Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

Another Surge in Afghanistan Would Be Folly. I Should KnowI Was Part of the Last One. – Mother Jones

A boots-on-the-ground analysis.

Danny SjursenJul. 4, 2017 6:00 AM

Army soldiers on patrol in Kandahar province, 2010.Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP

This story first appeared on the TomDispatch website.

We walked in a single file. Not because it was tactically sound. It wasntat least according to standard infantry doctrine. Patrolling southern Afghanistan in column formation limited maneuverability, made it difficult to mass fire, and exposed us to enfilading machine-gun bursts. Still, in 2011, in the Pashmul District of Kandahar Province, single file was our best bet.

The reason was simple enough: improvised bombs not just along roads but seemingly everywhere. Hundreds of them, maybe thousands. Who knew?

Thats right, the local Talibana term so nebulous its basically lost all meaninghad managed to drastically alter US Army tactics with crude, homemade explosives stored in plastic jugs. And believe me, this was a huge problem. Cheap, ubiquitous, and easy to bury, those anti-personnel Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, soon littered the roads, footpaths, and farmland surrounding our isolated outpost. To a greater extent than a number of commanders willingly admitted, the enemy had managed to nullify our many technological advantages for a few pennies on the dollar (or maybe, since were talking about the Pentagon, it was pennies on the millions of dollars).

Truth be told, it was never really about our high-tech gear. Instead, American units came to rely on superior training and discipline, as well as initiative and maneuverability, to best their opponents. And yet those deadly IEDs often seemed to even the score, being both difficult to detect and brutally effective. So there we were, after too many bloody lessons, meandering along in carnival-like, Pied Piper-style columns. Bomb-sniffing dogs often led the way, followed by a couple of soldiers carrying mine detectors, followed by a few explosives experts. Only then came the first foot soldiers, rifles at the ready. Anything else was, if not suicide, then at least grotesquely ill-advised.

And mind you, our improvised approach didnt always work either. To those of us out there, each patrol felt like an ad hoc round of Russian roulette. In that way, those IEDs completely changed how we operated, slowing movement, discouraging extra patrols, and distancing us from what was then considered the ultimate prize: the local villagers, or what was left of them anyway. In a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, which is what the U.S. military was running in Afghanistan in those years, that was the definition of defeat.

My own unit faced a dilemma common to dozensmaybe hundredsof other American units in Afghanistan. Every patrol was slow, cumbersome, and risky. The natural inclination, if you cared about your boys, was to do less. But effective COIN operations require securing territory and gaining the trust of the civilians living there. You simply cant do that from inside a well-protected American base. One obvious option was to live in the villageswhich we eventually didbut that required dividing up the company into smaller groups and securing a second, third, maybe fourth location, which quickly became problematic, at least for my 82-man cavalry troop (when at full strength). And, of course, there were no less than five villages in my area of responsibility.

I realize, writing this now, that theres no way I can make the situation sound quite as dicey as it actually was. How, for instance, were we to secure and empower a village population that was, by then, all but nonexistent? Years, even decades, of hard fighting, air strikes, and damaged crops had left many of those villages in that part of Kandahar Province little more than ghost towns, while cities elsewhere in the country teemed with uprooted and dissatisfied peasant refugees from the countryside.

The author in Pashmul, Afghanistan, 2011.

Danny Sjursen

Sometimes, it felt as if we were fighting over nothing more than a few dozen deserted mud huts. And like it or not, such absurdity exemplified Americas war in Afghanistan. It still does. That was the view from the bottom. Matters werentand arentmeasurably better at the top. As easily as one reconnaissance troop could be derailed, so the entire enterprise, which rested on similarly shaky foundations, could be unsettled.

At a moment when the generals to whom President Trump recently delegated decision-making powers on US troop strength in that country consider a new Afghan surge, it might be worth looking backward and zooming out just a bit. Remember, the very idea of winning the Afghan War, which left my unit in that collection of mud huts, rested (and still rests) on a few rather grandiose assumptions.

The first of these surely is that the Afghans actually want (or ever wanted) us there; the second, that the country was and still is vital to our national security; and the third, that 10,000, 50,000, or even 100,000 foreign troops ever were or now could be capable of pacifying an insurgency, or rather a growing set of insurgencies, or securing 33 million souls, or facilitating a stable, representative government in a heterogeneous, mountainous, landlocked country with little history of democracy.

The first of these points is at least debatable. As you might imagine, any kind of accurate polling is quite difficult, if not impossible, outside the few major population centers in that isolated country. Though many Afghans, particularly urban ones, may favor a continued US military presence, others clearly wonder what good a new influx of foreigners will do in their endlessly war-torn nation. As one high-ranking Afghan official recently lamented, thinking undoubtedly of the first use in his land of the largest non-nuclear bomb on the planet, Is the plan just to use our country as a testing ground for bombs? And keep in mind that the striking rise in territory the Taliban now controls, the most since they were driven from power in 2001, suggests that the US presence is hardly welcomed everywhere.

The second assumption is far more difficult to argue or justify. To say the least, classifying a war in far-away Afghanistan as vital relies on a rather pliable definition of the term. If that passes musterif bolstering the Afghan military to the tune of (at least) tens of billions of dollars annually and thousands of new boots-on-the-ground in order to deny safe haven to terrorists is truly vitalthen logically the current US presences in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen are critical as well and should be similarly fortified. And what about the growing terror groups in Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia, and so on? Were talking about a truly expensive proposition herein blood and treasure. But is it true? Rational analysis suggests it is not. After all, on average about seven Americans were killed by Islamist terrorists on US soil annually from 2005 to 2015. That puts terrorism deaths right up there with shark attacks and lightning strikes. The fear is real, the actual dangerless so.

As for the third point, its simply preposterous. One look at US military attempts at nation-building or post-conflict stabilization and pacification in Iraq, Libya, ordare I saySyria should settle the issue. Its often said that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. Yet here we are, 14 years after the folly of invading Iraq and many of the same voicesinside and outside the administrationare clamoring for one more surge in Afghanistan (and, of course, will be clamoring for the predictable surges to follow across the Greater Middle East).

The very idea that the US military had the ability to usher in a secure Afghanistan is grounded in a number of preconditions that proved to be little more than fantasies. First, there would have to be a capable, reasonably corruption-free local governing partner and military. Thats a nonstarter. Afghanistans corrupt, unpopular national unity government is little better than the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in the 1960s and that American war didnt turn out so well, did it? Then theres the question of longevity. When it comes to the US military presence there, soon to head into its 16th year, how long is long enough? Several mainstream voices, including former Afghan commander General David Petraeus, are now talking about at least a generation more to successfully pacify Afghanistan. Is that really feasible given Americas growing resource constraints and the ever expanding set of dangerous ungoverned spaces worldwide?

