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Human Rights CouncilForty-sixth session22 February19 March 2021Agenda items 2 and 10Annual report of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights and reports of the Office of theHigh Commissioner and the Secretary-GeneralTechnical assistance and capacity-building

Summary

Submitted pursuant to decision 2/113 and resolution 14/15 of the Human Rights Council, the present report contains a description of the situation of human rights in Afghanistan from 1 January to 30 November 2020, and provides an overview of the work, including technical assistance, conducted by the Human Rights Service of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

The report is focused on the five principal areas of work of the Human Rights Service: the protection of civilians in armed conflict; children and armed conflict; the elimination of violence against women and the promotion of womens rights; the prevention of torture and respect for procedural safeguards; and civic space and the integration of human rights into peace and reconciliation processes. The High Commissioner highlights the technical assistance provided by the Human Rights Service and the achievements under these areas.

The report concludes with recommendations addressed to the Government, antigovernment elements and the international community.

I. Introduction

1. Submitted pursuant to decision 2/113 and resolution 14/15 of the Human Rights Council, the present report covers the period between 1 January and 30 November 2020. It was prepared in cooperation with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

2. The report focuses on the five priority areas of work of the Human Rights Service of UNAMA: the protection of civilians in armed conflict; children and armed conflict; the elimination of violence against women and the promotion of womens rights; the prevention of torture and respect for procedural safeguards; and civic space and the integration of human rights into peace and reconciliation processes.

3. During the period under review, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to provide technical and financial support to the UNAMA Human Rights Service.

II. Context

4. On 29 February, the United States of America and the Taliban signed an agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan. The initial release of prisoners foreseen in the agreement was completed in September. On the same date, Afghanistan and the United States signed a joint declaration for bringing peace to Afghanistan, and on 12 September, the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations were inaugurated.

5. Civilians continued to bear the brunt of the armed conflict. While UNAMA and OHCHR documented a decrease in conflict-related civilian casualties in comparison with the same period in 2019, the level of civilian harm remained high. There were, however, short respites from violence the week before the signing of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban and during the two 3-day ceasefires during the religious celebrations of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. The overall decrease was mainly caused by a drop in civilian casualties from the airstrikes of international military forces and suicide attacks carried out by anti-government elements. This was partly offset by an increase of civilian casualties from Taliban pressure-plate improvised explosive devices and Afghan Air Force airstrikes. The start of the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations has not yet led to a decrease in civilian casualties.

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Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements in the field of human rights - Report of the United Nations High...

Representational image  |  Photo Credit: PTI

Kabul: India on Sunday handed over half a million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Afghan officials as its gift to the people of the war-torn nation, a goodwill gesture described by Afghanistan as "a strong sign of generosity and sincere cooperation" of New Delhi with Kabul.

"1st Batch of COVID-19 vaccines arrives in Afghanistan. A consignment of half a million dose of COVID vaccine gifted by India to the people of Afghanistan arrived in Kabul today," the Indian Embassy in Kabul tweeted.

India's Charged'Affaires Raghuram S handed over the consignment of vaccines to Wahid Majrooh, Acting Minister of Public Health, it said.

"My profound gratitude to my friend @DrSJaishankar, the government & people of India for assisting 500k dozes of 'Made in India' vaccines to address #Covid spread in Afghanistan. A clear sign of generosity, commitment & strong partnership indeed," Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammed Haneef Atmar tweeted.

In a brief statement, the Afghan Foreign Ministry expressed its sincere gratitude for the assistance and delivery of the first shipment of the COVID 19 vaccine (COVISHIELD) by "Afghanistan's generous supporter and strategic partner, India."

"The donation of five hundred thousand doses of vaccine to tackle the spread of COVID in Afghanistan in the current difficult circumstances is a strong sign of generosity and sincere cooperation of the Republic of India with the government and people of Afghanistan," it said in the statement.

As a part of expanding cooperation between the two countries, the COVID relief assistance had been announced by India earlier on January 8 during a telephone call between Jaishankar and Atmar.

President Ashraf Ghani has expressed his gratitude for the timely assistance of India, the presidential palace said in a tweet.In the first phase, the vaccines will be administered to security and defense forces, health workers and other groups at the forefront of the fight against the virus, it added.

