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January 22, 2020

By Adrian Morel

In Games without Rules, author and former Asia Foundation colleague Tamim Ansary argues that bringing rural Afghanistan under centralized rule has been the defining challenge of the Afghan state since the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th century. He debunks the colonial myth of an unconquerable Afghanistan: it was invaded many times, by Persians, Greeks, Turks, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union. For invading powers and national rulers alike, the real stumbling block was not conquering Afghanistan, but governing it.

Afghan kings ruled by forging alliances with local strongmen. Even the influence of tribal leaders waned quickly, however, as one left the towns for the mountains or the desert. Ansary describes rural Afghanistan as a universe of village-republics, self-reliant social units where daily life remained unaltered by events in the capital. The wars of the past decades have changed this. National and global politics have left deep scars in the social fabric of rural Afghanistan: bombs and mines turned fertile valleys into deserts; millions left their villages for the cities, Pakistan, or Iran. But to a large extent, these wars have illustrated once again the resistance of rural Afghanistan to central rule.

Afghanistans borderlands are an extreme illustration of this governance challenge: border residents tend to have stronger economic and cultural ties with people across the border than with Kabul. And yet, these areas play a central role in the security and economy of the country. Border security is inseparable from the larger war effort, as insurgents take advantage of porous borders and kinship networks to take refuge in neighboring countries.

This satellite photo of Bahramcha, a border town in Helmand Province, strikingly illustrates how the Durand Line (in yellow), which marks the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, runs straight through border communities. Bahramcha is also a Taliban-controlled border crossing on the KandaharQuetta route, and a major export route for narcotics.

The borders are also vital to the Afghan economy. Customs duties are the most important single source of government revenue after foreign aid. Despite significant improvements in customs collection since 2015, considerable leakage persists because of insecurity, entrenched corruption, and insufficient processing points along thousands of miles of permeable borders. Security dynamics and cross-border trade are interrelated in complex ways. In his 2000 book, Taliban, Ahmed Rashid exposed the role of Quettas trucking mafia in financing the expansion of the fundamentalist movement in the mid-90s. Insurgents levy taxes on trafficking and trade in areas that they control.

In border regions, a vast share of the local population makes a living from legal trade, smuggling, or the grey area in between. A 2019 study by The Asia Foundation looked into livelihoods and trade in the districts of Spin Boldak, in Kandahar province, and Muhmand Dara, in Nangarhar province. The two busiest official crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Torkham and Wesh-Chaman, are located in these districts. Torkham links Kabul to Peshawar via the Khyber Pass; Wesh-Chaman connects Kandahar to Quetta. A representative survey in these districts found that two-thirds of respondents had crossed the border at least once in the past year, and nearly one in five was conducting regular business with Pakistan residents other than family. A large majority reported that their community (71 percent) or their household (56 percent) depended on such trade for their economic welfare, and 47 percent depended on it for their own occupation. The study paints a picture of large traders and smuggling barons profiting most from business opportunities and ineffective border controls, while many more earn a modest living as truck drivers and cargo handlers, or by transporting licit and illicit goods along local trails.

The proportion of business activity, family well-being, and respondents occupation that relies on cross-border trade, Spin Boldak and Muhmand Dara districts

From the perspective of local residents, the border is an artificial line that divides families but also provides economic opportunity. Although they acknowledge the contribution of porous borders to national insecurity, border residents do not see lax controls as a threat to their own safety. Instead, they worry about the impact of tighter controls on their lifestyle and livelihoods. In the past few years, a series of measures by Pakistan have drastically limited their traditional freedom of movement. These measures include fencing the border, establishing additional security posts, and requiring incoming Afghans to show proper passport and visa documents. (Previously, border tribes were allowed to cross without them.) Pakistan has also occasionally closed the border, sometimes for days or weeks at a stretch, usually in response to security incidents.

Eight official crossing points along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Illustration: International Organization for Migration)

From the perspective of Pakistan, these measures are part of a legitimate effort to enforce border security, curb smuggling, and boost legal bilateral trade. The goal is to encourage people and goods to pass through official border crossings, where they can be more easily controlled and taxed. Security measures such as the border fence are combined with positive incentives: in September, Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurated the 24/7 opening of the Torkham gate, which used to be closed at night. This measure was intended to reduce the long wait times at the border, a major grievance of Afghans trading fresh produce. Afghans say delays persist despite Khans initiative, and it remains to be seen whether these policies will have the intended long-term effects. One way or another, they will durably affect the vast majority of border residents whose livelihoods, and often healthcare or education, have long been dependent on their ability to cross into Pakistan.

