanistan.

Officials said the Taliban saw Kandahar as a major strategic focus for their efforts amid the suggestion that the Taliban would like to use it as a temporary capital in the south.

In the countrys west, Afghan officials acknowledged that the Taliban had gained control of strategic buildings around Herat city, forcing civilians to remain in their homes.

On Sunday, the ministry of defence said that hundreds of commandos had been sent to Herat to help beat back the insurgent assault.

These forces will increase offensive operations and suppress the Taliban in Herat, the ministry tweeted.

Lashkar Gah, however, appears the most vulnerable.

Heavy clashes between the Taliban and government forces were continuing inside the city on Sunday, with militant fighters described as being only a few hundred metres from the governors office on Saturday amid Afghan and US airstrikes on Taliban positions.

Fighting is going on inside the city and we have asked for special forces to be deployed, Ataullah Afghan, the head of Helmand provincial council, told AFP.

The city is in the worst condition. I do not know what will happen, said Halim Karimi, a resident of the city of 200,000 residents.

Neither the Taliban will have mercy on us, nor will the government stop bombing.

The Taliban has been advancing in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US and Nato troops from the country, and in recent weeks the fundamentalist Islamist group said it had captured more than half of all Afghanistans territory, including border crossings with Iran and Pakistan.

As fighting raged, President Ashraf Ghani again slammed the Taliban for failing to marshal its negotiating power to reach a peace deal.

We want peace but they want us to surrender, Ghani said at a cabinet meeting.

The government has repeatedly dismissed the militants steady gains over the summer as lacking strategic value but has largely failed to reverse their momentum on the battlefield.

The Taliban has seized Afghan cities in the past but have managed to retain them only briefly.

The increasingly dire situation in Afghanistan has raised fears of a new Taliban takeover, with Boris Johnson admitting in the House of Commons last month that he was apprehensive about the future of Afghanistan.

If you ask me whether I feel happy about the current situation in Afghanistan, of course I dont. Im apprehensive, Johnson told parliaments liaison committee.

Thousands have been killed in the conflict, including more than 50,000 Afghan civilians and more than 2,000 US and 400 British troops.

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Resurgent Taliban escalates nationwide offensive in ...

KABUL, Afghanistan Haji Sakhi decided to flee Afghanistan the night he saw two Taliban members drag a young woman from her home and lash her on the sidewalk. Terrified for his three daughters, he crammed his family into a car the next morning and barreled down winding dirt roads into Pakistan.

That was more than 20 years ago. They returned to Kabul, the capital, nearly a decade later after the U.S.-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime. But now, with the Taliban sweeping across parts of the country as American forces withdraw, Mr. Sakhi, 68, fears a return of the violence he witnessed that night. This time, he says, his family is not waiting so long to leave.

Im not scared of leaving belongings behind, Im not scared of starting everything from scratch, said Mr. Sakhi, who recently applied for Turkish visas for himself, his wife, their three daughters and one son. What Im scared of is the Taliban.

Across Afghanistan, a mass exodus is unfolding as the Taliban press on in their brutal military campaign, which has captured more than half the countrys 400-odd districts, according to some assessments. And with that, fears of a harsh return to extremist rule or a bloody civil war between ethnically aligned militias have taken hold.

So far this year around 330,000 Afghans have been displaced, more than half of them fleeing their homes since the United States began its withdrawal in May, according to the United Nations.

Many have flooded into makeshift tent camps or crowded into relatives homes in cities, the last islands of government control in many provinces. Thousands more are trying to secure passports and visas to leave the country altogether. Others have crammed into smugglers pickup trucks in a desperate bid to slip illegally over the border.

In recent weeks, the number of Afghans crossing the border illegally shot up around 30 to 40 percent compared to the period before international troops began withdrawing in May, according to the International Organization for Migration. At least 30,000 people are now fleeing every week.

The sudden flight is an early sign of a looming refugee crisis, aid agencies warn, and has raised alarms in neighboring countries and Europe that the violence that has escalated since the start of the withdrawal is already spilling across the countrys borders.

