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From 2001 to 2021, Western-style democracy was forcibly introduced in Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghanis Afghan government, which the Taliban fought against, was weakened by deep internal divisions, infighting and rampant corruption.

The democratic government had strong support from the international community, but the results were very modest. Billions of dollars have been invested in Afghanistans democracy. The US Congress alone allocated more than 146 billion dollars for the reconstruction of the country and the establishment of a democratic order. Although progress has been made in almost all fields, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world.

The Trump administration retained 2,500 US troops ahead of the full military withdrawal the US committed to under the US-Taliban accord of February 2020. US officials pledged to continue providing financial support to government forces. At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001.

Weeks after new President Joe Biden confirmed that international forces would leave Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban troops began conquering large swaths of the country. The Talibans advance was achieved through struggle and negotiations. While the Taliban faced strong resistance from government forces in some areas, others were captured with minimal resistance. Often, the Taliban secured the surrender and departure of government forces by paying bribes or through local elders who wanted to avoid bloodshed.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure has been marked by an electoral crisis, pervasive corruption and a gradual weakening of the military, fled the country on August 15 for the UAE. On the same day, Taliban fighters began entering Kabul, taking control of the entire country. Today, a year and a half later, the most significant characteristics of the Taliban regime can be listed.

On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced the establishment of an interim government to rule Afghanistan. The Taliban call their government, as they have done before, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban, who did not adopt a constitution during their first rule, announced that they intended to rule according to Islamic law (Sharia), although they remained vague.

Haibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, has held supreme power as an emir since 2016. He had only a few recorded public appearances. Almost all members of the government are former officials from the previous government in the 1990s or longtime loyalists. All are men, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group in the country) and most are from southern Afghanistan.

More than half of the governments members are under US or UN sanctions for links to terrorism, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. The State Department has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to his arrest. Haqqani is the head of the Haqqani Network, an Islamist organization designated as a terrorist organization by the US for carrying out numerous attacks on US and other international targets in Afghanistan.

In the early days of the new regime, some observers hoped that the Taliban might turn to former Afghan government officials or others outside their movement in line with their promise to establish an inclusive government. The Taliban, however, have not fulfilled that promise and are filling positions in the government and ministries with military or religious figures with little professional experience, worsening the already bad situation in the country.

There are also strong internal frictions and tensions that threaten additional destabilization. Points of tension exist between politicians (such as First Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Baradar) and its military leaders (Haqqani et al) over who deserves the most credit for the victory. Tensions are strong between the leadership that strives for stability and ordinary fighters who want to adapt to post-war life, but also between those with different ideological perspectives and different ethnic identities. In a speech in February, Haqqani criticized the monopolization of power within certain Taliban circles, prompting other Taliban figures to say that criticism should be made in private.

Discrimination and violence against minority communities in Afghanistan are not new, but under the new Taliban regime, minorities suffer the most. Under Taliban rule, minority groups in Afghanistan experience systematic discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, language and religion. The Taliban are Sunni Muslims and have a long history of persecuting minority religious groups including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Shia Muslims. The Taliban are mainly members of the Pashtun ethnic group and speak the Pashto language. Minority ethnic groups include Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks, many of whom speak the Dari language. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings of minority groups across the country. The Taliban, both legally and illegally, kill members of minority groups, especially Hazaras and Tajiks.

Afghan human rights fighters, especially women, face arbitrary arrests and torture, abductions, gang rapes, psychophysical abuse, house searches, and physical threats of violence against family members. Public space is tightly controlled by the Taliban, who have overturned the Constitution and turned to a radical interpretation of Islamic law.

In November 2022, judges were ordered to begin enforcing Sharia law, which includes public floggings and executions. The absence of a judicial system leaves no guarantee or space for citizens to exercise their social and political rights through protests. The Taliban intimidated journalists and restricted press freedom, leading to the closure of more than 200 news outlets.