Majrooh said senior citizens and patients with chronic diseases such as heart disease, high blood pressure, and diabetes will receive the vaccine from this batch in the second phase.

In the second phase, senior citizens and people with chronic diseases will be immunized against the Coronavirus.Afghanistan has so far registered 55,359 COVID-19 cases and 2,413 fatalities. More than 48,041 people have recovered from the contagion.

India is one of the world's biggest drugmakers, and an increasing number of countries have already approached it for procuring the coronavirus vaccines.

India has already rolled out a massive coronavirus vaccination drive under which two vaccines, Covishield and Covaxin, are being administered to frontline health workers across the country.

While Oxford-AstraZeneca's Covishield is being manufactured by the Serum Institute, and the Covaxin is being produced by Bharat Biotech.

The Ministry of External Affairs has said it will be ensured that domestic manufacturers will have adequate stocks to meet domestic requirements while supplying abroad.

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Afghanistan receives COVID-19 vaccine from India as 'sign of generosity, commitment and strong partnership' - Times Now

KABUL, Afghanistan Both the Afghan government and its Taliban foes appear to be gearing up for a violent spring amid uncertainty over whether the Biden administration will meet a May 1 deadline for the withdrawal of all American troops from Afghanistan.

On Thursday, the Pentagon raised questions about whether the pullout agreed to in a February 2020 U.S.-Taliban peace deal would go ahead on schedule as the Biden administration reviews the agreement made by its predecessor. That statement followed bellicose remarks by Taliban and Afghan government officials, amplified by waves of violence across the country.

Without them meeting their commitments to renounce terrorism and to stop the violent attacks against the Afghan National Security Forces, its very hard to see a specific way forward for the negotiated settlement, John F. Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said at a news briefing. But were still committed to that.

Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, said Friday on social media that Mr. Kirbys assertions were unfounded.

The agreement between the Taliban and the U.S. government started the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan in exchange for counterterrorism pledges from the Taliban and a promise to push the Afghan government to release 5,000 prisoners. The move amounted to the strongest attempt yet by the United States to extricate itself from its longest war, potentially paving the way for the Talibans future inclusion in the Afghan government.

But the talks excluded the Afghan government and left it feeling sidelined and unheard, according to Afghan officials. Under former President Donald J. Trump, they said U.S. diplomats frequently ignored concerns from Kabul in an attempt to expedite the negotiations.

There are currently 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, down from 12,000 this time last year. And while the Afghan government favors the withdrawal of Western forces, it wants a slower timetable than the one agreed to with the Taliban.

Now, it faces the prospect that the uncertainty around meeting the troop withdrawal deadline could fuel even more violence.

With the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, at a standstill, Washingtons review will examine the Talibans commitments to severing ties with terrorist groups and reducing violence as agreed.

U.S. officials have long insisted that the agreement was conditions based, and that if the Taliban does not meet those terms it would extend the presence of U.S. forces in the country.

The Taliban, gearing up for the spring fighting season, is already well positioned around several Afghan cities after making steady gains across the country in recent years.

But recent overtures from the Biden White House have sent a more reassuring message to President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan and other government officials, raising their hopes that they will no longer be sidelined and that the Americans will not leave any time soon.

Hamdullah Mohib, Afghanistans national security adviser, unleashed a harsh diatribe against the Taliban last week while speaking to a group of Afghan commandos at an air base outside Kabul, the capital.

They have proved that they dont have any desire for peace and that they are a terrorist group, said Mr. Mohib, who has a long history of spouting such sharp rhetoric. His latest remarks came on the heels of a phone call with his new U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan.

Afghan officials have said privately that Mr. Sullivans hourlong call restored a certain level of trust between the Ghani administration and the White House and made them confident that their voices will be heard as the peace talks in Doha continue.

On Thursday, the new secretary of state, Antony J. Blinken, talked with Mr. Ghani and expressed the U.S. desire for all Afghan leaders to support this historic opportunity for peace while preserving the progress made over the last 20 years.

Assurances from the White House that the Ghani administration will have ample lines of communication to Mr. Bidens cabinet seem to have also assuaged the Afghan governments concerns over the U.S. decision to retain Zalmay Khalilzad, the diplomat who spearheaded the U.S.-Taliban negotiations that excluded the Afghan government.

