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Sapp: Having watched the arc of the conflicts and being one of the first guys on the ground, I first started questioning things in probably December '02. I know that seems kind of early. But all of a sudden, they were doing the conference in Bonn and they were talking about [writing an Afghan] constitution and so forth. And I thought, wow, that sounds kind of Jeffersonian. But you've got to understand, the attitude of the time was very upbeat and very optimistic. And we had been successful. It was clear that things were shifting to Iraq. I went into Iraq in '03. We were focused on Iraq, and that was also indicative of the overall look of the Defense Department at the time.

When I came back to Afghanistan [in 2011], it was a very, very different paradigm. The IED techniques had migrated from Iraq. You couldn't drive anywhere. When I was [in Afghanistan in 2001], we were on horseback or we're on foot or we're in light-skinned vehicles. Now, you couldn't get from A to B without being in an armored vehicle or flying a helicopter.

But the biggest problemthe big point where I said, things aren't going as well as I had hoped for was dealing with these district governors, whom I dealt with frequently. They didn't have a long view. They were not invested in the central government. There were a lot of reasons for that. Every day was a new day to them and it was a fight for survival. They had no incentive to build these relationships that we designed for them.

For example, we were paying nine and a half dollars per gallon to ship gas from Karachi to outlying districts. And when I approached the district governor'Hey, you need to learn how to use your own bureaucratic requisition systems'he said, 'Why should I do that when you're doing it for me?' And he was dead serious. And of course, he died a couple of months later, as probably 60 percent of the guys who I worked with did on the Afghan side.

You feel like a little piece in the game and not someone who's able to see the whole board.

Jess Gonzalez

Dempsey: I actually want to push back just a tad. It's absolutely truethe [Afghan] commandos are successful. But they're successful when we provide air support, planning, high-tech weaponry and a ton of in-depth training. And frankly, the question we have failed to ask is: Why are the commandos and everything that we've given them, why are they necessary for defeating a force that's for the most part equipped with AK-47s and flip-flops? It's because we became enamored with [creating] a force that looks like us and is effective by our measures.

What we miss is that the Taliban are actually playing the long-term political game. They're not getting money hand over fist, month after month that would incentivize them to be a client of the Americans. They're working inch by inch, working politics. We may not like it, but they're damn effective. And they're much more effective, unfortunately, than a force that we prop up to be tactically efficient in our image, but politically illegitimate and unable to win the battle for hearts and minds in a lot of these villages that are on the edge.

Matisek: The thing that became pretty apparent that kind of shocked me, but I guess it really shouldn't have: We had been there almost two decades. I'm talking to Afghan troops about, well, how do you get jobs in the Afghan military? Theyre just like [makes money gesture with hand]. So you mean to tell me that there is no record-keeping in the Afghan military about what you're qualified to do or what you can do? And they're just like, no [makes money gesture again]. You get around the military and get new jobs and promotions just by virtue of paying somebody off.

That's insanewe've done all this for almost two decades and we couldn't get them to do a basic personnel system to make it at least halfway meritocratic. Yeah, that's a bad sign.

If you want to give give props or credit to the Taliban, they did a great job with the green-on-blue attacksthey were able to basically keep turning Afghan troops and policemen against U.S. and coalition forces in a way that didn't really happen in Iraq. Really did a number on the way we tried doing military operations in Afghanistan.

The Taliban seemed to have moved into a phase, by the time I was leaving, of being able to approach government forces and not just kill them and basically make a deal that they couldn't refuse. So, for example, there was an Afghan army NCO [non-commissioned officer] down at Kandahar that had been approached. He came into work the following day and hes like, 'Hey, guys, it's my last day at work. Taliban came by my house. They basically offered to pay me double. They won't kill my family and I'll just go maintain their vehicles at the Taliban maintenance depot shop.' And he was like, 'Goodbye, guys.' It was sort of like, this is the way it is. And everyone saw the writing on the wall.

