Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

An Indian business community had thrived in Xinjiang before the Communists took over in China – Scroll.in

On November 22, 1953, a tiny Reuters dispatch from Leh appeared in The New York Times with the headline Indians get out of Red Sinkiang. After a journey of 500 miles through the western Himalayas, nineteen Indians have arrived here from southern Sinkiang in Communist China, the wire service reported. These were believed to be the last Indians who left the western Chinese province (now spelt in English as Xinjiang), ending a presence that is believed to have lasted at least several hundred years. The group was led by a vice counsel in Kashgar, who looked after Indian interests for three years after the Indian consulate in the fabled city was closed.

The exodus of Indians fearing Communist rule in Xinjiang, which took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s, closed a long chapter of history where people, goods, ideas, religion and culture moved in both directions across the Himalayas.

Chinese Buddhist monk and scholar Xuanzang, who visited India on a pilgrimage in the 7th century CE, travelled through the Khyber Pass and Hindu Kush to Kashgar and Khotan before heading back to eastern China, carrying with him sacred manuscripts. Indian Buddhist culture once thrived in the Khotan Oasis and spread from there all the way to the eastern coast of China.

Like Xuanzang, a community of traders from different parts of the Indian subcontinent travelled to Xinjiang either via Badakshan, Afghanistan, or Kashmir and Gilgit or the onerous and treacherous path from Ladakh through the Karakoram Pass, Karakoram Mountains and the Taklamakan Desert.

The one from Ladakh, which was much frequented by the traders, was a gruelling test of endurance and determination, with at least four mountain passes averaging heights of over 17,600 feet having to be crossed, Madhavi Thampi, who taught Chinese history at Delhi University for 35 years, wrote in her book Indians in China, 1800-1949. The journey to Yarkand in Xinjiang took on an average 38 days.

Indian traders are not known to have documented the rigours of the journey, but in 1925, Russian artist, writer and philosopher Nicholas Roerich wrote about his trip from Kashmir and Ladakh across the Karakoram Pass in great detail: It is impossible to describe the beauty of this multi-day snow kingdom. Such diversity, such expressiveness of outlines, such fantastic cities, such multi-coloured streams and streams and such memorable purple and moonlit rocksAt the same time, the striking sonorous silence of the desert. And people stop quarrelling with each other, and all differences are erased, and everyone, without exception, absorbs the beauty of the mountain desolation.

Leaving aside the romantic writing of Roerich, this was a journey that came at a heavy cost of human and animal life. The trail across the Karakoram Pass was littered with the bones of dead humans and animals. It was rare for caravans to make the trip without loss of life or goods.

Located in the heart of Central Asia and sandwiched between an expanding Russian Empire and British India, Xinjiang was one of the main theatres of the Great Game, the diplomatic and political confrontation between London and Moscow in the 19th and 20th century.

Indian traders began crossing the Karakoram Mountains long before the British colonised the country, and the presence of an Indian community in the western fringes of China was seen as an asset for London. Attempts to set up a diplomatic mission in Xinjiang were in full swing in 1890 when Francis Younghusband went on an expedition to the area. His interpreter George Macartney would stay on in Kashgar. It however took 18 years before the Chinese agreed to recognise him as the consul general, giving him the official right to intervene in legal matters when it involved Indians.

CS Cumberland, a British major who visited Xinjiang in the 1890s and wrote Sport on the Pamirs and Turkistan Steppes, was of the belief that Indians helped enhance British soft power in the region. He wrote, I consider that the friendly feeling and respect shown to Englishmen in Chinese Turkestan is entirely due to the reports of our traders.

Caravans of horses, mules and camels took Indian spices, tea, cotton, sugar, opium and dyestuffs to Xinjiang. From the other direction came carpets, charas, green tea, silk, precious stones, gold and silver.

Until the 1940s the cities of Yarkand, Kashgar and Khotan had active and clearly visible Indian communities, comprising of traders from Punjab, Ladakh, Kashmir and Sindhs Shikarpur. Most of them would stay in their own serais.

The actual trade between India and Sinkiang via the high Karakoram Pass was controlled by Punjabi Hindu merchants from the town of Hoshiarpur, French historian Claude Markovits wrote in his book titled The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947.

