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On today's episode of the 5 Things podcast: Our warsin Afghanistan and Iraq have hung overthe US and the world for nearly two decades takinghundreds of thousands of lives, costing taxpayer money and leaving Americawar-weary.

Now, Biden's full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and decision to end combat missions in Iraq marks an end to the post-9/11 era and represents a renewed focus on combatting threats from China.

We're mapping out Biden's skepticism toward our engagement in the Middle East and remembering the human lifeour wars have cost Afghan, Iraqi andAmerican lives and those touched by the far-flung effects of our "forever wars."

USA TODAY White House correspondentCourtney Subramanian, along with foreignpolicy reporter Deirdre Shesgreen and Pentagon correspondent Tom Vanden Brook explain what to keep in mindas US troops leave these two countries: What have these wars costs us? What happens if the Taliban regains control in Afghanistan?

Hit play on the player above to hear the podcast and follow along with the transcript below.This transcript was automatically generated, and then edited for clarity in its current form. There may be some differences between the audio and the text.

Claire Thornton:

Hey, there. I'm Claire Thornton, and this is Five Things. It's Sunday, August 1st. These Sunday episodes are special. We're bringing you more from in-depth stories you may have already heard.

Claire Thornton:

America's longest war is about to come to an end. Earlier this year, President Biden said all U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by September. We've been deployed to Afghanistan for nearly 20 years. The Biden administration also announced we're going to stop combat missions in Iraq by the end of this year. Shifting focus away from Afghanistan and Iraq is shaping up to be a signature aspect of the Biden administration's foreign policy. We've been through a lot as a country because of our involvement in these wars for the past two decades.

Claire Thornton:

Over 7,000 U.S. service members have been killed in post 9/11 war operations. Far more civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, hundreds of thousands, have died during that time because of military actions. Ending these wars is a long time coming. Still, similar threats remain in parts of Afghanistan and Iraq all these years later. Here to discuss is Courtney Subramanian USA Today White House Correspondent and our Pentagon reporter Tom Vanden Brook and foreign policy reporter Deirdre Shesgreen. Thank you all so much for being here.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Good to be here.

Courtney Subramanian:

Happy to be here.

Claire Thornton:

Here's a quote from Biden I like from this April. He said, "I'm now the fourth United States president to preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan. Two Republicans, two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility onto a fifth president." Courtney, could you walk us through Biden's initial support for these wars and how his support has waned over the past years?

Courtney Subramanian:

Yeah. Well, I'll start with Afghanistan. Biden has never hid the fact that he thought we should pull out of Afghanistan. He's long argued the U.S. mission should squarely be focused on dismantling Al-Qaeda and getting Osama bin Laden two objectives he said when he announced the full withdrawal that he said the U.S. had achieved. As vice president, he was one of the most vocal critics of further escalation in Afghanistan. He opposed Obama's decision to surge troops there in 2009.

Courtney Subramanian:

I think at one point he was referred to as Obama's in-house pessimist on Afghanistan. Other presidents have agreed with his thinking, but have never been able to fully pull out. Trump also talked about bringing an end to America's endless wars. He struck a deal with the Taliban to pull all U.S. troops. In February 2020, he struck that deal, and that's a deal the Biden administration has said they're honoring. Trump had set a May 1st, 2021 deadline, which Biden missed.

Courtney Subramanian:

But that decision by the Trump administration sort of gave Biden some political cover and ease some of that political pressure that other presidents faced with the decision to withdraw. But the public is with him on this. Polls show a strong majority of Americans support withdrawing troops. But I think the decision obviously has some implications that we've seen some Republicans and some of his critics call out politically, if the Taliban do topple the Afghan government, that sort of leaves the fate of Afghan women and children in peril.

Courtney Subramanian:

He understands that. He understands that this decision comes with obvious risks, but it's something that for a long time he has truly believed it was time to leave. The environment that we're in now, both at home and abroad, has given him the right conditions to finally make this decision. He has a long history with Iraq. As a Senator and later as a vice president, he developed relationships with the country's political leaders. He studied their tribal politics and rivalries.

Courtney Subramanian:

When he was vice president, he was assigned the Iraq portfolio and his son Bo was serving there at the time with the Delaware National Guard. So that gave him sort of the vantage point of military families that not every politician has. By the time he visited there in November 2011, he had been there seven times as vice president, and I think it was like his 16th across his career, but he hasn't always opposed intervention there.