Gonzalez: You know, its those little things that everyday junior enlisted guys had to deal with that were always these big moments for me within my deployment. I was expecting to go for a six-month deployment. One of the admin guys was like, 'Hey, where do you want to go for R&R [rest and recuperation]?' 'Oh man, Im not going on R&R. Im only here for six months, R&R is for people here for 10!' And theyre like, Nope, youre on the year list.' Things like thathow disconnected a lot of the times a junior enlisted is from the decisions that are made within our own lives. It's funny looking at it down the line.

There was a big controversy around the time I was leaving about a giant building that was getting built on Camp Leatherneck, a multimillion-dollar facility [at a time] when the Marine Corps was supposed to be somewhat pulling out of Afghanistan. That was always the big talkhow the Afghan National Army wasn't able to use that facility because we had set it up for American power. There were a lot of logistical problems that junior enlisted heard about through thewe call it the lance corporal underground.

Caruso: We made a lot of efforts to pacify villages that were more hostile to us. And we succeeded in some cases by putting an Afghan National Police checkpoint in a village that didn't have one to help deter the Taliban from launching rockets at the base. [In one instance] we convinced a village elder, who was a Ghilzai Pashtun, to support us, which was a big deal because many of the people to whom he had tribal ties were Taliban supporters.

But he was assassinated. Then his brother stood up and took his place and said, 'We'll stand with the government, the Americans.' And he was assassinated. By that point, the Taliban had essentially regained control of the village. I spoke to one gentleman on the side of the road one day, and he was subsequently beheaded for talking to me and made an example of.

I saw through that that some of these things were almost Pyrrhic victories because we were doing the things that, [per] the counterinsurgency manual, doctrinally, we were doing the right things. And we were succeeding in some cases. But at the end of the day, the sacrifice and the loss of trust in the villages was starting to hamper our effectiveness in getting people to want to work with us, to follow our goals and objectives, to cooperate with us and to resist the Taliban and ultimately for us to succeed. I think they were going to have to resist them on their own. We couldn't maintain a permanent presence of U.S. forces indefinitely to keep them safe or to deter the Taliban.

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We Never Got It. Not Even Close: Afghanistan Veterans Reflect on 20 Years of War - POLITICO

The Talibans takeover of Afghanistan is a shattering earthquake that will shape the Middle East for many years, a senior Gulf official has said, warning that despite the groups promises of moderation the militant group is essentially the same as last time it was in power.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the official also said that the rapid and chaotic US withdrawal also raises serious questions for Gulf states about the value of US promises of security over the next 20 years.

Afghanistan is an earthquake, a shattering, shattering earthquake, and this is going to stay with us for a very, very long time, the official said on Monday. He added that the episode marked a complete break with the outdated Carter doctrine a commitment that an oil-dependent US would use military force to defend its interests in the Gulf.

Can we really depend on an American security umbrella for the next 20 years? I think this is very problematic right now really very problematic.

He suggested that 20 years of warfare, supposed to be a battle against those who had hijacked Islam, had left no legacy in Afghanistan, and predicted that the Talibans seizure of power would prompt concern among leaders in West Africa and the Sahel about the rise of a newly confident Islamic extremism.

The official added he had no expectation that the Taliban would behave differently from when it was previously in power, saying, They are essentially the same, but just more world-savvy.

The biggest surprise, the official said, was the sheer incompetence of the US operation and the signs of bureaucratic infighting that marred US thinking.

Afghanistan, he said, will probably come to be seen as a Pakistan victory, and a Chinese opportunity with the US playing a minimal role. If there is a geopolitical struggle over Afghanistan, we will see Pakistan and China on one hand and India, Iran and Russia on the other hand, the official said. And I dont think the Americans are going to be a part of the geopolitical struggle over Afghanistan.

Many Gulf states have already begun recalibrating their foreign policy to take into account declining US dependence on oil and the growing popular insularity of the US, but the official said he now expected that process to speed up, leading to realignments in alliances and a desire for some historical rivals to establish more pragmatic relations. The general aim will be to de-escalate tensions in the region, the official said.

