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Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance, Jr. handed over 33 looted antiquities valued at roughly $1.8 million to Afghan officials yesterdayat a repatriation ceremony in New York.

The objects are linked to disgraced antiquities dealer Subhash Kapoor, from whom U.S. authorities have recovered more than 2,500 relics from all over the world at a total estimated value of $143 million.

Crimes of culture involving looted and stolen religious relics, such as the nearly two dozen Buddhist statues being repatriated today to the people of Afghanistan, not only tear at the societal fabric of nations, but also deprive millions of believers worldwide of the earlier sacred symbols of their faith, Vance said in a statement.

He added that since last August, his team has repatriated 338 stolen objects to seven countries. And we look forward to future ceremonies announcing the return of additional items to their rightful owners, he added.

Yesterdays ceremony was attended by Afghan ambassador to the U.S., Roya Rahmani, as well as acting special agent in charge Eric Silverman of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The preservation of Afghanistans heritage and history is paving the path for civilization and society to grow, Rahmani said, calling the recovered pieces irreplaceable pieces of Afghanistans diverse culture and rich history.

Pictured (from left to right): Schist statue depicting a Bodhisattva Meditating Under The Tree, Stucco Head of a Bearded Man, and Bronze mask of Silenus. Image via manhattanda.org

Kapoor is currently being held at a jail in India pending completion of a trial in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Manhattan district attorneys office, which issued an arrest warrant for Kapoor in 2012, also filed extradition paperwork for his return to the U.S. last summer.

The antiquities unit of the D.A. has been investigating Kapoor and his co-conspirators since 2011, tracking illegal looting, exportation, and sale of ancient art from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Thailand, Nepal, Indonesia, Myanmar, and other nations.

Kapoor and seven others allegedlysmuggled looted antiquities into Manhattan and sold the pieces through the dealers Madison Avenue gallery, Art of the Past, according to the D.A.

Artifacts of historical or cultural significance allow the public to experience a nations heritage and these items shouldnt be offered as souvenirs for sale to the highest bidder, said Peter C. Fitzhugh, special agent in charge of Homeland Security in New York.

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The U.S. Returns 33 Antiquities Stolen From Afghanistan That Are Linked to Disgraced Dealer Subhash Kapoor - artnet News

After 20 long years, the war in Afghanistan is coming to a close. Yet what does the next chapter for the U.S. military look like?

One projection involves an F-35 pilot shot down by Iran and a U.S. naval destroyer sunk by Beijing in the South China Sea. That is the fictional premise behind a new buzzed-about book, 2034.

The dismal prospects of how the U.S. military might fare in a future war, whether against China, Iran, or some other enemy, has Pentagon planners, defense manufacturers, and service chiefs bracing for a future that will not be kind to the defense budget. Besides ballooning national deficits, non-traditional national security priorities, and pushback against pricey yet unproven fighters like the F-35, the impact of COVID on the U.S. economy, two separate COVID relief packages, and the proposed American Jobs Plan could result in one of the biggest defense budget cuts in modern history.

This very real possibility has the armed services the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and now Space Force each scrambling for a larger piece of the dwindling pie. A U.S. Air Force general recently stated that the U.S. Armys pursuit of long-range artillery and missiles capabilities was stupid. The Army has had to reassure the Marines that they arent trying to encroach on their efforts in the Indo-Pacific region.

Some services are better at crafting compelling fiscal narratives than others. As the late Congressman Ike Skelton shared with one of us in 2009, Congress understands the strategic utility of a carrier strike group or a bomber wing. They have a harder time with an infantry brigade or an armor battalion.

In the wake of the 2013 sequestration, a similar turf war broke out when the military was set to take a roughly $1 trillion cut to its budget. The Department of Defense conducted a controversial study that included a set of scenarios and potential conflicts. Behind closed doors, each service argued that their strengths would be the greatest contribution of winning and therefore should be prioritized in budget decisions. Clearly, none of the scenarios imagined in 2013 have happened.

Now with the news that the U.S. will pull its last troops out of Afghanistan in September, it is anybodys guess where or how U.S. forces will be deployed next. One camp will argue that the next major war will take place on the high seas while another foresees a grand conflict waged across the skies using state-of-the-art manned and unmanned aircraft. Still another camp will insist that any future war must involve island-hopping campaigns in the South Pacific akin to World War II, while yet another will argue that the future portends clashes in outer space and the cyber domains. And some will simply tag every future concept with an appropriate military modifier (cross-domain, multi-domain, or all-domain) in hopes of maintaining an illusion of equity across the services.

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The British military recently endured their own defense budget war. The end result, based on assumptions that other nations would bear the burden of future warfighting, was major cuts to military end strength and the smallest British army to take the field in 300 years.