Courtney Subramanian:

He did vote to authorize military force there in 2002 he was critical of the Bush administration, but he did support the decision to invade. I think it's important to remember that his announcement this week is less of a dramatic shift and more of a reflection of what's actually happening on the ground there, and that's that U.S. forces are no longer fighting on behalf of Iraqi forces. They'll continue to play a supporting role, and that's what Biden said they'll do.

Courtney Subramanian:

He hasn't said whether he'll draw down the 2,500 troops that will remain there, but reassign them to help with training and advising and intelligence sharing. It's important to remember with Iraq, I think he is probably haunted by the Obama administration's withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, only they had to send troops back in 2014 in response to ISIS. I think part of that decision probably reflects that era of foreign policy and the consequences of that decision.

Claire Thornton:

You said that in Afghanistan, women and children are going to be at more risk once we pull troops from that country. The Taliban is the strongest it's been since 2001. For listeners, the Taliban is a political and Islamist movement in Afghanistan, and they're also a military organization. They've been causing conflict within the country, and the Taliban government also harbored Al-Qaeda militants involved in planning the 9/11 attacks.

Claire Thornton:

Tom, how worried are you that the Taliban could regain control in Afghanistan after this year? From everything I've learned, it seems really procure.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Yeah, Claire. I think it's a given that they're going to have some great measure of power in Afghanistan once... Well, they're working on some sort of peace deal and power sharing agreement, but they're going to take as much influence and power as they can, and they probably will be able to. They've already regained control of more than half of the districts in Afghanistan. They've overrun key strategic border crossings with Pakistan.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

It's a given that they're going to have some measure, perhaps the majority of the power in the Afghan government in the coming months. Is that a concern? It would certainly be a concern if you're an educated person in Afghanistan. Women, children before they were toppled in 2001, they had a very repressive regime that didn't allow women and girls to go to school. I think the thought now is there... Well, the hope, I think, is that they're going to be a little less repressive than they had been, but there's no guarantee of that.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

I mean, they will have the high hand when it comes to ruling the country in a very short time. It looks like the Afghan security forces are folding. They don't fight. I've talked to senior defense officials who say whatever resistance they put up is usually by their elite forces, their special forces, which are a smaller number. But the rest of the 300,000 plus Afghan soldiers that we've spent billions training are not putting up a fight. It looks fairly grim right there right now.

Claire Thornton:

In terms of how far we've come there in Afghanistan, or how far we haven't come, what's been the result of our engagement there? How far have we come since that war started? What sacrifices have we made?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Well, lots of sacrifices obviously, and the sacrifices are certainly great on the U.S. side, but much more so for Afghan civilians. Tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of died. Certainly at least hundreds of thousands have been maimed or affected in some way. Civilian casualties are way up again. Now this year. The Taliban is not a particularly kind force. They don't pay attention to Geneva Rules of Convention when it comes to warfare. We're now conducting airstrikes again in support of the Afghan forces that are besieged.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

But when you do that, you end up killing a lot of people who are civilians and bystanders. There's been a lot of sacrifice. There have been gains though. I mean, their life expectancy is up considerably since in the 20 years that we've been there. Literacy rate is up. Women and children have benefited greatly. It's not as though it's been a total failure on our part to help the Afghan people.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

But at this point, we've decided that the military mission no longer furthers U.S. national security interests to the extent that we need to have a large force there on the ground. After you've spent literally tens of billions of dollars training and equipping the Afghan forces, Biden feels it's time for them to give it a shot. As Courtney pointed out, this was a deal that was negotiated by former President Trump. We'll see what happens, but all signs right now are not very good.

Claire Thornton:

Anyone else want to weigh in?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

I would just say that all the gains that Tom mentioned are at risk if the Taliban do gain control of the country again. There is a question also of whether there will be a resurgence. I mean, that's the big criticism of both Trump's original deal with the Taliban and Biden's following through on it. If the Taliban allows Al-Qaeda to regain strength, then will the U.S. have to go back in?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

Biden has said that the U.S. will continue to provide over the horizon support for the Afghan security forces, which essentially means helping Afghan security forces from U.S. bases outside the country, but there's a real question about whether that's logistically feasible and how U.S. would really be able to do that.

