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Rahmat Mokhtar, 34, hopes to soon become a U.S. citizen. Mokhtar worked as translator for the U.S. Army and Marines. In 2016 his visa to travel to the U.S. was approved, and he soon arrived in El Cajon, Calif. (Nelvin C. Cepeda, The San Diego Union-Tribune/TNS)

SAN DIEGO (Tribune News Service) Zohal Abdurahmanhas been waiting for three years to bring her brother-in-law to safety inthe United States.

And now that theU.S.military is leavingAfghanistan, the wait has reached new levels of urgency.

Her brother-in-law, who is not being named due to threats on his life, fought alongsideU.S.troops over the past decade and specialized in disarming explosives. He is still inAfghanistanwaiting on a special immigrant visa often referred to as an SIV that would allow him, his wife and their children to come live inSan Diegoand protect them from potential retaliation for the work that he did.

Abdurahmans brother-in-law is one among thousands still inAfghanistanwho helped theU.S.military and are now watching the days count down to PresidentJoe Bidensdeadline for troops to leave with increased worry that they will be left behind bythe United States and then tortured and killed by theTaliban.

Its one thing dying on duty, thats like an honor. If hes caught, they will literally mutilate his body, torture him as much as they possibly can, Abdurahman said. Thats what scares him and scares the rest of the family.

More than 300 people who worked as interpreters for theU.S.military, or family members of those interpreters, have been killed inAfghanistansince 2014, according to advocacy group No One Left Behind.

And though Bidens initial deadline gives the military until September to exitAfghanistan, reports have since indicated troops could be gone as soon as next month.

Bipartisan groups in both theSenateandHousehave sent letters to theWhite Houseadvocating for people like Abdurahmans brother-in-law. But with backlogs in processing these visas and rules restricting who can get them and the quantity given, many who helpedthe United Statesare likely to remain there unless something changes.

Three-year wait

The program is supposed to take no more than nine months, but the average wait time for SIVs at the beginning of 2021 was nearly three years, according toState Departmentdocuments.

The Biden administration has expressed support for interpreters and other Afghans who worked with theU.S., but it has not made clear what plans it has, if any, to protect them.

When asked about the issue, Pentagon press secretaryJohn Kirbysaidthat any changes to the program would have to be worked out between theState DepartmentandCongress.

The president has been clear. We have a moral obligation to these people, Kirby told reporters. He wants to take a fresh look at the SIV program to see how and to what degree it could be expanded and/or accelerated.

State DepartmentspokesmanNed Pricesaid that the department has increased staffing levels in bothWashingtonandKabulto work on SIV processing.

When it comes to SIVs, weve said this before, but we understand and we recognize that we have a special commitment and a special responsibility to the many Afghans who, over the years, have at great risk to themselves and even to their families have assistedthe United Statesin our efforts inAfghanistan, Price said. We are always seeking ways to improve the SIV process while ensuring the integrity of the program and safeguarding our national security and affording opportunities to these Afghans.

Abdurahmans brother-in-law got laid off last month as part of the withdrawal. Without hisU.S.colleagues, he already feels less safe, Abdurahman said.

He is already close to the end of the process. He and his family had their medical screenings in May, one of the final steps in the 14-part process outlined inState Departmentrecords. Hes just waiting to have the visa in his hands so he can leave.

Were just literally praying day and night that he gets his visa, Abdurahman said. We told him, Youre not bringing anything. If youre going to pack anything, pack now because as soon as you get your visa, youre coming here.

Even the distribution of visas once theyre approved is backlogged because theU.S.embassy there has been closed for much of the pandemic, according toJames Miervaldis, chairman of the board for No One Left Behind.

And while Abdurahmans family is close to the end of the process, many others have much less hope of getting out of the country in time.

Ali Rasouly, 39, andRahmat Mokhtar, 34, both know that anxiety well.

They worked as interpreters with theMarines, and both managed to get through the SIV process and resettle inEl Cajon.

Since fiscal year 2016, more than 2,400 people fromAfghanistan a combination of SIVs and refugees have resettled inSan Diego County, according toAbdi Abdillahi, county refugee coordinator.

