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A Black Hawk helicopter flies over the site of a Taliban suicide attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on Aug. 2. Javed Tanveer/AFP/Getty Images hide caption

A Black Hawk helicopter flies over the site of a Taliban suicide attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on Aug. 2.

President Trump's calculation about Afghanistan boils down to a familiar question in U.S. national security: Of all the bad options, what's the least worst?

Trump, Vice President Pence and other national security team members are scheduled to convene at Camp David on Friday to review the next phase of the nearly 16-year war.

Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters at the Pentagon this week that all options remain in play as the White House weighs a long-awaited new strategy.

Trump could authorize a new deployment of more American troops to continue the approach the U.S. has taken all along. Or he could try to shift the burden so that more of it falls on private security contractors. Or he could authorize something like a gradual withdrawal or cut bait entirely.

None of those choices would bring victory or end the conflict, and each one has its downsides. As the summer wears on, however, observers worry that whatever the Trump administration decides, it's taking too long.

"It is doing just what it should not do," wrote defense scholar Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It is letting the situation steadily deteriorate and is losing by negligence and default."

The problem is not new: Afghanistan is a house that can stand only if the United States remains in the corner holding up the roof.

Its government cannot afford the military and security infrastructure built by Washington and other international donors. The Afghan military and police cannot hold their own against the Taliban and other insurgents they've been battling for nearly two decades. Billions of dollars of international aid have been squandered.

The U.S. intelligence community assessed years ago that if or when the United States withdrew its support, the Afghan government would most likely collapse. The question is how badly and how quickly.

Top American commanders say the conflict is in "stalemate"; Trump is said to have complained that the U.S. is "losing."

A new troop deployment could keep the war on a low boil but preserve the status quo or even claw back some previous security gains at greater risk to the larger population of American troops and the increased costs associated with a larger troop presence.

Switching to larger numbers of military contractors could usher in an unprecedented new era in which Washington more or less privatized a major arena of national security policy. That might pose fewer risks to American troops, but it would likely still be expensive and certainly still dangerous for the mercenaries who took over.

A withdrawal is the least certain, and potentially most dramatic, of all the options said to be under consideration. The devil, as ever, would be in the details.

President Barack Obama wanted to reduce the American military presence in Afghanistan to just a standard embassy detachment, but he had to backtrack from that plan toward the end of his tenure when it became clear that the dangers were too great from the Taliban and terrorist forces.

Mattis and Pentagon leaders appear to continue to hold that view, as may national security adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster. They pushed to deploy nearly 4,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan earlier this year to join the current force of about 8,500 in helping train the indigenous forces and fight insurgents and terrorists.

Trump and his top political advisers, however, are said to question whether the status quo is worth preserving if it won't bring the war any closer to a satisfactory end. The United States couldn't set the Afghan government up to succeed and defeat its enemies with 100,000 troops under Obama, so a much smaller bump would almost certainly not be decisive.

Trump has been described as bitterly frustrated with the war and his options, to the point where he has aired firing the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson. The general so far remains in his job but the White House also has delayed rolling out a new strategy for Afghanistan that was expected early this summer, which was supposed to outline the mission for any additional troops.

Mattis said this week that Nicholson "is our commander in the field, he has the confidence of NATO, he has the confidence of Afghanistan, he has the confidence of the United States."

But there are more signs that Trump is fed up with the generals. He even hosted a group of lower-ranking service members at the White House in July to ask them for their take on what he should do.

"We're going to be getting some ideas because we've been there it's our longest war we've been there for many years ... and I want to find out why," he said.

The White House did not disclose what advice the troops gave the president, but Trump and his advisers are said to look hard at this bottom line: If Afghanistan is unwinnable, why prolong the danger to American forces and the cost associated with deploying them?

Why not just rip off the Band-Aid?

Simply deciding to do so would not be enough, however. The White House would need to determine how to achieve its ends.

Trump could let Afghanistan down easy: preserve financial support for the government in Kabul, ask to keep some American warplanes and drones in key bases and continue targeting the most dangerous terrorist groups but get most U.S. troops out.

Supporters of a withdrawal make the case that decreasing American support for Afghanistan effectively imposes costs on nearby Iran, China and Russia. That could be worth doing for its own sake, in this view "forcing the countries that do have major strategic interests in the region to take on the burden or live with the consequences," as CSIS's Cordesman wrote.

The Afghan government might have a great deal to say about all this. And it might not agree to permit U.S. forces to keep access to only the bases that Washington wants if American troops are withdrawing from everywhere else.

If that means a breach with Kabul and full-scale "retrograde," as military planners would say, it would start the clock on a dark new era for Afghanistan. Taliban and terrorist insurgents would press their gains across the country and put intense new pressure on the more populated areas controlled by the central government.

