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Earlier this month, the Biden administration confirmed its intent to withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan by September 11 of this year. With NATO announcing its decision to follow suit, Afghanistan will soon be free of foreign forces for the first time in the 20 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The impact of this shift will be compounded by the Talibans rise in power.

Earlier this year, the Council for Foreign Relations asserted that the Taliban is currently at its strongest compared to any other point since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban now controls approximately 19% of districts in Afghanistan with the government controlling another 33% and the rest being contested between the two factions. The Taliban have thus far largely ignored the terms of the Doha treaty which marked a historic settlement between itself and the United States, leading to worries of increased insurgency in the country and the impending risk of civil war. Several regional observers also fear that the tacit support of Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran for the Taliban will legitimise its role and force the current Ghani administration to cede power to it. Due to its geographical positioning and influence on regional stability, the political future of Afghanistan will be of considerable significance to several nations with competing sets of interests as well as to pan-Asian relations as a whole. For many, the next round of the great game is about to begin.

The Khyber Pass, described by Rudyard Kipling as a sword cut through the mountains, has long functioned as a passageway between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent and currently lies on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. From Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan, many legendary generals have attempted to conquer India through this arid gateway, leading historians to describe the strategic borderland of Afghanistan as the Graveyard of Empires. Since the first invasion of Afghanistan in approximately 516BC, several conquests have been staged in the region, highlighting Afghanistans strategic importance and eventually giving rise to the concept of Afghanistan being the stage for the Great Game.

The Great Game is a term popularised by Kipling for the rivalry between the British and Russian Empires in Central Asia, starting in the 19th century and continuing through 1907. The conflict was rooted in Britains desire to create a buffer between its crown jewel India, and the ever-expanding Russian Empire. In 1830, the British Lord Ellenborough began the Great Game with an edict establishing a new trade route from India to Bukhara (now in Uzbekistan) with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan serving as a barrier against Russia. The Tsarist Russian government was vehemently opposed to such a move, which would not only compromise its access to the Silk Route, but also prevent it from taking control of any ports on the Persian Gulf.

These diverging interests culminated in a series of four unsuccessful wars for the British to conquer Afghanistan, Turkey and Persia. Not only did Britain suffer resounding defeats in all of them, but it also lost control of several territories including Bukhara to the Russians. A young Winston Churchill later criticised British policy in the area, stating financially it is ruinous. Morally it is wicked. Militarily it is an open question and politically it is a blunder.

The Great Game officially ended with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which divided Persia into a Russian controlled northern zone, an independent central zone and a British controlled Southern Zone. Afghanistan was declared as an official protectorate of the British but remained a nominally independent nation.

The proxy war between the USSR and USA in Afghanistan in the late 1970s gave the term Great Game a new lease on life. Serving as a battleground for the Cold War, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979. Over the next nine years, the American backed Mujahedeen or jihadists, fought a series of guerrilla wars against the Soviets and the Afghan government which ended with the withdrawal of foreign forces in 1989 in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Accord. The Soviet-Afghan war was widely considered as a failure for both sides, with historians pointing to the conflict as a root cause for the collapse of the USSR and attributing rise of extremism in Afghanistan to the destruction caused by the fighting. During the conflict, roughly 800,000 Afghans were killed, more than 5 million fled abroad and approximately 2 million were displaced from their homes.

Even with Afghanistan temporarily out of the global contest, the Great Game endured in Central Asia. In a 1996 editorial, the New York Times suggested that everyone could benefit in the revived game by agreeing to split the winnings. In its conceptualisation of the game, players included not only the competing nation states but also multilateral corporations that stood to profit from the oil rich Persian Gulf.

The 1990s would prove to be tumultuous for Afghanistan, with the country falling into the hands of the Taliban in 1996. Although the Taliban was formed from the ashes of the American-backed Mujahedeen, it soon locked horns with its early benefactors by providing shelter to Osama bin Ladens Al Qaeda. After Al Qaeda launched the September 11 attacks against the United States, Afghanistan, despite not claiming any of the terrorists as their own nationals, once again became the target of foreign forces. Once again, scholars seized upon this opportunity to label the NATO invasion of Afghanistan as another phase in the Great Game. However, while several aspects of the game endured, its fundamental premise seemed to shift closer towards the conceptualisation of international affairs articulated by American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his seminal thesis, the Clash of Civilizations. Writing for the Journal of American History, Bruce R. Kuniholm describes this new great game not as a clash between civilizations, but as a conflict within states, within cultures and within an increasingly global community over the values and ideas that underpin modernization.