And what could a new surge actually do? The US presence in Afghanistan is essentially a fragmented series of self-contained bases, each of which needs to be supplied and secured. In a country of its size, with a limited transportation infrastructure, even the 4,000-5,000 extra troops the Pentagon is reportedly considering sending right now wont go very far.

Now, zoom out again. Apply the same calculus to the US position across the Greater Middle East and you face what we might start calling the Afghan paradox, or my own quandary safeguarding five villages with only 82 men writ large. Do the math. The military is already struggling to keep up with its commitments. At what point is Washington simply spinning its proverbial wheels? Ill tell you whenyesterday.

Now, think about those three questionable Afghan assumptions and one uncomfortable actuality leaps forth. The only guiding force left in the American strategic arsenal is inertia.

Remember something: This wont be Americas first Afghan surge. Or its second, or even its third. No, this will be the U.S. militarys fourth crack at it. Who feels lucky? First came President George W. Bushs quiet surge back in 2008. Next, just one month into his first term, newly minted President Barack Obama sent 17,000 more troops to fight his so-called good war (unlike the bad one in Iraq) in southern Afghanistan. After a testy strategic review, he then committed 30,000 additional soldiers to the real surge a year later. Thats what brought me (and the rest of B Troop, 4-4 Cavalry) to Pashmul district in 2011. We leftmost of usmore than five years ago, but of course about 8,800 American military personnel remain today and they are the basis for the surge to come.

To be fair, Surge 4.0 might initially deliver certain modest gains (just as each of the other three did in their day). Realistically, more trainers, air support, and logistics personnel could indeed stabilize some Afghan military units for some limited amount of time. Sixteen years into the conflict, with 10 percent as many American troops on the ground as at the wars peak, and after a decade-plus of training, Afghan security forces are still being battered by the insurgents.

In the last years, theyve been experiencing record casualties, along with the usual massive stream of desertions and the legions of ghost soldiers who can neither die nor desert because they dont exist, although their salaries do (in the pockets of their commanders or other lucky Afghans). And thats earned them a stalemate, which has left the Taliban and other insurgent groups in control of a significant part of the country. And if all goes well (which isnt exactly a surefire thing), thats likely to be the best that Surge 4.0 can produce: a long, painful tie.

Peel back the onions layers just a bit more and the ostensible reasons for Americas Afghan War vanish along with all the explanatory smoke and mirrors. After all, there are two things the upcoming mini-surge will emphatically not do:

(1) It wont change a failing strategic formula. Imagine that formula this way: American trainers + Afghan soldiers + loads of cash + (unspecified) time = a stable Afghan government and lessening Taliban influence.

It hasnt worked yet, of course, butso the surge-believers assure usthats because we need more: more troops, more money, more time. Like so many loyal Reaganites, their answers are always supply-side ones and none of them ever seems to wonder whether, almost 16 years later, the formula itself might not be fatally flawed.

According to news reports, no solution being considered by the current administration will even deal with the following interlocking set of problems: Afghanistan is a large, mountainous, landlocked, ethno-religiously heterogeneous, poor country led by a deeply corrupt government with a deeply corrupt military. In a place long known as a graveyard of empires, the United States military and the Afghan Security Forces continue to wage what one eminent historian has termed fortified compound warfare. Essentially, Washington and its local allies continue to grapple with relatively conventional threats from exceedingly mobile Taliban fighters across a porous border with Pakistan, a country that has offered not-so-furtive support and a safe haven for those adversaries. And the Washington response to this has largely been to lock its soldiers inside those fortified compounds (and focus on protecting them against insider attacks by those Afghans it works with and trains). It hasnt worked. It cant. It wont.

Consider an analogous example. In Vietnam, the United States never solved the double conundrum of enemy safe havens and a futile search for legitimacy. The Vietcong guerillas and North Vietnamese Army used nearby Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to rest, refit, and replenish. US troops, meanwhile, lacked legitimacy because their corrupt South Vietnamese partners lacked it.

Sound familiar? We face the same two problems in Afghanistan: a Pakistani safe haven and a corrupt, unpopular central government in Kabul. Nothing, and I mean nothing, in any future troop surge will effectively change that.

(2) It wont pass the logical fallacy test.

The minute you really think about it, the whole argument for a surge or mini-surge instantly slides down a philosophical slippery slope.

If the war is really about denying terrorists safe havens in ungoverned or poorly governed territory, then why not surge more troops into Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan (where al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Ladens son Hamza bin-Laden are believed to be safely ensconced), Iraq, Syria, Chechnya, Dagestan (where one of the Boston Marathon bombers was radicalized), or for that matter Paris or London. Every one of those places has harbored and/or is harboring terrorists. Maybe instead of surging yet again in Afghanistan or elsewhere, the real answer is to begin to realize that all the US military in its present mode of operation can do to change that reality is make it worse. After all, the last 15 years offer a vision of how it continually surges and in the process only creates yet more ungovernable lands and territories.

So much of the effort, now as in previous years, rests on an evident desire among military and political types in Washington to wage the war they know, the one their army is built for: battles for terrain, fights that can be tracked and measured on maps, the sort of stuff that staff officers (like me) can display on ever more-complicated PowerPoint slides. Military men and traditional policymakers are far less comfortable with ideological warfare, the sort of contest where their instinctual proclivity to do something is often counterproductive.

As US Army Field Manual 3-24General David Petraeus highly touted counterinsurgency biblewisely opined: Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. Its high time to follow such advice (even if its not the advice that Petraeus himself is offering anymore).

As for me, call me a deep-dyed skeptic when it comes to what 4,000 or 5,000 more US troops can do to secure or stabilize a country where most of the village elders I met couldnt tell you how old they were. A little foreign policy humility goes a long way toward not heading down that slippery slope. Why, then, do Americans continue to deceive themselves? Why do they continue to believe that even 100,000 boys from Indiana and Alabama could alter Afghan society in a way Washington would like? Or any other foreign land for that matter?

I suppose some generals and policymakers are just plain gamblers. But before putting your money on the next Afghan surge, it might be worth flashing back to the limitations, struggles, and sacrifices of just one small unit in one tiny, contested district of southern Afghanistan in 2011.

So, on we walkedsingle file, step by treacherous stepfor nearly a year. Most days things worked out. Until they didnt. Unfortunately, some soldiers found bombs the hard way: three dead, dozens wounded, one triple amputee. So it went and so we kept on going. Always onward. Ever forward. For America? Afghanistan? Each other? No matter. And so it seems other Americans will keep on going in 2017, 2018, 2019

Lift foot. Hold breath. Step. Exhale. Keep walkingto defeatbut together.