Landpower, traditionally the domain of army forces, simply doesnt share the same narrative appeal as technologically advanced and often prohibitively expensive platforms and capabilities. In an information age society, putting boots on the ground is increasingly viewed as unnecessary when other capabilities can achieve the same ends without the commitment of blood and treasure. When the budget strings tighten, armies tend to shrink.

But should they? For many landpower advocates, the answer to that question came in the aftermath of the Korean War. You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, remarked historian T.R. Fehrenbach in his 1964 book, This Kind of War. [B]ut if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud. The U.S. has a terrible history of cutting landpower after wars despite going into Korea and Vietnam with a depleted Army, it wasnt until the 1980s that land forces were prepared for their next fight.

When deterrence fails, the introduction of significant ground forces signals an unmistakable level of national commitment and will. Although much has changed since the wars in Korea and Vietnam, one immutable fact remains: conflicts are decided in the land domain, where the will of the people ultimately rests. Any future conflict will inherently involve all the services, but without landpower namely tanks and troops to achieve a decisive outcome, we are likely to usher in an era of lengthy and inconclusive wars that are passed on to successive generations.

Dont believe the made-in-Hollywood hoopla about drones or cyber deciding the next war. Being able to decisively take and hold territory whether in Crimea or Taiwan or a sandy patch of the Middle East is what matters. The rest is all sci-fi fantasy.

John Spencer is the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point. Steve Leonard is director of assessments at the University of Kansas School of Business.

Editors note: This is an op-ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman,haltman@militarytimes.com.

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What the military needs after Afghanistan - Military Times

As US troops leave Afghanistan, rescued dogs and cats go with them

KABUL, Afghanistan Staff Sgt. Katie Catania found love at Kandahar Airfield, in the form of two puppies.

Charley is the playful one, while Flea is quiet and affectionate. Catania planned to choose one of them to keep, but the looming U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the increasing violence in the country weighed heavily on her decision.

I didnt want to just leave one, Catania said. Not knowing the state of the base, and the country itself If I could give these dogs a better life than just leaving them there in Afghanistan with an unknown future, then I was going to try.

Catania, a logistics specialist who has since left Afghanistan, helped to move gear out of Kandahar over the past year during troop drawdowns. The U.S. is expected to complete its withdrawal of about 2,500 troops by Sept. 11, the White House said last week.

As troops leave, others like Catania are taking the dogs and cats they befriended on base with them.

Charlotte Maxwell-Jones, who runs a veterinary clinic in Kabul, helps prepare animals for the long flight from Afghanistan to the U.S. Shes received a number of urgent calls from service members in the past year as troop levels dropped from their peak of about 12,000 last year.

People are calling from bases and saying, can we move these animals out, ASAP? she said, adding that of the dogs she shipped to the U.S. last week, two-thirds were for service members.

There is often a rush to move animals out when bases close, said Michelle Smith, executive director of Puppy Rescue Mission, which partners with Maxwell-Jones.

If theyre shutting down camps and bases, well see an increase in rescues, Smith said, recalling a surge during the 2014 troop drawdown. The guys who are shutting down that location dont want to leave the animals behind that theyve been feeding and caring for.

Troops are not supposed befriend local animals, which can carry disease, but they often do.

Youre so busy and you just miss regular stuff you become attached, said Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephanie Hall, a helicopter pilot, who until February was deployed to the base at Kabuls airport.

Hall brought back two dogs, Bennie and Mollie, and two cats, Playa and Kiaya.

Getting them from Afghanistan to America was at times incredibly difficult and complicated, Hall said, and cost more than $3,000.

But the process was worth it to ensure the pets she had cared for would get a good life, she said.

I didnt want to have regrets and not know what happened to them, Hall said.

Catania drove to the airport last week to pick up Charley and Flea. Catania, an avid lover of outdoor sports, wants to bring the dogs to Utah.

Id really like to take them out hiking and exploring, Catania said, and just spoil them.

lawrence.jp@stripes.comTwitter: @jplawrence3

Staff Sgt. Katie Catania, an Army reservist, brought Charley, left, and Flea, right, back to the U.S. with her from Afghanistan. The U.S. troop withdrawal and violence in the country weighed heavily on her decision to rescue the dogs.KATIE CATANIA

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As US troops leave Afghanistan, rescued dogs and cats go with them - Stars and Stripes

As his two predecessors did, President Biden has pledged to end the war in Afghanistan. But also as his two predecessors did, he could end up tragically perpetuating it. Outnumbered by a national security establishment fixated on continuing this misadventure, the Biden team will need courage and clarity if it is to finally disentangle America from what has become a futile struggle.