However, that iteration of the conflict proved to be less of a great game and more of a zero-sum game. The US invasion of Afghanistan was the longest foreign conflict fought by the Americans as well as the most expensive, costing upwards of $1 trillion. At one point, NATO had approximately 100,000 boots on the ground, of which, 3,500 returned. Afghanistan suffered even greater losses, with more than 65,000 security personnel and 111,000 civilians dying as a result of the conflict. Furthermore, despite channelling billions of dollars of aid into the country, World bank Figures indicate that over half the Afghan population live on less than $1.90 a day.

India and Afghanistan have shared a relationship from the time of the Indus Valley civilization. Afghanistan has been the gateway to India for several invading armies including that of the Mughals and were both ruled by the same rulers more than once.

India has also maintained strong ties with Afghanistan since independence, signing a number of treaties with Kabul under Afghan King Zahir Shahs regime in the mid-twentieth century. While India was not heavily involved in the anti-Soviet jihad or the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, it, along with Russia and Tajikistan, provided important resources to the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban. Changing dynamics within Afghanistan could have potential ramifications in India in regard to the spread of extremism, Pakistans growing sphere of influence in the region and Indias own relationship with the Taliban.

Sameer Patil, Fellow for International Security Studies Programme, Gateway House told indianexpress.com over phone that India is unlikely to deviate strongly from its current position in Afghanistan. It has historically been reluctant to intervene militarily in any foreign nation and stands little to gain from doing so in Afghanistan. Due to Indias developmental track record, having provided over $3 billion in aid to Afghanistan, it stands to benefit from the goodwill of the Afghani people and any form of aggression, diplomatically or otherwise, could provide fodder for the Taliban to stroke nationalist sentiments against another foreign occupier.

Writing for Foreign Policy, Harsh Pant and Kriti Shah, researchers at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, note that both the Taliban and New Delhi have indicated a willingness to work together in recent years. Whether or not they will be successful in that endeavour will be contingent on Afghanistan curbing the spread of extremism across its borders, on the strength of Indo-Pak relations following the ceasefire on the Line-of-Control and on Indias ability to successfully walk the line between providing transitional stability and overextending its interference in Afghani politics.

A big reason for concern among regional powers is the possibility of rising terrorism after the withdrawal of American forces. The Soviet-Afghan war necessitated the military training and armament of countless Afghan citizens and foreign volunteers, many of whom ended up becoming leaders of groups including the Taliban and Al Qaeda. While their training and tactics originated in the battlefields of Afghanistan, they were soon exported to every corner of the globe. This practice continued well after the war.Writing for the New York Times Magazine in 1994, Tim Weiner had reported, in the five years since the Soviets withdrew, tens of thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 nations have come to Afghanistan to learn the lessons of jihad, the holy war, to train for armed insurrection, to bring the struggle back home.

Under the Taliban, the situation intensified. After seizing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban imposed a strict form of Sharia law across the vast majority of Afghanistan that was under its control. Political experts have warned that with changing dynamics within Afghanistan, India will have reason to fear the resurgence of Taliban in the country. Patil pointed to the spillover of the Mujahedeen into Jammu and Kashmir in the 1980s as a historical precedent for such concern. He also noted that when the Obama administration first signified its intent to exit Afghanistan in 2014, the Taliban and Pakistan-based terrorist groups saw an opportunity to spread instability to J&K through means of irregular warfare. This shift from conventional warfare to irregular warfare in many ways vindicates Kuniholms theory of the new great game.Pakistan and China in the new great game

In a speech to the National Defence University in Washington DC, in 2010, Pakistani General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani argued that Pakistan wanted strategic depth in Afghanistan but (did) not want to control it. Furthermore, he asserted that it was within Pakistans imperative to keep Afghan state institutions, including the military and police, in check in order to ensure that they did not pose a threat to Islamabads strategic interests. Pakistan has since maintained this narrative, insisting that its involvement in Afghanistan is a byproduct of security concerns emanating from a need to protect its borders. No Afghan government has recognised the Durand Line, an international boundary separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, and despite the Talibans ties to the Pakistani military, the organisation has aligned itself with the governments viewpoint on this matter. Pakistan has been a key player in the great game since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and it is unlikely that Islamabads role will be diminished anytime soon.