Why does this matter for peace? Western commentators have focused on geopolitics and ideology to explain past and current Afghan wars. Tamim Ansary and Ahmed Rashid remind us, however, that the rise of the Taliban in the 90s was not just a religious reaction to the instability and insecurity of the Afghan civil war; it was also a revolt of southern tribes rooted in historical grievances and a sense of marginalization. Improving border management and the rule of law in border regions might be a legitimate goal, but unless the needs of local populations are taken into account, such efforts may feed a fresh cycle of frustration and sow mistrust in the benefits of peace.

A view of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, from the Pakistan side (Photo: Reuters)

Last year, U.S.-Taliban peace talks raised hopes for an agreement on a political process to end the war. It remains unclear whether the talks will resume, and if they do there is no guarantee that they will succeed. Nonetheless, key governance issues that have been pushed aside by the war will eventually reclaim their place in the Afghan public debate: What role for the central state in border regions? How to protect borders against traffickers and insurgents and improve customs revenues without hurting livelihoods and fueling local grievances?

These are questions that The Asia Foundation wants to help answer. Over the next four years, our offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan will undertake joint research to document changes in policy and other conditions along the border and their favorable or adverse effects on local livelihoods, trade, and security. This work will be done through the X-Border Local Research Network, a partnership with the Carnegie Middle East Center and the Rift Valley Institute, supported by DFID, to study conflict-affected borderlands in Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa and suggest more effective responses from the international community and national governments. Our research this year will focus on how border residents on either side adjust to tighter border controls. Future studies may look at the integration of Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bilateral trade, and other relevant topics. Stay tuned for updates on this work by visiting the X-Border Local Research Network webpage.

Adrian Morel is associate director for conflict and fragility in The Asia Foundations Program Specialists Group. He can be reached at adrian.morel@asiafoundation.org. This essay is adapted from an article published previously in Peripheral Vision. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author, not those of The Asia Foundation or the UK government.

Excerpt from:
Afghanistan's Borderlands: Unruly, Unruled, and Central to Peace - The Asia Foundation - In Asia

Key point: A proxy war that we are still paying for.

In 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Pakistans civilian president in a coup. He proceeded to institute hardline Islamist laws throughout Pakistan, and began rebuilding Pakistani military power after its humiliating defeat in a 1971 war with India.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Washington found that Zias policies dovetailed conveniently with getting Pakistani assistance in supporting Mujahideen insurgents fighting Communist forces. Thus, Pakistani and U.S. agents collaborated in organizing and arming militants proliferating in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

In retaliation, Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force (DRAAF) jet bombers began crossing into Pakistani airspace to blast those refugee camps. The Pakistani military deployed J-6 fighters (Chinese-built MiG-19 clones) capable of Mach 1 speed and two radars to defend the border, but these proved too slow and the patrol and radar coverage too spotty, so none of the raids were intercepted.

Thus in 1981, Zia persuaded the Reagan administration to authorize sale of forty F-16As and two-seat F-16Bs, which would be received between 1983-1986. The then cutting-edge fourth-generation fighter was affordable, extremely maneuverable due to its aerodynamically unstable design (compensated for with fly-by-wire controls), and could still attain high speeds and carry heavy payloads.

However, early production F-16s lacked the capability to fire radar-guided beyond-visual range missiles. This meant Pakistani Falcons needed to get up close to their opponents to use their AIM-9P and more advanced AIM-9L Sidewinder heat-seeking missilesor their 20-millimeter Vulcan cannons.

In 1986, the F-16s of the PAFs No. 9 Griffin and 14 Shaheen squadrons were finally ready to begin flying combat air patrols along the Afghan border. That year, Soviet and Afghan forces began a series of offensive targeting mujahideen bases in the Panshir valley, supported with intensified bombardments of refugee camps.

On May 17, 1986 two F-16As were vectored towards two DRAAF Su-22M3K penetrating Pakistani airspace near Parachinar. The Sukhois were rugged swing-wing supersonic fighter bombers that often suffered heavy losses in Cold War conflicts.

The PAF F-16s closed within six miles and Squadron Leader Hameed Qadri launched a Sidewinder which failed to hit. The Su-22 promptly belted back for the Afghan border. Qadri fired off a second AIM-9L which first flew wide off the Sukhoi, then curled around and slammed into its target.