Afghanistan is on the brink of another humanitarian crisis, Babar Baloch, a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, said earlier this month. A failure to reach a peace agreement in Afghanistan and stem the current violence will lead to further displacement.

The sudden exodus harks back to earlier periods of heightened unrest: Millions poured out of Afghanistan in the years after the Soviets invaded in 1979. A decade later, more fled as the Soviets withdrew and the country fell into civil war. The exodus continued when the Taliban came to power in 1996.

Afghans currently account for one of the worlds largest populations of refugees and asylum seekers around 3 million people and represent the second highest number of asylum claims in Europe, after Syria.

Now the country is at the precipice of another bloody chapter, but the new outpouring of Afghans comes as attitudes toward migrants have hardened around the world.

After forging a repatriation deal in 2016 to stem migration from war-afflicted countries, Europe has deported tens of thousands of Afghan migrants. Hundreds of thousands more are being forced back by Turkey as well as by neighboring Pakistan and Iran, which together host around 90 percent of displaced Afghans worldwide and have deported a record number of Afghans in recent years.

Coronavirus restrictions have also made legal and illegal migration more difficult, as countries closed their borders and scaled back refugee programs, pushing thousands of migrants to travel to Europe along more dangerous routes.

In the United States, the growing backlog for the Special Immigration Visa program available to Afghans who face threats because of their work with the U.S. government has left roughly 20,000 eligible Afghans and their families trapped in bureaucratic limbo in Afghanistan. The Biden administration has come under heavy pressure to protect Afghan allies as the United States withdraws troops and air support amid a Taliban insurgency.

Still, as the fighting between Taliban, government and militia forces intensifies and civilian casualties reach record highs, many Afghans remain determined to leave.

One recent morning in Kabul, people gathered outside the passport office. Within hours, a line snaked around three city blocks and past a mural of migrants with an ominous warning: Dont jeopardize you and your familys lives. Migration is not the solution.

Few people were deterred.

I need to get a passport and get the hell out of this country, said Abdullah, 41, who like many in Afghanistan goes by only one name.

Abdullah, who drives a taxi between Kabul and Ghazni, a trading hub in the southeast, remembers speeding toward the capital when fighting erupted recently, picking up a group of Afghan troops who demanded a ride along the way. Two days later, his boss called to say that Taliban fighters had asked about a taxi driver seen evacuating security forces and had recited Abdullahs license plate.

Terrified, Abdullah says he will find any way to leave.

Trying to leave legally is costly, and if we go illegally it is dangerous, he said. But right now the country is even more dangerous.

Farther west, a surge of Afghans have flocked to Zaranj, a hub for illegal migration in Nimruz Province, where smugglers pickup trucks snake south down the borderlands to Iran each day.

In March, around 200 cars left for the Iranian border each day from Zaranj a 300 percent increase from 2019, according to David Mansfield, a migration researcher and consultant with the British Overseas Development Institute. By early July, 450 cars were heading to the border each day.

Those who can afford it pay thousands of dollars to travel to Turkey and then Europe. But many more strike pay-as-you-go deals with smugglers, planning to work illegally in Iran until they can afford the next leg of the journey.

We dont have any money or means of getting a visa, said Mohammad Adib, who is considering migrating illegally to Iran.

Mr. Adib fled his home in Qala-e-Naw, in the countrys northwest, in early July after the Taliban laid siege to the city one night. As dawn broke, he says the paw-paw-paw of gunfire was replaced with wails from neighbors. Electricity lines littered the ground. Doors of houses were broken down. The road was stained with blood.

We cannot find another way out, he said.

In Tajikistan, officials recently announced that the country was prepared to host around 100,000 Afghan refugees, after the country received around 1,600 Afghans this month.

Other neighboring countries have expressed less willingness to host an outpouring of Afghans, instead beefing up their border security and warning that their economies cannot handle a new influx of refugees. Leaders in Central Europe have called to increase their border security as well, fearing the current exodus could swell into a crisis similar to that in 2015 when nearly a million, mostly Syrian migrants entered Europe.

But in Afghanistan, about half of the countrys population is already in need of humanitarian assistance this year twice as many people as last year and six times as many as four years ago, according to the United Nations.