Mr. Khalilzad will be reporting to a very organized decision-making process, Mr. Ghani said during a virtual appearance at the Aspen Security Forum, adding that he expects a predictable relationship with the Biden administration.

Some Afghan officials distrust Mr. Khalilzad and were hostile to his dialogue with the Taliban under the Trump administration, particularly his pressure on them to release the roughly 5,000 Taliban prisoners with hopes that a reduction in violence would follow.

It didnt. But it did open the way for talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban that began in Doha in September.

Asfandyar Mir, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University, said that an additional complication for the Biden administration is that the Afghan government is a house divided with rivalries throughout.

Many Afghan officials say they believe that the Taliban have only a single interest: to seize power by force. And all sides in the conflict agree that missing the May troop withdrawal deadline would quickly change whatever equilibrium has been established on the countrys battlefields and could risk setting off a concerted Taliban effort to enter cities.

In the meantime, regional powers, especially Iran and Pakistan, are biding their time and waiting to see what comes next under Mr. Biden.

Iran, for instance, hosted Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Talibans deputy leader, in Tehran on Wednesday, which could be perceived as demonstrating the countrys willingness to play a more active role in the talks.

Irans involvement in the Afghan war has shifted since 2001, underscoring the changing geopolitical currents over the wars duration. On one hand, Tehrans official line has denounced the return of the Taliban as a direct threat to Iran. But on the other, Iranian operatives have made quiet overtures to the insurgent group, offering weapons and other equipment, in Afghanistans southwest, Afghan officials say.

The Taliban does not trust the United States and we will fight any group that is a mercenary for the United States, Mr. Baradar was quoted as saying in the Iranian news media in an apparent reference to the Afghan government.

But just a month earlier, Irans foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, all but offered up an Iran-trained Afghan Shiite militia to serve the Kabul government in the fight against terrorism. He was speaking in an interview with an Afghan news outlet.

Officials here took that as a clear signal from its powerful neighbor that it intends to get further involved in the Afghan conflict.

Earlier this week, a Taliban delegation met with officials in Moscow, and on Friday, Abbas Stanekzai, a Taliban negotiator, told reporters that the Ghanis administration is not honest about peace.

Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the Afghan government council leading the peace negotiations, sounded a pessimistic note in an interview with The New York Times on Thursday.

The Taliban have taken a sort of maximalist position, Mr. Abdullah said. Before the negotiations, we were led to believe there would be a significant reduction in violence, he added.

The recent attitude of the Taliban has not been encouraging, Mr. Abdullah said, noting that the group had yet to make a promised break with Al Qaeda, the terror group responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks and the main reason U.S. forces invaded the country in 2001.

A report from the U.S. Treasury Department earlier this month indicated that Al Qaeda had only gained strength in Afghanistan and continued its ties with the Taliban throughout 2020.

Despite waves of targeted killings across the country striking fear in some of Afghanistans most populated cities, including Kabul the Afghan Independent Human Rights commission found that the number of civilian deaths had decreased by more than 20 percent compared with 2019.

The report also found that 8,500 civilians had been killed and wounded in Afghanistan in 2020.

Najim Rahim and Fahim Abed contributed reporting.

Continued here:
Violence May Delay U.S. Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan - The New York Times

Afghanistan on Sunday called on Pakistan to compel the Taliban to fulfil their commitments to reduce violence and to agree to a ceasefire, a day after the US said it would review its agreement with the militant group in the wake of a spike in violence.

The Afghan foreign ministry called on Pakistan and other international partners to press the Taliban to end violence in response to comments by Pakistans foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi that the US should not reverse things in Afghanistan.

The Taliban have not only failed to live up to their commitments to reduce violence and move toward a comprehensive ceasefire, but have escalated the violence to an unprecedented level, carrying out targeted killings and creating new challenges to meaningful negotiations and lasting peace, the Afghan foreign ministry said in a statement.

We expect the government of Pakistan and all our international partners to compel the Taliban to fulfil their commitments to reduce violence, to secure a nationwide ceasefire and to sever ties with terrorist groups so that the way for meaningful peace talks and political agreement is paved, it said.

Most of the Taliban's top commanders and its leadership council and clerics are based in Pakistan, especially in Quetta and the country's northwest. During a recent visit to Pakistan, top Taliban negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said all decisions regarding the peace process are made after consulting the leadership based in Pakistan.