Deadly secret

Rasouly waited about five years for his visa, he said. During that time, he was constantly moving, keeping his family in hiding to avoid being killed during the wait.

When he worked with the military, he kept his face covered so that he wouldnt be recognized. But sometimes neighbors or other observers would still figure out his secret, even in the time that he stopped working for the military to be an accountant. Each time, he quickly and quietly moved, sometimes to an entirely different province.

And though Rasouly and Mokhtar are now safe, their worries are not over.

They have parents, siblings and other family left behind, and on top of their concerns about theTalibanconnecting their families to their work with theU.S., they have another reason to be afraid for their loved ones. Rasouly and Mokhtar are part of the Hazara ethnic group that has been and continues to be targeted for persecution.

That persecution has been going on for centuries, Mokhtar said, referring to it as a genocide. Frequent news of suicide bombings targeting Hazara make him feel physically sick with worry.

Its super complicated and stressful, Mokhtar said. I cannot live it every day, and I cannot forget it. Its like a nightmare. Its like a coffin on my shoulder and following me, and Im carrying it everywhere.

Neither Mokhtar nor Rasouly have becomeU.S.citizens yet a process that has its own backlog and requires a five-year wait after getting a green card so they are not able to sponsor visas for their family members back inAfghanistan. Even when they do becomeU.S.citizens, that process would take many years because of country caps and additional backlogs in the family-sponsored visa queue.

Rasouly and Mokhtar hope that in addition to helping interpreters and others who worked in service to theU.S.leaveAfghanistan,the United Stateswill find a way to prioritize helping Hazara people leave.

On Saturday, about 100 people of Hazara descent who have settled in theSan Diegoarea demonstrated outside the County Administration Center to call for the formal recognition of Hazara genocide.

In the past 24 hours there have been four attacks in our very small area inAfghanistan, said participantAli Changiz Yasa, an English language teacher who worked with theU.S.military inAfghanistanas an interpreter and cultural adviser before fleeing toSan Diego.

The withdrawal ofU.S.forces will leave us once again under suppression and extreme oppression, he added.

TheState Departmenttold theSan Diego Union-Tribuneon background that there will be humanitarian and development assistance programs meant to support the rights of Hazaras, among other groups, after the troops are gone.

Veterans urge action

Some of the most vocal advocates for bringing people like Rasouly and Mokhtar and their families tothe United Statesare theU.S.military veterans who worked with them.

What we really ought to be doing is an immediate evacuation of these folks, saidShawn Vandiver, aNavyveteran and co-founder of theTruman National Security Projectchapter inSan Diego. We should be totally eliminating the cap on SIVs and immediately processing them. These folks served alongside us. They were armed. They killed their fellow countrymen while wearing uniforms withU.S.service members. Theyve already been vetted. Give them another quick background check, and get them over here.

Referencing what happened whenthe United Statespulled out ofVietnam a move that beganSan Diegoslong history of receiving refugees he suggested that theU.S.military transport Afghans to a safe place to finish any processing.

Our system is so broken that people are dying all the time over there, Vandiver said.

When asked recently about the possibility of evacuations, Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, said that there are contingency plans for evacuations in different parts of the world, includingAfghanistan.

We have put some planning resources to this, no question, Kirby said. But there has been no tasking to carry such an evacuation out on any scale right now. And if that tasking comes, we will be ready to execute.

Amber Robinson, 43, ofChula Vista, served in theU.S. Armyfor 10 years and feels conflicted about the withdrawal, knowing that it will likely mean more harm to Afghan civilians, particularly women and girls, while also recognizing the human cost of continued war.

So many of my fellow veterans, were torn. Were just absolutely torn. I know thats how I feel, Robinson said. Weve just gone over and over and over again, and were used up. Were just exhausted. So when is enough enough?

But on the issue of SIVs, her feelings are much more straightforward.

They all have come over here just for safety. Its just so dangerous for them to stay, Robinson said. I shudder to think whats going to happen to everybody.