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, 40, borrowed $1,000 to bring 36 relatives to Kabul after the Taliban attacked his village in Malistan district. Today his three-room apartment, situated on the edge of the city, feels more like a crowded shelter than a home.

The men sleep in one large living room, women stay in the other and the children cram into the apartments one small bedroom alongside bags of clothes and cleaning supplies. Mr. Mohammadi borrows more money from neighbors to buy enough bread and chicken which have nearly doubled in price as food prices surge to feed everyone.

Now, sinking further into debt with no relief in sight, he is at a loss for what to do.

These families are sick, they are traumatized, they have lost everything, he said, standing near his kitchens one countertop out of earshot from his family. Unless the situation improves, I dont know what we will do.

Asad Timory contributed reporting from Herat; Zabihullah Ghazi from Laghman; Fahim Abed and Jim Huylebroek from Kabul.

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As Fears Grip Afghanistan, Hundreds of Thousands Flee - The New York Times

On today's episode of the 5 Things podcast: Our warsin Afghanistan and Iraq have hung overthe US and the world for nearly two decades takinghundreds of thousands of lives, costing taxpayer money and leaving Americawar-weary.

Now, Biden's full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and decision to end combat missions in Iraq marks an end to the post-9/11 era and represents a renewed focus on combatting threats from China.

We're mapping out Biden's skepticism toward our engagement in the Middle East and remembering the human lifeour wars have cost Afghan, Iraqi andAmerican lives and those touched by the far-flung effects of our "forever wars."

USA TODAY White House correspondentCourtney Subramanian, along with foreignpolicy reporter Deirdre Shesgreen and Pentagon correspondent Tom Vanden Brook explain what to keep in mindas US troops leave these two countries: What have these wars costs us? What happens if the Taliban regains control in Afghanistan?

Hit play on the player above to hear the podcast and follow along with the transcript below.This transcript was automatically generated, and then edited for clarity in its current form. There may be some differences between the audio and the text.

Claire Thornton:

Hey, there. I'm Claire Thornton, and this is Five Things. It's Sunday, August 1st. These Sunday episodes are special. We're bringing you more from in-depth stories you may have already heard.

Claire Thornton:

America's longest war is about to come to an end. Earlier this year, President Biden said all U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by September. We've been deployed to Afghanistan for nearly 20 years. The Biden administration also announced we're going to stop combat missions in Iraq by the end of this year. Shifting focus away from Afghanistan and Iraq is shaping up to be a signature aspect of the Biden administration's foreign policy. We've been through a lot as a country because of our involvement in these wars for the past two decades.

Claire Thornton:

Over 7,000 U.S. service members have been killed in post 9/11 war operations. Far more civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, hundreds of thousands, have died during that time because of military actions. Ending these wars is a long time coming. Still, similar threats remain in parts of Afghanistan and Iraq all these years later. Here to discuss is Courtney Subramanian USA Today White House Correspondent and our Pentagon reporter Tom Vanden Brook and foreign policy reporter Deirdre Shesgreen. Thank you all so much for being here.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Good to be here.

Courtney Subramanian:

Happy to be here.

Claire Thornton:

Here's a quote from Biden I like from this April. He said, "I'm now the fourth United States president to preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan. Two Republicans, two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility onto a fifth president." Courtney, could you walk us through Biden's initial support for these wars and how his support has waned over the past years?

Courtney Subramanian:

Yeah. Well, I'll start with Afghanistan. Biden has never hid the fact that he thought we should pull out of Afghanistan. He's long argued the U.S. mission should squarely be focused on dismantling Al-Qaeda and getting Osama bin Laden two objectives he said when he announced the full withdrawal that he said the U.S. had achieved. As vice president, he was one of the most vocal critics of further escalation in Afghanistan. He opposed Obama's decision to surge troops there in 2009.

Courtney Subramanian:

I think at one point he was referred to as Obama's in-house pessimist on Afghanistan. Other presidents have agreed with his thinking, but have never been able to fully pull out. Trump also talked about bringing an end to America's endless wars. He struck a deal with the Taliban to pull all U.S. troops. In February 2020, he struck that deal, and that's a deal the Biden administration has said they're honoring. Trump had set a May 1st, 2021 deadline, which Biden missed.