In the list of 50 countries that oppress Christians the most, Afghanistan ranks high in 9th place. After the Taliban took over, Christians found themselves in extreme danger, as accurately described by the US governments religious agency. Many fled and sought asylum, while those Christians who remained in the country reported that they were hiding from the Talibans actions. The Taliban falsely claim that there are no more Christians in Afghanistan. There are probably around 10 to 12 thousand of them. The former first lady from 2014 to 2021, Rula Ghani, is a Maronite Christian from Lebanon. Child marriage rates have also increased.

Although the Talibans takeover has reduced the high levels of violence that characterized the war, the Talibans return to power has had a significant negative impact on Afghan women and girls. In a September 2022 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan said: In no other country have women and girls disappeared so quickly from all spheres of public life, nor are they disadvantaged in every aspect of their lives .

After taking power, the Taliban closed down the Ministry of Womens Affairs, which was part of the former Afghan government, and re-established the Ministry of Promotion of Virtues and Prevention of Vices, as in the 1990s. The ministry has issued guidelines that impose new restrictions on women. The December 2021 restrictions include a ban on driving long distances or flying without a male guardian. The May 2022 decree prescribes penalties for male relatives of women who do not wear a full-body hijab. The November 2022 decision prohibits women from entering public parks and swimming pools.

The Taliban banned girls from attending secondary schools. The education of girls is a matter of contention within the Taliban leadership. Some hardliners like Akhundzad support it while Baradar and Haqqani support secondary education for girls. The influence of traditionalists and reluctance to make pragmatic decisions is visible, which shows that the international community has limited influence on the Talibans decisions. Some Afghan women continued to provide informal education to girls in clandestine schools.

In December 2022, the Taliban banned girls from attending college. In the same month, the Taliban also banned women from working for national and international NGOs, threatening NGOs that did not comply with this decision. In response, an estimated 94% of Afghan NGOs have completely or partially ceased operations, and 11 American NGOs have suspended operations in the country. The ban was unanimously condemned by the UN Security Council. Women are mostly prohibited from working, which according to the UN will lead to a 5% drop in GDP.

It is the economy that is the cancer of Afghanistan. The return of the Taliban has exacerbated one of the worlds worst humanitarian crises, as Afghanistan is one of the worlds poorest countries dependent on foreign aid. International donors provided billions of dollars annually in support to the former Afghan government, financing more than half of its annual budget of $6 billion and as much as 80% of total public expenditures.

Much of that development aid was cut off in August 2021, causing the nations GDP to drop by as much as 35% in 2021 and 2022. The UN Secretary-Generals Special Representative for Afghanistan said in December 2022 that the Talibans economic governance was more effective than expected, due to lower corruption, higher revenue collection and the relative stability of Afghanistans currency. However, the economy continues to rely on international donations, including the UN, which sent $1.8 billion in humanitarian aid in cash between December 2021 and January 2023.

The economic situation in the country was bad even before the Taliban due to war, drought and the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Talibans incompetence further worsened the situation. More than half of Afghanistans 39 million people faced acute food shortages in October 2021. Human Rights Watch reported in November 2021 that Afghanistan is facing widespread hunger due to an economic and banking crisis.

Experts from the UN agency World Food Program stated at the beginning of this year that 90% of Afghans do not have enough food to live on. The vast majority of Afghans live in poverty. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 26.1 million Afghans received at least one form of aid in 2022 and that the outlook remains poor given the predicted droughts and high commodity prices.

Although the Talibans takeover of power in August 2021 was swift, their triumph, according to many analysts, reflected not so much popular support for the movement as a lack of support for the former government. Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Taliban with skepticism, fear or hostility.

A small number of citizens nonviolently demonstrated advocating their rights and expressing opposition to the regime. The Taliban violently dispersed these protests and openly suppressed dissent. The regime is currently facing armed resistance from two very different groups. The first is the National Resistance Front (NRF), made up of people associated with the overthrown democratic government. NRF leaders have appealed for US and international support and have maintained a representative office based in Washington.