Major Danny Sjursen, an Army strategist and former history instructor at West Point, is the author of Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge. He served tours with reconnaissance units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

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Originally posted here:
Another Surge in Afghanistan Would Be Folly. I Should KnowI Was Part of the Last One. - Mother Jones

US still has no path to peace in Afghanistan, bipartisan senators say – The Guardian

From left: Sheldon Whitehouse, Elizabeth Warren, John McCain and Lindsey Graham in Kabul. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

After more than 15 years in Afghanistan, the US still does not have a strategy for winning peace, and is making that goal even more unattainable by hampering diplomacy, a bipartisan group of US senators said in the Afghan capital on Tuesday.

The criticism came as the Trump administration mulls the deployment of thousands of additional soldiers, without publicly explaining what they are meant to achieve.

In Kabul, senator John McCain excoriated 15 years of US efforts in Afghanistan, which, he said, pursued a goal amounting to dont lose, rather than winning.

McCain accompanied by Democratic senators Elizabeth Warren and Sheldon Whitehouse, and Republican senators Lindsey Graham and David Perdue said the delegation shared concerns about the worsened security in Afghanistan since the drawdown of coalition troops in 2014.

Each of us may describe that concern in our own way but none of us would say that were on course to a success here in Afghanistan, he said.

Warren added that without a clear plan, political patience in the US could run out.

We need a strategy in the United States that defines our role in Afghanistan, defines our objective and explains how were going to get from here to there, she said.

Most experts believe the Afghan conflict cannot be won by military means alone. Yet, while planning to boost the 8,400 US troops in Afghanistan with approximately 4,000 more, Donald Trump is gutting civilian bodies tasked with diplomacy.

Proposing budget cuts of 32% to the State Department, Trump has also allowed for the closure of the office of the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, tasked with coordinating across the US government to meet strategic goals in the region.

I see a lack of focus thats very unnerving, said Graham, calling the State Department woefully understaffed.

Whitehouse agreed, commended the military for pushing back at the hollowing out of the State Department in the early months of this administration.

The congressional delegation visited Afghanistan and Pakistan ahead of a US review of its Afghan war strategy.

The strongest nation on Earth should be able to win this conflict, McCain said. And we are frustrated that this strategy hadnt been articulated yet, to be honest with you.

In Islamabad on Monday, McCain said Pakistans cooperation was crucial to gain peace in the region.

The US government has already shown signs of a hardened line against Pakistan, which experts believe has sheltered and supported militants from the Afghan Taliban for years, and not sufficiently curbed terrorist groups.

Last week, the US designated Syed Salahuddin, a Kashmiri militant leader, as a terrorist, prompting accusations from Pakistan that Trump was doing the bidding of Indias prime minister, Narendra Modi, who was visiting Washington at the time.

Also last week, General Joseph Dunford, chair of the joint chiefs of staff, visited Kabul for a last evaluation of whether to increase US troop levels.

When asked what winning in Afghanistan would look like, McCain stopped short of demanding a military defeat of the Taliban, settling for an advantage on the battlefield.

Winning is getting major areas of the country under control, and working towards some kind of ceasefire with the Taliban, he said. They will not negotiate unless they think they are losing.

Graham said American soldiers were in Afghanistan to protect the homeland.

Leaving radical Islam alone will not make us safe at home, he said. I want every American to know that we will win this thing because the Afghan people do not want to go back to the darkness. They want to pursue the light.

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US still has no path to peace in Afghanistan, bipartisan senators say - The Guardian

Afghanistan’s all-girl robotics team can’t get visas to come to the US – PRI

A group of teenage girls from Afghanistanwho had planned to cometo Washington, DC, for an international robotics competition won't be coming after all, after the US State Department denied their visas.

This opportunity would allow us to invent, design, and create things that could possibly allow our community, our lives, and us, the team memberswrote on their page ofthe FIRSTGlobal Challenge competitionwebsite. We want to make a difference and most breakthroughs in science, technology, and other industries normally start with the dream of a child to do something great. We want to be that child and pursue our dreams to make a difference in peoples lives."

The team of six had been working for months to build a robot that could complete a variety of engineering tasks, like providing access to clean drinking water.

Just getting this far had been a challenge. While other competitors received raw materials from the event organizer, the Afghan team had to improvise because the box sent from America had been held up for months amid concerns about terrorism, according to the Washington Post.

So being selected to come was a thrill. But it also meant enduring the US visa application process.

The girls had to make a 500-mile journey twice from their hometownof Herat, in western Afghanistan, to the USEmbassy in Kabul for an interview.

I can't tell you why exactly [their applications were denied], but I do know that a fair opportunity was given by the USState Department and embassy, said Joe Sestak, a former congressman and president of FIRST Global. We are saddened they won't be here.

The team was sponsored by Roya Mahboob, founder of Afghanistans Citadel software company, and the countrys first female tech CEO. Mahboob told Mashable the girls spent the day crying after finding out they wouldnt be able to travel.

"The first time [they were rejected] it was very difficult talking with the students," Mahboob said. "They're young and they were very upset.

Although the young women wont make it to the US, their robot is now on its way to participate in the competition. The team of six will tune in to the event via Skype, and a group of young Afghan-American women will represent them at the event.

The team from Afghanistan isn't alone in being rejected, according to Sestak. A team from Gambia was also denied entry, and will also participate via Skype.

See more here:
Afghanistan's all-girl robotics team can't get visas to come to the US - PRI

Afghanistan U-15 Beats Tajikistan In Central Asian Championships – TOLOnews

Afghanistan's u-15 team started off well in the Central Asian competition, with Asghar Hussaini clinching two goals for his team.

Afghanistans under-15 football team beat Tajikistan 3-1 in their Central Asian Football Association (CAFA) championship match in Tajikistan on Monday night.

The match was held at the Hisor Stadium outside Dushanbe.

Fardin Naser scored for Afghanistan in the first minute of the match, while Asghar Hussaini scored the second goal for the team in the 83rd minute.

Hussaini also scored the third goal for his team in the 92nd minute.

We have showed in our first match to others that Afghanistan can be the champion of the competition. I hope our wishes come true, said u-15 team coach, Sayed Hadi Kazimi.

Hussaini who scored two goals in the first match for his team said: I will try to score more goals with the support of my teammates so we can become the top scorers of the competition.

The competition is being hosted by Tajikistan, with five teams taking part - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Afghanistan will play Kyrgyzstan in its second match on Tuesday night.