These Punjabis mainly belonged to the Khatri caste and worked both on their own and as agents of other traders. They were in general treated well by the Chinese authorities, although they had to bear some discriminatory measures such as not being allowed to wear turbans or ride horses within the town, Thampi wrote.

Many of these traders would split their time between Xinjiang and Punjab, with some managing to accumulate vast fortunes. The British authorities managed to recruit some of them to work as informers and interpreters, and also to keep an eye on Russian activity in the region.

The British were happy to reward such traders for their services and loyalty. A declassified letter dated October 26, 1893 shows the approval of a monthly pension of Rs 50 to one Jowala Bhaggat, a trader who moved back permanently to Punjab. Jowala Bhaggat, now between 70 and 80 years of age, is the well-known Yarkand trader who rendered on many occasions, as the correspondence submitted shows, conspicuous services to the British Government and its officers from whom he holds very high testimonials, HC Fanshawe, Officiating Secretary Punjab, wrote in the letter to the Foreign Department.

The southern areas of Xinjiang also had a presence of Kashmiri Muslim traders. Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar all had streets that were inhabited by Kashmiris.

While some were seasonal traders, a number of them stayed on in Xinjiang for so long that they lost their ties with their homes in India and considered themselves as locals for all practical purposes, according to Thampi. Some Kashmiris married Uyghur women and bought land and were so integrated into to the local culture that they spoke the Uyghur language better than Kashmiri, which they slowly forgot.

In 1949, when the descendants of such people wanted to move back to India, it was more difficult for them to establish their Kashmiri identity with the Indian authorities.

An Indian community that earned notoriety and the ire of the Uyghurs and Chinese was the Shikarpuris. The diaries of the Kashgar agency, which would become the British consulate in the city had detailed information about the Shikarpuris in Xinjiang, according to Markovits. It gives a fairly detailed, although extremely hostile account of the activities of Shikarpuri moneylenders in southern Sinkiang or Kashgaria (there is no evidence of a Shikarpuri presence in the rest of this huge territory), from the 1890s to the 1940s, which saw the last Shikarpuris leave the region, the French historian wrote.

By 1907, there were 500 Shikarpuri moneylenders in the region. They had a so-called shah-gumastha system where the shah advanced capital to junior partners, the gumasthas, who had no capital of their own but were engaged to travel and collect debts. Some of these gumasthas were described as bad characters, men against whom there were cases in Shikarpur for housebreaking, according to Markovits. Their exactions against the local population in the course of collecting debts, in particular their seizing of women and children as sureties, led to a string of protests from the Uyghur peasantry, which were relayed by the Chinese authorities to the British consular authorities.

The British consular officers used to regularly receive complaints about the moneylenders, who were accused of charging exorbitant interest (12% per month), not returning bonds despite loans being fully paid up and forcibly keeping people in confinement until loans were paid back.

Allen Robert Shuttleworth, who was a British consular officer in Kashgar, wrote that the Chinese and the British were ready to help the Shikarpuris collect their debts but there was no satisfying the moneylenders who he called vultures and an unlovable lot.

By 1909, half of the Shikarpuris were sent back to India. Others managed to stay on in Xinjiang until 1933, when an Uyghur uprising against the Chinese led to violence against the moneylenders. The violence claimed several Indian lives and led to a flight of most Shikarpuris, although some stayed back until the early 1940s.

While the risks that Indians took to trade and live in Xinjiang were rewarded, they were often caught up in business disputes with Chinese and Uyghurs, and amongst themselves. When the British consular authorities would visit cities such as Yarkand, they would be flooded with petitions and requests to settle business disputes.

When the disputes involved Chinese subjects, Macartney would intervene with the authorities. Xinjiang had a system in place through which arbitrators would be appointed to settle these disputes. The corruption in the bureaucracy in the region, well documented in Nicholas Roerichs Altai-Himalaya, was also a major hindrance to resolving disputes.

Thampis book documents a communal riot between local Muslims and Hindus in Yarkand when a Muslim woman was found in the room of a Hindu cook. The situation threatened to spiral out of control, but the Chinese authorities took swift action, including fining the cook, administering mild beatings on those who used insulting languages against Muslims and a gift of carpets. Muslim rioters were also punished with similarly mild beatings and banned from slaughtering cows or selling beef in front of Hindu serais.