It is interesting that, unlike some other leaders dear to the West, such as Juan Guaido, the leader of the NRF, Ahmad Massoud, did not receive the explicit public support of any foreign country, let alone the recognition of the leader of the government in exile. This is due to the Talibans relatively strong military position and the Talibans close ties to regional powers, including some that previously opposed them in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran.

In addition, strategically speaking, Taliban Afghanistan is not something that worries the Americans who knew very well what would happen when they withdrew their army. The NRF has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on Taliban fighters, mostly in and around the northeastern province of Panjshir. However, the NRF appears to have neither the military capabilities nor the broad popular support needed to seriously threaten the government in Kabul.

Another group, undeniably militarily more dangerous, consists of the local branch of the Islamic State the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), also known as ISIS-K, a longtime opponent of the Taliban. The ISKP has opposed the Taliban since its founding in 2015 because it is bothered by the Talibans nationalist political project focused on Afghanistan, which is opposed to ISISs universalist vision of a global jihad that should ultimately lead to the Vatican becoming a Muslim place, as Bosnian Islamist Bilal puts it Bosnian.

Since the Taliban took over, ISKP ranks have grown to as many as 6,000 fighters despite the Taliban offensive. At least 16 terrorist attacks were carried out by the ISKP between August 2021 and September 2022 against the Hazara minority Shiite community in mosques, schools and workplaces, killing more than 700 people. An attack was also carried out on a Sikh place of worship, which undermined the Talibans assurance that it would provide security to all ethnic communities. Attacks on the embassies of Russia (September 2022), Pakistan (December 2022) and a hotel housing Chinese diplomats and executives (also December 2022) make a mockery of the Taliban regimes security arrangements that seek to provide security for the few remaining foreign embassies in Kabul. There were also cross-border rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

In the morning hours of March 9, in the countrys fourth largest city, Mazar-i-Sharif, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the office of Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, the Taliban governor of Afghanistans Balkh province. The ISKP claimed responsibility for the assassination of one of the highest-ranking figures in the Taliban administration. Muzammil, in his capacity as the governor of Nangarhar, led the fight against ISKP and was transferred to Balkh in late 2022.

Prior to this, ISKP killed Abdul Haq Abu Omar, the Taliban police commander for Badakhshan province and a Taliban judge in Jalalabad. These killings introduced the conflict between the Taliban and the ISKP into a completely new phase. Since coming to power, the Talibans response to the jihadist threat has ranged from denying the ISKPs presence on Afghan soil to portraying the group as insignificant. The Taliban regime refused any outside help to solve this problem.

Almost every ISKP attack is always followed by a Taliban counter-attack on ISKP hideouts in Kabul and elsewhere during which the alleged perpetrators of the attacks are liquidated. For example the killing of Qari Fateh, the alleged ISKP intelligence chief, during a Taliban raid in Kabul in February this year, was highlighted as a successful retaliation for attacks on Russian, Pakistani and Chinese diplomatic missions.

At the beginning of January, eight ISKP members were killed in Kabul and Nimroz province. A government spokesman claimed that those responsible for the attacks on a hotel in Kabul, the Pakistani embassy, and the airport in the capital were liquidated. In any case, the Islamic State of Khorosan represents an existential threat to the government in Kabul and represents a wider global problem that should concern foreign diplomats and intelligence officers.

Relations in the region directly affect the development of events in Afghanistan, which has no access to the sea or any special natural barriers on its borders, and therefore throughout its history it has been constantly subject to interventions by its neighbors and superpowers.

Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for neighboring countries. Pakistan is the most important neighboring country that supported the Taliban regime in the 1990s and their subsequent guerrilla struggle. Many analysts (at least initially) saw the Taliban takeover as a triumph of Pakistans regional politics. Senior Pakistani officials held numerous meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad.