Qureshi, in an interview with Al Jazeera last week, had called on new US President Joe Biden to follow up on the Afghan peace process and US troop withdrawal. I think they should realise there is an opportunity in Afghanistan and they should persevere with what was initiated and not reverse things, he said.

He contended Pakistan had done a lot to create an environment to facilitate the peace process, and blamed spoilers internal Afghan players and elements from outside for the violence.

The new US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, told his Afghan counterpart Hamdullah Mohib during a phone call on Saturday that the Biden administration intends to review the US-Taliban agreement that was finalised in February 2020. The aim of the review is to assess whether the Taliban is living up to its commitments to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government and other stakeholders.

Over the past few weeks, Afghan government officials, civil society activists and journalists have been targeted in bombings and attacks in Kabul and other cities across Afghanistan. On January 14, India had called for an immediate stop to the targeted attacks and sought a comprehensive ceasefire to take forward efforts to usher in peace.

Among the terror groups active in Afghanistan and having links with the Taliban are al-Qaeda and the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). According to a UN report, there are some 6,500 Pakistani fighters active in Afghanistan.

The Afghan foreign ministry said regional and international consensus is needed to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan. We appreciate the efforts of all parties who sincerely support the Afghan peace process. We expect the parties involved in the peace process to fulfil their commitments towards achieving peace, it said.

The Afghan government has taken the most important steps to build trust and pave the way for a comprehensive political agreement by releasing more than 6,000 Taliban prisoners, declaring its readiness for an immediate and nationwide ceasefire, and participating in peace talks, the ministry added.

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Force Taliban to reduce violence and agree to truce, Afghanistan tells Pakistan - Hindustan Times

The changing narratives and operations of al-Qaeda and its Pakistani ally, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in recent years indicate that the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan will not end with a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 or thereafter (The News, March 1). Recent speeches by the TTP emir, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, to a coalition of senior TTP commanders on the future goals of the war in Pakistan is not the only piece of evidence signifying that this war will continue (Umar Media, August 18, 2020; Umar Media, December 15, 2020). Rather, history also shows this war still has a long way to go.

Pakistani Islamists are widely believed to have originally supported al-Qaedas war against the Pakistani state due to post-9/11 changes in Pakistans foreign policy, which supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that expelled the Taliban regime from Kabul. However, the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan is deeply rooted in the pre-9/11 complexities of Pakistani politics, which culminated in Islamists enabling al-Qaeda operations within Pakistan immediately after 9/11. The war against the Pakistani government is so deeply entrenched that it will remain a challenge for the country even if the widely accepted jihad against the U.S. infidel occupier in Afghanistan and its allies, including Pakistan, is no longer a factor.

An overlooked illustration of the deep roots of the Islamist war in Pakistan comes from the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, whose thirteenth anniversary was last month. Bhuttos assassination provides indications about how jihadist violence will continue to be a feature in Pakistan even when the countrys support to the U.S. in Afghanistan no longer motivates al-Qaeda and TTP militancy. Benazir was the leader of the social-democratic party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), when she was assassinated on December 27, 2007 in Rawalpindi, which neighbors the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. She had only returned to Pakistan in October 2007 from self-imposed exile in Britain and Dubai in the hope of becoming Pakistans prime minister for the third time. A leading figure of Pakistani politics secular and liberal camp, she was the first major al-Qaeda and TTP target in Pakistan, but hardly the last. [1]

Her high-profile daylight assassination remained controversial for years and led to a blame game between Pakistani politicians, but new evidence related to her murder was released in 2017 in a book on the matter by current TTP emir, Noor Wali Mehsud, which solved several mysteries (Dawn, December 29, 2017). [2] The official final investigation results involving Scotland Yard and a UN team concluded that Osama bin Laden commissioned Benazirs assassination to the TTP founding emir Baitullah Mehsud through Abu Ubaydah al-Masri (the Egyptian), who commanded al-Qaeda operations in Pakistan (Dawn, December 28, 2018). The investigation identified different tiers of operators from the chief planner Ibad-ur-Rehman (a.k.a Farooq Chattan) to suicide bomber assassins, to local facilitators. Mehsuds book added to this understanding by showing that Baitullah Mehsud and TTPs leadership purposely denied their involvement in Benazirs assassination, despite providing planning and operational details not only for the assassination, but also for the previous assassination attempt in Larkana, Sindh Province in October 2007, which killed dozens of her party members.

