Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

McCain backs top commander, slams Trump on Afghanistan – CNN

"General John Nicholson has served our country with honor and distinction for 35 years. He has earned the trust and admiration of those he has served with. And he has earned my full confidence," McCain said in a statement.

"Our commanders-in-chief, not our commanders in the field, are responsible for this failure," he added, referring to Trump and former President Barack Obama. "I urge the President to resolve the differences within his administration as soon as possible and decide on a policy and strategy that can achieve our national security interests in Afghanistan and the region."

In an appearance on Fox News Thursday, Trump's deputy assistant, Sebastian Gorka, said the President is confident in Nicholson's military leadership in Afghanistan.

"Absolutely, absolutely, yes," he said. "It is not a question of confidence, it is a question of inheriting bad ideas, false assumptions and reassessing what's good for America."

The Pentagon also tried to downplay reports that Nicholson could be on the way out.

Defense Secretary James Mattis "has confidence in General Nicholson's leadership," according to a statement from Pentagon spokesperson Dana W. White.

Nicholson took command of US forces in Afghanistan in March 2016 and CNN has not independently verified the NBC News report that Trump is considering removing him from his post.

But while Trump retains full confidence in his military commanders in Afghanistan, he remains skeptical about a continued US presence in the country, Gorka said on Thursday, describing a meeting last week where Trump questioned plans for the future of US troops in Afghanistan.

"Look, nothing is carved in stone," said Gorka, a national security adviser to the President.

"What the President did here in the West Wing a week ago in the situation room is he asked them very pertinent questions and he basically doesn't want this administration to make the same mistakes that both the Bush administration and the Obama administration made."

"He wants everyone to look at the core assumptions upon which our plans are based, and say are these assumptions sound," Gorka said. "The key question, Bill (Hemmer), is what is the national security relevance of Afghanistan to this country? When that question is answered adequately then we'll know which options we should apply and the President will make the decision."

The Trump administration is currently considering its commitment to and strategy for Afghanistan and the wider region.

Mattis told Congress that the strategy would be decided upon by mid-July but the plan has been delayed for months amid sharp disagreements between national security adviser H.R. McMaster, who is arguing for an increase of several thousand troops to help turn the tide in the fight against the Taliban, and the President's chief strategist Steve Bannon, who is opposed to getting the US more deeply involved in the conflict.

"Eight years of a 'don't lose' strategy has cost us lives and treasure in Afghanistan. Our troops deserve better," McCain said in a statement.

US and coalition casualties in Afghanistan have become rarer in recent years, falling dramatically since the Afghan government assumed responsibility for combat operations in 2014. But there has been an uptick in recent months as US forces have become more directly involved in the fight against the local ISIS affiliate.

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McCain backs top commander, slams Trump on Afghanistan - CNN

Trump’s 21 Club Salute – Slate Magazine

Seated with National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with service members at the White House on July 18.

Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

According to an incredibly detailed NBC News report of a highly classified National Security Council meeting, President Donald Trump unloaded on his top military leaders over Afghanistan in mid-July, questioning the wars management and suggesting that its commander, Gen. John Nicholson, be sacked. Over the long and reportedly heated meeting, Trump broke norm after norm of civil-military relations, in roughly what might be expected from a man who displayed so much antipathy toward the military during his presidential campaign.

Trump is right to question the fundamentals of a war that has already cost so much and achieved so little.

Throughout the two-hour meeting, Trump appeared biased against the advice of his generals and Cabinet secretaries, going so far as to compare the military advice he was getting to bad business advice given to the management of the 21 Club, one of his favorite New York restaurants. He told the group that he had gotten better advice from a relatively junior group of troops he had lunch with at the White House days before the meeting. Trump likened these troops to the 21 Clubs waiters, who really knew what was going on at the restaurant as opposed to the clueless, high-priced consultants brought in by management.

And yet, for all that he was a jerk, Trump wasnt wrong to question the military establishments position on Americas longest war. The brass has gotten a lot wrong over the past 16 years of fighting in Afghanistanfrom rotating units constantly to placing bases in dumb places to deciding on questionable strategies. Adding slightly more resources, or marginally changing the strategy, will not produce better outcomes much less victory (whatever that means). Even if hes going about it poorly, Trump is right to question the fundamentals of a war that has already cost so much and achieved so little. And this is precisely the point to ask such questions: at the start of an administration, prior to the adoption of a strategy or commitment of more troops.