However, according to some developments, it seems that the Talibans return to power could pose a challenge to Pakistan. The victory of the Taliban provides an injection of moral support, and perhaps a material boost, to Pakistani Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban TTP.

TTP attacks on Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021 and reportedly prompted the Pakistani government to seek mediation from the Afghan Taliban. The TTP continued to attack Pakistani targets, including an attack in January 2023 that attacked police officers and killed more than 100 people. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are further complicated by the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically colored dispute over their 2,500 km interstate border. Afghan and Pakistani border forces have occasionally clashed on it during the past year.

Iran, with which Afghanistan shares a western border, opposed Taliban rule in the 1990s but has now maintained diplomatic relations, emphasizing the need to represent in power Afghan ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties. More precisely, it is about the Tajiks who speak a variant of Persian and the Khazars who are mostly Shiites. There are still disputes over water sources and refugees with occasional border clashes.

Neighbors in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) reacted in different ways to the Taliban in power. The governments of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear to prioritize economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, and have held official meetings with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, opposed the Taliban and offered sanctuary to the anti-Taliban NRF. This is a consequence of the Tajik authorities struggle with Islamist militants, as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the countrys second largest ethnic group), some of whom are opposed to Taliban rule.

Relations with China are a separate story. China, which played a relatively limited role in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan (particularly in the development of minerals and other resources) before taking over from the Taliban, but large projects did not materialize due to instability, lack of infrastructure and other constraints. Despite concerns about Islamist terrorist groups based in Afghanistan because of its problem with the Muslim population in Xinjiang, Beijing has tacitly accepted Taliban rule. During a visit to Kabul in May 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that China respects the independent elections of the Afghan people.

The question of all questions is how to help the Afghan people and not the regime? The US has provided over $1.1 billion in humanitarian aid since the Taliban took over. Such aid differs greatly from the previous aid amounting to over $5 billion annually between 2019 and 2021 (in addition to helping the people, the funds were used to pay the salaries of civil and military officials and made up a large part of the national GDP).

The two elements of US policy that have the greatest impact on the humanitarian situation are sanctions and monitoring of the reserves of the Central Bank of Afghanistan (DAB). US sanctions against the Taliban (in force in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban took power, the US Treasury Department has issued several statements saying US sanctions against the Taliban do not prohibit aid and has authorized some humanitarian payments.

The US government froze the assets of US-based DAB days after the Taliban entered Kabul. Taliban and some foreign leaders have called on the US to unfreeze these assets, which total about 7 billion dollars. In September 2022, the US government announced the establishment of the Afghanistan Fund (based in Switzerland) to pay $3.5 billion in aid to the Afghan economy. At the time of writing in March, no payouts have yet been made. The other half of the funds ($3.5 billion) is also held by the US government, but it is assumed that it will be transferred to a fund account in Switzerland after a federal court in New York recently ruled that the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack are not entitled to this money as compensation for attack.

A good aid plan was presented by the UN in 2022 under the name Transitional Engagement Framework. The plan is based on providing basic services to the people, including deliveries of basic necessities and medical assistance. The plan calls for the UN to establish a minimally functional relationship with the Taliban. In short, the plan proposed by the UN involves unprecedented financial, political and human risks, as well as creating new potential for corruption. The Taliban already have experience in trying to use humanitarian aid to strengthen their rule. At the beginning of this year, the UN approved a humanitarian aid appeal worth $4.6 billion, and time will tell the results: how much donors will donate and what the effects will be.

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Afghanistan: The Glory And Misery Of The Taliban Regime Analysis - Eurasia Review

Afghanistan Taliban fume over US violation of airspace. Representational Image/AFP.

Kabul: Afghanistan Taliban leaders have criticised and expressed anger over the United States for violating the airspace and said it was difficult for their government to defend the airspace of Afghanistan.

An Afghanistan military expert Asadullah Nadim said, the planes and drones that fly in the airspace of Afghanistan are from some advanced countries and it is difficult for the Taliban government to defend it.