Courtney Subramanian:

But that decision by the Trump administration sort of gave Biden some political cover and ease some of that political pressure that other presidents faced with the decision to withdraw. But the public is with him on this. Polls show a strong majority of Americans support withdrawing troops. But I think the decision obviously has some implications that we've seen some Republicans and some of his critics call out politically, if the Taliban do topple the Afghan government, that sort of leaves the fate of Afghan women and children in peril.

Courtney Subramanian:

He understands that. He understands that this decision comes with obvious risks, but it's something that for a long time he has truly believed it was time to leave. The environment that we're in now, both at home and abroad, has given him the right conditions to finally make this decision. He has a long history with Iraq. As a Senator and later as a vice president, he developed relationships with the country's political leaders. He studied their tribal politics and rivalries.

Courtney Subramanian:

When he was vice president, he was assigned the Iraq portfolio and his son Bo was serving there at the time with the Delaware National Guard. So that gave him sort of the vantage point of military families that not every politician has. By the time he visited there in November 2011, he had been there seven times as vice president, and I think it was like his 16th across his career, but he hasn't always opposed intervention there.

Courtney Subramanian:

He did vote to authorize military force there in 2002 he was critical of the Bush administration, but he did support the decision to invade. I think it's important to remember that his announcement this week is less of a dramatic shift and more of a reflection of what's actually happening on the ground there, and that's that U.S. forces are no longer fighting on behalf of Iraqi forces. They'll continue to play a supporting role, and that's what Biden said they'll do.

Courtney Subramanian:

He hasn't said whether he'll draw down the 2,500 troops that will remain there, but reassign them to help with training and advising and intelligence sharing. It's important to remember with Iraq, I think he is probably haunted by the Obama administration's withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, only they had to send troops back in 2014 in response to ISIS. I think part of that decision probably reflects that era of foreign policy and the consequences of that decision.

Claire Thornton:

You said that in Afghanistan, women and children are going to be at more risk once we pull troops from that country. The Taliban is the strongest it's been since 2001. For listeners, the Taliban is a political and Islamist movement in Afghanistan, and they're also a military organization. They've been causing conflict within the country, and the Taliban government also harbored Al-Qaeda militants involved in planning the 9/11 attacks.

Claire Thornton:

Tom, how worried are you that the Taliban could regain control in Afghanistan after this year? From everything I've learned, it seems really procure.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Yeah, Claire. I think it's a given that they're going to have some great measure of power in Afghanistan once... Well, they're working on some sort of peace deal and power sharing agreement, but they're going to take as much influence and power as they can, and they probably will be able to. They've already regained control of more than half of the districts in Afghanistan. They've overrun key strategic border crossings with Pakistan.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

It's a given that they're going to have some measure, perhaps the majority of the power in the Afghan government in the coming months. Is that a concern? It would certainly be a concern if you're an educated person in Afghanistan. Women, children before they were toppled in 2001, they had a very repressive regime that didn't allow women and girls to go to school. I think the thought now is there... Well, the hope, I think, is that they're going to be a little less repressive than they had been, but there's no guarantee of that.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

I mean, they will have the high hand when it comes to ruling the country in a very short time. It looks like the Afghan security forces are folding. They don't fight. I've talked to senior defense officials who say whatever resistance they put up is usually by their elite forces, their special forces, which are a smaller number. But the rest of the 300,000 plus Afghan soldiers that we've spent billions training are not putting up a fight. It looks fairly grim right there right now.