The meeting at the heart of the NBC News report appears to have been a gathering of the statutory National Security Council, composed of the executive branchs top Cabinet-level officials and chaired by the president himself. These full-up NSC meetings are rarely held and usually used to decide on a major strategy, or discuss responses to a crisis. Last months meeting capped weeks of lower-level conversations held without the president, not to mention a great deal of effort by military planners, to figure out the road ahead. National Security Adviser H.R. McMasters goal was clear: to get the presidents approval to send another 4,000 troops to Afghanistan and make an indefinite commitment to that country too.

Unfortunately for McMaster and the other brass in the room, the meeting didnt play out that way. Over two hours, Trump reacted poorly to being boxed in by the generals (who he very clearly and wrongly sees as his generals), a sentiment shared (if not overtly voiced) by President Obama. Trumps frustration with the lack of progress boiled over in attacks upon Defense Secretary James Mattis and others. Trump reportedly felt there should be more to show for the six months of fighting since he took office (as if the 15 previous years hadnt happened). Trump also fixated on the contributions of NATO allies to the fight and the potential extraction of precious metals from Afghanistan.

Mattis reportedly returned to the Pentagon so upset that he took a long walk to think about the meeting. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford offered to broker a meeting between Trump and Afghanistan commander Gen. John Nicholsonwho the president has yet to meet because hes not yet visited Afghanistan (or Iraq).

To be sure, Trump showed a startling lack of decorum and respect for his top national security officials. In dismissing their advice and privileging the views of junior troops over the generals, Trump is undermining the chain of command. Hes also depriving himself of the expertise and experience that all those generals earned while working their way up from being junior troops too. And, in mockingly comparing management of the Afghan war to that of a Manhattan restaurant, Trump denigrated the seriousness of the war itself, and the gravity of the decisions he must make that will have life and death consequences for Americans and Afghans alike.

But that doesnt mean Trump should treat the advice hes given with skepticism, no matter the qualifications of his source. Trump is also right to try to objectively evaluate the situation today, notwithstanding our enormous sunk costs, to determine the best strategy.

In deciding on a strategy, Trump should begin by deciding on our aims in Afghanistan. Despite (or maybe because of) 16 years of combat, these goals remain murky. It is unclear whether U.S. forces are currently focused on killing al-Qaida and ISIS elements, shoring up the Afghan government, or some combination of the two. In either case, it remains unclear what result would be good enough to satisfy U.S. interests.

Realism must shape this choice of goals. The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, according to both American and international officials. U.S. sources estimate that Afghanistans government controls or influences roughly 60 percent of the countrys districts. Taliban forces continue to outmatch Afghan security forces, and U.S. combat advisers can only do much to support these Afghan units. In southern Afghanistan, where U.S. and British forces fought fiercely just a few years ago to beat back the Taliban, those gains have been nearly erased by successful political and military maneuvering by the Taliban, which now effectively controls Helmand and other nearby areas. At this point, given all that has transpired, the only realistic goal may be to pursue a narrow counterterrorism objective in Afghanistan, leaving broader questions about the countrys governance to its own leaders and forces.

These questions have a political dimension, to the extent they will require the president to raise and spend political capital to support the war. Although the president has reportedly delegated authority on troop levels to the Pentagon (only to have McMaster curtail this delegation), hes right to insist on some discussion of these at the NSC level. Ultimately, responsibility for the war rests with the president.

Join Emily Bazelon, John Dickerson, and David Plotz as they discuss and debate the weeks biggest political news.

Good strategy often involves trade-offs based on realism about objectives and the scarcity of resources. In Afghanistan, it is unrealistic to pursue a strategy that involves remaking the country in our image, or indefinitely supporting the government there. Former Vice President Joseph Biden and others were right that our interests are more narrow, and that a strategy focused on killing al-Qaida and ISIS elements is both more realistic and more appropriate. This necessarily abandons much of the current strategy and approach, as well as much of what has been done since 2001 by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. These sunk costs matter enormously and emotionally to the brassbut Trump is right to be skeptical.

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"And yet, for all that he was a jerk, Trump wasnt wrong to question the military establishments position on Americas longest war." Three words: Civilian military control. More...

For their part, the brass havent always had the right answers to these questions, either at a strategic level or tactical level, in Afghanistan. Setting aside the political decisions made by Presidents Bush and Obama, and their civilian secretaries of defense, on strategic questions like whether to invade Iraq or whether to pull resources from Afghanistan to fight the other war, the generals have made many bad decisions at the tactical level in Afghanistan (and Iraq too). Choosing to deploy the Marines in Helmand over other more strategically important locations, placing combat outposts in vulnerable places where they could be overrun, running a piecemeal and inefficient strategy to train and equip Afghan forces, waiting years to implement effective counterinsurgency techniques, and rotating units and leaders too frequently through Afghanistan to be effectivethese failures belong to military leaders more than political ones. This includes Mattis, who was one of the first U.S. commanders in Afghanistan in 2001, and later oversaw fighting there as head of U.S. Central Command from 2010 to 2013. The military leaders in the Situation Room with Trump have the most expertise and experience on Afghanistan of anyonebut that does not make them infallible.