Then there is China. In a way, Chinas involvement in the great game is more similar to that of the British and Russian Empires than to the more recent conflicts fought within Afghan borders. Like the Russians in 1830, China views Afghanistan as an important component in its One Belt, One Road initiative and is eager to protect its investment in the region, especially in terms of the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

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With US withdrawal from Afghanistan, fears of another Great Game sequel - The Indian Express

Forty-two years have passed since the start of nonstop imposed conflicts in Afghanistan. During this period, several attempts have been made to stabilize the country and to restore sustainable peace there. However, each peace effort has failed or stalled, including the Doha Agreement recently, which the United States under the Trump administration and the Taliban signed in February 2020.

This expedient measure that intended to serve the former presidents electoral goals excluded the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a principal stakeholder in the U.S.-Taliban talks that produced a fragile deal. But it coerced the Islamic Republic into making an unprecedented concession: the release of over 5,500 Taliban prisoners. In exchange, the Taliban was supposed to start meaningful intra-Afghan talks, notably reduce violence towards a mutual ceasefire, sever ties with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and ensure those prisoners would not return to the battlefield. None of these have so far materialized, thanks to the Taliban and their regional state-sponsor, Pakistan.

As former war criminals and drug-traffickers, most of the released Taliban prisoners have either returned to the battlefield or resumed drug-trafficking out of Taliban-controlled areas. And still others have manned the Talibans campaign of targeted killings, whose victims are largely the drivers of Afghanistans continued progress, including protection of human rights, empowerment of women and girls, and freedoms of expression and press.

Last week, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan reported on the Talibans genocidal acts of terrorism, claiming 1,783 civilian casualties, a 29 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2020. And it lamented that of particular concern is the 37 per cent increase in the number of women killed and injured, and a 23 per cent increase in child casualties compared with the first quarter of 2020.

It is clear from this grim picture that even though the government and people of Afghanistan have demonstrated concrete willingness and preparedness to negotiate a sustainable political settlement with the Taliban to end the imposed war, the latter have contrarily exploited Afghan and international peace efforts to gain legitimacy, while escalating their terror campaign across Afghanistan. What accounts for such Taliban behavior?

First, the Taliban and Pakistan are hardly genuine peacemakers. Rather, they are both peace spoilers, as they may easily be judged by their deliberate and consistent peace-spoiling behavior since the relaunch by President Ashraf Ghani of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation in June 2017. As President Trumps 2017 South Asia Strategy highlighted in detail and U.S. intelligence reports have confirmed since, the Taliban enjoy safe havens in Pakistan where they receive arms, intelligence guidance, operational training, and ideological indoctrination. As early as 2004, these lines of enduring support have enabled the Taliban to prosecute a growing terror campaign against the Afghan people, while denying them peace as the most basic human right.

To that end, the Taliban have deliberately frustrated every genuine peace effort made by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which enjoys overwhelming public support, the backing of most of the neighboring countries, as well as that of the broader international community, including the Muslim world. In this regard, last March in Dushanbe-Tajikistan, the country-participants of the Foreign Ministerial Heart of AsiaIstanbul Process Conference, which included supporting countries from outside of the 16-country Heart of Asia region and supporting regional and international organizations, reaffirmed their commitment to and support for the peace efforts of the Islamic Republic. And in their joint declaration, they strongly condemned high level of violence in Afghanistan, especially the high number of civilian causalities and deliberate targeting of civil service employees, civil society activists, human rights defenders, journalists and media workers by the Taliban.

Second, the peace-spoiling role which the Taliban and Pakistan have so far played has enabled other such spoilers as al Qaeda, ISIS, regional terrorist networks, and local strongmen to thrive and operate symbiotically to destabilize Afghanistan. Together, they have engendered an enabling environment for largescale drug-production from which the Taliban derive some $400 million in annual revenues that directly contribute to their terrorist activities.

Third, Pakistans well-documented behavior has received inconsistent, scant attention from the principal stakeholders that intervened in Afghanistan 20 years ago. Commenting on institutional support for terrorism in Afghanistans neighborhood, Trump tweeted on Jan. 1, 2018: The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more! This has often prompted Afghans to question the very rationale of waging a war against terrorism in Afghan villages and mountains.