Staff photographerNelvin C. Cepedacontributed to this report.

(c)2021 The San Diego Union-Tribune

Visit The San Diego Union-Tribune at http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Continued here:
stripes - Fear mounts for many with loved ones left in Afghanistan as US begins to leave - Stars and Stripes

In April, President Joe Biden announced he would withdraw Americas 2,500 combat troops from Afghanistan before Sept. 11, 2021. Supporters praised the move for finally closing the book on Americas longest war and allowing Washington, in the words of Democratic Senator Tim Kaine, to refocus American national security on the most pressing challenges we face. Meanwhile, critics denounced the decision as reckless and dangerous. Former secretary of state Hillary Clintonwarned it could have huge consequences, including a surge in global terrorism and a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Writing in War on the Rocks, Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware argued that withdrawal will be universally seen as defeat, thereby making America less safe.

Both sides of this debate, however, tend to exaggerate the importance of the U.S. troop departure. The key to the war in Afghanistan is not American soldiers but American dollars. The Biden administration should couple the withdrawal of soldiers with a long-term commitment to monetary aid which prioritizes sustainability, avoids unrealistic conditions, and shares the burden with foreign donors.

Small Footprint

U.S. forces in Afghanistan are doing valuable work mainly, training and advising Afghan troops. The American departure also means the withdrawal of the roughly 7,000-strong NATO-led contingent in the country. But the fixation on the number of U.S. soldiers reflects a certain strategic narcissism the American belief that the presence (or absence) of Americans is the decisive factor in any conflict combined with the medias disinterest in wars where Americans are not directly involved in the fighting.

In truth, there are stark limits on what a small U.S. and allied force can achieve in a country of nearly 40 million people that faces a nationwide rebellion. The current number of U.S. soldiers is the same as the enrollment in a large American high school and pales in comparison to the 300,000-strong Afghan security forces or the Talibans estimated 60,000 core fighters.

Furthermore, the departure of U.S. soldiers does not mean the end of Americas physical presence in Afghanistan. The CIA has reportedly deployed hundreds of covert operatives in Afghanistan to target al-Qaeda and ISIL. A smaller detachment of U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan beyond September 2021 to protect diplomatic facilities like the U.S. embassy. There are even creative ways to boost troop numbers beyond the official headcount. The true U.S. deployment was recently reported to be 3,500 rather than 2,500. In other words, the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is already small and will get smaller but is not about to disappear entirely.

Mo Money, Mo Problems

The vital factor in shaping the fate of Afghanistan is not foreign troops but foreign aid. In recent years, Washington has given Afghanistan around $4 billion in security assistance and $500 million in civilian aid. Of this, $3 billion is used to bankroll the Afghan military, covering everything from salaries to helicopters. Since the war began, the United States has spent around $140 billion on aid to Afghanistan. Other countries also contribute, for example, through the World Banks Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but the United States is by far the biggest donor.

U.S. aid to Afghanistan may be the most inefficient assistance program in the world. Stories of shocking mismanagement are rife, such as the industrial-scale theft of U.S.-provided fuel, the construction of a dining facility that didnt include a kitchen, or the $6.7 million compound for Afghan women police that was never used. One review found that 30 percent of American aid was lost to waste, fraud, and abuse. Foreign assistance can backfire by creating patronage opportunities for corrupt officials, dividing Afghan communities, and boosting the Taliban. American officials struggle to even know whether aid works or not, and they sometimes evaluate the effectiveness of assistance programs using dubious metrics like the amount of money spent.

Unsurprisingly, given these problems, foreign aid to Afghanistan has gradually declined, both in terms of the dollar amount and the length of commitments. In 2020, donors at the Afghanistan Conference in Geneva pledged $1213 billion for the period 2021 to 2024, a decrease of around 20 percent from the $15.2 billion that was promised for 2017 to 2020. Whereas the norm had previously been to make four-year pledges, Washington has now made any payments beyond 2021 conditional on consistent progress on transparency and accountability, as well as on the peace process, on the part of the Afghan government.