As the White House has cycled through personnel and dithered over strategy, the Afghan war has drifted, to the point where Mattis and most senior military leaders now publicly say the U.S. is not winning there. Trump must confront this reality and decide on a path forward. Wire-brushing the brass over the situation, or having lunch with troops at the White House, may help Trump feel better about what hes doing, but it wont affect the situation on the ground where U.S. troops are currently fighting and dying. Trump is right to ask hard questions of our Afghanistan strategy and our military leadership implementing itbut he must also realize there are no easy or quick answers where Afghanistan is concerned.

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Trump's 21 Club Salute - Slate Magazine

Father: Indiana soldier among 2 killed in Afghanistan attack – Fox News

COLUMBUS, Ind. An Indiana soldier who was just 32 days into his first deployment was one of two American service members killed in a suicide bombing attack in Afghanistan, his father said Thursday.

Mark Hunter said members of the Indiana National Guard informed him Wednesday night that his son, 23-year-old U.S. Army Sgt. Jonathon Michael Hunter, died in the attack on a NATO convoy near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar.

The U.S. military in Afghanistan, which has not yet released the names of the two soldiers killed in Wednesday's attack, said Thursday that four other American troops were wounded in the bombing.

Jonathon Hunter, who grew up about 40 miles south of Indianapolis in the central Indiana community of Columbus, left July 1 on his first deployment and was providing security for the convoy that was attacked, his father said. He joined the Army in 2014 and was a member of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Mark Hunter said his son was excited about his first deployment, but that he, as an Army veteran, was apprehensive.

"He had been there 32 days. I'm former military, me and his uncle both, so we know the dangers," Hunter told The Associated Press by phone from his home in Columbus.

He said his son, who got married last October and has an older brother and two stepsisters, was cheerful, loving and religious.

"If you were down, he would cheer you up and he was God-loving. He was raised in the church," he said.

Hunter said he will travel Friday to Dover Air Force Base to retrieve his son's remains and that funeral plans were being determined by him, Jonathon's mother and Jonathon's wife, Whitney.

After graduating from Columbus East High School in 2011, he said his son spent a short time in Nashville, Tennessee, pursuing his dream of becoming a music producer before he enrolled Indiana State University in Terre Haute, where he studied criminology and business.

But Hunter said his son eventually left ISU and joined the Army in April 2014 because of he didn't want to burden him with paying for his college.

"After he got into school and of course we were struggling with bills, to pay for it he decided to join. He said, 'Dad, I know that going into the military I can get a free education,'" Mark Hunter said.

He said his family has a history of military service that dates back to the Civil War.

"I'm just proud of him. He was a great soldier. He made (sergeant) in a little over three years, which is pretty rare, they tell me," Hunter said.

Before Jonathon Hunter's death, 207 Indiana service members had died since 2002 in the war in Afghanistan or Iraq, or supporting those operations, said Tim Dyke, director of training and services Indiana Department of Veterans Affairs. He said that's based on a tally produced by the agency's former director.

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Father: Indiana soldier among 2 killed in Afghanistan attack - Fox News

The war America can’t win: how the Taliban is regaining control in Afghanistan – The Guardian

In a rocky graveyard at the edge of Lashkar Gah, a local police commander was digging his sisters grave.

Her name was Salima, but it was never uttered at her funeral. As is custom in rural Afghanistan, no women attended the ceremony, and of the dozens of men gathered to pay their respects, few had known the deceased.

Salima, like almost all women in Helmand province, had spent most of her life after puberty cloistered in her family home.

Her family said she accidentally shot herself in the face when she came across a Kalashnikov hidden under some blankets while cleaning.

In town Helmands provincial capital the story was regarded with suspicion, if not surprise. Salima died 10 days before an arranged marriage, but nobody asked any questions: it would be improper to scrutinise a womans death.

Her body was lowered into the hole, wrapped in a thin, black shroud. She had lived unseen, and was buried by strangers.

For more than 15 years, womens empowerment has been claimed as a central pillar of western efforts in Afghanistan. Yet in Helmand, adult women are almost entirely invisible, even in the city. They are the property of their family, and few are able to work or seek higher education, independent medical care or justice.

And if the advancement of womens rights has moved at a glacial pace in places such as Helmand, the process toward peace has slid backwards. Helmands two main towns, Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, are among a handful of places in the province not under Taliban control.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to define a strategy for Afghanistan.