Indians would sometimes get in the crossfire between warlords who would seize power in the large territory. With each change in the power structure came a new set of rules and regulation from increased property taxes to a clampdown on the sale of charas.

The most lucrative period for Indian traders in Xinjiang was right after the Bolshevik Revolution, when chaos in Russia led to minimal trade with the country. By the 1930s, the Soviet Union had become a major industrial force and built good road and railway infrastructure up to the borders of Xinjiang. It became financially unviable for many Indian traders to live and work in the region. The death knell to the Indian presence in Xinjiang was the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War and Beijings subsequent exertion of stronger authority over western China. The final exodus to India began in 1949, with some Uyghurs also crossing over the Karakoram Pass to Ladakh and Kashmir.

In 2021 the diplomatic relationship between India and China is far from ideal, but there is no dispute over the boundary at the Karakoram Pass. If trade over the pass were reopened, places like Ladakh, which once hosted Central Asian serais and was a major trade hub, would benefit enormously from the new opportunities. Indians would also be able to gain from the opportunities on the other side of the Karakoram Mountains given how much China is investing in its Belt and Road initiatives.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer and independent journalist, based in Mumbai. He is a Kalpalata Fellow for History & Heritage Writings for 2021.

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An Indian business community had thrived in Xinjiang before the Communists took over in China - Scroll.in

In dealing with Taliban, India must remember consequences of rushing to recognise communist China in 1949 – The Indian Express

One of the many issues thrown up by the Talibans seizure of power has been the question of providing official recognition to the Taliban-led government or the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Should the Indian government provide diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government? Or should it refuse to recognise the Taliban on grounds of its violent overthrow of the previous Afghan government and the unreserved use of terrorism (both, locally and abroad)? This, of course, is quite different from mere engagement or dialogue with the Taliban. States are frequently compelled to interact and negotiate with a wide variety of non-state actors to serve their interests whilst still denying them legitimacy on the global stage. What should Indias policy be moving forward?

One line of thought would argue that India must accept the ground realities in Kabul. It is an obvious fact that the Taliban is in control and so recognition must logically flow from that. Consideration of values should not cloud New Delhis judgement. After all, there are a whole host of Islamic states that have questionable human rights records that India recognises and fruitfully engages with. There are two other compelling reasons. First, India has significant interests at stake that may be harmed by delayed recognition or non-recognition. Concerns over cross-border terrorism, radicalisation, drug trade, etc. can hardly be addressed in the absence of a sustained dialogue with whoever occupies the seat of power in Kabul. Second, if India refuses to recognise the Taliban, it may strengthen the hand of its regional rivalsPakistan and Chinaleading to a further intensification of national security threats on its northern frontier.

However, such arguments and their underlying assumptions are somewhat flawed. India had adopted precisely this line of reasoning in 1949 with communist China and failed. The Nehru government felt compelled to provide early recognition to the communists despite close ties with the previous Kuomintang government and Chiang Kai-Shek during the interwar period. There were many similar forces in play. Nehru believed communist Chinas goodwill was crucial to ensure a peaceful border settlement and to prevent the rise of communists in India. The reticence to provide similar recognition to the Bolsheviks in 1918 by the West, Nehru argued, was the main reason behind the inability of the Western powers and Russia to forge a common alliance to effectively counter Nazi Germany. So, Nehru proceeded to provide early and unconditional recognition and also chose to maintain Indias diplomatic mission in Beijing. He then successfully persuaded Commonwealth countries to follow suit, despite strong reservations about whether the communists would honour Chinas previous international legal obligations and would refrain from the use of force across the Taiwan straits as well as in Tibet and Hong Kong. Nehru also championed the cause of communist Chinas UN membership.

But did early recognition change anything in communist Chinas policy? No. Communist China continued to be suspicious of Indias intentions in Tibet and the bourgeois nature of its regime and elites. Moreover, it was Indias early recognition that gave Mao Zedong confidence in his plans to annex Tibet through force in 1950. Goodwill proved to be an ineffective tool of deterrence. Mao did not risk such offensives in Hong Kong or Taiwan. A very different trajectory can be seen in Pakistan-China ties. Being overzealous in its pursuit of US military aid, Pakistan ceded closer ties with communist China initially. They made no attempt to build goodwill or provide any reassurances to the latter. Still, when the opportunity for collaboration against India arose after the 1962 War, the two were not bogged down by previous inhibitions.