Bhuttos Early Battles against Islamism, al-Qaeda, and the Military Establishment

Pro-Islamist Pakistani army general, Zia-ul-Haq, ousted Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB), father of Benazir, through a military coup resulting in ZABs controversial death sentence in 1979 (Dawn, April 4, 2019). [3] Zia soon became a hero to Pakistani Islamists for the advancement of Islamization processes and central role in supporting the Afghan jihad against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. [4] This brought Zia closer to Islamist political parties, particularly to Jamaat Islami (JI), which held a longstanding ideological and political rival of the socialist ZAB, whose government suppressed their organization in the 1970s. [5] Benazir, therefore, inherited her fathers political legacy, including his conflict with Pakistani Islamists and his fight against the military establishments dominance over democratically elected governments.

Benazir became the first female prime minister of Pakistan and the first woman to become prime minister of a Muslim majority country after defeating a powerful alliance of Islamist and mainstream political parties in 1988 that were allegedly backed by pro-Zia army generals (Dawn, October 30, 2012). The Islamist parties opposed her both because they considered a female head of state to be against Islamic law and because she was a strong voice against their interpretations of Islam. The Arab jihadists in Pakistan also feared Benazir would obstruct their goals to further Islamize Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bin Laden, through his trusted associates among Pakistani Islamists, financed the 1989 no-confidence motion against Benazir in parliament, which was brought forward by the anti-Benazir political alliance (Dawn, December 24, 2017; YouTube, September 18, 2012). Subsequent evidence suggested a senior officer of the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who at the time served as ISIs Islamabad station chief, covertly played a central role in this no-confidence motion. This remains a major scandal in Pakistans political history, known as Operation Midnight Jackal, which resulted in the termination of the involved officer (Dawn, November 27, 2016; YouTube, September 27, 2009).

During Benazirs second term as prime minister came in 1993-1996 (her first being 1988-1990), during which she arrested and extradited dozens of Arab jihadists to their home countries. This policy resulted in the Arab jihadists receiving life imprisonment and death penalties. [6] The remaining Arab jihadists feared that they too would be arrested and fled to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Central Asia, and Sudan. [7] They included senior al-Qaeda cadres, who became al-Qaedas post-9/11 leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including, for example, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri and Mustafa Abu Yazid, the latter of whom would go on to claimed that Benazirs assassination was revenge for her policies against jihadists (Asia Times, December 27, 2007). [8]

In addition, as a result of these extraditions, an al-Qaeda-linked Pakistani jihadist, Ramzi Yousef, organized two attempts to assassinate Benazir, but she survived both times (The News, September 7, 2017). Ramzi also masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and was the nephew of the 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. Benazirs government finally arrested Ramzi in February 1995 in Islamabad and quickly extradited him to the United States, where he has since been imprisoned for life. He remains an al-Qaeda hero praised by bin Laden and Aymen al-Zawahiri. [9]

Besides these arrests and extraditions, the Benazir government also implemented controversial laws in 1994 in the Dir division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan that agitated local Islamists. [10] A radical JI splinter group, Tehreek Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM), protested these laws through a violent uprising that took control of government buildings and the Saidu Sharif airport (Dawn, November 3, 2007; Dawn, July 12, 2019). [11] This resulted in a Taliban-style movement emerging in the Dir, Bajaur, and Swat areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa led by TNSM emir Sufi Muhammad. [12] His movement coincided with Mullah Umars rise in Afghanistan, but both movements remained separate and the Benazir government killed and arrested hundreds of TNSM members. [13]

TNSMs two senior-most members after Sufi Muhammad, his son-in-law and successor Maulana Fazlullah and Mulawi Faqir Muhammad, became founding figures of TTP in 2007. The latter became the founding deputy head of TTP and was formerly its central emir in 2013. [14] Faqir Muhammad was the TTP Bajaur chapter emir. Post-9/11, he hosted al-Qaeda leaders in Bajaur, including Aymen al-Zawahiri and Abu Ubaydah al-Masri. [15] Meanwhile, the head planner of Benazirs assassination, Farooq Chattan, hailed from Swat, and was affiliated with the TTPs Maulana Fazlullah-led Swati Taliban (Dawn, October 30, 2012).