Political pressures in Washington cast even greater doubt over the future of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. American aid faces a potential pincer attack from both the right and left. Conservatives are often skeptical of foreign aid as big government handouts: a kind of diplomatic Obamacare. Meanwhile, some on the left see foreign aid especially military aid as a form of imperialism that fuels the violence, lines the pockets of the military-industrial complex, and extends Americas forever wars. Given competing budget pressures, from tackling a rising China to domestic priorities, the idea of sending billions of taxpayer dollars indefinitely to Afghanistan may be tough to swallow. Its hard enough to agree on infrastructure spending in America, never mind in Afghanistan.

Its the Economic Aid, Stupid!

Yet despite its problems and unpopularity, foreign aid is indispensable to the future of Afghanistan. In the ninth most fragile state in the world, unfortunately, inefficiency goes with the terrain. In the end, what matters is not whether the aid machine runs smoothly. What matters is its net effect. The assistance program in Afghanistan may be the most wasteful around the globe, but it could also be the most valuable. After all, foreign aid is the main barrier preventing a Taliban victory. Kabul raises just $2.5 billion in revenue every year and spends $11 billion the other three-quarters of the budget comes from foreign donations. In 2018, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani said the Afghan army could not survive six months without assistance: [W]e dont have the money.

Turning off the spigot of assistance would likely trigger the collapse of the regime and allow the Taliban to capture much of the country, including Kabul. In turn, a Taliban triumph would have devastating humanitarian consequences in Afghanistan and could spur a blame game in the United States that would further inflame American politics and divide the United States from its allies.

By contrast, if the foreign aid keeps flowing, the Afghan government has a reasonable shot at survival. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989 after a decade of brutal warfare, many observers believed that Moscows client regime in Kabul would quickly fall to the insurgents. But the rebels were a disparate coalition that was bonded together by the shared Soviet enemy. When the Red Army departed, the insurgency splintered, and Kabul cut deals with local rebel commanders. Crucially, Moscow continued to supply aid to Kabul, including a weekly convoy of hundreds of trucks of weapons, fuel, and food. In the end, the Afghan regime survived longer than the Soviet Union itself and only disintegrated in 1992 when Moscow finally cut off support. Today, the withdrawal of foreign forces may also cause the glue bonding the Taliban together to come unstuck and create opportunities to drive a wedge into rebel ranks.

For all its flaws, foreign aid has helped spur impressive gains in Afghanistan, including a dramatic fall in infant and maternal mortality, huge advances in childhood education (especially for girls), and the construction of infrastructure like roads. In the last 20 years, Afghan life expectancy has jumped almost a decade, from 56 to 65 years.

The Price of Peace

What should Washington do? The United States has real, if moderate, interests in Afghanistan stabilizing the region, countering extremist groups, fulfilling a moral obligation to the Afghan people, and averting a Taliban triumph. These interests do not justify anything close to the peak U.S. commitment during the 20092012 Afghan surge, when Washington deployed 100,000 U.S. soldiers and spent over $100 billion per year. But they do justify a sustained program of American financial assistance. As a result, the Biden administration should build domestic support, among both Democrats and Republicans, for a withdrawal of U.S. troops combined with a long-term program of aid.

First, Washington should commit to a four-year plan of military and civilian assistance to signal that America intends to back Afghanistan for the long haul. The most effective way to encourage the Taliban to embrace peace talks is to alter their expectations about the future and diminish their confidence in an easy victory. Guaranteeing the flow of aid means that the Taliban may face a painful stalemate, boosting the attraction of a negotiated deal.

Second, Washington should focus on building sustainable military and civilian capabilities. There is little point in constructing a high-tech Afghan air force that cannot operate without American know-how. Rather, the key is to shore up the Afghan armys basic functionality for example, paying soldiers salaries in a timely manner to reduce attrition rates. Civilian aid should also be targeted toward areas of greatest need or projects with a track record of success for example, strengthening the Afghan Ministry of Finance so the country can eventually pay its own way or boosting the World Banks Citizens Charter Afghanistan Project, which delivers social services to local communities through elected community development councils.