It is fortunate to have an opportunity to do so. Last year, after a decade of negotiation, the United States and the Taliban reached an agreement calling for a complete withdrawal of American troops by May 1. The administration is now attempting to broker peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. That effort should not come at the expense of this commitment. But the administration is reportedly considering a six-month extension of the deployment of American troops. If the United States gets the Taliban to agree to such an extension, those troops become mere leverage in a complicated diplomatic drama. If it doesnt and delays withdrawal anyway, the agreement that has prevented any U.S. combat casualties for the past year dissolves. Regardless, it will be tough to get American troops home by the deadline, as Mr. Biden told ABC News this week.

As vice president, Mr. Biden opposed the surge of troops in Afghanistan in 2010. Last year, he wisely recognized it is past time to end the forever wars. His secretary of state, Antony Blinken, asserted two years ago that it was time to cut the cord in Afghanistan. This month, Mr. Blinken insisted military action would be taken only when the objectives and mission are clear and achievable and with the informed consent of the American people. According to polling my colleagues and I have conducted, the American people support the details of the U.S.-Taliban agreement by six to one.

Why, then, is leaving Afghanistan so tough?

True, the country presents dilemmas: Despite decades of American intervention and investment, it remains weak and poorly governed. Like other weak and poorly governed states, it could attract violent extremists. This is a real concern but not an impossible one to overcome: Mr. Biden will need to maintain diplomatic ties and intelligence capabilities to thwart groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

There are also real concerns that removing U.S. troops will force the Afghan government and the Taliban to face the prospect of an escalating civil war. But Afghanistan has been stuck in a civil war for decades, well before the arrival of U.S. troops 20 years ago; its more than a little egocentric for American policymakers to think they alone can hold the country together.

The bigger barrier confronting the Biden administration may be closer to home. Despite promises to make foreign policy serve the interests of everyday Americans, many of Washingtons decisions are circumscribed by a professional culture among policymakers that normalizes war and idealizes military might. Its not as if Mr. Biden is being pressured to stay in Afghanistan with a cogent argument; most analysts freely admit that the United States has no plausible path to victory, that the military isnt trained to midwife democracy and that the Afghan government is grievously corrupt.

Rather, the national security community cannot bear to display its failure. Thats why many who advocate continuing the war are left grasping for illogical or far-fetched justifications. In a meeting of National Security Council principals, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, reportedly made an emotional plea to stay in Afghanistan, after all the blood and treasure spent there.

A recent report from the congressionally commissioned Afghanistan Study Group, which advised against withdrawing U.S. troops, shows just how ossified the foreign policy establishment has become. The groups members argue that the militarys mission should include lofty goals like creating stability, promoting democracy and shaping conditions that enhance the prospects of a successful peace process. Their recommendations reflect the unimaginative assumptions and stale rationales that have kept the United States stuck in Afghanistan for so long. And their otherwise impressive bona fides appear to be compromised by an array of financial connections to major defense contractors.

Like General Milley, the report fell for the sunk costs fallacy, insisting American troops must stay in the country, in part, to honor the sacrifices that have been made. (Listening to the majority of veterans who favor withdrawing troops might actually achieve that goal.) The report couldnt conjure a vital national interest in remaining and instead came up with only vague claims like: A stable Afghanistan would create the potential for regional economic cooperation that could benefit all countries in the region, linking energy-rich Central Asia with energy-deprived South Asia.

Mr. Biden came to office envisioning a foreign policy for the middle class. When he tapped Jake Sullivan to be his national security adviser, he insisted Mr. Sullivan judge all of his decisions on a basic question: Will this make life better, easier, safer for families across this country?

Staying the course in Afghanistan accomplishes none of this and Mr. Sullivan seems to know it. He admits as much in a report he co-authored last year, plainly stating the war has proven costly to middle-class economic interests. But its not easy to construct a foreign policy that prioritizes the interests of ordinary Americans once youre back among the Beltway herd. If the Biden administration wants to match its policies to its precepts, it will have to buck Washingtons culture of inertia.

This isnt just about Afghanistan. The people who make foreign policy tend to be walled off from public opinion and all too eager to conform to a bipartisan consensus that favors intervention over restraint. Washington isnt solely to blame. American voters dont often prioritize foreign policy during election season and so dont exert the political influence they might. Fortunately, in recent years, there have been more efforts to constrain American military power, and a new generation wary of war has begun to make its voice heard. All this hasnt been enough to bring about the end of Americas war in Afghanistan yet.

Achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan has always been a Sisyphean task, and Americas foreign policy leadership has little motivation to confront the political cost of withdrawal. Even though most Americans favor ending the war, after 20 years, they have become inured to it. Mr. Biden most likely knows a May 1 withdrawal from Afghanistan is not premature but long overdue. Seeking to avoid the political distraction of a troop withdrawals potentially messy aftermath, he risks keeping the United States bogged down in a war it cannot win.

President Biden, who wants America to reclaim a humble and sober outlook, is uniquely qualified to get Washington to quit its compulsive continuation of this conflict beyond this spring. Lets hope he musters the wisdom and the will to do so.