Claire Thornton:

Yeah. Where would those bases be outside Afghanistan?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Well, they used Al Udeid and Qatar to fly missions with B-1 bombers, and they're doing airstrikes right now presumably from Al Udeid, but also from carriers in the Arabian Gulf. We can still perform some missions that way, but you don't have the intelligence on the ground to tell you who you're hitting precisely, or you're banking on the Afghan security forces to tell you you're hitting the right people in the right targets. And that's a very dicey proposition. And often what ends up happening is you end up killing civilians. It's a bad solution to an even worse problem.

Claire Thornton:

Our invasion of Iraq had no connection to the 9/11 attacks. Deirdre, what sacrifices have Iraqis made since we invaded there in 2003?

Deirdre Shesgreen:

The U.S. war in Iraq has been devastating in terms of the death toll and the chaos and the instability. Researchers at Brown University who specialize in trying to tally the costs of war say that it's very difficult to know for sure how many Iraqis were killed, but they say that between 180,000 and 200,000 civilians have died in direct war-related violence as a result of the U.S. invasion. And then several times more have died from indirect causes, for example, damage to the food system, the healthcare system, clean drinking, water illness, mountain malnutrition.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

All these tangential, but severe consequences of the war. The U.S. occupation also led to instability in Iraq that included a rise in corruption and a very weak government that exists still today. I will pause and say, of course, no one would argue that Saddam Hussein, the deposed and now dead former leader of Iraq, was a good person. He led a very repressive regime. I just want to make that clear, but the U.S. occupation of Iraq had really far-reaching consequences.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

And we also know that it eventually led to the rise of sectarian politics and the rise of the Islamic State, which controlled large parts of Iraq starting in 2014 and remains a problem today, much less of a problem, but still a concern for Iraq and for the U.S. and other countries.

Claire Thornton:

Anyone else want to weigh in? Maybe we could talk about how with ISIS's rise, millions of people were displaced from Syria.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

Sure. I'll talk about that a little bit. I was actually in Baghdad in 2011 when they wrapped up the combat mission for the last time. And the thought was that we'd spent, as we had in Afghanistan, a lot of money to support security forces there, and that they would be capable of handling internal security, but that turned out to be a bad miscalculation. And it wasn't long before ISIS, which basically had been Al-Qaeda in Iraq before that, resurged across that region.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

And then we had to put together a coalition quickly in order to keep Baghdad from falling, because ISIS rolled through Ramadi and other provincial capitals in Iraq very quickly and threatened Baghdad. We put together a coalition that started airstrikes in 2014 after a sect of Iraqis in Northern Iraq, the Yazidis, were threatened with genocide by ISIS. That's what spurred us to go back in there. Spent a lot of money on that again and a lot of civilians were killed again in airstrikes.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

These things have definite costs, both for us and for the people on the ground, when the wrong decisions are made.

Claire Thornton:

Yeah. Biden's shift away from Afghanistan and Iraq. It's going to become a pillar of his foreign policy. Experts say he is definitely going to focus on China instead going forward. How do you think he might do that, shift our military focus toward China?

Tom Vanden Brrook:

I'll take a quick whack at it and let you guys go forward too. Well, you've already seen it. I mean, we've already started to strike targets more frequently in Africa and militant groups like Al-Shabaab. That's what they talk about when they're talking about the shift away from Afghanistan and Iraq, that the threat from extremists has metastasized, as they would say, and shown up in other countries around the globe. You see them in Africa. There are some in Southeast Asia as well.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

The reason for leaving Afghanistan primarily is that the threat is still there to an extent, but not as much as it is elsewhere. And then you see the idea that we would also shift focus to China because China is continuing to exercise its muscles around the globe actually. You've got them in Africa, in Djibouti. You have them throughout Asia. The idea that they want to turn the South China Sea a key shipping area for the entire world into their sphere of influence. We continue to sail ships through there and run into provocations with the Chinese Navy.