Afghans too often are the victims of the domestic priorities or conflicting foreign policy interests of our partners. For example, the politics surrounding electoral cycles in major troop-contributing countries usually has gotten in the way of implementing a long-term coherent war strategy for sustainable peace in Afghanistan. To do so, we have long been told by the West, would require strategic patience and a firm commitment of adequate resources for high-impact aid implementation. This could have continually strengthened civil-military state capacity for the provision of essential services across the country and built critical infrastructure to integrate Afghanistan with the regional and global markets for sustainable job creation. And these state- and market-building efforts could have been complemented with the pursuit of robust diplomacy to incentivize regional consensus and cooperation to restore durable peace in the country.

On the contrary, however, Afghanistan stabilization and reconstruction efforts were first underfunded and later remained piecemeal, inconsistent, and disconnected from the end goal of helping Afghans stand on our own. As former National Security Adviser and author of the U.S. South Asia Strategy H.R. McMaster tweeted last week, ...Americans are frustrated with not a twenty-year war, but a one-year war fought twenty times over. We will look back on this time with shame and regret.

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistans former ambassador to the United States, a longtime observer and critic of his countrys role in Afghanistan, similarly reacted to the latest U.S. Afghanistan policy announcement, saying: The U.S. military went into Afghanistan immediately after 9/11 to ensure that Afghanistan did not again become a center for global jihad and radical Islamism. American troops have stayed in Afghanistan for almost two decades, not because that was the plan but because there were 19 one-year plans. This might be the time to develop a long-term U.S. plan for Afghanistans future.

Looking ahead, when a peace agreement finally has been hammered out, the international community must be mindful of the difficulty and complexity of the peace implementation environment in Afghanistan, which is awash with onshore and offshore spoilers. They have so far proven to undermine peacemaking efforts or achievements that would not favor their strategic goals. That is why a well-calculated peace enforcement strategy with adequate coercive capabilities, including targeted sanctions, must be considered for implementation, following the signing of a judicious and comprehensive peace agreement with the Taliban.

And to that end, the demobilization of former combatants, demilitarization of politics, civilian security, as well as peacebuilding programs that promote human rights, empowerment of women, and reconciliation should be given top priority to help peace take sustainable root in Afghanistan. Without adopting and committing to execute such a peace enforcement strategy, a signed document alone like the 1988 Geneva Accords would only dash Afghans hopes of achieving durable peace.

Indeed, the prevention of this tragic history, which included 9/11 as one of its key consequences, from repeating itself would serve the increasingly intertwined interests of all stakeholders from the United States and Europe to major regional actors China, India, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar. As they recently pledged in the Heart of Asia -Istanbul Process Conference, together, they can and must cooperate to free Afghanistan from the imposed shackles of extremism, terrorism, drugs, and poverty. Doing so would quickly translate into diminished security and criminal threats across the region. And this should pave the way for tangible regional economic cooperation by way of enhanced connectivity for transit trade, energy supply, fiber-optic cables, and people-to-people interactions through a peaceful Afghanistan at the Heart of Asia.

M. Ashraf Haidari is Afghanistans ambassador to Sri Lanka. He headed the Afghan delegation in the Eleven-Party and Six-Party Meetings on Afghan Peace in Moscow in April and February 2017 when he was the director-general of policy & strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan. He previously served as the countrys deputy chief of mission to India, deputy assistant national security advisor, as well as charg daffaires to the United States.

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Afghanistan Will Know No Peace Without Pressure on Pakistan - Defense One

Biden administration officials will brief members of Congress this week on the decision to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan later this year, one of a series of high-level closed-door military briefings on Capitol Hill this week.

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are scheduled to hear details of the draw-down plan on Monday afternoon, and a full Senate briefing on the decision is set for Tuesday.

Meanwhile, House Appropriations Committee members will be holding closed sessions with leaders from European Command, Central Command, and Africa Command this week as they work on the defense budget for fiscal 2022.

Those leaders, plus the heads of Space Command and Strategic Command, will also have public appearances before other committees this week. Typically, those visits would draw large crowds of defense lobbyists and military advocates to Capitol Hill, but much of the complex is still closed to the public due to coronavirus precautions.