Mark Hannah (@ProfessorHannah) is a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation and host of its podcast None of the Above.

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Opinion | Why Is It So Tough to Leave Afghanistan? - The ...

In debates on the future of the war in Afghanistan, policymakers and analysts have come to invoke it as a given that Americans want the troops to come home quickly. But does this conventional wisdom hold true? Not necessarily, based on our analysis of a number of polls on Americans views on Afghanistan conducted in the last few years.

Ordinary Americans display a significant degree of ambivalence on the question of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. Veterans are also divided on this question but are more likely to show strong opinions on both sides of the spectrum. The data suggest that vocal, concerted grassroots campaigns currently conducted by veterans groups represent just one subset of veterans. More specifically, veterans who served after the 9/11 attacks are more likely to feel strongly about ending our involvement in Afghanistan.

A look at the data reveals that a significant number of Americans surveyed dont respond to questions about withdrawing troops, possibly reflecting a lack of strong opinions. In a recent poll conducted in the fall of 2020 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for researchers Peter Feaver and Jim Golby, only 59% of survey respondents answered the question about withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. In previous polls, one conducted by the University of Maryland in October 2019 and the other by YouGov in 2018, approximately one-fifth of respondents opted not to answer questions about troop levels in Afghanistan. Underlying this is the fact that American voters do not rank foreign policy highly in their list of priorities a survey of registered voters in 2020 found that they ranked it sixth out of a list of 12 priorities and Afghanistan is but one of several pressing foreign policy issues facing the United States.

In these polls, even respondents who do offer an opinion on withdrawal are divided on the question. In the NORC fall 2020 poll, 34% of survey respondents said that they supported troop withdrawals (in exchange for the Talibans counterterrorism assurances as per the deal struck in Doha in February 2020), while 25% said they opposed them. While one would have expected the Doha deal to have normalized the idea of withdrawals in the fall 2020 survey, that hasnt quite happened. Polling prior to the Doha deal also offered mixed results: Thirty-four percent of respondents to the University of Maryland poll from October 2019 were in favor of maintaining troop levels in Afghanistan, 23% were in favor of reducing troop levels, and 22% were in favor of removing all troops in the next year. A similar question asked by YouGov in 2018 also revealed mixed results.

Interestingly, however, there was greater support in the YouGov poll for removing all troops if the decision was made under a hypothetical presidential authorization. Sixty-one percent of respondents supported withdrawal in that case, while 20% opposed it. No timeline was provided for this question. The lack of a majority for either option in any of the polls along with clear majority support for withdrawal in case of a presidential authorization indicates the publics uncertainty on Afghanistan policy. This suggests that the governments policy decisions on Afghanistan may drive public opinion, rather than the other way around.

The lack of a majority for either option in any of the polls indicates the publics uncertainty on Afghanistan policy.

Americans overall are more likely to support the notion of a longer timeline for withdrawal: The YouGov poll conducted in 2018 looked at a five-year time horizon and found that 42% of respondents were in favor of removing all troops in the next five years that is, by 2023 suggesting that the ambivalence we highlighted above manifests in shorter-term time horizons.

In the NORC and YouGov polls, military respondents are more likely to express an opinion on questions about troop withdrawal than civilians are. In the YouGov poll, that increased military response rate translated to higher support for both sides of the spectrum on the question of withdrawal: increasing and maintaining troops, as well as removing troops within the next year (but not for decreasing troop levels). Military respondents were also more likely to respond when asked about their opinion regarding the hypothetical presidential authorization of a withdrawal. That increased response rate corresponded with an increase in military support for withdrawal under presidential authorization when compared to the general public.

Opinions among military members are divided on withdrawal from Afghanistan, depending on their experiences. According to the NORC poll, 40% of veterans who served prior to 9/11 supported troop reductions and 32% opposed them. Yet 54% who served post-9/11 supported reductions, and 29% opposed them. It is perhaps not surprising that veterans of the post-9/11 wars are more weary of these wars.

The YouGov 2018 poll reveals notable differences between veterans who are 25 to 34 years old and those who are older. The plurality of the younger group supported maintaining troop levels for the next year, while the older group was somewhat evenly divided between all of the options increasing, maintaining, decreasing, and removing all troops. The younger age group is also far less likely to favor removing all troops in the next year relative to the older groups: Nine percent of the younger group expressed a desire to withdraw all troops in 12 months compared to roughly 30% of the older group.

The American public is unsure about the next steps to take in Afghanistan, and for good reason: The decision is a very difficult one, with downsides to both staying and leaving. The public seems to be partly ambivalent, partly divided on the correct course of action. Veterans groups are also divided on the right policy decision. Whats clear is that the common refrain in policy debates that Americans want out is not accurate and should not be presented as the driving force for efforts to withdraw from Afghanistan.

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Americans are not unanimously war-weary on Afghanistan - Brookings Institution