Benazirs Second-Term Battles

Benazirs ascension to power for a second term in 1993 resulted in the formation of another radical JI splinter group, Tehreek Islami Pakistan (TIP), which emerged from JIs intellectual class in Islamabad and other Pakistani urban centers (The Friday Times, June 26, 2011). TIPs hardliners separated from JI in 1994 due to the policies of JI head Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Some of the hardliners even accused him of pursuing a failed strategy that allowed Benazir to become prime minister for a second time one year earlier. [16] Amira Ihsan, a senior TIP member who represented JI in the Pakistani parliament in 1988, now led this charge against JI. A brother of Ihsan, Colonel Muhammad Hamid, was later part of a failed military coup against Benazir in 1995, which was planned by senior army generals and a pro-al-Qaeda veteran Afghan jihadist commander, Qari Saifullah Akhtar (The Friday Times, June 26, 2011).

One of Amira Ihsans sons, Raja Muhammad Salman (a.k.a Ustad Ahmad Farooq), also played the primary role in establishing al-Qaeda in Pakistan after 9/11. [17] Ustad Ahmad Farooq became senior advisor to Mustafa Abu Yazid and later led al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) until he was killed in a US drone strike in 2015. [18] Benazir suspected Akhtar of plotting her assassination weeks before her assassination took place (Geo TV, January 10, 2007). Akhtar was consequently arrested for her assassination, but he was released in 2008. He later joined Ustad Ahmad Farooqs al-Qaeda fighters in Waziristan until his death in January 2017 in a U.S. and Afghan joint operation in Ghazni province, Afghanistan. [19]

Besides these enemies, Benazir also faced severe opposition from the anti-Shia Sunni Deobandi sectarian group, Sipahi Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) for her Shia roots. [20] SSP excommunicates all Shia Muslims, demands a totalitarian Sunni state, and has been a major contributor to lethal Shia-Sunni sectarian violence in Pakistan (see Terrorism Monitor, May 5, 2005). SSPs founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who was known for his firebrand oratory, declared it a religious duty to oust Benazir from power for being Shia. [21] SSP members also facilitated Ramzi Yousefs two assassination attempts on Benazir in the 1990s and its underground splinter, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which was named after Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, has remained a brutal face of terrorism in Pakistan (The News, September 7, 2017). [22]

In 1990, Jhangvi was assassinated by his Shia sectarian opponents, who were arrested immediately after the murder. His followers considered his killing to be part of a larger conspiracy organized by influential Pakistani Shia politicians and even Iran. Jhangvis killing resulted in massive violence in his native district of Jhang and elsewhere in Punjab, which birthed LeJ in 1995. [23] In particular, LeJ also became the main implementer of al-Qaeda and TTP attacks in Pakistan after 9/11. [24] Mustafa Abu Yazid, for example, mentioned that LeJ assisted al-Qaeda in assassinating Benazir when later claiming responsibility for the act (Asia Times, December 27, 2007).

The Red Mosque Operation and Relationship with Musharraf

Although Benazir remained in exile after 9/11, she consistently informed the world about the Islamist and jihadist threat in Pakistan (Asia Times, November 3, 2004). She was also critical of the post-9/11 policies of Pakistani army generals, particularly Pervez Musharraf, specifically their attempts at countering al-Qaeda and its allies, such as TTP, in Pakistan. Her long experience confronting al-Qaeda, Islamists, and rogue elements of Pakistans military establishment gave her perspective on how to counter the post-9/11 challenge of Islamist militancy in Pakistan.