Tom Vanden Brrook:

That's where the principal effort and concern for the Pentagon is, is the rise of China's military and confronting them around the globe.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

I'll just wheel in to say that there's two forces driving Biden's desire to get out of these so-called endless wars. One is domestic politics. The American public is tired of this, and they feel like the costs have been exorbitant in terms of U.S. taxpayer dollars and U.S. lives, and they want investment at home. Then the second thing is what you've mentioned in terms of this desire to pivot to China. That is not just a military question.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

In fact, I would say that, of course, while there is concern of a military confrontation with China, the dominant concern among Biden's foreign policy advisors is that China poses more of an economic threat and a political threat with its anti-democratic sort of authoritarian moves in Hong Kong, for example, and its desire to sort of spread its authoritarian form of government. Biden argues that there's this sort of looming conflict between democracy and authoritarianism and that China is driving it.

Deirdre Shesgreen:

It's a much more complex discussion than just a military debate or a matter of redeploying American forces to a new theater, because that's not actually what's happening. It's a matter of confronting China economically, politically, and also preparing for different kinds of warfare like cyber. We've seen both China and Russia mount these cyber attacks that are devastating and could become or already have become this new front. It's a very different conversation I think.

Courtney Subramanian:

Just to kind of build on what Deirdre saying, actually Biden made his first visit to the ODNI, spoke to the intelligence community, and during his remarks said something to the effect of the next shooting war that we'll be involved in will be a result of cyber warfare.

Claire Thornton:

Wow!

Courtney Subramanian:

Because he really does believe that that is one of the biggest threats facing the country aside from the military focus, but also like an economic focus. I think it really reflects a worldview that his national security advisor Jake Sullivan has really pushed, and that is national security and foreign policy should play a proactive role in the domestic economic policy debate. Because his thought is that the two should be linked because foreign policy should focus on what it will take to enhance U.S. competitiveness, both at home and abroad.

Courtney Subramanian:

We've seen that throughout Biden's agenda. It really reflects that when he met with foreign leaders in Europe in his first trip, urging them to take a tough line on China. He's launched a government wide initiative, this buy American initiative, which is like federal procurement to support American manufacturing. This focus on China, he's really trying to thread the needle throughout his entire agenda, and I think this is a reflection of that.

Claire Thornton:

Thank you. Any closing thoughts from you all?

Courtney Subramanian:

Read more:
With Biden's withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan, America's longest war is ending: 5 Things podcast - USA TODAY

Editors Note: Some links in this article lead to Iranian media sites. If access to such sites is prohibited by your employers policy, please do not click links in this article from a work computer.

A senior Iranian military leader, Esmail Qaani, traveled in late June to the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal to rally a group of fighters. Normally, this type of visit would not be unusual. Qaani commands the Quds Force the wing of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for external action and is expected to travel to Syria to coordinate Irans efforts to preserve the regime of Bashar al Assad. What made Qaanis trip noteworthy was that he was visiting the Fatemiyoun Division, an Iran-backed proxy force whose foot soldiers are Afghans from the Shiite Hazara community.

While fighters of the Fatemiyoun Division remain active in Syria, so far they have been sidelined in Afghanistan. That could change. The Fatemiyoun constitute a small but potent force with longstanding and extensive ties to Iran and could prove useful to Iranian officials as they craft their Afghan policy, especially if the Taliban continue to press their military advantage. On July 7, Irans political leaders hosted talks between Taliban and Afghan government representatives in Tehran. While Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif used the meeting to celebrate the U.S. departure from Afghanistan, he also warned that continuing clashes between Taliban fighters and the Afghan government would be costly. With the American military exit from Afghanistan due to be completed by Aug. 31, Iranian policymakers are strategizing about their future approach toward Afghanistan. They face a difficult set of decisions, including how they will balance their countrys strong ties to Afghanistans minority Hazara community against Irans diplomatic dance with the Taliban and the Afghan government.

The Fatemiyoun pale in comparison to the Taliban both in numbers and capacity. But they could prove either to be a lever of influence for Iran, if the Taliban and Afghan government do ultimately cut a deal, or a political liability, if an all-out civil war ensues in Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to target the countrys Shiite Hazara community.

There is significant risk of blowback for Iran if Afghanistans conflict takes on an even more sectarian cast with Afghan Hazara Shiites pitted against the predominantly Pashtun Sunni Taliban. If the history of the Afghan conflicts is any guide, such a scenario could draw in Irans regional rivals, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who would be likely to support the Taliban, as they have in the past. Plus, the United States has already demonstrated, with recent retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed proxies in Syria and Iraq, that it is prepared to use any means necessary to check threats to American interests in the region. Going forward, Iranian officials will likely feel a need to tread carefully with both the Fatemiyoun and the Taliban.