The US was expected to have approved the deployment of about 4,000 additional troops to Afghanistan by now the first surge since the withdrawal began in 2011.

Yet the administration is torn. The president himself has wondered aloud why weve been there for 17 years, and recent reports even suggest that the White House is considering scaling back instead.

In Helmand, which is markedly worse off than when foreign combat troops left three years ago, Afghan forces on the frontline are desperate for support. But critics say that more military power only risks fomenting insurgency.

Even if you kill all the teenagers, the next generation will join the Taliban, said Abdul Jabbar Qahraman, a former presidential envoy to Helmand. The insurgency used to be mostly a business. Now its also about revenge.

Afghanistan is Americas longest war, but it is a war America cannot win. And nowhere is this more evident than in Helmand.

Places where British and American troops fought their hardest battles are now firmly under Taliban control.

Babaji, the scene of one of biggest British air assaults in modern times, fell to the Taliban shortly after the Guardian visited last year.

Marjah where in 2010 thousands of US, British and Afghan troops launched the largest joint offensive in the war is firmly in the control of the insurgents.

In Musa Qala, the Taliban run a veritable government; in Lashkar Gah, they are close enough to occasionally lob rockets into the governors compound.

Prolonged, large-scale battles are rare. Instead, the war is a slow grind of guerrilla attacks, sporadic gun clashes and the occasional push to overrun a population centre. Homemade bombs the Talibans weapon of choice continue to spread.

Several provincial capitals remain in government hands only due to US air support. In the first six months of 2017, the coalition released 1,634 weapons, the highest level of air engagement since 2012.

Once in a while, though, government forces win small successes by striking back with their own unconventional methods.

Lounging in the shade of a plum tree at a police base in the town of Spina Kota, Nesar Zendaneh was dressed in black traditional tunic, sporting a thick moustache under curly bangs that partly covered his druggy, bloodshot eyes.

As part of a unit under the National Directorate of Security, Zendaneh and his colleagues dress like local villagers, infiltrate Taliban areas and conduct sneak attacks.

I dont hide from them, said Zendaneh, as small arms fire crackled nearby. Four months ago, we snuck up on a group of Taliban and fired on them with RPGs. We killed 10 of them; the rest fled.

In the summer months, the land, green and overgrown, provides bountiful cover for insurgents. Leaving the base in Spina Kota, a police Humvee sped up as it swerved around a bend in the road.

This is the most dangerous corner, said the driver, pointing to a white house behind a single sunflower, about 30 meters (100ft) away. Thats the Taliban right there.

Often dispatched to frontlines and remote checkpoints, Afghan police have become so militarised that they rarely engage in actual police work. That makes winning the loyalty of the people even harder.

But foreign troops have relied heavily on the police and other local forces, such as the 1,500-strong militia led by Haji Baz Gul, the first community leader to rise up against the Taliban in Marjah, in 2010.

A mild-mannered elder with a cloud of grey beard and a white skullcap, Baz Gul said western forces had left their Afghan allies in the lurch.

After the long fight for Marjah, the US pulled out too soon, he said, leaving salaries for only one-third of his men. The rest were unable to work in their villages after the Taliban returned; they either fled the region or chose to join the militants.

The enemy is at our gates, Gul said. And the Taliban are not just winning the military battle, but hearts and minds too, he added.

Across Helmand, new mosques are cropping up, funded by private businessmen. Government schools, however, stand empty and decrepit.

We have 2,000 Taliban madrasahs in Helmand. The government is very weak, he said.

In a province where the war is being fought between neighbours, the frontline can offer a sense of security. For Maj Ghulam Wali Afghan, the only problem with the frontline, where he has been fighting for 15 years, is how to get there.

As he scooted forward in his chair, two of his men gingerly wiggled the stumps that used to be his legs into a pair of prosthetics. Grabbing one leg each, they clicked his knees into place and helped him stand. Six months ago, the police major sustained his first-ever injury when he stepped on a landmine.

We are tired of fighting, said Afghan, who commands 330 police. Still, he has nowhere else to go.

Neither does Sardar Mohammad, another police commander, who lost his legs to a mine two years ago. Eleven days later, he was back at the front.

For the men without formal education, and with no compensation for wounded Afghan veterans a civilian future holds little promise. At the frontline, they are protected.

Taliban are my enemy. They can kill me easily. If I leave the job, I will just be at home. Here I have guards, Mohammad said.

Battle-hardened police commanders such as Afghan and Mohammad have been left to fight the wests war, but they are not necessarily fuelled by the same ideals of democracy and human rights touted by western leaders and the Kabul government.