See the article here:
Afghanistan U-15 Beats Tajikistan In Central Asian Championships - TOLOnews

War in Afghanistan (2001present) – Wikipedia

War in Afghanistan (2001Present) Part of the larger War in Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism Clockwise from top-left: British Royal Marines take part in the clearance of Nad-e Ali District of Helmand Province; two F/A-18 strike fighters conduct combat missions over Afghanistan; an anti-Taliban fighter during an operation to secure a compound in Helmand Province; a French chasseur alpin patrols a valley in Kapisa Province; U.S. Marines prepare to board buses shortly after arriving in southern Afghanistan; Taliban fighters in a cave hideout; U.S. soldiers prepare to fire a mortar during a mission in Paktika Province, U.S. troops disembark from a helicopter, a MEDCAP centre in Khost Province. Belligerents Invasion (2001): Northern Alliance United States United Kingdom Canada Australia Germany Invasion (2001): Afghanistan[a] al-Qaeda 055 Brigade[1][2] IMU[3] TNSM[4] ETIM[5] Insurgency: Afghanistan[6] Coalition: Insurgency: Commanders and leaders

Hamid Karzai Ashraf Ghani George W. Bush (20012009) Barack Obama (20092017) Donald J Trump (2017 )

Mohammed Omar Akhtar Mansoor Abdul Ghani Baradar(POW)[13] Hibatullah Akhundzada[9] Jalaluddin Haqqani Obaidullah Akhund[13] Dadullah Akhund[13] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Osama bin Laden Ayman al-Zawahiri

Afghan National Security Forces: 352,000[15] ISAF: 18,000+[16]

Taliban: 60,000 (tentative estimate)[17]

HIG: 1,500 2,000+[21] al-Qaeda: 50100[22][23] ~ 3,000 in 2001[24]

Afghan security forces: 21,950 killed[25] Northern Alliance: 200 killed[26][27][28][29] Coalition Dead: 3,486 (all causes) 2,807 (hostile causes) (United States:2,356, United Kingdom:454,[30] Canada:158, France:89, Germany:57, Italy:53, Others:321)[31] Wounded: 22,773 (United States:19,950, United Kingdom:2,188, Canada:635)[32][33][34] Contractors Dead: 1,582[35][36] Wounded: 15,000+[35][36]

The War in Afghanistan (or the U.S. War in Afghanistan)[38][39] followed the 2001 United States invasion of Afghanistan.[40] Supported initially by Canada in the form of JTF2[41] and the United Kingdom, the US was later joined by the rest of NATO, beginning in 2003. Its public aims were to dismantle al-Qaeda and to deny it a safe base of operations in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban from power.[42] Key allies, including the United Kingdom, supported the U.S. from the start to the end of the phase. This phase of the war is the longest war in United States history.[43][44][45][46][47]

In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda; bin Laden had already been wanted by the United Nations since 1999. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless given evidence of his involvement in the September 11 attacks[48] and also declined demands to extradite others on the same grounds. The request for evidence was dismissed by the U.S. as a delaying tactic, and on 7 October 2001 it launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other forces, including the Northern Alliance which had been fighting the Taliban in the ongoing civil war since 1996.[49][50] In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the Afghan interim authorities with securing Kabul. At the Bonn Conference the same month, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[51]

NATO became involved in ISAF in August 2003, and later that year assumed leadership of it, with troops from 43 countries by this stage. NATO members provided the core of the force.[52] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command.

The Taliban was reorganised by its leader Mullah Omar, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[53][54] Though outgunned and outnumbered, insurgents from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and other groups have waged asymmetric warfare with guerilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets and turncoat killings against coalition forces. The Taliban exploited weaknesses in the Afghan government, among the most corrupt in the world, to reassert influence across rural areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. In the initial years there was little fighting, but from 2006 the Taliban made significant gains and showed an increased willingness to commit atrocities against civilians. ISAF responded in 2006 by increasing troops for counterinsurgency operations to "clear and hold" villages and "nation building" projects to "win hearts and minds".[55][56] Violence sharply escalated from 2007 to 2009.[57] While ISAF continued to battle the Taliban insurgency, fighting crossed into neighboring North-West Pakistan.[58]

On 1 May 2011, United States Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan. In May 2012, NATO leaders endorsed an exit strategy for withdrawing their forces. UN-backed peace talks have since taken place between the Afghan government and the Taliban.[59] In May 2014, the United States announced that its major combat operations would end in December 2014, and that it would leave a residual force in the country.[60] In October 2014, British forces handed over the last bases in Helmand to the Afghan military, officially ending their combat operations in the war.[61] On 28 December 2014, NATO formally ended ISAF combat operations in Afghanistan and officially transferred full security responsibility to the Afghan government. The NATO led Operation Resolute Support was formed the same day.[62][63] In May 2017, over 13,000 foreign troops remain in Afghanistan without any formal plans to withdraw.[64][65]

Tens of thousands of people have been killed in the war. Over 4,000 ISAF soldiers and civilian contractors as well as over 15,000 Afghan national security forces were killed, as well as nearly 20,000 civilians.

Afghanistan's political order began to break down with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah by his distant cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in a bloodless 1946 coup. Daoud Khan had served as prime minister since 1953 and promoted economic modernization, emancipation of women, and Pashtun nationalism. This was threatening to neighboring Pakistan, faced with its own restive Pashtun population. In the mid-1930's, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to encourage Afghan Islamist leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to fight against the regime. In 1978, Daoud Khan was killed in a coup by Afghan's Communist Party, his former partner in government, known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA pushed for a socialist transformation by abolishing arranged marriages, promoting mass literacy and reforming land ownership. This undermined the traditional tribal order and provoked opposition across rural areas. The PDPA's crackdown was met with open rebellion, including Ismail Khan's Herat Uprising. The PDPA was beset by internal leadership differences and was weakened by an internal coup on 11 September 1979 when Hafizullah Amin ousted Nur Muhammad Taraki. The Soviet Union, sensing PDPA weakness, intervened militarily three months later, to depose Amin and install another PDA faction led by Babrak Karmal.

The entry of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in December 1979 prompted its Cold War rivals, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China to support rebels fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In contrast to the secular and socialist government, which controlled the cities, religiously motivated mujahideen held sway in much of the countryside. Beside Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khan, other mujahideen commanders included Jalaluddin Haqqani. The CIA worked closely with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence to funnel foreign support for the mujahideen. The war also attracted Arab volunteers, known as "Afghan Arabs", including Osama bin Laden.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan in May 1989, the PDPA regime under Najibullah held on until 1992, when the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the regime of aid, and the defection of Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum cleared the approach to Kabul. With the political stage cleared of socialists, the warlords, some of them Islamist, vied for power. By then, Bin Laden had left the country and the United States' interest in Afghanistan also diminished.

In 1992, Rabbani officially became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, but had to battle other warlords for control of Kabul. In late 1994, Rabbani's defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud, defeated Hekmatyr in Kabul and ended ongoing bombardment of the capital.[66][67][68] Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation. Other warlords, including Ismail Khan in the west and Dostum in the north, maintained their fiefdoms.