But the terrorism threat in 2017 is different from 2001, when the U.S. invaded. Extremist groups have proliferated in the Middle East and North Africa, but they are divided and, say U.S. national security officials, less capable of launching a major attack.

Former CIA Director John Brennan told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum that although homegrown extremists or small-scale attacks remain dangerous, he believes the U.S. and its allies could disrupt or prevent something as large as another Sept. 11 plot.

Or so the U.S. and Western governments might hope. In terms of terrorism, abandoning Afghanistan might amount to a roll of the dice.

Separate from the geopolitical and security implications, the biggest consideration for Trump and his advisers are the politics. How much do Americans care?

If the old conventional wisdom was that a president didn't want to "lose" Afghanistan in the way that the U.S. "lost" Vietnam or the way critics blamed Obama for the rise of the Islamic State after the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2011 does that still apply?

Most Americans are disconnected from the war in Afghanistan. Only a small minority have served there or know someone who has. And even though U.S. casualties do continue 10 service members have been killed in Afghanistan so far this year the war keeps well off the front page and almost never gets onto TV. Obama himself claimed to have "ended" combat in Afghanistan.

So the question for Trump is whether he would pay any political price for pulling the plug on a conflict that many Americans already ignore, or whether the risks from a crumbling Afghanistan would be so great it's wiser to keep the war going behind the scenes.

Mattis told reporters the research and analysis behind the menu of choices for Trump is complete. What remains, he said, is for the president to pick.

"We're sharpening each one of the options so you can see the pluses and minuses of each one, so that there's no longer any new data you're going to get," Mattis said. "Now just make the decision."

Original post:
Behind The Scenes, A Major Choice Looms On Afghanistan - NPR

The U.S. military says an American soldier was killed and several others wounded in a battle with Islamic State militants in eastern Afghanistan.

The military said in a statement that several Afghan forces were also wounded in the fighting Wednesday in the Achin district of the Nangarhar province, a militant stronghold. It did not specify how many forces were wounded.

Islamic State militants have gained a foothold in recent years in Afghanistan, where they have battled U.S.-backed government forces as well as the more established Taliban.

The Islamic State affiliate largely consists of disgruntled former Taliban insurgents, and has clashed with the larger group over leadership and ideology.

Elsewhere in Afghanistan, a suicide car bomber killed three civilians while trying to attack an Afghan army base in the southern Helmand province late Wednesday.

Omar Zwak, spokesman for the provincial governor, said the attacker and three other militants approached the base before guards opened fire on them, killing the three who were on foot. Three soldiers were wounded in the blast.

In southern Kandahar province, Taliban fighters stormed police checkpoints in two districts late Wednesday, killing seven police and wounding nine others, according to Zia Durani, spokesman for the provincial governor. He said 19 Taliban were killed in the ensuing clashes.

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Originally posted here:
US soldier killed in battle with Islamic State in Afghanistan - Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON After months of sometimes heated internal debate, the Trump administration has almost reached a decision on a new approach for fighting the 16-year-old war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Thursday. He gave no hint of what the strategy would look like.

In remarks at the State Department, Mattis told reporters President Donald Trump will confer with his national security team Friday at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, and said the talks will move this toward a decision.

We are coming very close to a decision, and I anticipate it in the very near future, he added.

The U.S. has about 8,400 troops in Afghanistan. Their primary roles are to train and advise Afghan forces and to hunt down and kill members of al-Qaida and other extremist groups.

Months ago the Pentagon had settled on a plan to send approximately 3,800 additional troops to help strengthen the Afghan army, which is stuck in what some call a deteriorating stalemate with the Taliban insurgency. Some in the White House have questioned the wisdom of investing further resources in the war, which is the longest in American history.

The administration has said its Afghanistan strategy will be informed by a review of its approach to the broader region, including Pakistan and India. The Taliban have long used Pakistan as a sanctuary, complicating efforts to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan and stabilize the country.

The outlook in Afghanistan is clouded by the governments struggle to halt Taliban advances on its own. In its most recent report, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said the Taliban hold sway in almost half the country.

READ MORE: U.S. still debating big ideas on Afghan plan, says Mattis

Government forces also are battling an Islamic State affiliate that has carved out a foothold mostly in eastern Afghanistan. Trump has vowed to crush IS, so the affiliate in Afghanistan poses an additional challenge with no immediate solution. Just this week, a U.S. soldier was killed and nearly a dozen were wounded in combat with the IS affiliate.

The U.S. has about 8,400 troops in Afghanistan. Their primary roles are to train and advise Afghan forces and to hunt down and kill members of al-Qaida and other extremist groups.

Trump has expressed frustration at the prolonged fighting in Afghanistan. Earlier this summer he raised the idea of firing the top U.S. commander there, Gen. John Nicholson. On July 18, he said, I want to find out why weve been there for 17 years.

