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Recently, President Joe Biden ordered the Pentagon to conduct a review of the U.S. military footprint around the world, and a May 1st deadline for complete withdrawal from Afghanistan is less than certain.

It is urgent and important for President Biden to fulfill his pledge to end the forever wars and despite the recommendation of theAfghanistan Study Groupto extend the May 1st deadline bring troops home from Afghanistan as scheduled. This would make for a major milestone for the new presidents first 100 days.

To begin, the Authorization for the Use of Military Forceapproved by Congresson September 14, 2001, was to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons. In other words, Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the then-Taliban-led government in Afghanistan because it gave safe haven to bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

That mission has long since been completed. The Taliban was driven from power in a matter of weeks. Al Qaedas senior leadership was decimated and scattered over the next several months. And if there was any doubt about achieving closure for 9/11, Osama bin Laden was eventually found and killed by U.S. Special Operations Forces in May 2011.

Instead, what was originally a counter-terrorism operation in response to the September 11 attacks quickly morphed into nation-building and a counterinsurgency war to protect a US-installed Afghan government. But such a war was not then and is not now a war of national survival. The Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan are internal threats to the Afghan government and part of a power struggle over who controls the country, but are not direct (let alone existential) threats to the United States. And however desirable a representative, multiethnic, democratic government in Afghanistan would be, it is not an absolute necessity for U.S. national security. All we need is for whatever government controls Afghanistan to understand that the United States will not tolerate support for or the harboring of any terrorist group with global reach that directly threatens the United States which is the essence of the terms of the path to apeace agreementbrokered in February 2020.

Yet the Afghanistan Study Group clings to the belief that an ongoing U.S. military presence is necessary to create conditions for an acceptable peace agreement. This despite

acknowledging the fact that the Taliban have signaled publicly that if all international forces are not withdrawn by May 2021, as envisioned in the Doha agreement, they will resume their jihad against the foreign presence and will withdraw from the peace process. More pointedly, the harsh reality is that nearly 20 years in the U.S. military presence has not been able to ensure peace in Afghanistan. So why would keeping them there longer result in something different?

To be sure, withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan will not magically result in peace breaking out. But neither will keeping them there because the U.S. military presence is part of what fuels Afghanistans violence. The reality is that U.S. troops are a foreign occupation force that breeds resentment with the population (not just with the Afghans but also the larger Muslim world) regardless of our intentions, just as would happen if a foreign military was ensconced in America.

Furthermore, the violence in Afghanistan represents a long-standing civil war within the Muslim world. It is not Americas war to fight or win. Only Afghans can determine the outcome.

The appropriate analogy is Americas experience in Vietnam another insurgent war unnecessary to U.S. national security. Peace only came after the U.S. military withdrawal. And over the ensuing decades, the result has been a socialist country pursuing increasingly capitalist economic policies and normalized relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Not necessarily the outcome the U.S. would have envisioned if it was up to us to engineer but it wasnt and we couldnt; it was up to the Vietnamese people. And even if it isnt perfect in the eyes of the U.S., it is good enough for U.S. national security which is the paramount concern. The lesson is that we shouldnt let a quixotic quest for perfect be the enemy of good enough in Afghanistan.

Charles V.Peais a senior fellow with Defense Priorities. He has more than thirty years of experience as a policy and program analyst and senior manager, supporting both the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.Peais the former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author ofWinning the UnWar: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism.

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Why the Biden administration should keep to the Afghanistan withdrawal timetable - LA Daily News

Zimbabwe cricket team is set to lock horns with Afghanistan in an upcoming Test and T20I Series. Zimbabwe will be touring UAE- Afghanistans home ground- in March 2021. In the absence of few senior players, Zimbabwe has announced the 15-man squad for the upcoming Test tour against the Asian side. Batting all-rounder Sean Williams has been selected to lead the Test team.

Many Zimbabwe cricketers are out of the tour due to various health concerns. Senior batsman Brendan Taylor and Craig Ervine are not part of the squad due to which selectors have opted for Sean Williams to lead the team in the red-ball matches.

Chamu Chibhabha has been ruled out as he suffers from a thigh injury. Similarly, Tendai Chatara is going through right-upper-arm injury due to which he has not been able to make up for the series. Wicketkeeper-batsman PJ Moor will also be out of action due to hamstring injury.