Third, its important to establish conditions on aid without treating these requirements as a silver bullet. Monitoring projects effectively is necessary to convince taxpayers their dollars are being put to good use. After all, nearly one-third of U.S.-funded capital assets in Afghanistan weremisused, unused, or abandoned sometimes because the asset was destroyed by natural forces or war but often because the beneficiary was unable to maintain the asset or because U.S. officials failed to ensure the asset was constructed according to guidelines. But conditionality on aid should not be prioritized so much that it undermines the aids effectiveness. For instance, one study found that [s]ome benchmarks are largely irrelevant to achieving real progress. Furthermore, conditionality is essentially a threat to withhold aid which may serve to embolden the Taliban and increase Afghanistans need for support. In addition, conditionality can create perverse incentives. In 2020, Washington announced that future civilian assistance to Afghanistan would depend on progress in the peace process. But tying aid to advances in peace talks may encourage the Taliban to play spoiler and keep fighting. Similarly, the Afghanistan Partnership Framework, agreed to by Kabul and outside donors in 2020, made future foreign aid conditional on a peace settlement that lives up to highly idealistic principles, including democracy, human rights, and gender equality. Some compromise on these values is probably necessary to forge a deal with the ultra-conservative Taliban and donor righteousness is the ticket to forever war.

Fourth, at a time of budget pressure, its important to keep international donors on board. Fortunately, key partners like the European Union, Japan, and Norway remain committed to Afghan aid and, in 2020, largely stuck to previous funding levels and the traditional four-year program, albeit with a greater emphasis on conditionality. What about China? Wider strategic competition between Washington and Beijing undeniably complicates cooperation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this could be a case where the great powers can act in cautious partnership. The United States and China share an interest in tackling extremism, while Beijing has the capacity to invest in Afghanistan through the Belt and Road Initiative. Afghanistan is far from an existential threat to either great power, and Washington can tolerate a modest growth of Chinese influence in the country.

A U.S. aid program to Afghanistan of around $45 billion per year is affordable even indefinitely so. The figure equates to less than one percent of the U.S. defense budget. Indeed, to put the number in perspective, Washington spends over $300 million every year just on military bands. The aid program is also much cheaper than deploying U.S. troops. Washington can pay for around 50 to 100 Afghan soldiers for the same cost as stationing a single American soldier there (about $1 million per year). The aid program is only a tiny fraction of the expenditure in Afghanistan a decade ago.

Continuing aid to Afghanistan does not guarantee success, but curtailing aid guarantees failure. $4 billion is a lot of money. But it buys Washington a reasonable chance at creating military deadlock in Afghanistan, forcing the Taliban to make peace, and avoiding a repeat of Saigon 1975, with all the associated trauma and recrimination.

Dominic Tierney is a professor of political science at Swarthmore College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has published four books most recently, The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (Little, Brown, & Co., 2015). His work has also appeared in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, NPR, and various academic journals.

Image: U.S. Central Command (Photo by 1st Lt. Verniccia Ford)

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The Future of Afghanistan Hinges on American Dollars, Not Troops - War on the Rocks

A worrisome dimension of Al Qaedas strengthening of relations with the Taliban has been confirmed by the 18-member UN Monitoring Team. The report observes that not only the two outfits remain closely aligned but their relationship has grown deeper as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in the struggle, now cemented through the second generational ties. Several top commanders of the Al Qaeda continue to be given shelter and protection by the Taliban.

Assessing the geographical reach of the Al Qaeda, the report points out that it is mainly in 15 districts in east, southern and southern-eastern, and are led by Al Qaedas Jabhat-al-Nusra wing under the direction of Sheikh Mahmood. It is also known by other names as well viz. the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Al-Qaeda in Syria or Al-Qaeda in the Levant. This faction is a Salafist jihadist organization fighting against Syrian government forces in the Syrian Civil War with the aim to establish an Islamic state in the country.