The official added that he expected to see greater discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the future, as well as between the United Arab Emirates and Iran. The official also pointed to the signing of a defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Russia as a sign that in a post-carbon age, the Gulf states wanted to diversify their sources of security away from the US.

Iran, under its previous government, led by Hassan Rouhan, had started to hold discreet talks with Saudi Arabia at an intelligence cooperation level, but that may now become more open. Bahrain has already been seen to look for new alliances in the region including through the Abraham Accord with Israel, and in the UAEs case by restoring diplomatic relations with Syria.

The emphasis will be on trying to make this region less of a pressure cooker.

Original post:
Taliban takeover of Afghanistan will reshape Middle East, official warns - The Guardian

In October 2001 just about 20 years ago the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11. It's been the longest war in the history of the United States. It's been going on for so long, that this war that killed so many Afghan people and U.S. military personnel rarely made front page news anymore. But when Afghanistan did make the news, it was mostly a country defined by the ongoing military occupation and by violence.

But that's not the full story not even close. Afghanistan has a long, rich, complex history and culture. A lot of it flies in the face of what those of us in the U.S. are exposed to, or is in direct opposition to the stereotypes that we do see portrayed.

So this week, we're sharing an episode from our play-cousins at Throughline. They spent some time unspooling the history of Afghanistan its art, its culture, its people and they used the stories that Afghans have told about themselves through the ages to do it.

By the way, if you listen to this episode and find yourself wanting more, you are in luck. The Throughline team is coming out with part two of the series about the rise of the Taliban later this week.

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The Making And Remaking Of Afghanistan : Code Switch - NPR

Senator James Risch weighed in on Secretary of State Antony Blinken's testimony on Afghanistan on Special Report, and reacted to President Biden's sound being cut off when asked questions from the media.

SENATOR JAMES RISCH:Well, you know, theyvebeen all over the board on thisthingbut theyre really delusional on it.Theyre out of step with theAmerican people.The vast majority of theAmerican people watched thisunfold.What you just saw was astatement from the Democratchairman of that committeecalling this a colossal failure. It clearly was.It's a debacle.It was an embarrassment.It was all those things and we wanted answers as to whowas making the who was makingthe decisions and who was makingthe calls on it.We didnt get very much in thatregard, but the takeaway is thatthere as was said here, theyre patting themselves on theback on what great job is done.Look, I was privy to thediscussions about this in thelast administration. Certainly, not in thisadministrationand theres some basics theydidnt follow.Look, you evacuate the countryfirst. Then you give up thecountry.You dont give up the countryand then try to evacuate it orwhat you saw is what you get.

Well, I think all of us have seen this administration and compared it to prior administrations. Whether you like it or not, you wind up comparing it. And for whatever reason, from time to time, his is his sound is cut off, whether he's in the White House or in other places. Sometimes he's hustled off of the stage where we can't or the media can't get answers. Somebody needs to be in charge now.

WATCH THE FULL INTERVIEW BELOW:

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Sen. Risch: Biden administration is 'delusional' on Afghanistan and 'out of step with the American people' - Fox News

View of a gold mine in Nor Aaba, Takhar province, Afghanistan.

Omar Sobhani | Reuters

One of the first things many Western pundits predicted as the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan unraveled was the replacement in that power vacuum by China, long a critic of and strategic adversary to the United States.

Afghanistan has trillions of dollars worth of untapped mineral resources, and is in dire need of infrastructure investment, making it in theory a prime ground for China's expansive Belt and Road Initiative. What's more, China is one of the few countries and the only economic superpower to have so far established friendly relations with the Taliban, who shocked the world in early August by overtaking Afghanistan in a matter of days.

In what many see as a symbolic taunt to the West, Chinese state officials have chastised Washington and its 20-year war, and cautiously welcomed the Taliban's announcement of its new government of hardliners and FBI-wanted terrorists this week.

Taliban take control of Hamid Karzai International Airport after the completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, in Kabul, Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.