In 1994, Mohammed Omar, a mujahideen member who taught at a Pakistani madrassa, returned to Kandahar and formed the Taliban movement. His followers were religious students, known as the Talib and they sought to end warlordism through strict adherence to Islamic law. By November 1994, the Taliban had captured all of Kandahar Province. They declined the government's offer to join in a coalition government and marched on Kabul in 1995.[69]

The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of costly defeats.[70] Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban.[71][72] Analysts such as Amin Saikal described the group as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional interests, which the Taliban denied.[71] The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995, but were driven back by Massoud.[67][73]

On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia, seized Kabul and founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They imposed their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in areas under their control, issuing edicts forbidding women to work outside the home, attend school, or to leave their homes unless accompanied by a male relative.[75] According to the Pakistani expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban.[76][77]

Massoud and Dostum, former arch-enemies, created a United Front against the Taliban, commonly known as the Northern Alliance.[78] In addition to Massoud's Tajik force and Dostum's Uzbeks, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq and Haji Abdul Qadir. Abdul Haq also gathered a limited number of defecting Pashtun Taliban.[79] Both agreed to work together with the exiled Afghan king Zahir Shah.[77] International officials who met with representatives of the new alliance, which the journalist Steve Coll referred to as the "grand Pashtun-Tajik alliance", said, "It's crazy that you have this today Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara They were all ready to buy in to the process to work under the king's banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan."[81] The Northern Alliance received varying degrees of support from Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and India. The Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and drove Dostum into exile.

The conflict was brutal. According to the United Nations (UN), the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. The Taliban especially targeted the Shia Hazaras.[82][83] In retaliation for the execution of 3,000 Taliban prisoners by Uzbek general Abdul Malik Pahlawan in 1997, the Taliban executed about 4,000 civilians after taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998.[84][85]

Bin Laden's 055 Brigade was responsible for mass killings of Afghan civilians.[86] The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing "Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people".[82][83]

By 2001, the Taliban controlled as much as 90% of Afghanistan, with the Northern Alliance confined to the country's northeast corner. Fighting alongside Taliban forces were some 28,00030,000 Pakistanis (usually also Pashtun) and 2,0003,000 Al-Qaeda militants.[69][86] Many of the Pakistanis were recruited from madrassas.[86] A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirmed that "2040 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani." The document said that many of the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan". According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular soldiers, especially from the Frontier Corps, but also from the Pakistani Army providing direct combat support.[72][89]

In August 1996, Bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan and arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He had founded Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen's war against the Soviets, but became disillusioned by infighting among warlords. He grew close to Mullah Omar and moved Al-Qaeda's operations to eastern Afghanistan.[citation needed]

The 9/11 Commission in the U.S. reported found that under the Taliban, al-Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a place to train and indoctrinate fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other jihadists, and plot terrorist actions. While al-Qaeda maintained its own camps in Afghanistan, it also supported training camps of other organizations. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 men passed through these facilities before 9/11, most of whom were sent to fight for the Taliban against the United Front. A smaller number were inducted into al-Qaeda.

After the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were linked to bin Laden, President Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant training camps in Afghanistan. U.S. officials pressed the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. In 1999, the international community imposed sanctions on the Taliban, calling for bin Laden to be surrendered. The Taliban repeatedly rebuffed these demands.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special Activities Division paramilitary teams were active in Afghanistan in the 1990s in clandestine operations to locate and kill or capture Osama bin Laden. These teams planned several operations, but did not receive the order to proceed from President Clinton. Their efforts built relationships with Afghan leaders that proved essential in the 2001 invasion.

During the Clinton administration, the U.S. tended to favor Pakistan and until 19981999 had no clear policy toward Afghanistan. In 1997, for example, the U.S. State Department's Robin Raphel told Massoud to surrender to the Taliban. Massoud responded that, as long as he controlled an area the size of his hat, he would continue to defend it from the Taliban.[69] Around the same time, top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration flew to northern Afghanistan to try to persuade the United Front not to take advantage of a chance to make crucial gains against the Taliban. They insisted it was the time for a cease-fire and an arms embargo. At the time, Pakistan began a "Berlin-like airlift to resupply and re-equip the Taliban", financed with Saudi money.[93]

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan changed after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings. Subsequently, Osama bin Laden was indicted for his involvement in the embassy bombings. In 1999 both the U.S. and the United Nations enacted sanctions against the Taliban via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, which demanded the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden for trial in the U.S. and close all terrorist bases in Afghanistan.[94] The only collaboration between Massoud and the US at the time was an effort with the CIA to trace bin Laden following the 1998 bombings. The U.S. and the European Union provided no support to Massoud for the fight against the Taliban.

By 2001 the change of policy sought by CIA officers who knew Massoud was underway. CIA lawyers, working with officers in the Near East Division and Counter-terrorist Center, began to draft a formal finding for President George W. Bush's signature, authorizing a covert action program in Afghanistan. It would be the first in a decade to seek to influence the course of the Afghan war in favor of Massoud.Richard A. Clarke, chair of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group under the Clinton administration, and later an official in the Bush administration, allegedly presented a plan to incoming Bush National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in January 2001.

A change in US policy was effected in August 2001. The Bush administration agreed on a plan to start supporting Massoud. A meeting of top national security officials agreed that the Taliban would be presented with an ultimatum to hand over bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives. If the Taliban refused, the US would provide covert military aid to anti-Taliban groups. If both those options failed, "the deputies agreed that the United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action."[97]

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only leader of the United Front in Afghanistan. In the areas under his control, Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women's Rights Declaration.[98] As a consequence, many civilians had fled to areas under his control.[99][100] In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban.[101]

In late 2000, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik nationalist and leader of the Northern Alliance, invited several other prominent Afghan tribal leaders to a jirga in northern Afghanistan "to settle political turmoil in Afghanistan".[102] Among those in attendance were Pashtun nationalists, Abdul Haq and Hamid Karzai.[103][104]

In early 2001, Massoud and several other Afghan leaders addressed the European Parliament in Brussels, asking the international community to provide humanitarian help. The Afghan envoy asserted that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and Osama bin Laden, the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for another year. Massoud warned that his intelligence had gathered information about an imminent, large-scale attack on U.S. soil.[105]

On 9 September 2001, two French-speaking Algerians posing as journalists killed Massoud in a suicide attack in Takhar Province of Afghanistan. The two perpetrators were later alleged to be members of al-Qaeda. They were interviewing Massoud before detonating a bomb hidden in their video camera.[106][107] Both of the alleged al-Qaeda men were subsequently killed by Massoud's guards.