Claire Thornton:

In terms of how far we've come there in Afghanistan, or how far we haven't come, what's been the result of our engagement there? How far have we come since that war started? What sacrifices have we made?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Well, lots of sacrifices obviously, and the sacrifices are certainly great on the U.S. side, but much more so for Afghan civilians. Tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of died. Certainly at least hundreds of thousands have been maimed or affected in some way. Civilian casualties are way up again. Now this year. The Taliban is not a particularly kind force. They don't pay attention to Geneva Rules of Convention when it comes to warfare. We're now conducting airstrikes again in support of the Afghan forces that are besieged.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

But when you do that, you end up killing a lot of people who are civilians and bystanders. There's been a lot of sacrifice. There have been gains though. I mean, their life expectancy is up considerably since in the 20 years that we've been there. Literacy rate is up. Women and children have benefited greatly. It's not as though it's been a total failure on our part to help the Afghan people.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

But at this point, we've decided that the military mission no longer furthers U.S. national security interests to the extent that we need to have a large force there on the ground. After you've spent literally tens of billions of dollars training and equipping the Afghan forces, Biden feels it's time for them to give it a shot. As Courtney pointed out, this was a deal that was negotiated by former President Trump. We'll see what happens, but all signs right now are not very good.

Claire Thornton:

Anyone else want to weigh in?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

I would just say that all the gains that Tom mentioned are at risk if the Taliban do gain control of the country again. There is a question also of whether there will be a resurgence. I mean, that's the big criticism of both Trump's original deal with the Taliban and Biden's following through on it. If the Taliban allows Al-Qaeda to regain strength, then will the U.S. have to go back in?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

Biden has said that the U.S. will continue to provide over the horizon support for the Afghan security forces, which essentially means helping Afghan security forces from U.S. bases outside the country, but there's a real question about whether that's logistically feasible and how U.S. would really be able to do that.

Claire Thornton:

Yeah. Where would those bases be outside Afghanistan?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Well, they used Al Udeid and Qatar to fly missions with B-1 bombers, and they're doing airstrikes right now presumably from Al Udeid, but also from carriers in the Arabian Gulf. We can still perform some missions that way, but you don't have the intelligence on the ground to tell you who you're hitting precisely, or you're banking on the Afghan security forces to tell you you're hitting the right people in the right targets. And that's a very dicey proposition. And often what ends up happening is you end up killing civilians. It's a bad solution to an even worse problem.

Claire Thornton:

Our invasion of Iraq had no connection to the 9/11 attacks. Deirdre, what sacrifices have Iraqis made since we invaded there in 2003?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

The U.S. war in Iraq has been devastating in terms of the death toll and the chaos and the instability. Researchers at Brown University who specialize in trying to tally the costs of war say that it's very difficult to know for sure how many Iraqis were killed, but they say that between 180,000 and 200,000 civilians have died in direct war-related violence as a result of the U.S. invasion. And then several times more have died from indirect causes, for example, damage to the food system, the healthcare system, clean drinking, water illness, mountain malnutrition.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

All these tangential, but severe consequences of the war. The U.S. occupation also led to instability in Iraq that included a rise in corruption and a very weak government that exists still today. I will pause and say, of course, no one would argue that Saddam Hussein, the deposed and now dead former leader of Iraq, was a good person. He led a very repressive regime. I just want to make that clear, but the U.S. occupation of Iraq had really far-reaching consequences.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

And we also know that it eventually led to the rise of sectarian politics and the rise of the Islamic State, which controlled large parts of Iraq starting in 2014 and remains a problem today, much less of a problem, but still a concern for Iraq and for the U.S. and other countries.

Claire Thornton:

Anyone else want to weigh in? Maybe we could talk about how with ISIS's rise, millions of people were displaced from Syria.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Sure. I'll talk about that a little bit. I was actually in Baghdad in 2011 when they wrapped up the combat mission for the last time. And the thought was that we'd spent, as we had in Afghanistan, a lot of money to support security forces there, and that they would be capable of handling internal security, but that turned out to be a bad miscalculation. And it wasn't long before ISIS, which basically had been Al-Qaeda in Iraq before that, resurged across that region.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

And then we had to put together a coalition quickly in order to keep Baghdad from falling, because ISIS rolled through Ramadi and other provincial capitals in Iraq very quickly and threatened Baghdad. We put together a coalition that started airstrikes in 2014 after a sect of Iraqis in Northern Iraq, the Yazidis, were threatened with genocide by ISIS. That's what spurred us to go back in there. Spent a lot of money on that again and a lot of civilians were killed again in airstrikes.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

These things have definite costs, both for us and for the people on the ground, when the wrong decisions are made.