Due to absence of above-mentioned senior players, selectors have rolled in few other players to the squad for the Afghanistan tour. Tarisai Musakanda, a top-order batsman, who last played a Test match against Sri Lanka in 2017, has been recalled.

Likewise, middle-order batsman and part-time spinner Ryan Burl has been recalled into the squad. Nurl has played just one Test against South Africa in December 2017.

For the T20I games, Zimbabwe cricket team will feature Milton Shumba, Faraz Akram and Tinashe Kamunhukamwe in the squad. Zimbabwe tour of Afghanistan consists of two Test matches and three T20Is. The first Test match will commence at Sheikh Zayed Stadium in Abu Dhabi on March 2, followed by 2nd and3rd Test on the same venue on March 10 and March 17 respectively.

The three T20I games are scheduled to be played on March 17, 19 and 20. All the three matches will be played at Sheikh Zayed Stadium in Abu Dhabi. Here is the full Zimbabwe squad for the Test series.

Zimbabwe last toured Pakistan in October-November 2020. Zimbabwe lost the three-match ODI series 2-1. In T20Is, Pakistan whitewashed Zimbabwe in all the three T20Is. On the other hand, Afghanistan hosted Ireland in a three-match ODI series. Afghanistan won all the three matches, which were held at Sheikh Zayed Stadium in Abu Dhabi (UAE) in January 2021.

Sean Williams (captain), Ryan Burl, Sikandar Raza Butt, Prince Masvaure, Brandon Mavuta, Tarisai Musakanda, Richmond Mutumbami, Blessing Muzarabani, Kevin Kasuza, Wesley Madhevere, Wellington Masakadza, Richard Ngarava, Victor Nyauchi, Donald Tiripano, Regis Chakabva.

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Zimbabwe vs Afghanistan 2021: Zimbabwe Names Sean Williams To Lead His Team In The Test Series Against Afghanistan In The Absence Of Seniors - Cricket...

Feb 13th 2021

WHEN HE CAME to office last month President Joe Biden inherited, in Afghanistan, Americas longest war. He also inherited a deal that his predecessor struck a year ago with the Taliban, who have fought a bloody insurgency ever since American-led forces ousted them from power in late 2001. Under the accord, Donald Trump agreed to withdraw all American forces by May 1st 2021so supposedly ending this forever war.

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The Taliban leadership promised, in return, not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a base by terrorist groups planning attacks against America, as it was by al-Qaeda. It also committed itself to talks with the debilitated, American-backed government in Kabul, whose writ covers a diminishing portion of the country. As part of those talks, it specifically promised to negotiate a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.

The United States has kept its side of the bargain. In recent months Mr Trump cut the American presence, which once numbered over 100,000 servicemen, to just 2,500 troops. That is a fraction of what American generals consider a minimum, for both counter-terrorism efforts and for helping the despondent Afghan armed forces prepare for life without American support. Yet apart from a (delayed) exchange of prisoners, very little else has moved forward. The Taliban still appear close to al-Qaeda. Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government started six months late, in September, and have got nowhere. The gulf at times appears unbridgeable, including whether Afghanistan should be a theocracy or a republic.

Worst of all, the violencethe Talibans biggest bargaining chipcontinues. Scores are killed or injured each week in gun and bomb attacks. Recent assassinations in Kabul and elsewhere, widely assumed to be the work of the Taliban, have targeted not just police and soldiers but civil-society activists, journalists and, last month, two female judges. On February 9th five government employees were killed in two separate attacks in the capital.

Laurel Miller, a former American official at the International Crisis Group, a think-tank, points out that neither the Taliban nor the government believes they have exhausted their military options, so are half-hearted about talking. As May approaches, Mr Biden faces a pressing decision. Should the United States, having expended 2,300 American lives and nearly $1trn, cut and run, leaving the country to its fate? Or should it declare the peace deal dead and accept that the war, if not endless, is not over yet?

Mr Bidens gut surely favours the first option. When vice-president to Barack Obama, he argued against redoubled attempts at nation-building in Afghanistan. But his reappointment of Mr Trumps special envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who negotiated last years deal, suggests indecision. So does the administrations talk of a review.