Although Benazir supported Musharrafs controversial military operation against a pro-al-Qaeda Islamist leader, Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, in Islamabad in July 2007, which killed Ghazi and dozens of followers in the Red Mosque, she doubted the sincerity behind Musharraf and his allies post-9/11 counterterrorism policies (Dawn, Jul 16, 2007). Other Pakistani political leaders, including Musharrafs allies, meanwhile tried to disassociate themselves from the Red Mosque operation due to fears of severe repercussions from the public and reprisal attacks from jihadists and Islamist militants (The Express Tribune, April 26, 2013). The Red Mosque incident was the boiling point for al-Qaeda and its post-9/11 allied Pakistani jihadists, who quickly declared an open war against the state in revenge for the operation. [25]

The Remaining al-Qaeda and TTP Threat in Pakistan

The sequences of confrontations between Islamists, al-Qaeda, the military establishment, and Benazir from her entry into politics in 1988 until the July 2007 Red Mosque incident and her assassination in December 2007 offer a detailed picture of Pakistani political complexities, which paved the way for post-9/11 pro-al-Qaeda Islamists, including the TTP, to conduct an anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan. The hardliners from the anti-Benazir Islamist groups of the 1990s defected to al-Qaeda and the TTP and played a part in her assassination. Powerful elements of the military establishment who tried to stop Benazir by allegedly supporting Islamist groups who also were considered suspects for their roles in al-Qaeda and the TTPs assassination of Benazir (UN, April 15, 2010; BBC, December 27, 2017).

Although al-Qaedas and the TTPs official narrative of fighting against the Pakistani state began with their criticism of the Red Mosque incident in 2007 and Pakistans support of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, they are now focused on the long-term goals of replacing democracy with Sharia and making Pakistan a totalitarian Sunni state. [26] These were the goals for which their predecessors struggled, including JI, TIP, TNSM, SSP and LeJ. This suggests that the anti-state jihadist war will not end with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as it is deeply rooted in the complexities of Pakistani politics, which still persist into the future.

Notes:

[1] Syed Salim Shahzad, Inside al-Qaeda and Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, (Pluto Press: London, UK, 2011), pp.169

[2] See for details, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Inqilab-i-Mehsud, (Mehsuds Revolution) [In Urdu], (Al-Shahab Publishers: Paktika, 2017).

[3] See, for example, Chris Sands and Fazelminallah Qazizai,Night Letters, (Hurst Publishers: London, 2019)

[4] In 2011, during the time of the PPP government, the murder case was reopened by the Supreme Court, which declared it a political murder. ZAB was suspected in a murder case of his political opponent, so when Zia came to power, he probed that case against ZAB and handed down the death penalty to ZAB, even though political opponents of ZAB declared it an unjust decision.

[5] Sands and Qazizai, 2019.

[6] Anne Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom, 2017). pp.48

[7] Ibid.

[8] Shahzad, 2011, pp.168-9.

[9] Rabi al-Islami [In Arabic: Islamic Spring], Second Part, As-Sahab Central, 2015. Osama Bin Laden interview with ABC John Miller, ABC News, May 1998. For details on Ramzi Yousef, see, Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen, (Arcade Publishing: New York, 2004).

[10] Mona Kanwal Sheikh, Guardians of God: Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016), pp.80-82.

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Mehsud, 2017, pp. 522

[18] Ustad Ahmad Farooq, Shaikh Saeed (Mustafa Abu Yazid), Hitteen, Issue 9, pp. 117-138

[19] It is mentioned in the Urdu magazine of al-Qaeda by a close aide of Ahmad Farooq, see for details; Moeenuddin Shami, With Ustad Farooq: Part 17th, Nawai Afghan Jihad [in Urdu], Vol. 13, Issue 4, pp. 65-66.

[20] See for details, the autobiography of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi successor; Zia ur Rehman Farooqi, Phir Wahe Qaid o Qafas (Again the same imprisonment) [In Urdu], (Farooqi Academy: Faisalabad, 1997)

[21] Ibid

[22] Mohammad Amir Rana, Gateway to Terrorism, (New Millennium: London, UK, 2003)

[23] See for details, the autobiography of SSP leader; Azam Tariq, Toot gae zanjeer (The broken chains) [In Urdu], (Ishat-ul-Maarif: Faisalabad, Sep 2004) 6th:Ed.

[24] Mujahid Hussain, Punjabi Taliban: Driving Extremism in Pakistan, (Pentagon Press: New Delhi, India, 2012)

[25] See for details, Shahzad, 2011.

[26] See the detailed essay of the al-Qaeda recruitment and propaganda head in Pakistan, who played a central role in the establishment of the post-9/11 anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan: Ustad Ahmad Farooq,Pakistan mi jihad jari rihna chaheay[Urdu: Jihad should continue in Pakistan], Hitteen Publications, Oct 2016.

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