In an account published by the PAF, Qadri describes that he raced towards the second Su-22, which he engaged with a gun:

The other aircraft was in a left turn. His radius of turn and my energy state gave me enough confidence that I could easily achieve kill parameters both with missile and guns. During the turn, I found myself hitting the fringes of AIM-9P missile. I pulled a high yo-yo as I was in a totally offensive position. My target was now in a nose-down and heading towards Afghan territory. After apexing, I quickly rolled back and fired a three-second burst on the exiting Su-22. I stopped firing when a trail of smoke and flash from his aircraft confirmed a lethal kill. Through a split 'S', I headed east of Parachinar.

However, the Afghan Air Force confirmed losing only one jet, though the engagement led to a major decrease in attacks on refugee camps. Furthermore, the Soviet VVS deployed MiG-23MLD fighters to protect Afghan Su-22s.

Qadri encountered the MiGs a month later, but neither side opened fire. Nearly a year later on April 16 1987, F-16s chased down DRAAF Su-22s again near Thal, managing to overtake the supersonic jets despite having to attack from lower altitude. Squadron Leader Badar-us-Islam shot down the Sukhoi of Lt. Col. Abdul Jameel, who ejected and was captured on Pakistani soil.

By 1987, Soviets records indicate that Pakistani fighters had begun roaming into Afghan airspaceparticularly harassing efforts to provide aerial resupply to besieged garrisons like Khost, only ten miles across the border.

On March 30, 1987 two F-16s intercepted an An-26 twin-turboprop cargo plane near Khost, each striking it with one Sidewinder from just under a mile away. The ponderous cargo plane crashed into the snowy mountains below, killing all 39 aboard. Over the course of the conflict, Pakistani F-16 pilots also claimed the destruction of several Mi-8 transports helicopter, another An-26 on a reconnaissance mission in 1989, and a maneuver kill versus an An-24 transport which was actually attempting to defect.

However, the Pakistani fighter jocks luck turned two weeks later when two No.9 Squadron F-16s ambushed four MiG-23s of the Soviet 120th Fighter Regiment as they plastered a mujahideen supply bases in Djaware, Pakistan with cluster bombs. As Soviet Lt. Col. Pochitalkin led his unit in evasive maneuvers he saw an airplane plummet towards the earth in flames below him.

This was not a MiG, but the F-16 of Lt. Shahi Sikander, who had inadvertently been acquired by an AIM-9L fired by his wingman. Sikander parachuted down to Afghan soil, where he and the wreckage of his plane were smuggled back to Pakistan by Mujahideen. Some Russian sources claim Sikander was actually shot down by a Soviet jetthough the MiGs were not carrying air-to-air missilesor had somehow plowed into the rain of cluster bomblets.

In 1988, as Soviet ground forces withdrew from Afghanistan, DRAAF and Soviet aviation units began a ferocious new bombardment campaign in a last-ditch effort to save the crumbling Afghan Communist government.

On August 8, Col Alexander Rutskoy, commander of a regiment of slow but heavily armored Su-25 Frogfoot attack jetswas leading a night raid on the Maranshah refugee camp when his four-ship flight was bounced by two F-16As of the 14th fighter squadron. Rutskoy turned hard towards the F-16s, perhaps seeking to draw them away, and believing the heat-seeking missile would lose its track if his planes hot tail-pipe was facing away from it. But the AIM-9L was designed to engage targets from all aspects, and the detonations of its proximity warhead broke the flying tank in two.

Rutskoy ejected over Pakistani soil and was captured. Exchanged back to Russia, he was decorated as a hero of the Soviet Union and went onto become vice president of Russia under Boris Yeltsin, before leading an attempted coup in 1993.

A month after Rutskoys shootdown, a formation of twelve Soviet MiG-23seight loaded with bombs, and four carrying R-24 air-to-air missiles, zipped into Pakistani airspace near the Kunar valley at 32,000 feetprobably seeking to lure PAF F-16s into an ambush.

Obligingly, two F-16s raced towards the swing-wing fighters at only 11,000 feet. However, the Soviet radars failed to detect the lower-flying F-16s amidst the ground clutter. A Sidewinder fired at a steep angle by Squadron Leader Khalid Mahmood managed to riddle one MiG-23 with shrapnel, which limped back home for a crash landing. Two MiGs peeled away to engage the F-16s in a dogfight. But while Pakistani pilots claimed two MiG-23 kills, Soviet records show no additional aircraft were lost.

On November 3, 1988 the PAF would bag its final jet kill when Lt. Khalid Mahmood shot down a DRAAF Su-2M4K. Pakistan formally credits its F-16 pilots with 10 kills during the conflict, while Soviet records confirm the loss of three Su-22s, an Su-25 and An-26. Some sources claim the PAF shot down at least a dozen more aircraft during the Soviet war in Afghanistan which ostensibly were not formally credited because they involved violations of Afghan airspace. Those interested in a more extensive accounting of the Pakistani-Afghan air battles are recommended to consult the following compilations of Pakistani air combat narratives.