The Rise of the Fatemiyoun Division

As we explain in a recent report, the links between Irans revolutionary guard and Afghan and Pakistani Hazaras have their roots in the Iran-Iraq War. After Saddam Husseins Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, Irans revolutionary government cast the war as an opportunity for Shiites to demonstrate their faith. Many Afghan Shiites answered the call by heading to Iran, where they were trained by the revolutionary guard.

During the 1980s, Irans effort to stand up an Afghan paramilitary force underwent several phases, name changes, and reorganizations. As well as training Shiite fighters in Iran, the guard also dispatched several of its officers to serve as cultural and military advisers in Afghanistan, where they embedded with cells in the resistance movement that was fighting the Soviet Unions occupation of that country.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, conflict in Afghanistan raged on as various factions fought for power. Throughout the 1990s, Iran provided support to Afghan Shiite groups and the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban. Qassem Soleimani was among the revolutionary guard personnel involved in that effort. He would become the head of the Quds Force in 1998 and remained its commander until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike last year.

From these deep and longstanding links to Afghanistans Shiite Hazara community, in 2012 Iran established the Fatemiyoun Division as part of its wide-ranging effort to support Syrias Assad regime in its fight against an armed rebellion. Under the supervision and direction of Soleimani, the revolutionary guard recruited todays Afghan Hazara foreign fighters for that purpose. It also established the Fatemiyouns Pakistani sister unit, the Zeynabiyoun Brigade. Thousands of ethnic Afghan and Pakistani Hazara foreign fighters fought and died with those units to help save the Assad regime.

In addition to their battlefield impact, the Fatemiyoun have been a significant propaganda asset for the revolutionary guard, which works to persuade constituents in the Shiite community across the region to support the Iranian government and its policies. Touting the daring and successes of Afghan foreign fighters in Syria has played an integral part in that campaign. Iran-financed propaganda about the Fatemiyoun employs strategic narratives related to differences in Sunni and Shiite interpretations of Islamic law and just governance, and it stokes fears among the Hazara about the potency of the predominantly Sunni Taliban and Islamic State forces in Afghanistan and Syria.

Soleimani was the key architect and star of Irans propaganda strategy. He made a habit of snapping frontline selfies with the Fatemiyoun and recounting their heroics. The Fatemiyoun achieved a substantial social media following on YouTube and Twitter until both platforms took down their accounts. Even so, the Fatemiyoun remain active on other social media as a result of Irans investment. They have thousands of followers on encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram and its Iranian government-controlled counterpart, Soroush, which they use to showcase their battlefield exploits in Syria. Fighters shared videos of combat on social media, which proved to be an effective recruiting tool among those who joined the cause were a significant number of American-trained former soldiers in the Afghan National Army and elite Afghan special operations forces.

The revolutionary guards propaganda about the Fatemiyoun could have long-lasting ramifications. The guard corps has pushed sectarian narratives that may prove difficult to control in the future, notably including in relation to Afghanistan. In strengthening the Fatemiyoun, the revolutionary guard has given power to a network that, while deeply indebted to Iran, is not fully under its control. For Iran, managing risks in Afghanistan, where the Fatemiyoun are an important political force, could prove difficult over time if the Taliban continue their aggressive and bloody campaign of targeting Hazara communities. In that event, Iranian officials may be tempted to provide significant support to Fatemiyoun fighters to help Iran maintain its influence over the Hazara community and combat the Taliban.

The Future of the Fatemiyoun and Irans Approach Toward Afghanistan

Even as the Afghan and Pakistani Shiite militias involvement in Syria winds down, their power, and the narratives through which Iran framed their mobilization, will continue to shape South Asia and the Middle East for years to come. This is especially true in Afghanistan, where Irans strategic hedging and years-long quiet campaign to cultivate influence with the Taliban has contributed significantly to the military gains made by the insurgents over the last several years.

It remains to be seen if Iranian officials are able to sustain relations with both their Fatemiyoun proxies and the Taliban after the exit of their common enemy, the United States. Questions abound about whether and when Irans newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi, might leverage Iranian influence over tens of thousands of Hazaras in Afghanistan and across South Asia who answered Tehrans call to join the fight in Syria almost a decade ago. For Raisi, who has vowed to make Irans economic revival a centerpiece of his tenure, steering political outcomes in Afghanistan, which is one of Irans largest trading partners, is a crucial part of his own political calculus.