The chief of staff of the Islamic Emirate, Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, in a interview with RTA said: Even though it was a term in the agreement, it has been violated many times, and even though the US side has been informed, it is violated many times.

Efforts made to make Afghanistan forces more professional

Fitrat said that the Afghanistan Taliban government has decided to increase the size of the army from 150,000 to 200,000.

We have decided to increase the size of the army, God willing, in the following year, from 150,000 to 170,000 and gradually increase the number of troops to 200,000, he said.

Another military expert, Sarwar Niazi said, Afghanistan should at least have an army in proportion to its neighbors and in proportion to its population. An army that has an air force, artillery, ground troops, and air defense forces, he added.

Over the past two decades, military training in Afghanistan was one of the most costly sectors. The 350,000-member force of the previous government was disbanded after the collapse of that government.

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Updated Date: March 31, 2023 12:51:29 IST

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Afghanistan Taliban fume over US violation of airspace, helpless as planes, drones are hi tech - Firstpost

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In early March, Afghanistans foreign minister, Mawlavi Amir Khan Muttaqi, met with Kazakh Ambassador to Afghanistan Alimkhan Yessengeldiyev and agreed to expand bilateral cooperation in the transport sector. High on the agenda was developing the railway system in Afghanistan. Muttaqi requested technical support from Kazakhstan for new rail line construction.

Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistans infrastructure, especially in the areas of transport, energy, and agriculture. This comes amid efforts to reconnect Afghanistan to world trade and Kazakhstans attempts to become a mediator in the region. An informal meeting between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was held prior to the Muttaqi-Yessengeldiyev agreement, and Afghanistan was central to their discussion.

Afghanistan is the third largest buyer of Kazakh grain. The Afghan market traditionally occupies a significant share in the export of grain and flour from Kazakhstan. In 2022 Kazakhstan exported 1.36 million tonnes of wheat flour to Afghanistan, 52 percent more than in 2021, according to APK-Inform, a Central Asian agricultural analytical site.

In 2018 a rail route from Kazakhstan to Afghanistan was opened for traffic. The Kostanay-Bolashak-Serhetabad (Turkmenistan) rail route is more than 3,500 kilometers long. It traverses through the Kazakh city of Bolashak and the Turkmen city of Serhetabad, where it crosses the border with Afghanistan to Herat.

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In 2022 plans were discussed between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for the construction of a grain terminal and elevator at the Turkmen-Afghan border. This grain supply route via Turkmenistan is being promoted by Kazakhstan because it bypasses Uzbekistan, which according to KazAgro, the national grain operator, has traditionally imposed high rates for the transit of grain through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. However, no Kazakh railroads have been laid yet in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has been the only country so far that has built and managed a railway line in Afghanistan.

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Advancing this cross-border transport development is necessary to prevent a humanitarian crisis and economic collapse in Afghanistan. Indeed the Afghan issue has created a tricky new reality for Kazakhstan and the region as a whole. Central Asian governments see Afghanistan as both a threat and an opportunity.

Underpinning this perception is Afghanistans position at the heart of the region. This has resulted in concerted efforts by countries to align their policy in engaging with Afghanistan.

With Russias war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia, as well as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Central Asia has been forced to make its own contingency plans when it comes to security and trade. In light of this, Kazakhstan and the other Central Asia republics have pursued a strategy with Afghanistan based on the assumption that cooperation and engagement would promote stability. One way they have been going about this is by opening up and testing transport corridors through the country. An example of this is the Uzbek-led Trans-Afghan railway project.

For Kazakhstan, supporting economic development along the north-south axis would see Afghanistan becoming a bridge, not a barrier. In this vision, Kazakhstan hopes to be the convener, facilitator, and engine for change by prying open physical and diplomatic bottlenecks.