Another disquieting aspect brought out by this report is that the above-mentioned faction is also maintaining close links with the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). The report brings out that the core of the Al Qaeda remains in the bordering region of Afghanistan with Pakistan and works closely with AQIS. The AQIS has cadres mainly from Pakistan and Afghanistan with some from India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. It was earlier led by late Asim Umar and is now headed by Osama Mehmood. Asim Umar belonged to a respectable family in UP with his great grand-father being the District Magistrate during the colonial period.The group is reported to be organically linked with Taliban and it is difficult to separate them from the Taliban allies. The report gives three important pieces of evidence to indicate their nexus. First, it pointed out that the wife of the former leader of AQIS, Asim Umar, was among 5,000 Taliban prisoners freed by the Afghan Government in 2020 as part of the Doha agreement. Second, several Al Qaeda cadres were also reported to have been killed in the attacks launched by US led operations. Third, that the AQIS operates under the Taliban umbrella from Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz Provinces.

The Taliban use Haqqanis faction to deal with Al Qaeda according to the report. Crucially the report mentions that the Taliban is increasing its grip over the Al Qaeda and is keeping a strict watch on the foreign terrorists in the outfit.

According to the report, the immediate objective of the Al Qaeda is to ensure safe heavens in Afghanistan under the new dispensation and therefore they are deliberately lying low as a part of strategic patience. The Al Qaeda does not wish to let others know about its linkages with the Taliban as that could jeopardise the diplomatic position of the Taliban under the Doha agreement. The report also points out the presence of Al Zawahiri in the region. Al Zawahiri in the past had often raised the Kashmir Issue. In 2019, in a speech, he brought to light Pakistans involvement in fuelling the cross-border terrorism in a message titled Dont forget Kashmir. He had exhorted the mujahideen to inflict unrelenting blows on the Indian Army and J&K government.

While Taliban have assured the US that it would not allow the Al Qaeda to operate from Afghanistan to attack the US targets, the report expresses it doubts if the Taliban could live up to their commitment. Given the close links and continued attacks on the Afghan National Forces, such a suspicion is bound to be there.Importantly, the report provides the larger picture of the role of ISIL. It says that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K)s regional strategy is to coordinate the activities of all insurgent groups. It covers the Khorasan region of Central and South Asia (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Central Asian Republics). Since June 2020, ISIL-K has had an ambitious new leader, Shahab al-Muhajir, who is not listed, and it remains active and dangerous. There is a distinct possibility that it can recruit disaffected Taliban and other militants to swell its ranks and pose a serious security challenge in the region.

A related aspect is the role of Pakistan in the continuation of violence. The Afghan National government leaders have often accused Pakistan for the continuation of bloodshed. Last month, the Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib in a public speech at Nangahar province at the border of Pakistan not only alleged the Pak role in the continuing attacks by the Taliban at the Afghan National Forces and other targets, but called Pakistan a brothel house. His remarks outraged leaders in Islamabad, who denounced him.

Pak PM Imran Khan is assiduously trying to remove the impression that Pak has any hand in it. Khan said Pakistan would suffer the most, after Afghanistan itself, if there was civil war and a refugee crisis, while pointing out that after the US has indicated its decision to withdraw its forces by Sept 11, it is not easy to get concessions from the Taliban. He stated: There is a lot of fear right now in Pakistan and I assure you that we are trying our level best that there is some sort of political settlement before the Americans leave. However, impression in Kabul remains unchanged over the Pak support to the Taliban.

Overall, the situation remains extremely menacing and volatile with the violence level increasing continuously. The report points that failure to arrive at an agreement to form a strong and stable government, could spur the growth of ISIL and Al Qaeda in different parts of the world. The report also observed the concerns of member states about the rising number of ISIL sympathisers in cyber space. This aspect requires a greater focus in view of systematic misuse of social media platforms by adversaries to incite the targets sections and recruit them for causing communal violence. For India, the growing nexus between the different outfits has a serious security implication.

Views expressed above are the author's own.

END OF ARTICLE

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UN report on growing Taliban-Al Qaeda-ISIS nexus in Afghanistan-Pakistan region: Implications - Economic Times

A UN Security Council monitoring team for Afghanistan has warned that the Taleban is well poised to make a grab for power in Kabul after the US completes its ongoing withdrawal in September.