With the clock running down, Ms Miller and others argue that Mr Biden should seek a six-month extension of the deadline. The intention would be to keep the peace process alive, while buying the Biden administration time to work out what it wants. A delay would reassure the Afghan government, which felt sidelined by the Trump deal and dreads American abandonment. Officials in Kabul hope to be treated as American partners again. Their message to the Biden administration, says a negotiator, Nader Nadery, is that a lasting peace deal must not be rushed, especially when the Taliban are not keeping to their side of the bargain.

But America has few ways to force the Taliban to behave better. The insurgents leaders, former international pariahs, may be reluctant to give up the boost in standing that the peace process has given them. And the Talibans friends in the region, in places like Pakistan, might conceivably be persuaded to press the insurgents to curb their attacks.

To some in both Afghanistan and America that seems like fantasy. They fear the Taliban will seize on any American foot-dragging to abandon the peace process altogether. Even if the Taliban do acquiesce to a delay, that may only be because they believe time works in their favour. Popular anger at the corruption and ineptitude of the Afghan government is high. Taliban commanders, meanwhile, are buoyed by their creeping conquest of the country. They talk not of power-sharing but of a coming takeover. Meanwhile, even if Mr Biden secures an extension, the same dilemma is likely to loom for him six months later: should I stay or should I go?

See also: We are tracking the Biden administrations progress in its first 100 days

This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline "Cool it or blow?"

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Banyan - If America leaves Afghanistan there will be trouble | Asia - The Economist

Leaders of an inter-departmental working group from Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan agreed on a tripartite roadmap for deeper cooperation on the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, on January 16, 2021 (Mfa.gov.tm, January 16). The online meeting was attended by the deputy chairperson of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan in charge of the transport and communications sector, Bayramgeldi Ovezov; Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev; and the acting chair of the Central Bank of Afghanistan, Ajmal Ahmadi. Addressing his colleagues, Mustafayev noted that on the basis of the initiative put forward by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on July 2, 2020, Baku had prepared the Roadmap to expand and deepen cooperation between the three participating countries in multiple directions (Trend.az, January 19). Reportedly, the Roadmap will expand trilateral partnership in a number of significant areas, such as IT, energy, telecommunications, transport, logistics, trade and investment. The signed document pays special attention to the issues of deepening border and customs coordination, with an eye to help remove barriers to the transportation of goods along the Lapis Lazuli Corridor (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, January 26).

The multimodal, eastwest Lapis Lazuli corridor, which originates in Afghanistan, is composed of overland routes that pass through Turkmenistan, followed by ferry connections across the Caspian to Azerbaijan; from there, goods continue by rail to Georgia, Turkey and potentially on to Europe. Conception of the project dates back to 2012. For a long time, the route was impassable due to insufficient infrastructure and economic and political instability in the member countries. However, the final agreement was signed on November 15, 2017 (Tolonews.com, November 15, 2017). The opening ceremony of the corridor took place on December 13, 2018 (Ariananews.af, December 13, 2018). Yet the shipment of goods along the Lapis Lazuli Corridor was carried out only sporadically in 2019.

A video summit of the three participating countries presidents, held on July 2, 2020, gave significant impetus to intensifying the efforts to develop the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. The associated trilateral negotiations covered issues of practical implementation of the transport project, including facilitating customs procedures to ensure the unimpeded movement of traffic flow along the route (News.az, July 8, 2020).

Azerbaijans decision to participate in the Lapis Lazuli project is aligned with its proactive foreign policy to promote regional interconnectivity. Azerbaijan benefits from a strategic geopolitical position, which allows Baku to enhance the wider connectivity of the entire Eurasian space (see EDM, November 30, 2017). To become one of the largest transit hubs in the region, Azerbaijan is actively investing in the transport sector, including the modernization of railways as well as the development of port and airport infrastructure. According to data released by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which supports six trans-regional multimodal corridor projects that pass through Azerbaijan, this combined ADB-backed investment is estimated at about $4.6 billion in total value in 20122021 (Adbh.org, accessed February 10, 2021). Azerbaijan itself invested around $1 billion to construct two essential components of the Lapis Lazuli projectthe Baku International Sea Trade Port Complex (Alyat) and the BakuTbilisiKars (BTK) Railway, at a cost of $760 million and $770 million, respectively (Reconnectingasia.csis.org, accessed February 10).