MORE: Criticizing Trump, McCain proposes new Afghanistan strategy

Asked Monday if Trump has confidence in Nicholson, Mattis demurred.

Ask the president, Mattis said. I will tell you right now, he is our commander in the field, he has the confidence of NATO, he has the confidence of Afghanistan, he has the confidence of the United States.

Trump is looking at all aspects of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan as he must in his responsibilities as the commander in chief, Mattis said.

We are losing in Afghanistan and time is of the essence if we intend to turn the tide.

Lawmakers in Congress also are frustrated by the war and the prolonged debate within the administration on how to break the stalemate. Last week, Republican Sen. John McCain declared that America is adrift in Afghanistan. He proposed a war strategy that would expand the U.S. counterterrorism effort and provide greater support to Afghan security forces.

Nearly seven months into President Trumps administration, weve had no strategy at all as conditions on the ground have steadily worsened, said McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The thousands of Americans putting their lives on the line in Afghanistan deserve better from their commander in chief.

McCain said bluntly, We are losing in Afghanistan and time is of the essence if we intend to turn the tide.

Read the original here:
WATCH: Mattis says US is close to new approach in Afghanistan - PBS NewsHour

Monticello soldier. (Photo: courtesy Butler family)

(KUTV) The family of a Utah soldier killed in Afghanistan this week has identified him as Aaron Butler, 27, from Monticello.

Butler, a Special Forces soldier with the Utah National Guard, died Tuesday night when he entered a booby-trapped building with his twelve-member team.

Aaron was absolutely fearless, selfless, courageous and relentless, said his father, Randy Butler.

The Butler family has released the following statement to 2News Thursday morning:

The Army values are: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless-Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage. Aaron Butler personified those values in everything he said and did.

In a life that was all too brief, our dear son and brother made the ultimate sacrifice for his country. While we are heartbroken to become a Gold Star family, we honor Aarons service and sacrifice. Aaron was a strength to us, an inspiration to those around him, and a joy to have in our family.

In the statement, the Butler family wrote that Aaron graduated from Monticello High School in 2008. He later served an LDS Mission in Ghana.

Butler was a four-time high school state wrestling champion, claiming state titles in 2005 through 2008, according to the family.

Butler graduated with honors from the Army Green Beret Special Forces Qualifications Course in January 2016, the family told 2News.

The Butler family said Aarons body is being flown back to the United States and funeral plans are pending.

Read this article:
Family identifies Monticello soldier killed in Afghanistan - KUTV 2News

There is so much that is wrong, corrupt, troubling, and dangerous in Afghanistan that it seems strange to return from a visit with positive impressions. Yet so it was, more than in any time I can recall in the dozen years I have worked in and visited Afghanistan. After several years in which the Obama administration barely put enough resources into Afghanistan to avoid losing, and when the Trump administration has neither altered the strategy nor understood why it still hasn't produced victory, it is useful to look deeper into what is happening in some important areas that get little to no news coverage.

The three things that have so impressed me in my visit last month are in the reform of military leadership, civil service improvements, and anti-corruption efforts. None of the changes are complete, to be sure. All could be lost or reversed. The pushback against them from entrenched political elites is intense. The forthcoming elections may undercut them. But the important difference from the past is that the reforms now starting are Afghan initiatives. That makes it extremely important that American and NATO support for the new efforts be clear and unwavering so that they will be locked in place.

Military leadership, especially at the senior levels has been a grave weakness of the Afghan military. Generals appointed for political connections have performed poorly. The fall of the Afghan city of Kunduz in 2015 was a demonstration of government and military incompetence as much as it was a Taliban success. After my visit last year, I told senior officials of the Obama administration that without changes in the most senior Afghan National Army leadership, most of the other military reforms the United States was engaged in would be undermined. Now, slowly and painfully there is change.

A new defense minister has replaced one who was woefully inept. Lt. Gen. Mohammad Sharif Yaftali, for several years spoken of as one of the two best corps commanders, has become the army chief of staff. Most of the other corps commanders have been replaced by younger generals, promoted from the commands of brigades - and, in one case, the elite commandos - on merit rather than politics or family ties. And the replacement of at least some incompetent subordinate commanders has begun. In my experience, this is the first time that battle-tested officers are breaking through the political ceiling of senior ranks. It will take time, but President Ashraf Ghani intends this to be a generational change in Afghan military leadership. And as these new leaders take command, U.S. advisers and air support are essential. Current U.S. forces number just less than 9,000. The advisory teams they can field do not cover every corps, and of the combat brigades only a few receive periodic advice as floating teams of advisers move to reinforce the most critical needs.