The benefits attained through cooperation between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan are obvious for all to see. There is a mutual interest on both sides for cooperation, as the Taliban cannot afford long-term isolation. Economic gains from expanded trade and investment would help diversify Kazakhstans transport corridors and bolster Afghanistans integration efforts with the wider regional and international community.

That said, Kazakh interests in Afghanistan are challenged by the extreme domestic fragility of the country and the risk of sanctions. Security has remained a key concern in the region, and despite Taliban assurances terrorist activity remains high and widespread.

This has been a key issue for Kazakhstan and has been reflected in Kazakhstans efforts to request external support on the Afghan issue. Through the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Kazakhstan has been airing its concerns over the unstable situation in Afghanistan and has suggested that the CSTO should increase its focus on securing Central Asias southern borders. Other Central Asian countries have expressed the same concern, and the Afghan issue has brought them together. However, fault lines have emerged, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan both vying for the mediator role of the region and adopting their own way of working with the Taliban.

With pressure from sanctions, any type of economic interaction with the Taliban government poses a reputational risk to Kazakhstans relations with the West. Given the size of Western involvement in Kazakhstan, particularly in its oil and gas sector, this is something that would need to be considered by the Kazakh government.

All that said, transport development is seen as key to both Kazakhstan and Afghanistans economic future. Security will continue to be a challenge but without cooperation between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, the prospects for stability in Central Asia are fairly slim. The spillover effect that could result from an isolated and vulnerable Afghanistan is a risk that Kazakhstan would want to avoid given the January 2022 protests. Kazakhstan must play a key role in restoring trade and communications, and in transforming Afghanistan into a route for licit rather than illicit trade between Central Asia and South Asia.

Much remains to be done, however, and Kazakhstan as well as the other Central Asian states will continue to act in and around Afghanistan, pursuing their national interests as they see them. Looking ahead, Kazakhstan should pursue its desire for cooperation with eyes wide open to make certain that in the process of seeking peace and economic benefit, they do not achieve just the opposite.

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Kazakhstan and Afghanistan Seek to Realign Bilateral Ties - The Diplomat

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised women in Afghanistan and Iran for standing up for freedoms as he spoke Tuesday at an event highlighting the role of women in democracy.

Blinken praised women who have protested in Iran in response to the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini last year, saying they have courageously demonstrated under great threat to themselves, to call for woman, life, and freedom.

And in Afghanistan, Blinken said women are fighting for a better future in their country despite efforts by the Taliban to erase them from daily life.

The United States stands in solidarity with these women and all who are working for womens full, free, and equal participation around the world. Through our diplomacy, were committed to supporting them and advancing gender equality worldwide, Blinken said.

The top U.S. diplomat said women face these challenges not only in autocracies, but also in far too many places where they lack equal opportunities to study and work.

Women journalists, advocates, politicians, and others are subject to persistent online harassment and abuse. Women who are victims of violence often do not have equal access to justice. Women are subject to discrimination that often puts them at a disadvantage whether through double standards they face in the workplace, in access to reproductive rights, or in nationality laws, which can result in barriers to accessing education, health care, and property for themselves and for their families, Blinken said.

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Photograph Source: Petty Officer 1st Class John Collins Public Domain

Being the scapegoat of tribal lore cast out with the heavy weight of sins remains a popular political motif. Supposedly noble soldiers, by way of example, are punished for not adhering to the rules of war. In breaching the codes of killing and the protocols of acceptable murder, they are banished from a realm supposedly wrapped in law. In doing so, commanding officers, policy makers and politicians are left, purified, their dirt shed.

In the context of war crimes, the subordinate and the minion often take centre stage, heaped upon with sins like a tribal scapegoat and sent out into the metaphorical, prison wild. For the moment, such a figure is Australian Special Air Service trooper Oliver Jordan Schulz. That he is the sole figure so far is not going to impress the fair minded, though there may be others to follow.