On the morning of 11 September 2001, a total of 19 Arab men carried out four coordinated attacks in the United States. Four commercial passenger jet airliners were hijacked.[108][109] The hijackers members of al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell [110] intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and more than 2000 people in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed within two hours from damage related to the crashes, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C.. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, in rural Pennsylvania, after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C., to target the White House, or the U.S. Capitol. No one aboard the flights survived. According to the New York State Health Department, the death toll among responders including firefighters and police was 836 as of June 2009.[111] Total deaths were 2996, including the 19 hijackers.[111]

The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred after the September 11 attacks in late 2001,[112] supported by allies including the United Kingdom.

U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Bin Laden had been wanted by the U.N. since 1999 for the prior attack on the World Trade Center. The Taliban government refused to extradite him (or others sought by the US) unless it provided evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks.[48] They ignored U.S. demands to shut down al-Qaeda bases. The request for proof of bin Laden's involvement was dismissed by the U.S. as a meaningless delaying tactic.

Immediately after the attacks, General Tommy Franks, then-commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), initially proposed to President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the U.S. invade Afghanistan using a conventional force of 60,000 troops, preceded by six months of preparation. Rumsfield and Bush feared that a conventional invasion of Afghanistan could bog down as had happened to the Soviets and the British.[113] Rumsfield rejected Franks's plan, saying "I want men on the ground now!" Franks returned the next day with a plan utilizing US Special Forces.[114] On September 26, 2001, fifteen days after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. covertly inserted members of the CIA's Special Activities Division led by Gary Schroen as part of team Jawbreaker into Afghanistan, forming the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team.[115][116][117] They linked up with the Northern Alliance as part of Task Force Dagger.[118]

Two weeks later, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 555 and 595, both 12-man Green Beret teams from 5th Special Forces Group, plus Air Force combat controllers, were airlifted by helicopter from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan[119] more than 300 kilometers (190mi) across the 16,000 feet (4,900m) Hindu Kush mountains in zero-visibility conditions by two SOAR MH-47E Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks were refueled in-flight three times during the 11-hour mission, establishing a new world record for combat rotorcraft missions at the time. They linked up with the CIA and Northern Alliance. Within a few weeks the Northern Alliance, with assistance from the U.S. ground and air forces, captured several key cities from the Taliban.[115][120]

The U.S. officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 with the assistance of the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other countries.[49][50] The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power and built military bases near major cities across the country. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban were not captured, escaping to neighboring Pakistan or retreating to rural or remote mountainous regions.[121]

On 20 December 2001, the United Nations authorized an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate to help the Afghans maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. It was initially established from the headquarters of the British 3rd Mechanised Division under Major General John McColl, and for its first years numbered no more than 5,000.[122] Its mandate did not extend beyond the Kabul area for the first few years.[123] Eighteen countries were contributing to the force in February 2002.

At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[51]

In August 2003, NATO became involved, taking the helm at ISAF.[52] Some U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[53][54]

After evading coalition forces throughout mid-2002, Taliban remnants gradually regained confidence and prepared to launch the Taliban insurgency that Omar had promised.[124] During September, Taliban forces began a jihad recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pamphlets distributed in secret appeared in many villages in southeastern Afghanistan called for jihad.[125]

Small mobile training camps were established along the border to train recruits in guerrilla warfare.[126] Most were drawn from tribal area madrassas in Pakistan. Bases, a few with as many as 200 fighters, emerged in the tribal areas by the summer of 2003. Pakistani will to prevent infiltration was uncertain, while Pakistani military operations proved of little use.[127]

The Taliban gathered into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on isolated outposts, and then breaking up into groups of 510 to evade counterattacks. Coalition forces were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised explosive devices.

To coordinate the strategy, Omar named a 10-man leadership council, with himself as its leader.[127] Five operational zones were assigned to Taliban commanders such as Dadullah, who took charge in Zabul province.[127] Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of attacking Americans using elaborate ambushes. The first sign of the strategy came on 27 January 2003, during Operation Mongoose, when a band of fighters were assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex 25km (15mi) north of Spin Boldak.[128] 18 rebels were reported killed with no U.S. casualties. The site was suspected to be a base for supplies and fighters coming from Pakistan. The first isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.

As the summer continued, Taliban attacks gradually increased in frequency. Dozens of Afghan government soldiers, NGO humanitarian workers, and several U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes and rocket attacks. Besides guerrilla attacks, Taliban fighters began building up forces in the district of Dai Chopan in Zabul Province. The Taliban decided to make a stand there. Over the course of the summer, up to 1,000 guerrillas moved there. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August 2003. In late August 2005, Afghan government forces attacked, backed by U.S. troops with air support. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters killed.

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed control of ISAF.[123] On 31 July 2006, ISAF assumed command of the south of the country, and by 5 October 2006, of the east.[129] Once this transition had taken place, ISAF grew to a large coalition involving up to 46 countries, under a U.S. commander.

From January 2006, a multinational ISAF contingent started to replace U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan. The British 16th Air Assault Brigade (later reinforced by Royal Marines) formed the core of the force, along with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. The initial force consisted of roughly 3,300 British,[130] 2,300 Canadian,[131] 1,963 Dutch, 300 Australian,[132] 290 Danish[133] and 150 Estonian troops.[134] Air support was provided by U.S., British, Dutch, Norwegian and French combat aircraft and helicopters.

In January 2006, NATO's focus in southern Afghanistan was to form Provincial Reconstruction Teams with the British leading in Helmand while the Netherlands and Canada would lead similar deployments in Orzgn and Kandahar, respectively. Local Taliban figures pledged to resist.[135]

Southern Afghanistan faced in 2006 the deadliest violence since the Taliban's fall. NATO operations were led by British, Canadian and Dutch commanders. Operation Mountain Thrust was launched on 17 May 2006, with. In July, Canadian Forces, supported by U.S., British, Dutch and Danish forces, launched Operation Medusa.

A combined force of Dutch and Australians launched a successful offensive between late April to mid July 2006 to push the Taliban out of the Chora and Baluchi areas.

On 18 September 2006 Italian special forces of Task Force 45 and airborne troopers of the 'Trieste' infantry regiment of the Rapid Reaction Corps composed of Italian and Spanish forces, took part in 'Wyconda Pincer' operation in the districts of Bala Buluk and Pusht-i-Rod, in Farah province. Italian forces killed at least 70 Taliban. The situation in RC-W then deteriorated. Hotspots included Badghis in the very north and Farah in the southwest.

Further NATO operations included the Battle of Panjwaii, Operation Mountain Fury and Operation Falcon Summit. NATO achieved tactical victories and area denial, but the Taliban were not completely defeated. NATO operations continued into 2007.