The lesson here is clear: In the absence of compelling shared interests, building mere goodwill through early recognition provides no returns. Does India have any such compelling shared interests with the Taliban?

All Nehrus early recognition did was to cede Indias only leverage vis--vis communist China. This is one of the key takeaways from Vijay Gokhales new book The Long Game: How the Chinese negotiate with India. Nehru could have used recognition of communist China to draw concessions on the disputed frontier or at the very least to restrain Chinas dealings with Tibet. Similarly, it is far from clear if early and unconditional recognition of the Taliban government will help India achieve any of its regional security objectives. In fact, it may compromise the only leverage the international community and India have. With its rhetorical efforts to appear moderate, the Taliban has not demonstrated sincerity, but rather a reluctant acceptance of the fact that legitimacy on the global stage is a social good that cannot be achieved through force. Surely, New Delhi must engage the Taliban. But in a manner that uses the Talibans need for social recognition to draw concrete concessions on key interest areas.

The writer is reading for a DPhil in Area Studies at the University of Oxford and is the Managing Editor of Statecraft Daily.

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In dealing with Taliban, India must remember consequences of rushing to recognise communist China in 1949 - The Indian Express

Afghanistan: Street fighting rages as Taliban attack key city

Afghan government forces are battling the Taliban in three key cities

Ferocious fighting is taking place in a major Afghan city, amid fears it could be the first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban.

Lashkar Gah in southern Helmand province is under heavy assault from the militants, despite persistent US and Afghan air strikes.

The Taliban are said to have seized a TV station. Thousands of people fleeing rural areas took shelter in buildings.

"There is fighting all around," a doctor told the BBC from his hospital.

Hundreds of Afghan reinforcements have been deployed to battle the militants. The Taliban have made rapid advances in recent months as US forces have withdrawn after 20 years of military operations in the country.

Helmand was the centrepiece of the US and British military campaign, and Taliban gains there would be a blow for the Afghan government.

If Lashkar Gah fell, it would be the first provincial capital won by the Taliban since 2016. It is one of three provincial capitals under attack.

An Afghan military commander in the city warned that a Taliban victory would have a "devastating effect on global security".

"This is not a war of Afghanistan, this is a war between liberty and totalitarianism," Maj Gen Sami Sadaat told the BBC.

On Monday, the Afghan information ministry announced that 11 radio and four television networks in Helmand province had stopped broadcasting due to what it described as Taliban "attacks and threats".

Attempts by the militants to capture Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, have continued after rocket strikes hit its airport on Sunday.

Seizing control of Kandahar would be a hugely symbolic victory for the Taliban, giving them a grip on the south of the country.

In a third besieged city, Herat, in the west, government commandos are battling the insurgents after days of fierce fighting. Government forces have taken back some areas after a UN compound was attacked on Friday.

Videos shared on social media appeared to show residents on the streets and rooftops of Herat shouting "Allahu akbar" ("God is greatest") in support of the government's gains.

Story continues

Map showing areas of full Taliban or government control, updated 29 July 2021

As government forces struggled to contain Taliban advances, President Ashraf Ghani blamed the sudden withdrawal of US troops for the increase in fighting.

"The reason for our current situation is that the decision was taken abruptly," he told parliament.

Mr Ghani said he had warned Washington that the withdrawal would have "consequences".

Although nearly all its military forces have left, the US has continued its air offensive in support of government troops. Strikes targeting Lashkar Gah continued late on Monday.

President Biden's administration announced on Monday that because of the increase in violence, it would take in thousands more Afghan refugees who worked with US forces.

The US and UK have accused the Taliban of committing possible war crimes by "massacring civilians" in a town captured near the Pakistan border.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he had seen reports of "deeply disturbing and totally unacceptable" Taliban atrocities.

Gruesome videos that emerged from Spin Boldak apparently showed revenge killings. The Taliban have rejected the accusations.

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Afghanistan: Street fighting rages as Taliban attack key city

Taliban fighters continue to grab territory in Afghanistan

Taliban fighters continue to seize territory in Afghanistan as the militant group mounts new offensives in the northern part of the war-torn country victories that have come as the US prepares to withdraw its troops by Sept. 11.