Claire Thornton:

Yeah. Biden's shift away from Afghanistan and Iraq. It's going to become a pillar of his foreign policy. Experts say he is definitely going to focus on China instead going forward. How do you think he might do that, shift our military focus toward China?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

I'll take a quick whack at it and let you guys go forward too. Well, you've already seen it. I mean, we've already started to strike targets more frequently in Africa and militant groups like Al-Shabaab. That's what they talk about when they're talking about the shift away from Afghanistan and Iraq, that the threat from extremists has metastasized, as they would say, and shown up in other countries around the globe. You see them in Africa. There are some in Southeast Asia as well.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

The reason for leaving Afghanistan primarily is that the threat is still there to an extent, but not as much as it is elsewhere. And then you see the idea that we would also shift focus to China because China is continuing to exercise its muscles around the globe actually. You've got them in Africa, in Djibouti. You have them throughout Asia. The idea that they want to turn the South China Sea a key shipping area for the entire world into their sphere of influence. We continue to sail ships through there and run into provocations with the Chinese Navy.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

That's where the principal effort and concern for the Pentagon is, is the rise of China's military and confronting them around the globe.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

I'll just wheel in to say that there's two forces driving Biden's desire to get out of these so-called endless wars. One is domestic politics. The American public is tired of this, and they feel like the costs have been exorbitant in terms of U.S. taxpayer dollars and U.S. lives, and they want investment at home. Then the second thing is what you've mentioned in terms of this desire to pivot to China. That is not just a military question.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

In fact, I would say that, of course, while there is concern of a military confrontation with China, the dominant concern among Biden's foreign policy advisors is that China poses more of an economic threat and a political threat with its anti-democratic sort of authoritarian moves in Hong Kong, for example, and its desire to sort of spread its authoritarian form of government. Biden argues that there's this sort of looming conflict between democracy and authoritarianism and that China is driving it.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

It's a much more complex discussion than just a military debate or a matter of redeploying American forces to a new theater, because that's not actually what's happening. It's a matter of confronting China economically, politically, and also preparing for different kinds of warfare like cyber. We've seen both China and Russia mount these cyber attacks that are devastating and could become or already have become this new front. It's a very different conversation I think.

Courtney Subramanian:

Just to kind of build on what Deirdre saying, actually Biden made his first visit to the ODNI, spoke to the intelligence community, and during his remarks said something to the effect of the next shooting war that we'll be involved in will be a result of cyber warfare.

Claire Thornton:

Wow!

Courtney Subramanian:

Because he really does believe that that is one of the biggest threats facing the country aside from the military focus, but also like an economic focus. I think it really reflects a worldview that his national security advisor Jake Sullivan has really pushed, and that is national security and foreign policy should play a proactive role in the domestic economic policy debate. Because his thought is that the two should be linked because foreign policy should focus on what it will take to enhance U.S. competitiveness, both at home and abroad.

Courtney Subramanian:

We've seen that throughout Biden's agenda. It really reflects that when he met with foreign leaders in Europe in his first trip, urging them to take a tough line on China. He's launched a government wide initiative, this buy American initiative, which is like federal procurement to support American manufacturing. This focus on China, he's really trying to thread the needle throughout his entire agenda, and I think this is a reflection of that.

Claire Thornton:

Thank you. Any closing thoughts from you all?

Courtney Subramanian:

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A senior Iranian military leader, Esmail Qaani, traveled in late June to the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal to rally a group of fighters. Normally, this type of visit would not be unusual. Qaani commands the Quds Force the wing of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for external action and is expected to travel to Syria to coordinate Irans efforts to preserve the regime of Bashar al Assad. What made Qaanis trip noteworthy was that he was visiting the Fatemiyoun Division, an Iran-backed proxy force whose foot soldiers are Afghans from the Shiite Hazara community.