There are increasing concerns that the Talibans victories on the ground may translate into the revival of the harsh and bloody targeting of Afghan Shiite Hazaras, which could trigger unwelcome regional instability and have pronounced effects on Irans ailing economy. Iranian officials and media outlets close to the revolutionary guard have argued that the Taliban have changed. Whether that is true or not, Irans approach to dealing with the predominantly Pashtun Taliban will likely continue on Raisis watch in the near term. Playing all three major sides pro-Taliban Pashtuns, ethnic Hazara Shiites, and Afghan elites affiliated with the government in Kabul will likely be critical to Tehrans approach in Afghanistan no matter what Washington does next.

The mixed signals coming out of Tehran on engagement in Afghan affairs may be both a sign of Irans pragmatism and a reflection of a deeper divide between hard-liners aligned with the supreme leader and reform-minded Iranian critics of Ali Khameneis regime. Disagreements between various camps on Irans engagement in Afghanistan have openly erupted in the Iranian press. In a recent column that appeared in Irans centrist online daily Arman, for instance, former Iranian diplomat Seyed Ali Khorram sharply criticized Khameneis engagement with the Taliban, saying it only emboldens the Taliban to continue their aggressive attacks against Afghan Shiite Hazaras. Khorram echoed the complaints of other Iranian reformists and reminded readers that Taliban attacks on Iranian diplomats during the 1990s brought Afghanistan and Iran to the brink of war.

Given that Iran has long positioned itself as the champion and protector of Afghanistans marginalized Shiite Hazara population, the internal rifts emerging over Irans cultivation of the Taliban suggest that Tehrans diplomatic dalliances with the group may result only in a temporary marriage of convenience that could easily disintegrate after the U.S. drawdown is completed this summer. For now, how Iranian officials play their cards in Afghanistan is a game of wait and see.

Candace Rondeaux directs the Future Frontlines program at New America and is a professor at the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University. She has covered the Afghan conflict for 13 years, working variously for the Washington Post, the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Amir Toumaj is a nonresident fellow at New America and is the co-founder of the Resistance Axis Monitor.

Arif Ammar is an independent researcher based in Washington and a native of Kabul. He has produced analysis on the Afghan conflict for the International Crisis Group and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.

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Iran's Tricky Balancing Act in Afghanistan - War on the Rocks

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Reports from Afghanistan now refer to a resurgent Talibanas the violent group has now taken more territory thanitever had sinceit waspushed out of power in 2001. While the situation on the ground israpidly shifting, there is no doubt that the Taliban have the upper hand and mean to keep it that way.Alongside isreportageof what everyone knew allalong theTalibanhasntchanged in the slightest. The old rules against music, shaving beards and girlseducation are back.Andyet another wave of refugeesis onthe move.

In Islamabad, Pakistans National Security AdvisorMoeed Yusuf warneda Senate committee that thesituationin Afghanistan was out of Pakistans control. That was of course an inadvertent admission that the Taliban had been, in fact, always under Pakistani control, but the NSA seemed to be trying to make a public case that Pakistan was in danger. It is, but for reasons that the security establishment may be blind to, while it actuallycheersthe victory that it has sought for more than three decades. No one is fooled, except the Pakistani establishment itself. Despite extensive planning and frenetic diplomacy, trouble is coming to Pakistan.

Also read: Imran Khan should know who really messed up in Afghanistan

As the Taliban rampagesacross Afghanistan, another flow of refugees has begun toTurkey,US,UK, and closer home toneighbouringcountries. TinyTajikistansays its ready to take in 100,000 refugees, whileIranis seeing some 10,000 arriving every day through well-known smuggling routesviaPakistan. Oddly, there is no indication of much movement into Pakistani territory.Datacollected by migration mapping agencies indicate that while some 81 per cent plan to stay in Iran and others are aiming for Europe, just two per cent plan togo toPakistan. The reasons for this indicate a carefully planned policy.