In a joint statement between the Office of the Special Investigator and the Australian Federal Police, Schulz is alleged to have murdered an Afghan man during the course of his deployment in Afghanistan with the Australian Defence Force. He is being charged with one count of War Crime, specifically murder under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The ABC reports that the victim was Dad Mohammad, slain in May 2012 in central Uruzgan province as he lay helpless in a wheat field.

Speaking in the Downing Centre local court on March 28, magistrate Jennifer Atkinson made a number of remarks. The executed man was quiet and not resisting. Schulz turns towards the Afghan man and shoots towards him three times. The man appears to go limp after the first shot.

Mohammad, according to the allegations against the defendant, was not taking an active part in the hostilities. The defendant knew, or was reckless as to the factual circumstances establishing that the person was not taking an active part in the hostilities.

The OSI was established to pursue the findings of the 2020 Brereton Report, also known by its lengthier title as the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Forces Afghanistan Inquiry Report. Sharing joint responsibility with the AFP, the office is charged with investigating allegations of criminal offences under Australian law, arising from or related to any breaches of the Laws of Armed Conflict, by members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in Afghanistan from 2005 and 2016.

The prosecution of Schulz is clearly designed to prevent the prying eyes from personnel based at the International Criminal Court. As a few legal authorities have written, It seems certain that Australia would not want ICC scrutiny of its conduct in Afghanistan nor the embarrassment of the ICC stepping in to prosecute Australian military personnel.

The prosecution is already attracting international attention. According to Human Rights Watch, it provides an important opportunity for authorities to uphold the rule of law by ensuring respect for the fair trial rights of the accused, including the presumption of innocence of any individual charged with criminal offense, and ensuring accountability for war crimes. It also sows the seeds of concern among the soldiers of other military forces deployed to Afghanistan during that same period.

The nagging worry here is that the military and political higher-ups are going to be given a convenient, well-oiled exoneration. Exonerated, the politicos and deskbound army wonks, who made critical decisions thousands of miles away, will be exempt, professing ignorance about the activities of a few bad apples in the Special Forces. Never mind why those apples were there in the first place.

The law will not necessarily be of much help here, beyond targeting the lower elements of foot soldiery. Doctrines of command responsibility require an adequate formulation of the guilty mind, otherwise known as mens rea. The pressing point in such a context is assessing what standard of knowledge is relevant: strict liability, constructive knowledge (that the commanders ought to have known about the crimes), or actual knowledge?

As Douglas Guilfoyle has observed, both the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and Australian law tend to exclude strict liability and actual knowledge, yet contain different formulations of what falls between. In a co-authored piece, Guilfoyle also notes that international law generally attaches liability to commanders who, given the circumstances, should have known crimes were being or had been committed.

The Brereton Report has done a remarkable disservice in shielding the chain of command in terms of operational awareness, and makes no mention of the political process that led to the deployment of such soldiers in Afghanistan in the first place. As the report improbably asserts, there was no evidence that there was knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the commission of war crimes, on the part of commanders at troop/platoon, squadron/company or Task Group Headquarters level, let alone at higher levels such as Joint Operations Command, or Australian Defence Command. Nor was there any failure at any of those levels to take reasonable and practical steps that would have prevented or detected the commission of war crimes.

The practice of frequently rotating commanders above the patrol level in the Afghanistan theatre, and the nature of how information was compartmentalised, have served to ignore culpability for practices in the field of battle.

This is not to say that a number of senior officers are not concerned by what Schulzs trial promises. As The Australian reports, citing a military source, Individuals who were commanding the soldier, right up the chain of command for as high as the defence team can justify, should reasonably expect to be called into court. The defence team could then point to various chain-of-command deficiencies, among them the practice of repeatedly redeploying special service soldiers despite concerns about their state of mind.

Exposing such practices, and their source, would not only be fitting but just. We are otherwise faced with that convenient and all too regular spectacle: that of a soldier punished in isolation from the war machine that emboldened him to kill in the first place.

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Calculated Exoneration: Command Responsibility and War Crimes ... - CounterPunch