While fighters of the Fatemiyoun Division remain active in Syria, so far they have been sidelined in Afghanistan. That could change. The Fatemiyoun constitute a small but potent force with longstanding and extensive ties to Iran and could prove useful to Iranian officials as they craft their Afghan policy, especially if the Taliban continue to press their military advantage. On July 7, Irans political leaders hosted talks between Taliban and Afghan government representatives in Tehran. While Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif used the meeting to celebrate the U.S. departure from Afghanistan, he also warned that continuing clashes between Taliban fighters and the Afghan government would be costly. With the American military exit from Afghanistan due to be completed by Aug. 31, Iranian policymakers are strategizing about their future approach toward Afghanistan. They face a difficult set of decisions, including how they will balance their countrys strong ties to Afghanistans minority Hazara community against Irans diplomatic dance with the Taliban and the Afghan government.

The Fatemiyoun pale in comparison to the Taliban both in numbers and capacity. But they could prove either to be a lever of influence for Iran, if the Taliban and Afghan government do ultimately cut a deal, or a political liability, if an all-out civil war ensues in Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to target the countrys Shiite Hazara community.

There is significant risk of blowback for Iran if Afghanistans conflict takes on an even more sectarian cast with Afghan Hazara Shiites pitted against the predominantly Pashtun Sunni Taliban. If the history of the Afghan conflicts is any guide, such a scenario could draw in Irans regional rivals, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who would be likely to support the Taliban, as they have in the past. Plus, the United States has already demonstrated, with recent retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed proxies in Syria and Iraq, that it is prepared to use any means necessary to check threats to American interests in the region. Going forward, Iranian officials will likely feel a need to tread carefully with both the Fatemiyoun and the Taliban.

The Rise of the Fatemiyoun Division

As we explain in a recent report, the links between Irans revolutionary guard and Afghan and Pakistani Hazaras have their roots in the Iran-Iraq War. After Saddam Husseins Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, Irans revolutionary government cast the war as an opportunity for Shiites to demonstrate their faith. Many Afghan Shiites answered the call by heading to Iran, where they were trained by the revolutionary guard.

During the 1980s, Irans effort to stand up an Afghan paramilitary force underwent several phases, name changes, and reorganizations. As well as training Shiite fighters in Iran, the guard also dispatched several of its officers to serve as cultural and military advisers in Afghanistan, where they embedded with cells in the resistance movement that was fighting the Soviet Unions occupation of that country.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, conflict in Afghanistan raged on as various factions fought for power. Throughout the 1990s, Iran provided support to Afghan Shiite groups and the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban. Qassem Soleimani was among the revolutionary guard personnel involved in that effort. He would become the head of the Quds Force in 1998 and remained its commander until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike last year.

From these deep and longstanding links to Afghanistans Shiite Hazara community, in 2012 Iran established the Fatemiyoun Division as part of its wide-ranging effort to support Syrias Assad regime in its fight against an armed rebellion. Under the supervision and direction of Soleimani, the revolutionary guard recruited todays Afghan Hazara foreign fighters for that purpose. It also established the Fatemiyouns Pakistani sister unit, the Zeynabiyoun Brigade. Thousands of ethnic Afghan and Pakistani Hazara foreign fighters fought and died with those units to help save the Assad regime.

In addition to their battlefield impact, the Fatemiyoun have been a significant propaganda asset for the revolutionary guard, which works to persuade constituents in the Shiite community across the region to support the Iranian government and its policies. Touting the daring and successes of Afghan foreign fighters in Syria has played an integral part in that campaign. Iran-financed propaganda about the Fatemiyoun employs strategic narratives related to differences in Sunni and Shiite interpretations of Islamic law and just governance, and it stokes fears among the Hazara about the potency of the predominantly Sunni Taliban and Islamic State forces in Afghanistan and Syria.

Soleimani was the key architect and star of Irans propaganda strategy. He made a habit of snapping frontline selfies with the Fatemiyoun and recounting their heroics. The Fatemiyoun achieved a substantial social media following on YouTube and Twitter until both platforms took down their accounts. Even so, the Fatemiyoun remain active on other social media as a result of Irans investment. They have thousands of followers on encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram and its Iranian government-controlled counterpart, Soroush, which they use to showcase their battlefield exploits in Syria. Fighters shared videos of combat on social media, which proved to be an effective recruiting tool among those who joined the cause were a significant number of American-trained former soldiers in the Afghan National Army and elite Afghan special operations forces.