The geo-economic importance of the Lapis Lazuli route for Afghanistan was repeatedly emphasized by President Ashraf Ghani. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan has historically relied mainly on Pakistan for its international trade (The Diplomat, December 22, 2017). But since the movement of goods through Pakistan has become hampered by aggravated relations between Kabul and Islamabad, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor has carried growing shares of supplies traveling to and from Afghanistan. Using the Lapis Lazuli route, cargo from Afghanistan arrives in Europe in 16 days, while it takes more than 20 days to reach Europe via the port of Karachi (Caspiannews.com, September 10, 2020). Consequently, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Afghanistan increased by 50 percent in JanuaryApril 2019, year-on-year, after the Lapis Lazuli Corridor became fully operational in the last month of 2018 (Economy.gov.az, May 27, 2019).

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, which heavily relies on hydrocarbon resources, is seeking to diversify its economy. Accordingly, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor agreement corresponds to the countrys strategic priorities. Notably, Turkmenistan funded the construction of the southern terminus of the AkinaAndkhoy railway on Afghan territory (Tdh.gov.tm, January 14, 2021). Regarding this, Azerbaijans President Aliyev, speaking to his Turkmenistani counterpart, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, declared, I am also aware of your [Turkmenistans] investment policy in neighboring countries. Without this, it would be impossible to implement the Lapis-Lazuli project today. Moreover, in late 2018, Ashgabat signed an agreement with Baku that allows for the exchange of preliminary information on cross-border cargo transport (President.az, November 22, 2018).

The Lapis-Lazuli Corridor is a crucial strategic transit project for central Eurasia. First of all, for all of the participating countries, this project offers the opportunity to integrate their infrastructure and economies into the wider east-west Eurasian overland (road and rail) transport corridors linking the economic powerhouses of Europe and East Asia. Relatedly, the Corridor promises to strengthen regional cooperation and boost mutual economic and cultural ties among Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, thus bestowing dividends to each country in the form of increased mutual trade and investment. Growing regional integration and access to the European Unions large market may offer the most promising opportunity for these Eurasian neighbors to secure their economic future. In turn, this will balance or possibly even decrease the expanding economic presence of China in the region. From a geopolitical point of view, the route is mainly meant for trade: its overland capacity for the transit of military supplies and personnel is constrained by Turkmenistans neutrality (War on the Rocks, July 11, 2017). Despite this, the project is in line with the strategic interests of the United States and its Western allies as the route bypasses their three largest regional adversaries/rivalsRussia, China and Iranand connects the landlocked region to Europe. It is not a coincidence that the signing of the trilateral roadmap for cooperation on the Lapis Lazuli Corridor this past January occurred only a few days after the visit to the region of the US special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. During his trip, Khalilzad pointedly encouraged the preexisting projects and plans for expanded regional connectivity, trade and development, which, he argued, can bolster and help sustain an Afghan peace agreement (Af.usembassy.gov, January 5, 2021).

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Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan Sign Trilateral Roadmap for Cooperation on Eurasian Connectivity - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation

By Asena Karacalti and Vardan Ghaplanyan

Last week, violence in Afghanistan continued between the Taliban and government forces. The Taliban was also targeted by the Islamic State (IS), while Afghan forces clashed with another militia led by an anti-Taliban insurgent. In the de facto Republic of Artsakh, remnant landmines inflicted casualties on civilians and military forces for another week. Protests took place in Armenia against recent changes in the judicial system. In Georgia, demonstrations took place calling for the opening of the Armenian border, which has been closed due to the coronavirus pandemic, restricting economic migration. In Kazakhstan, oil and gas workers continue to protest for better working conditions. In Kyrgyzstan, a new round of opposition protests followed the appointment of the new parliament.