In January and February 2007, British Royal Marines mounted Operation Volcano to clear insurgents from firing-points in the village of Barikju, north of Kajaki.[136] Other major operations during this period included Operation Achilles (MarchMay) and Operation Lastay Kulang. The UK Ministry of Defence announced its intention to bring British troop levels in the country up to 7,700 (committed until 2009).[137] Further operations, such as Operation Silver and Operation Silicon, took place to keep up the pressure on the Taliban in the hope of blunting their expected spring offensive.[138][139]

In February 2007, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan inactivated. Combined Joint Task Force 76, a two-star U.S. command headquartered on Bagram Airfield, assumed responsibility as the National Command Element for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.[140] Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, the other two-star U.S. command, was charged with training and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces.

On 4 March 2007, U.S. Marines killed at least 12 civilians and injured 33 in Shinwar district, Nangrahar,[141] in a response to a bomb ambush. The event became known as the "Shinwar massacre".[142] The 120 member Marine unit responsible for the attack were ordered to leave the country by Army Major General Frank Kearney, because the incident damaged the unit's relations with the local Afghan population.[143]

Later in March 2007, the US added more than 3,500 troops.

On 12 May 2007, ISAF forces killed Mullah Dadullah. Eleven other Taliban fighters died in the same firefight.

During the summer, NATO forces achieved tactical victories at the Battle of Chora in Orzgn, where Dutch and Australian ISAF forces were deployed.

On 16 August, eight civilians including a pregnant woman and a baby died when, few hours after an insurgent IED ambush damaged a Polish wheeled armored vehicle, Polish soldiers shelled the village of Nangar Khel, Paktika Province. Seven soldiers were charged with war crimes, after locals stated the Polish unit fired mortar rounds and machine guns into a wedding celebration without provocation,[144] but they were cleared of all charges in 2011.[145]

On 28 October about 80 Taliban fighters were killed in a 24-hour battle in Helmand.[146]

Western officials and analysts estimated the strength of Taliban forces at about 10,000 fighters fielded at any given time. Of that number, only 2,000 to 3,000 were highly motivated, full-time insurgents. The rest were volunteer units, made up of young Afghans, angered by deaths of Afghan civilians in military airstrikes and American detention of Muslim prisoners who had been held for years without being charged.[147] In 2007, more foreign fighters came into Afghanistan than ever before, according to officials. Approximately 100 to 300 full-time combatants were foreigners, many from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, various Arab countries and perhaps even Turkey and western China. They were reportedly more violent, incontrollable and extreme, often bringing superior video-production or bombmaking expertise.[148]

On 2 November security forces killed a top-ranking militant, Mawlawi Abdul Manan, after he was caught crossing the border. The Taliban confirmed his death.[149] On 10 November the Taliban ambushed a patrol in eastern Afghanistan. This attack brought the U.S. death toll for 2007 to 100, making it the Americans' deadliest year in Afghanistan.[150]

The Battle of Musa Qala took place in December. Afghan units were the principal fighting force, supported by British forces.[151] Taliban forces were forced out of the town.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that while the situation in Afghanistan is "precarious and urgent", the 10,000 additional troops needed there would be unavailable "in any significant manner" unless withdrawals from Iraq are made. The priority was Iraq first, Afghanistan second.[152]

In the first five months of 2008, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan increased by over 80% with a surge of 21,643 more troops, bringing the total from 26,607 in January to 48,250 in June.[153] In September 2008, President Bush announced the withdrawal of over 8,000 from Iraq and a further increase of up to 4,500 in Afghanistan.[154]

In June 2008, British prime minister Gordon Brown announced the number of British troops serving in Afghanistan would increase to 8,030 a rise of 230.[155] The same month, the UK lost its 100th serviceman.[156]

On 13 June, Taliban fighters demonstrated their ongoing strength, liberating all prisoners in Kandahar jail. The operation freed 1200 prisoners, 400 of whom were Taliban, causing a major embarrassment for NATO.[157]

On 13 July 2008, a coordinated Taliban attack was launched on a remote NATO base at Wanat in Kunar province. On 19 August, French troops suffered their worst losses in Afghanistan in an ambush with 10 soldiers killed in action and 21 injured.[158] Later in the month, an airstrike targeted a Taliban commander in Herat province and killed 90 civilians.

Late August saw one of NATO's largest operations in Helmand, Operation Eagle's Summit, aiming to bring electricity to the region.[159]

On 3 September, commandos, believed to be U.S. Army Special Forces, landed by helicopter and attacked three houses close to a known enemy stronghold in Pakistan. The attack killed between seven and twenty people. Local residents claimed that most of the dead were civilians. Pakistan condemned the attack, calling the incursion "a gross violation of Pakistan's territory".[160][161]

On 6 September, in an apparent reaction, Pakistan announced an indefinite disconnection of supply lines.[162]

On 11 September, militants killed two U.S. troops in the east. This brought the total number of U.S. losses to 113, more than in any prior year.[163] Several European countries set their own records, particularly the UK, who suffered 108 casualties.[31]

In November and December 2008, multiple incidents of major theft, robbery, and arson attacks afflicted NATO supply convoys in Pakistan.[164][165][166] Transport companies south of Kabul were extorted for money by the Taliban.[166][167] These incidents included the hijacking of a NATO convoy carrying supplies in Peshawar,[165] the torching of cargo trucks and Humvees east of the Khyber pass[168] and a half-dozen raids on NATO supply depots near Peshawar that destroyed 300 cargo trucks and Humvees in December 2008.[169]

An unnamed senior Pentagon official told the BBC that at some point between 12 July and 12 September 2008, President Bush issued a classified order authorizing raids against militants in Pakistan. Pakistan said it would not allow foreign forces onto its territory and that it would vigorously protect its sovereignty.[170] In September, the Pakistan military stated that it had issued orders to "open fire" on U.S. soldiers who crossed the border in pursuit of militant forces.[171]

On 25 September 2008, Pakistani troops fired on ISAF helicopters. This caused confusion and anger in the Pentagon, which asked for a full explanation into the incident and denied that U.S. helicopters were in Pakistani airspace. Chief Pakistani military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said that the helicopters had "crossed into our territory in Ghulam Khan area. They passed over our checkpost so our troops fired warning shots". A few days later a CIA drone crashed into Pakistan territory.[172]

A further split occurred when U.S. troops apparently landed on Pakistani soil to carry out an operation against militants in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Pakistanis reacted angrily to the action, saying that 20 innocent villagers had been killed by US troops.[173] However, despite tensions, the U.S. increased the use of remotely piloted drone aircraft in Pakistan's border regions, in particular the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) and Balochistan; as of early 2009, drone attacks were up 183% since 2006.[174]

By the end of 2008, the Taliban apparently had severed remaining ties with al-Qaeda.[175] According to senior U.S. military intelligence officials, perhaps fewer than 100 members of al-Qaeda remained in Afghanistan.[176]