The revolutionary guards propaganda about the Fatemiyoun could have long-lasting ramifications. The guard corps has pushed sectarian narratives that may prove difficult to control in the future, notably including in relation to Afghanistan. In strengthening the Fatemiyoun, the revolutionary guard has given power to a network that, while deeply indebted to Iran, is not fully under its control. For Iran, managing risks in Afghanistan, where the Fatemiyoun are an important political force, could prove difficult over time if the Taliban continue their aggressive and bloody campaign of targeting Hazara communities. In that event, Iranian officials may be tempted to provide significant support to Fatemiyoun fighters to help Iran maintain its influence over the Hazara community and combat the Taliban.

The Future of the Fatemiyoun and Irans Approach Toward Afghanistan

Even as the Afghan and Pakistani Shiite militias involvement in Syria winds down, their power, and the narratives through which Iran framed their mobilization, will continue to shape South Asia and the Middle East for years to come. This is especially true in Afghanistan, where Irans strategic hedging and years-long quiet campaign to cultivate influence with the Taliban has contributed significantly to the military gains made by the insurgents over the last several years.

It remains to be seen if Iranian officials are able to sustain relations with both their Fatemiyoun proxies and the Taliban after the exit of their common enemy, the United States. Questions abound about whether and when Irans newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi, might leverage Iranian influence over tens of thousands of Hazaras in Afghanistan and across South Asia who answered Tehrans call to join the fight in Syria almost a decade ago. For Raisi, who has vowed to make Irans economic revival a centerpiece of his tenure, steering political outcomes in Afghanistan, which is one of Irans largest trading partners, is a crucial part of his own political calculus.

There are increasing concerns that the Talibans victories on the ground may translate into the revival of the harsh and bloody targeting of Afghan Shiite Hazaras, which could trigger unwelcome regional instability and have pronounced effects on Irans ailing economy. Iranian officials and media outlets close to the revolutionary guard have argued that the Taliban have changed. Whether that is true or not, Irans approach to dealing with the predominantly Pashtun Taliban will likely continue on Raisis watch in the near term. Playing all three major sides pro-Taliban Pashtuns, ethnic Hazara Shiites, and Afghan elites affiliated with the government in Kabul will likely be critical to Tehrans approach in Afghanistan no matter what Washington does next.

The mixed signals coming out of Tehran on engagement in Afghan affairs may be both a sign of Irans pragmatism and a reflection of a deeper divide between hard-liners aligned with the supreme leader and reform-minded Iranian critics of Ali Khameneis regime. Disagreements between various camps on Irans engagement in Afghanistan have openly erupted in the Iranian press. In a recent column that appeared in Irans centrist online daily Arman, for instance, former Iranian diplomat Seyed Ali Khorram sharply criticized Khameneis engagement with the Taliban, saying it only emboldens the Taliban to continue their aggressive attacks against Afghan Shiite Hazaras. Khorram echoed the complaints of other Iranian reformists and reminded readers that Taliban attacks on Iranian diplomats during the 1990s brought Afghanistan and Iran to the brink of war.

Given that Iran has long positioned itself as the champion and protector of Afghanistans marginalized Shiite Hazara population, the internal rifts emerging over Irans cultivation of the Taliban suggest that Tehrans diplomatic dalliances with the group may result only in a temporary marriage of convenience that could easily disintegrate after the U.S. drawdown is completed this summer. For now, how Iranian officials play their cards in Afghanistan is a game of wait and see.

Candace Rondeaux directs the Future Frontlines program at New America and is a professor at the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University. She has covered the Afghan conflict for 13 years, working variously for the Washington Post, the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Amir Toumaj is a nonresident fellow at New America and is the co-founder of the Resistance Axis Monitor.

Arif Ammar is an independent researcher based in Washington and a native of Kabul. He has produced analysis on the Afghan conflict for the International Crisis Group and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.

Image: Office of the Supreme Leader

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