There have been reports of intense fighting between Taliban and Afghan government forces surrounding the northern provincial capitals of Kunduz, Faryab and Balkh in recent days.

Militant forces were closing in on Kunduz on Monday and had overrun the district headquarters in Imam Sahib and taken control of the police headquarters, Inamuddin Rahmani, the provincial police spokesman, told the Associated Press.

Since the Biden administration announced in April that it would pull the remainder of US troops from Afghanistan, ending Americas longest war, the Taliban have moved beyond their southern strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar and begun taking control of areas like Imam Sahib, which islocated near the border with Tajikistan and on a key supply route from Central Asia.

The latest offensive comes as peace talks between the Taliban and Afghan officials in Qatar have stalled and just days before Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah, will visit President Biden at the White House.

The talks on Friday will focus on how the US will continue to provide support for the Afghan people following the withdrawal, including offering diplomatic, humanitarian and economic assistance, the White House said.

The United Nation Secretary-Generals Special Representative for Afghanistan said she pressed the Security Council to urge both sides to begin negotiations again.

Increased conflict in Afghanistan means increased insecurity for many other countries, near and far,Deborah Lyons said.

But while the talks are halted, the Taliban continue to advance their military presence in the north.

The Talibans strategy is to make inroads and have a strong presence in the northern region of the country that long resisted the insurgent group, a senior Afghan security official told Reuters.They would face less resistance in other parts of the country where they have more influence and presence.

And while the fighting has been fierce in places, the Taliban have also begun paying Afghan government forces to return home.

A senior police official told the AP that many of the police in his district come from poor families and havent seen their financial conditions rise despite the trillions of dollars the US spent during the 20-year war.

They have not seen changes in their lives and are indifferent so they see no difference. They want to save their lives just for today, the official said.

Many observers fear that the Taliban will overrun the country once US and NATO troops leave Afghanistan a predicament that could lead to the rise of al Qaeda in the country again.

The US overthrew the Taliban in 2001 for allowing the terror groups leader Osama bin Laden to use Afghanistan as a base of operations as they planned the Sept. 11 attacks.

At a Senate hearing last week, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were questioned about the possibility that al Qaeda could regenerate and once again become a threat to the US.

I would assess it as medium, Austin said. I would also say, Senator, that it would take possibly two years for them to develop that capability.

Milley said he agreed.

I think that if certain other things happen if there was a collapse of the government or the dissolution of the Afghan security forces that risk would obviously increase, but right now I would say medium and about two years or so, hesaid.

With Post wires

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Taliban fighters continue to grab territory in Afghanistan

Have No Illusions About the U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan – The Wall Street Journal

Is Afghanistan destined to return to barbarism? Some hope that the hasty and haphazard U.S. withdrawal wont lead to Taliban rule or that the jihadist group will govern more gently than before. That optimism is misplaced, and the disaster likely to come will have global consequences.

Many observers fear that the Taliban will soon re-establish an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. Scarcely a day passes without news of their advances. They now control about half of Afghanistans roughly 400 districts. Taliban fighters are at the gates of or inside at least three important provincial capitalsHerat, Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. They have captured border crossings with Iran, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and the strategic town of Spin Boldak on the Pakistan border. At times, Afghan government troops have fled in disarray or surrendered U.S.-provided equipment.

Atrocities have accompanied the Talibans battlefield gains. A video last month purportedly showed the Taliban executing 22 Afghan government special forces after they surrendered. On Monday the U.S. and the U.K. accused the Taliban of murdering civilians in Spin Boldak.

Last month the Taliban brutalized and murdered Danish Siddiqui, an Indian Pulitzer-prize winning photojournalist with Reuters. They also murdered a folksy Afghan comedian known for poking fun at them. In some places, Taliban commanders have reportedly demanded lists of widows and unmarried women between 15 and 45 to be married off to their fighters. They have murdered civil society leaders, closed girls schools, and forced women out of public roles.

They havent yet reinstated the classical Islamic punishment of amputating limbs for theft, but a Taliban spokesman told this newspaper that this was only because they first need to establish the appropriate healthcare apparatus.

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Have No Illusions About the U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan - The Wall Street Journal