In Afghanistan, Afghan forces operations and airstrikes inflicted many fatalities on the Taliban last week in a number of provinces, mainly in Kandahar. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked a military base in Khan Abad district of Kunduz, killing members of the National Security and Defense and National Civil Order Forces. The group also conducted a suicide attack using a car bomb, inflicting tens of casualties at the Public Order Police base in Nangarhar province. Such attacks have been rare since December 2020. In a separate development, IS claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb that killed four Taliban militants in the Chawkay district of Kunar province and another that killed one policeman in Jalalabad city of Nangarhar province.

Apart from these clashes, the Alipour militia reportedly seized control over Hisa i Awali Bihsud district in Wardak province following several days of clashes with Afghan forces. Alipour is a militia commander who was arrested in 2018 due to severe abuses, mostly against Pashtun minorities (Al Jazeera, 27 November 2018). He was released shortly after as his supporters staged a series of violent demonstrations and formed an insurgency. Since then, the Alipour Militia has surfaced from time to time most recently on 29 January 2021 clashing with Afghan forces in Wardak province after Afghan forces reportedly killed some civilians during a protest on the same day (TOLO News, 3 February 2021).

Targeted killings of civilians also continued in the country last week. Many such killings remain unclaimed, similar to past weeks. Last weeks attacks mainly took place in Kabul and Jalalabad cities, where government officials, judges, and religious scholars were killed and injured.

On the other hand, a bipartisan panel tasked by the United States (US) congress to examine the US-Taliban deal recommended that the Biden administration slow down the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan past the May 2021 deadline (New York Times, 3 February 2021). The Taliban attacked the panels report and warned that extending the stay of NATO forces will lead to a major war (Voice of Jihad, 5 February 2021). Last week, Taliban negotiators also made a series of diplomatic trips to Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan, with a planned visit to Turkey to come. The government threatened to recall its negotiation team from Qatar if the group does not rejoin the talks soon (AP, 3 February 2021; AP, 31 January 2021).

Along the Armenia-Artsakh-Azerbaijan border, the situation remains relatively stable; however, Azerbaijan did accuse Armenian military forces of firing towards Azerbaijani positions in the direction of the Qazakh region. The Armenian Defense Ministry denies these accusations. At the same time, the number of victims of landmine explosions continues to rise, with a civilian and a soldiers death reported last week. In addition, Russia and Turkey officially opened a joint ceasefire monitoring center that will serve as a base for surveillance drones to monitor the new ceasefire lines between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces (Eurasianet, 2 February 2021).

In Armenia, opposition Homeland Salvation Movement members staged a protest against the proposed amendments to the Armenian Judicial Code and the formation of an anti-corruption court. According to the demonstrators, the new courts might become a political tool to suppress the opposition (Sputnik Armenia, 3 February 2021). Meanwhile, the ruling My Step alliance, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan re-evaluated the idea to organize snap parliamentary elections in 2021, stating that there was no such demand among the general public (OC Media, 8 February 2021). This signals that opposition protests are likely to continue in Armenia since Pashinyans government remains in power.

In Georgia, locals staged protests in the Akhalkalaki region, demanding the borders with Armenia and Russia be reopened. For most of the local population, the primary source of income has been seasonal work abroad. These borders were closed in March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic (Jnews, 3 February 2021).

In Kyrgyzstan, the parliament approved a new government, bringing the long-running political crisis which started after the parliamentary elections in October 2020 in the country to a close. However, the new prime ministers appointment was protested in Bishkek and Batken cities right after the news. Protesters claim that the new prime minister is not capable of overcoming the countrys economic hardship. The current government will operate until the snap Parliamentary elections take place in June 2021 (Eurasianet, 3 February 2021).

Oil and gas workers continued to protest in Kazakhstan by organizing five protests over the last week in Aqtobe, Mangghystau, and Shymkent regions, demanding improved working conditions for a second week in a row. Meanwhile, in Taldykorgan and Nur-Sultan, people organized protests against the governments coronavirus vaccine policy. This comes amid a certain degree of public skepticism regarding the vaccination campaigns efficiency and transparency. Mass vaccination against coronavirus using the Russian Sputnik V vaccine began on 1 February (Ria Novosti, 1 February 2021).

For more on protests in Central Asia, see this new ACLED joint report with our partners at the Oxus Society.

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ACLED Regional Overview Central Asia and the Caucus (30 January - 5 February 2021) - Afghanistan - ReliefWeb