The Obama administration's numbers games pulled advisers from the field too fast, leaving major Afghan units without U.S. advice and training. Air support was yanked before an Afghan air force even existed, leaving Afghan ground troops to fend for themselves for nearly three years until we finally adjusted our rules. The Afghan air force is now coming online, but at least two years will be necessary to deliver the planned aircraft.

The answer to the frequently asked question, "why will a few thousand more troops help?" is that they are needed for a limited time to make up for our mistakes of the last three years and allow Afghan forces to reach their full potential on the battlefield. It would be an enormous error not to field these critical reinforcements just when the Afghans are starting to make essential reforms.

The defense ministry reforms are only a beginning. The equally critical but far more corrupt interior ministry has barely been touched. As Ghani told me, illustrating the difficulty of the political pressures he faces, "I could not do both at the same time. In two years Interior will be where Defense is now, but it will not be where Defense will be then." To offset the slowness in reforming the interior ministry, most of the border police and the so-called civil order police battalions (ANCOP) will be transferred to army control.

Another critical area of performance is the justice sector, particularly with regard to corruption. In the nearly 40 years Afghanistan has been at war, bribery, predatory behavior, and corruption have become a way of life. Elites steal not only to enrich themselves but to maintain a circle of supporters and security on which their power is based. But this tradition now is being threatened by the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), an Afghan government effort to go after serious graft in senior ranks launched last year. It is specifically limited to defendants of at least the rank of major general or their civilian equivalent or theft of over the value of $7,500. Cases are referred from the Afghan attorney general, the older Major Crimes Task Force (long thwarted by courts releasing those they had charged), and other sources. Some 140 new staff members and investigators have been polygraphed to keep corruption out of the ACJC.

To date, there have be 36 convictions in 14 trials with sentences ranging from 6 months to 22 years. Two major generals have been sent to prison along with four deputy ministers. These convictions are still only a drop in a sea of corruption. They have not yet reached the most senior levels and many Afghans seem unaware of what is happening, perhaps because the court does a poor job of publicizing its activities. Nevertheless, it's a start. The conviction of senior generals and deputy ministers is cutting away at the ability of those more senior to protect them.

Perhaps the most important challenge to the sewer that is Afghan politics is the newly reformed Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). Despite several previous efforts, the Afghan civil service has been mired in political patronage. Connections, not qualifications, are the job requirement at every level from tea boy to minister. The new commission has immense power to change this. It can change the structure of ministries to smooth bureaucratic overlaps, determine hiring procedures, and reverse appointments deemed not to have followed proper procedures.

The revitalized commission is led by Nader Naderi, a young but widely respected civil society and human rights leader. Commission members include young leaders from several civil society groups conspicuously outside the normal political ranks. Their first success provides an interesting case study in doing things differently. Required to select 500 employees to work on a new electronic identity card, they took applications from 25,000 candidates across the country; 14,000 were then qualified to take an exam scored by computer with the names removed.

This approach threatened every aspect of political patronage. A wide assortment of political leaders and parliamentarians attacked the commission claiming, among other things, that exams were given only in Dari to eliminate Pashto speakers (not true, candidates had a choice). In the end, the successful candidates, picked on merit alone, hailed from 33 of the country's 34 provinces - with an ethnic balance roughly proportional to Afghanistan's population. It was a huge success for non-political hiring that has raised the commission's prestige.

However, the commission still confronts a gigantic task. It cannot tackle all ministries and all the personnel and pay systems at once. Success will take years. What Naderi and his colleagues are undertaking at Ghani's direction and with the support of national Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah is nothing less than challenging the basis of Afghanistan's patronage politics. One should expect that the attacks on the commission will be ferocious, and quite possibly physical. This is the challenge of real reform in Afghanistan.

"Our situation is not normal," Lt. Gen. Yaftali told me. "We are trying to fight, to change our leadership, and to win back the public's trust all at the same time. This makes us slow." The current government's term is already halfway over, and campaigning for parliamentary elections next year and presidential elections in 2019 are already underway. The deal-making, corruption, and fraud of the electoral cycle will challenge even the maintenance of the reform effort. The United States will need to use its influence to help Afghan reformers stay on course.

Meanwhile, security remains a great challenge with many of the rural areas contested and attacks mounting in cities. The reform of the security services needed to reverse this state of affairs will take time. There are no magic solutions. One should not expect to see major change on the battlefield for at a year or two. The reforms beginning now should have begun years ago; they are necessary but not sufficient to alter a political culture that threatens the country. But they are a beginning and they manifest a political will not previously evident. They are actions, not just plans and promises. And for those reasons they should be a source for hope and a reason for continued support in America's longest war.

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Neumann was U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. He is president of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

More here:
In Afghanistan, reform can't come fast enough - Chicago Tribune