First, Pakistan can police its 267-km border better than it pretends to, with88 per centof its border with Afghanistan double fencedand accompanied byditches, bunds and sensors. Its a one-way system that allows the Taliban to go as they please, but no one elsecomesin. Second, Pakistaniparliamentariansnote that the Taliban are roaming freely in Quetta and adjoining areas. Any fleeing Afghan coming to these areasislikely to be sent back as a Taliban recruit faster than the blink of an eye. When asked why these insurgents were not removed,PakistanArmy chief GeneralQamar JavedBajwaand ISI chiefLt General Faiz Hameedwarnedlawmakers that this would result in a blowback on Pakistan.Thats strangefor a countrythathas no compunctions in removing, killing or threatening its Pashtun and Baloch population, not to mention disobedient political parties.

Third, is the fact that much of the territory opposite Pakistan have already been Taliban-controlled for years. Main border crossings like Spin Boldak have recently fallen, even as the Pakistan Air Force threatened airstrikesif the Afghan Army sought to wrench it back. The strategy is aimed at ensuring that the Taliban police the border areas, thus preventing any huge ingress of desperate people.PakistanForeign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshihas declared thatthe countrywill not take in any more refugees. But if matters worsen, as they surely will, Pakistan has the option ofdealing with700,000refugees expected to arrive orshelterthem. The key point is whether the Taliban can take control over all key border crossings, as well as the dozens of mountain trails that cross into the tribal areas.

Also read: India right to wait till Taliban comes in full view. No need to rush into an Afghan strategy

Before blaming the Taliban for being a bunch of rabble-rousers, remember that the fundamentalist ideologythatsustains their ranks, or the mujahideen before them, was part of a deliberate ISI policy to funnel US funds to the most extremistgroups tostem the tide of rising Pashtun nationalism that had erupted even before the USSR walked in.

Afghans were never fundamentalist; they had it thrust upon them. Now it seems the Taliban are reiterating that with a vengeance.Reportafterreporttalk of the Taliban preventing girls from attending schools, barring the wearing of red and green clothes (the colour of the Afghan flag), shaving and listening to songs. This lunacy haslargelyemanated from Pakistans madrassas, with major madrassaleadersdeclaring their pride at Taliban alumni, and seeing their victories as vindication of this revanchist ideology. The end result is thatgroups like the extremeRight-wing Tehreek-e-Labbaik(TLP)do well in provincial elections, and a former office-bearer of theTehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)has been nominated by Islamabad for the ulema seat in PoK elections.Parliamentis no exception, with passionate statements declaring the Talibanasa protective barrier for Pakistan. Islamist parties and even common people are united in their admiration of Taliban victory against a superpower.

This is ideology coming home to roost; and like all extreme ideologies, it could swallow up its creators.

Also read: Team Bajwa now betting on UK to promote Taliban to get to US indirectly

While the Talibanison a winning spree, itsnot going to be a walkover. Former warlords and the Opposition in Kabul arebanding togetherfor their own survival. Within all this, outside powers are fishing for newproxiesamong the second generation leaders like the son of Ahmed Shah Masood, or even Uzbek warlordAbdul RashidDostum.

Despite the Taliban being sent around to major world capitals such as Beijing, Moscow, and Teheran, few want a Taliban-dominated government in place, despite the best efforts of a sophisticated PR machine that nearly sold the argument of a changed Taliban, particularly to US academics. Such a civil war scenario, where each will backtheirown grouping is Islamabads worst nightmare. There is an even worse scenario. That once within sight of power, the Taliban itself will splinter along its weakest points. Success in insurgency has its own price when each leader wants a share of the pie. Ironically, chances of a civil war are the highest if Kabul falls, with warlords like Atta Mohammad Noor likely to try and carve out their own territory.

The only ones who will welcome civil war are the terrorists. As a recentUN Report observed, theal-Qaeda is still around, aligned with the Taliban through the offices of the Haqqani network in a complex network of intermarriage and operations. This deadly combinationof terrorist groupsis fighting and sharing victories with the Taliban and are therefore largely on the right side of Pakistans intelligence agencies. But this is an uncivil war. With enough money and spunk, any or all of these can be bought by various actors, orthey canjust decide to do their own thing. Its already apparent in the tribal areas wheretwo Pakistani soldierswere recently killed and several wounded incross-border attacks. A flareup of unrest in these areas, bracketed with wounded Pashtun pride, could mean Waziristan redux, or return of the war that sucked in thousands of Pakistani troops in intermittent operations between 2003 and 2014. In that case, Pakistan will find that ithasleft itself wide open to total chaos. Allthe black ravens it has let loose,willfinally come home to roost.Pakistans game of thrones in Afghanistan has gone on for much too long. The audience is simply tired of it.