Sbastien Roblin holds a masters degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Image: Wikipedia.

Excerpt from:
The Soviet's War In Afghanistan Had Russian Pilots Fighting Pakistani F-16s - The National Interest Online

Among the many flaws in the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, or CAA, that Indias Parliament passed late last year is the manner in which it divides those who have suffered injustice. The former Afghan president Hamid Karzai pointed this out when he said that the victims of religious intolerance in Afghanistan are not only Sikhs or Hindus, but also Muslims themselves. In doing so, he was contradicting assertions made by some leaders of the Indian government who had spoken about the persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan, implying that others suffered less or not at all. Any failure to see that tyrants in Afghanistan spare no one shows either nave ignorance or political expedience. It also plays to a vociferous gallery within India that seems highly uninformed, and does little to enhance Indias global reputation.

The Karzai intervention is important because it calls out an Indian law that uses the lofty language of human rights to justify what is blatantly discriminatory. As it happens, the CAA also makes little strategic or diplomatic sense. Winning the hearts and minds of people in another country is more important in the long run than securing bilateral deals with its government of the day. Governments and their leaders come and go, but the people are always there. The CAA annuls the goodwill India has enjoyed among the people of Afghanistan. Given Pakistans terrible record of interference in Afghan affairs for decades, many Afghans have historically and naturally gravitated towards India. The CAA fritters away that goodwill.

The pattern repeats in Bangladesh. That is a graver mistake, since India has historically had a relatively frictionless relationship with what was East Pakistan before 1971. Over the years, hardline nationalists in Bangladesh have accused the Awami League government of appearing to bow to Indian demands. Whether it is building a fence along the border, investing jointly in the controversial coal-fired Rampal power plant near the Sundarbans, or cooperating with New Delhi on curbing the activities of the United Liberation Front of Assam, Bangladesh under its prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, has acted in ways that align with Indian interests. However, India often appears to look upon its eastern neighbour as a kind of client state, which may explain the surprise in New Delhi each time Dhaka asserts its independence, but also reveals a profound misreading of that 49-year-old country.

While those who played no role in Bangladeshs liberation may lack a historical understanding of the country, too many politicians today seem to have a unidimensional view of Islam and a confused view of Bangladesh, seeing in it a mirror image of Pakistan. Bangladeshi nationalism is distinct from Pakistani nationalism. While Pakistan began a composite of different languages and ethnicities that tried to forge a common identity rooted in one faith and one language, namely Urdu, its Bengali wing fought for independence because it resented that monocultural imposition. Not only was it not going to accept Urdu, preferring Bengali, the rhetoric of its liberation war was to create a more inclusive nation. Its original constitution enshrined those values.

This is not to suggest that religious minorities in Bangladesh have had it easy. To be sure, among those who have expropriated Hindu-owned property in Bangladesh are politicians of all parties, including the Awami League. And yet, Bangladeshis hold Rabindranath Tagore in the same high national esteem as does India. You wont find many Bangladeshis shunning Tagores poetry, calling it alien, unlike those in India who have issues with Faiz Ahmed Faizs poetry.

Before Bangladeshs independence, Pakistan attempted to relegate Tagore to obscurity, which only emboldened the Bangla language movement that ultimately led to the war in 1971. At an academic conference in New York some years ago, a Pakistani delegate asked a Bangladeshi delegate why Bangladeshis cared so much for Tagore when they had Kazi Nazrul Islam. We are lucky to have both, replied the Bangladeshi. As the Bangladeshi-American poet Tarfia Faizullah puts it in a poem, Bangladesh is Bengali and Muslim; Pakistan didnt understand that, and India, it seems, is forgetting that. Which is why Sheikh Hasina Wajed has a valid point when she asks: We dont understand why India did it. [The CAA] wasnt necessary." Her argument is self-serving: She claims that minorities are safe in Bangladesh, which is odd, since many, not just minorities, feel unsafe there. People leave Bangladesh, as do those who leave India, for similar reasons: Some flee injustice, many flee poverty.

Bangladesh has scrapped several high-level meetings with India in recent weeks. Dhaka seems worried that if India declares many people stateless and attempts to expel them, it will impact Bangladesh, since the Bengali-speaking among them, particularly if they are Muslims, would probably be assumed to be Bangladeshi. What will India do if Bangladesh refuses to accept them? Detain them in camps? Given the imperfect process of determining nationality, what might happen if it is carried out across India? The blazing summer could make the winter of discontent seem mild.