Senate Appropriations 9:30 a.m. 192 Dirksen Defense Health ProgramThe service surgeon generals will testify on military health priorities and the fiscal 2022 budget request.

Senate Armed Services 9:30 a.m. G-50 Dirksen Space and Strategic CommandGen. James Dickinson, head of U.S. Space Command, and Adm. Charles Richard, head of U.S. Strategic Command, will testify on the fiscal 2022 budget request.

House Armed Services 11 a.m. 2118 Rayburn Middle East/Africa ActivitiesGen. Kenneth McKenzie Jr., head of Central Command, and Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of Africa Command, will testify on current operations and the fiscal 2022 budget request.

Wednesday, April 21

Senate Foreign Relations 10 a.m. 106 DirksenPending LegislationThe committee will consider several bills, including one to establish a China Censorship Monitor and Action group.

House Veterans' Affairs 10 a.m. online hearingPending LegislationThe subcommittee on oversight will consider several pending bills.

House Foreign Affairs 10 a.m. online hearingYemenTimothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen, will testify on the security situation there.

Senate Foreign Relations 2 p.m. 106 Dirksen YemenTimothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen, and outside experts will testify on the security situation in Yemen.

Senate Armed Services 2:30 p.m. 232-A Russell Defense Cyber WorkforceLt. Gen. Dennis Crall, Chief Information Officer for the Joint Staff, and other Pentagon leaders will testify on the departments cyber workforce.

Senate Armed Services 2:30 p.m. 222 Russell Defense Science and Technology Research officials from the services will testify on technology transition activities and research efforts in the military today.

House Armed Services 4 p.m. 2118 Rayburn Space and Strategic CommandGen. James Dickinson, head of U.S. Space Command, and Adm. Charles Richard, head of U.S. Strategic Command, will testify on the fiscal 2022 budget request.

Thursday, April 22

House Armed Services 9:30 a.m. 2118 Rayburn F-35 updatesOfficials from the F-35 Joint Program Office and outside watchdogs will testify on ongoing issues with the F-35 program.

Senate Armed Services 9:30 a.m. G-50 Dirksen Central and Africa CommandsGen. Stephen Townsend, head of Africa Command, and Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, head of Central Command, will testify on current mission operations and the fiscal 2022 budget request.

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This week in Congress: Details on the Afghanistan withdrawal plan - Military Times

Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance, Jr. handed over 33 looted antiquities valued at roughly $1.8 million to Afghan officials yesterdayat a repatriation ceremony in New York.

The objects are linked to disgraced antiquities dealer Subhash Kapoor, from whom U.S. authorities have recovered more than 2,500 relics from all over the world at a total estimated value of $143 million.

Crimes of culture involving looted and stolen religious relics, such as the nearly two dozen Buddhist statues being repatriated today to the people of Afghanistan, not only tear at the societal fabric of nations, but also deprive millions of believers worldwide of the earlier sacred symbols of their faith, Vance said in a statement.

He added that since last August, his team has repatriated 338 stolen objects to seven countries. And we look forward to future ceremonies announcing the return of additional items to their rightful owners, he added.

Yesterdays ceremony was attended by Afghan ambassador to the U.S., Roya Rahmani, as well as acting special agent in charge Eric Silverman of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The preservation of Afghanistans heritage and history is paving the path for civilization and society to grow, Rahmani said, calling the recovered pieces irreplaceable pieces of Afghanistans diverse culture and rich history.

Pictured (from left to right): Schist statue depicting a Bodhisattva Meditating Under The Tree, Stucco Head of a Bearded Man, and Bronze mask of Silenus. Image via manhattanda.org

Kapoor is currently being held at a jail in India pending completion of a trial in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Manhattan district attorneys office, which issued an arrest warrant for Kapoor in 2012, also filed extradition paperwork for his return to the U.S. last summer.

The antiquities unit of the D.A. has been investigating Kapoor and his co-conspirators since 2011, tracking illegal looting, exportation, and sale of ancient art from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Thailand, Nepal, Indonesia, Myanmar, and other nations.

Kapoor and seven others allegedlysmuggled looted antiquities into Manhattan and sold the pieces through the dealers Madison Avenue gallery, Art of the Past, according to the D.A.