Wali Sabawoon | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

"This has ended the more than three weeks of anarchy in Afghanistan and is a necessary step for Afghanistan's restoration of domestic order and postwar reconstruction," Wang Wenbin, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, told reporters at a briefing on Wednesday, according to a transcript published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

But beyond the statements, many regional experts are not convinced of China's enthusiasm for barreling into the war-torn Central Asian state on its western border.

China has long been wary of Islamic extremism in its far west. It's also determined not to fall into the same quagmires that the Soviet Union and the U.S. were sucked into with Afghanistan, analysts say.

"China is interested in economic engagement in Afghanistan and extension of its Belt and Road, including reconstruction and investing in untapped mineral resources of the landlocked country," Ekta Raghuwanshi, Stratfor's South Asia analyst for RANE, told CNBC.

"However," she cautioned, "it wouldn't invest substantially anytime soon given security concerns in Afghanistan and proximity to China's restive Xinjiang province," she said, referring to Uyghur militants and the resurgence of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

And while China has made clear its approval of the Taliban, that doesn't mean it's ready to commit to doing business with them.

"We don't have evidence China will see the Taliban as a more secure partner," Maximilian Hess,a Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia Program, told CNBC.

"It is very aware of the security risks, and attacks on Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan by Islamist groups have increased in recent years" including one as recently as August, Hess said. China risks angering local Afghans with its presence, and Beijing "recognizes Afghanistan's tribal reality and that the Taliban has many sub-factions that it lets operate with quasi-autonomy in many areas," he added.

So even if the Taliban who have embraced China's diplomatic overtures and celebrate the prospect of its investment give Chinese investors a guarantee of security, the group does not necessarily have control over other militants and tribes across the country of nearly 40 million people.

What Beijing doesn't voice publicly, analysts say, is its concern about the impact of the U.S. withdrawal, much like Russia.

As journalist Sreemoy Talukdar wrote in Indian news outlet Firstpost this week, China "may have been gloating at U.S. discomfiture during the bungling exit but had so far been quite content with America's role as the security guarantor next door in a region that is a veritable witches' brew of terrorism and ethnic insurgency."

The Chinese foreign ministry did not reply to a CNBC request for comment.

The Taliban remains sanctioned by the U.S., EU and United Nations. That presents an obvious legal and financial risk for anyone hoping to do business with the group.

"Any deals signed with the Taliban face obvious political and sanctions risks," said Jonathan Wood, deputy global research director at Control Risks.

China has proven adept at navigating U.S. sanctions in the past, importing embargoed Iranian oil thanks to the use of things like "ghost ships." But some Chinese companies have been hit by U.S. penalties, and in the case of Afghanistan, the security risks make pushing that boundary even less appealing.

"Western sanctions mean that even if the Taliban is recognized (by China), very few banks or financial institutions will deal with the Taliban government while those sanctions remain," Hess said.

Afghanistan's mineral wealth is staggering. The country sits above some 60 tons of copper reserves, more than 2.2 billion tons of iron ore, 1.4 million tons of rare earth minerals coveted for their use in electronic products such as lithium which is in high demand for electric vehicle batteries 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil, 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and another 500 million barrels of natural gas liquids, according to U.S. geological surveys.

But so far, it's proven nearly impossible to reach.

In 2008, a consortium of Chinese companies took on a 30-year lease for the largest copper project in Afghanistan, called Mes Aynak. To date 13 years later no work has been started on the mining project.

This is due to a combination of security issues, state corruption and infrastructure constraints, even though the 11.08 million tons of copper it's estimated to hold would be worth over $100 billion at current London Metal Exchange prices.

"Afghanistan's limited infrastructure power, roads, rails difficult terrain, and landlocked geography will continue to hinder natural resource development," Stratfor's Wood said.

Despite all the limitations, these have not necessarily stopped China in the past, as its investments in Sudan and the Congo show, noted Samuel Ramani, a tutor of International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Given the stagnation of its previous Afghan ventures, "I think Chinese involvement in Afghanistan could look a lot like their purported reconstruction plans in Syria," Ramani said. "A lot of speculation, but little substance."

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China's rumored ambitions to dive into Afghanistan are overstated and unrealistic, experts say - CNBC