Salil Tripathi is a writer based in New York. Read Salils previous Mint columns at livemint.com/saliltripathi

Read more from the original source:
Opinion | How the CAA affects ties with Afghanistan and Bangladesh - Livemint

Afghan security forces take position at the site of an attack in a U.S. military air base in Bagram, north of Kabul, Afghanistan, on December 11, 2019. MOHAMMAD ISMAIL/REUTERS

Kabul, Afghanistan A powerful suicide bombing targeted an under-construction medical facility on Wednesday near Bagram Air Base, the main American base north of the Afghan capital, the U.S. military said. Two civilians were killed and more than 70 people wounded.

The Taliban later claimed responsibility for the attack and Afghan officials said all the insurgents were killed. The Bagram airfield was not in danger, said Colonel Sonny Leggett. The facility is being rebuilt to help the Afghan people who live in the area, the U.S. military said.

The Taliban statement denied any civilian casualties and claimed the attackers had managed to enter the Bagram base, even penetrating barracks used by coalition forces.

Outside the sprawling base, several homes, mostly belonging to poor Afghans, were destroyed. A large mosque in the area was also badly damaged.

Shortly after the bombing, Afghan troops, special forces and intelligence officers cordoned off the perimeter of the base with armored personnel carriers. Heavily armed soldiers kept residents far from the gates to Bagram Air Base.

Within minutes of the suicide bombing, U.S. fighter aircraft bombed the area, according to witnesses

Dr. Abdul Qasim Sangin, a physician who heads the main hospital in the province, said the hospital near the perimeter of the base was on fire. It wasn't immediately clear if any foreigners were inside the hospital.

Sangin said his hospital received six wounded, all Afghans. Five were in stable condition and one was critical, he said. Scores more were treated and released by medics at the scene. Most were suffering cuts and bruises from flying glass and debris.

The Taliban control or hold sway over nearly half of Afghanistan, staging regular attacks that target foreign and Afghan forces, as well as Kabul government officials, but also kill scores of civilians.

See the rest here:
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan fends off Taliban attack but ...

The interviews published by the Post provide a starker version of SIGARs previous analysis, but in many ways, they tell the same story. In its reports and testimony before Congress, SIGAR has revealed waste, abuse, and questionable judgment in a host of Afghanistan programs and projects. The interviews are stripped of the dry inspector-general verbiage and also of the strategic context within which judgments were made; senior officials frankly assess their failures to produce security, stability, or transparent and effective governance in Afghanistan. Those failures are documented in SIGARs reports.

But the extensive oversight mechanisms created for this massive project were not enough to force a rethink in the face of inertia, sunk costs, and short-term political calculations. SIGARs extant analysis of failures and missteps should have prompted a greater reckoning some time agoif not within the executive branch, then within Congress, which regularly authorized and appropriated funds for the ongoing campaign.

This attempt at nation-building in Afghanistan was embarked on by one president and embraced, at least for a time, by two more. Each one, when faced with the decision, chose to continue down this doomed road, believing it less risky and more palatable than his available alternatives. What the Post reporting reveals is that, while this path may have been easier, it was a road that would never reach its stated destination.

The U.S. effort in Afghanistan was an undertaking of breathtaking ambition: to oust a Taliban regime that gave haven to international terrorists; to defeat those terrorists and their allies and supporters in a counterinsurgency campaign; to set up and sustain a democratic government in a society riven by years of factional war; and to promote human development, human security, and basic human rights in a country where religious extremists, drug lords, and tribal chiefs had long ruled over (and fought for control of) a beleaguered populace. The overarching result seems to be a sort of D-minussome degree of visible achievement, but still a failing grade.

The Posts reporting is unsparing in its depiction of second-guessing and back-biting among U.S. government officials about their work in Afghanistan. Field staff argued that higher-ups didnt understand the realities they faced on the ground, didnt give them enough leeway to be effective, or cut off resources at the wrong time. Senior staff questioned strategies chosen by their superiors or determined in internal debates in which they participated. These concerns, voiced mostly in confidential interviews with SIGAR, were no doubt honestly felt, and had real foundations.

The existence of such doubts and concerns, however, does not necessarily reveal the roots of the Afghanistan failure. This kind of second-guessing is endemic in any large organization undertaking a long-term, complex project. Field staff close to on-the-ground implementation often question how their work is valued or prioritized by central decision makers, or question how their contribution fits into the wider strategy; central decision makers often fail to see the reality of implementation on the ground, and focus their energies on the policy battles theyve won and lost around the interagency table.

Read the original:
The Lessons of the Afghanistan Papers - The Atlantic