Key Taleban leaders "oppose peace talks and favour a military solution", the report said.

The Taleban already has direct control over more than half of Afghanistan's district administrative centres, while contesting or controlling up to 70 per cent of territory outside urban areas, according to the report.

Moreover, the ultra-conservative Taleban, which calls itself the Islamic Emirate, and Al-Qaeda "remain closely aligned and show no indication of breaking ties".

There has been "no material change to this relationship, which has grown deeper as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in struggle, now cemented through second-generational ties".

The Taleban swiftly rejected the report by the UN Security Council's Analytic Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team last Tuesday and made public the next day.

"Unfortunately, this report has been compiled on the basis of false information from enemy intelligence agencies," said Taleban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.

"Representatives of the Islamic Emirate are also fully prepared for the inter-Afghan negotiating table, in order to make progress in the negotiations and implement all the clauses," he said.

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taleban for sheltering Al-Qaeda, which carried out the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America.

President Joe Biden last month set a deadline of Sept 1 for withdrawing an estimated 2,500 American troops, along with those of Nato partners. The withdrawal is well under way.

But the 2020 Doha Agreement, which paved the way for this transition, states: "A comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement will include guarantees to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any international terrorist groups or individuals against the security of the United States and its allies."

Analysts watching Afghanistan agree with the UN report.

"It's a little late," tweeted Ms Farahnaz Ispahani, senior fellow at the Religious Freedom Institute and public policy fellow at the Wilson Centre.

"The Taleban have not given up on anything," Dr Aparna Pande, research fellow and director of the Hudson Institute's Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, told The Sunday Times. "They don't believe in power-sharing and have shown no intention of breaking ties with Al-Qaeda."

Just last month, the Taleban warned neighbours against allowing the US to use their territory or air space for military operations in Afghanistan. This came amid plans by the Pentagon to reposition some troops in the region to carry out counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan even after the US exit.

Mr Bill Roggio, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, warned last Thursday that the Afghan government is "slowly but clearly losing ground to the Taleban".

The same day, the Taleban captured another district in central Uruzgan province, he noted.

Al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan has been confirmed by its own media wings; its Thabat newsletter has listed Al-Qaeda attacks since 2020 in 18 provinces, the United Nations report noted.

It said: "Al-Qaeda is resident in at least 15 Afghan provinces, primarily in the east, southern and south-eastern regions.

"Al-Qaeda, including Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, is reported to number several dozen to 500 persons. The group's leader, Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri, is believed to be located somewhere in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Previous reports of his death due to ill health have not been confirmed."

Al-Qaeda's near-term strategy has been assessed as maintaining its traditional safe haven in Afghanistan for its core leadership, and it maintains contact with the Taleban but has minimised overt communications in an effort to "lay low", it added.

"It will be important for the international community to monitor any sign of Afghanistan again becoming a destination for extremists with both regional and international agendas," the report warned.

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Taleban well-poised to take over in Afghanistan: Report - The Straits Times

The planned withdrawal of all U.S. and European troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021 will probably allow the Taliban to reconquer Afghanistan and impose a strict Islamist regime within the country, and establish terrorist organizations devoted to attacking the United States.

The Taliban followers are terrorists who are aligned with al-Qaida, and they are the same groups who have launched terrorist attacks in the world over the past 30 years, including the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

We need to keep adequate military forces in the region outside of Afghanistan to counter Taliban and al-Qaida moves in Afghanistan and to keep them off balance to prevent attacks against us.

Approximately 3,000 U.S. troops should be based on the Arabian peninsula in case they are needed as a quick reaction force. U.S. Special Forces in the region will probably have to be beefed up.

We need ground assault aircraft available in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, a squadron of B-52s should be based in the region.

A U.S. Navy carrier battle group and an amphibious assault force must be deployed in the region to provide the capabilities for air bombardment and missile attacks as necessary.

The Taliban are the enemy and must be treated as such.

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Dangerous withdrawal from Afghanistan | News, Sports, Jobs - The Express - Lock Haven Express