The Helmand conflict is highly localised. Mohammads enmity with the Taliban began when the Islamists regime confiscated his familys land, and detained and beat his relatives two decades ago. To him, the Talibans views on religion, education and womens role in society are unimportant.

Mohammads war is not an ideological one. It is just war.

We have the same views. We are all Muslims, he said. Both he and Afghan would welcome more US troops.

When there are American airplanes and helicopters monitoring in the air, nobody fires at us. When they are not there, we cant even move one metre without being shot on, said Mohammad.

Yet neither commander believed military might would end the hostilities. Only a negotiated peace could do that, said Afghan.

We know from the past 40 years that bullets dont stop war.

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The war America can't win: how the Taliban is regaining control in Afghanistan - The Guardian

Afghanistan in crisis: Why is the region still a hotbed of terrorism and violence? – Fox News

Afghanistan is back in the news. Wednesday, 2 U.S. servicemembers were killed in a suicide bombing attack. Already this year, U.S. airstrikes are at their highest level since 2012, and President Trump is considering sending up to 3,000 more troops to support the 8,400 Americans already serving there.

Why does the AfPak region remain a hotbed of terrorist plotting and violence? General John W. Nicholson, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, notes that of the 98 designated terrorist organizations around the globe, 20 of them operate in the region. Its an exceptional concentration, and just one reason why the U.S. must remain engaged in Afghanistan.

Yet for some years now, voices on both the right and left have urged American withdrawal. That would be a mistake. As America and its allies have drawn down troops in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has been quietly strengthening its hand.

The terrorist group has proved adept at retaining allies in the region, then working alongside them to strengthen the terrorist movement as a whole. Lets focus on just three of these allies.

First, there is the Taliban. Many in the West believe they can be peeled off from Al Qaeda at the negotiating table. That seems highly unlikely. Despite multiple changes of leadership, the two groups have reaffirmed allegiance to each other after every change. Its not just talk. The two continue to work together militarily.

Al Qaeda also retains its ties to the Haqqani network (HQN). In the immediate aftermath of the allied invasion of Afghanistan, the AfPak insurgent group helped al-Qaeda establish itself in Pakistani tribal areas. The groups continue to work hand-in-glove.

Intelligence officials recently told Fox News that Al Qaeda provides fighters, expertise and material support to HQN when needed and several times its members have participated in joint operations with the Taliban and HQN. Indeed, a senior HQN leader has commented that there is no distinction between us [and Al Qaeda] we are all one.

Then there is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Formed in December 2007, its an umbrella group drawing terrorists from various Pashtun Pakistani groups. TTP provided the training to Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber. Back then CIA Director John Brennan noted that TTP and AQ train together, they plan together, they plot together. They are almost indistinguishable.

That remains true. TTP publicly confirmed that senior al-Qaeda leaders such as Qari Muhammad Yasin killed in an air strike in March 2017 worked closely with their group up until the time of his death.

In addition forging alliances in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda still uses it as a training base--most notably for its newest affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).

Terrorism expert Bill Roggio says AQIS has likely drawn members from al-Qaeda allies such as TTP, Harakat-ul-Muhajideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. AQIS is a regional threat, focused on carrying out attacks on military targets in Bangladesh, Burma, India and Pakistan.

In October 2015, the U.S. launched one of the largest joint ground-assault operations we have ever conducted in Afghanistan. The target: two AQIS training camps that, in total, covered around 30 square miles. The U.S. commander said it was probably the largest Al Qaeda training camp found since the war began.

That such a training camp could exist in 2015 speaks to a broader problem of the U.S. consistently underestimating Al Qaedas strength. Last year, the U.S. killed or captured 250 Al Qaeda figures. Thomas Joscelyn, a leading expert on al-Qaeda points out, This was two and half times the American governments long-held, high-end estimate for Al Qaedas entire presence in the country.

Underestimating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had devastating consequences on 9/11. We cannot make the same mistake again. The ongoing terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan remains a compelling reason for the U.S. to remain committed to the fight there. (And I have not even discussed ISIS, which has its own affiliate in the country).

Unfortunately, the Afghan security forces are not yet trained to such a standard that they can execute this vital counter-terrorism task alone. So the nature of the Western commitment must involve troops not just from the U.S., but across NATO. These troops will not be able to transform Afghanistan into a paragon of democracy and liberty, nor should they try to.

But additional troops will be able to help maintain security in a country rife with terrorist groups that still pose a very clear danger to innocent lives around the world.

Robin Simcox is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation (heritage.org).

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Afghanistan in crisis: Why is the region still a hotbed of terrorism and violence? - Fox News