Artifacts of historical or cultural significance allow the public to experience a nations heritage and these items shouldnt be offered as souvenirs for sale to the highest bidder, said Peter C. Fitzhugh, special agent in charge of Homeland Security in New York.

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The U.S. Returns 33 Antiquities Stolen From Afghanistan That Are Linked to Disgraced Dealer Subhash Kapoor - artnet News

After 20 long years, the war in Afghanistan is coming to a close. Yet what does the next chapter for the U.S. military look like?

One projection involves an F-35 pilot shot down by Iran and a U.S. naval destroyer sunk by Beijing in the South China Sea. That is the fictional premise behind a new buzzed-about book, 2034.

The dismal prospects of how the U.S. military might fare in a future war, whether against China, Iran, or some other enemy, has Pentagon planners, defense manufacturers, and service chiefs bracing for a future that will not be kind to the defense budget. Besides ballooning national deficits, non-traditional national security priorities, and pushback against pricey yet unproven fighters like the F-35, the impact of COVID on the U.S. economy, two separate COVID relief packages, and the proposed American Jobs Plan could result in one of the biggest defense budget cuts in modern history.

This very real possibility has the armed services the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and now Space Force each scrambling for a larger piece of the dwindling pie. A U.S. Air Force general recently stated that the U.S. Armys pursuit of long-range artillery and missiles capabilities was stupid. The Army has had to reassure the Marines that they arent trying to encroach on their efforts in the Indo-Pacific region.

Some services are better at crafting compelling fiscal narratives than others. As the late Congressman Ike Skelton shared with one of us in 2009, Congress understands the strategic utility of a carrier strike group or a bomber wing. They have a harder time with an infantry brigade or an armor battalion.

In the wake of the 2013 sequestration, a similar turf war broke out when the military was set to take a roughly $1 trillion cut to its budget. The Department of Defense conducted a controversial study that included a set of scenarios and potential conflicts. Behind closed doors, each service argued that their strengths would be the greatest contribution of winning and therefore should be prioritized in budget decisions. Clearly, none of the scenarios imagined in 2013 have happened.

Now with the news that the U.S. will pull its last troops out of Afghanistan in September, it is anybodys guess where or how U.S. forces will be deployed next. One camp will argue that the next major war will take place on the high seas while another foresees a grand conflict waged across the skies using state-of-the-art manned and unmanned aircraft. Still another camp will insist that any future war must involve island-hopping campaigns in the South Pacific akin to World War II, while yet another will argue that the future portends clashes in outer space and the cyber domains. And some will simply tag every future concept with an appropriate military modifier (cross-domain, multi-domain, or all-domain) in hopes of maintaining an illusion of equity across the services.

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The British military recently endured their own defense budget war. The end result, based on assumptions that other nations would bear the burden of future warfighting, was major cuts to military end strength and the smallest British army to take the field in 300 years.

Landpower, traditionally the domain of army forces, simply doesnt share the same narrative appeal as technologically advanced and often prohibitively expensive platforms and capabilities. In an information age society, putting boots on the ground is increasingly viewed as unnecessary when other capabilities can achieve the same ends without the commitment of blood and treasure. When the budget strings tighten, armies tend to shrink.

But should they? For many landpower advocates, the answer to that question came in the aftermath of the Korean War. You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, remarked historian T.R. Fehrenbach in his 1964 book, This Kind of War. [B]ut if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud. The U.S. has a terrible history of cutting landpower after wars despite going into Korea and Vietnam with a depleted Army, it wasnt until the 1980s that land forces were prepared for their next fight.

When deterrence fails, the introduction of significant ground forces signals an unmistakable level of national commitment and will. Although much has changed since the wars in Korea and Vietnam, one immutable fact remains: conflicts are decided in the land domain, where the will of the people ultimately rests. Any future conflict will inherently involve all the services, but without landpower namely tanks and troops to achieve a decisive outcome, we are likely to usher in an era of lengthy and inconclusive wars that are passed on to successive generations.

Dont believe the made-in-Hollywood hoopla about drones or cyber deciding the next war. Being able to decisively take and hold territory whether in Crimea or Taiwan or a sandy patch of the Middle East is what matters. The rest is all sci-fi fantasy.

John Spencer is the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point. Steve Leonard is director of assessments at the University of Kansas School of Business.

Editors note: This is an op-ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman,haltman@militarytimes.com.

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What the military needs after Afghanistan - Military Times