The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views are personal.

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Trouble is coming to Pakistan. No matter its double fence on Afghanistan border - ThePrint

Judy Woodruff:

In just over one month, according to President Biden, the U.S. will have completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, after 20 years.

But for those two decades, Afghanistan's neighbor to the east, Pakistan, has been a key player in the regional dynamics, and stands long accused by the United States and Afghanistan of supporting Taliban insurgents.

In a moment, I will have an interview with Pakistan's prime minister, Imran Khan, but, first, some background on him and the fraught relationship with the U.S. and Afghanistan.

From the 1970s to the early 90's, Imran Khan was a professional athlete, a cricket star, guiding Pakistan's national team to victory. Now, as Pakistan's prime minister, he's leading his country at a time of regional tumult.

As the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, the Taliban is making swift territorial advances. When the Taliban recently took over a key Afghan-Pakistani border crossing, residents on the Pakistani side seemed to celebrate, waving Taliban flags and honking horns.

Recently, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made a longstanding accusation: Pakistan provides insurgents safe haven.

ASHRAF GHANI, President of Afghanistan: Intelligence estimates indicate the influx of over 10,000 jihadi fighters from Pakistan and other places in the last month, as well as support from their affiliates in the transnational terrorist organization.

Read the original here:
U.S. 'really messed it up' in Afghanistan, Pakistan PM says - PBS NewsHour

The U.S. military is physically withdrawing from Afghanistan, and Afghan nationals who aided the American military are trying to evacuate as the Taliban gains ground in remote areas. GBH News analyst Charlie Sennott called into Boston Public Radio on Monday from Kabul, Afghanistan, to give a sense of the situation on the ground.

Sennott, formerly a Middle East bureau chief for the Boston Globe covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, said the nation is in a moment of "tremendous uncertainty."

"You can really feel sort of the barometric pressure dropping with the U.S. pullout underway," said Sennott. "The situation on the ground is, you don't see U.S. military on the streets the way you used to see them."

"This place has always lived with violence, it's always lived with a great deal of nerve-wracking fighting going on with the Taliban for many many years," he said, but added that this moment, as the Taliban surges in outer provinces, feels unique in just how much is changing quickly.

Sennott, who was last in the country in 2016, said that while the Taliban is gaining ground outside the cities, it still feels relatively normal in metropolitan areas.

"[There's a] really strange mix of inspiring and hopeful commitment and endurance to sort of daily life going on: the vegetable markets are there, you see the butchers on the street, you see people out and about and shopping, and then ... this feeling of tremendous uncertainty with a total lack of U.S. military presence, and many questions about what that's going to mean in the weeks and months ahead," said Sennott.

Human rights groups and monitors in Afghanistan are reporting a rise in civilian casualties and executions, with the Taliban responsible for the bulk of the offenses. Sennott said his reporting so far reflects a sense that "the Taliban is going to be a part of the future of Afghanistan."

"I spoke today to a young man who was very openly in favor of the Taliban and he felt like the Taliban has changed," said Sennott, noting that footage coming out of Afghanistan showing beheadings and the slaughter of surrendering troops, shows "completely the opposite."

"I think the young people who are educated here, like the young man I spoke with, he said to me that yes he supports some of the aspects of the Taliban a sense of traditional Islam, of living by Sharia but that he would never tolerate girls not to be educated or women not to be in the workplace, and that no one his age would support that."

75% of Afghans are 25 years old or younger, said Sennott.

While the Taliban has gained ground in remote areas of the country, Sennott said he doesn't believe "they are going to come into power and surge into taking over Kabul any time soon."

"The clearest assessment I have is a shift in strategy, that the Afghan national army and security forces here have decided they're going to concentrate on the urban centers, and that's going to mean letting go of some of the outposts in more distant regions," he said.

Charlie Sennott is a GBH News analyst and founder and CEO of the Groundtruth Project.

See more here:
On The Ground In Kabul: The 'Barometric Pressure Is Dropping' In Afghanistan As US Troops Withdraw - wgbh.org