In a meeting with General Stanley McChrystal, Pakistani military officials urged international forces to remain on the Afghan side of the border and prevent militants from fleeing into Pakistan. Pakistan noted that it had deployed 140,000 soldiers on its side of the border to address militant activities, while the coalition had only 100,000 soldiers to police the Afghanistan side.[177]

In response to the increased risk of sending supplies through Pakistan, work began on the establishment of a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Russia and Central Asian republics. Initial permission to move supplies through the region was given on 20 January 2009, after a visit to the region by General David Petraeus.[178] The first shipment along the NDN route left on 20 February from Riga, Latvia, then traveled 5,169km (3,212mi) to the Uzbek town of Termez on the Afghanistan border.[179] In addition to Riga, other European ports included Poti, Georgia and Vladivostok, Russia.[180] U.S. commanders hoped that 100 containers a day would be shipped along the NDN.[179] By comparison, 140 containers a day were typically shipped through the Khyber Pass.[181] By 2011, the NDN handled about 40% of Afghanistan-bound traffic, versus 30% through Pakistan.[180]

On 11 May 2009, Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov announced that the airport in Navoi (Uzbekistan) was being used to transport non-lethal cargo into Afghanistan. Due to the still unsettled relationship between Uzbekistan and the U.S. following the 2005 Andijon massacre and subsequent expulsion of U.S. forces from Karshi-Khanabad airbase, U.S. forces were not involved in the shipments. Instead, South Korea's Korean Air, which overhauled Navoi's airport, officially handled logistics.[182]

Originally only non-lethal resources were allowed on the NDN. In July 2009, however, shortly before a visit by new President Barack Obama to Moscow, Russian authorities announced that U.S. troops and weapons could use the country's airspace to reach Afghanistan.[183]

Human rights advocates were (as of 2009) concerned that the U.S. was again working with the government of Uzbekistan, which is often accused of violating human rights.[184] U.S. officials promised increased cooperation with Uzbekistan, including further assistance to turn Navoi into a regional distribution center for both military and civilian ventures.[185][186]

In January 2009, about 3,000 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division moved into the provinces of Logar and Wardak. Afghan Federal Guards fought alongside them. The troops were the first wave of an expected surge of reinforcements originally ordered by President Bush and increased by President Obama.[187]

In mid-February 2009, it was announced that 17,000 additional troops would be deployed in two brigades and support troops; the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 3,500 and the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, a Stryker Brigade with about 4,000.[188] ISAF commander General David McKiernan had called for as many as 30,000 additional troops, effectively doubling the number of troops.[189] On 23 September, a classified assessment by General McChrystal included his conclusion that a successful counterinsurgency strategy would require 500,000 troops and five years.[190]

In November 2009, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry sent two classified cables to Washington expressing concerns about sending more troops before the Afghan government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban's rise. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who in 20062007 commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan, also expressed frustration with the relative paucity of funds set aside for development and reconstruction.[191] In subsequent cables, Eikenberry repeatedly cautioned that deploying sizable American reinforcements would result in "astronomical costs" tens of billions of dollars and would only deepen the Afghan government's dependence on the United States.

On 26 November 2009, Karzai made a public plea for direct negotiations with the Taliban leadership. Karzai said there is an "urgent need" for negotiations and made it clear that the Obama administration had opposed such talks. There was no formal US response.[192][193]

On 1 December, Obama announced at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point that the U.S. would send 30,000 more troops.[194] Antiwar organizations in the U.S. responded quickly, and cities throughout the U.S. saw protests on 2 December.[195] Many protesters compared the decision to deploy more troops in Afghanistan to the expansion of the Vietnam War under the Johnson administration.[196]

On 4 September, during the Kunduz Province Campaign a devastating NATO air raid was conducted 7 kilometres southwest of Kunduz where Taliban fighters had hijacked civilian supply trucks, killing up to 179 people, including over 100 civilians.[197]

On 25 June US officials announced the launch of Operation Khanjar ("strike of the sword").[198] About 4000 U.S. Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade[199] and 650 Afghan soldiers[200] participated. Khanjar followed a British-led operation named Operation Panther's Claw in the same region.[201] Officials called it the Marines' largest operation since the 2004 invasion of Fallujah, Iraq.[199] Operation Panther's Claw was aimed to secure various canal and river crossings to establish a long-term ISAF presence.[202]

Initially, Afghan and American soldiers moved into towns and villages along the Helmand River[199] to protect the civilian population. The main objective was to push into insurgent strongholds along the river. A secondary aim was to bring security to the Helmand Valley in time for presidential elections, set to take place on 20 August.

According to a 22 December briefing by Major General Michael T. Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan, "The Taliban retains [the] required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity."[203] The 23-page briefing states that "Security incidents [are] projected to be higher in 2010." Those incidents were already up by 300 percent since 2007 and by 60 percent since 2008, according to the briefing.[204] NATO intelligence at the time indicated that the Taliban had as many as 25,000 dedicated soldiers, almost as many as before 9/11 and more than in 2005.[205]

On 10 August McChrystal, newly appointed as U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the Taliban had gained the upper hand. In a continuation of the Taliban's usual strategy of summer offensives,[206] the militants aggressively spread their influence into north and west Afghanistan and stepped up their attack in an attempt to disrupt presidential polls.[207] Calling the Taliban a "very aggressive enemy", he added that the U.S. strategy was to stop their momentum and focus on protecting and safeguarding Afghan civilians, calling it "hard work".[208]

The Taliban's claim that the over 135 violent incidents disrupting elections was largely disputed. However, the media was asked to not report on any violent incidents.[209] Some estimates reported voter turn out as much less than the expected 70 percent. In southern Afghanistan where the Taliban held the most power, voter turnout was low and sporadic violence was directed at voters and security personnel. The chief observer of the European Union election mission, General Philippe Morillon, said the election was "generally fair" but "not free".[210]

Western election observers had difficulty accessing southern regions, where at least 9 Afghan civilians and 14 security forces were killed in attacks intended to intimidate voters. The Taliban released a video days after the elections, filming on the road between Kabul and Kandahar, stopping vehicles and asking to see their fingers. The video went showed ten men who had voted, listening to a Taliban militant. The Taliban pardoned the voters because of Ramadan.[211] The Taliban attacked towns with rockets and other indirect fire. Amid claims of widespread fraud, both top contenders, Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, claimed victory. Reports suggested that turnout was lower than in the prior election.[212]

After Karzai's alleged win of 54 per cent, which would prevent a runoff, over 400,000 Karzai votes had to be disallowed after accusations of fraud. Some nations criticized the elections as "free but not fair".[213]

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War in Afghanistan (2001present) - Wikipedia