Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

War in Afghanistan (20012014) – Wikipedia

War in Afghanistan Part of the War in Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism Clockwise from top-left: British Royal Marines take part in the clearance of Nad-e Ali District of Helmand Province; two F/A-18 strike fighters conduct combat missions over Afghanistan; an anti-Taliban fighter during an operation to secure a compound in Helmand Province; A French chasseur alpin patrols a valley in Kapisa Province; U.S. Marines prepare to board buses shortly after arriving in southern Afghanistan; Taliban fighters in a cave hideout; U.S. soldiers prepare to fire a mortar during a mission in Paktika Province, U.S. troops disembark from a helicopter, a MEDCAP centre in Khost Province. Belligerents

Afghanistan Government

Taliban

Allied groups

Taliban splinter groups

2001 invasion: Northern Alliance

2001 invasion: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

al-Qaeda

Hamid Karzai Ashraf Ghani

Mohammed Omar(Deceased, non-combat) Akhtar Mansoor Abdul Ghani Baradar(POW)[4] Hibatullah Akhundzada[2] Jalaluddin Haqqani Obaidullah Akhund[4] Dadullah Akhund[4] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Osama bin Laden Ayman al-Zawahiri

Afghan National Security Forces: 352,000[6] ISAF: 18,000+[7]

Taliban: 60,000 (tentative estimate)[8]

HIG: 1,500 - 2,000+[12] al-Qaeda: 50100[13][14] ~ 3,000 in 2001[15]

Afghan security forces: 21,950 killed[16] Northern Alliance: 200 killed[17][18][19][20] Coalition Dead: 3,486 (all causes) 2,807 (hostile causes) (United States:2,356, United Kingdom:454,[21] Canada:158, France:88, Germany:57, Italy:53, Others:321)[22] Wounded: 22,773 (United States:19,950, United Kingdom:2,188, Canada:635)[23][24][25] Contractors Dead: 1,582[26][27] Wounded: 15,000+[26][27]

The war in Afghanistan (or the American war in Afghanistan)[29][30] was the period in which the United States invaded Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks.[31] Supported initially by close allies, they were later joined by NATO beginning in 2003. It followed the Afghan Civil War's 19962001 phase. Its public aims were to dismantle al-Qaeda and to deny it a safe base of operations in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban from power.[32] Key allies, including the United Kingdom, supported the U.S. from the start to the end of the phase. This phase of the war is the longest war in United States history.[33][34][35][36][37]

In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda; bin Laden had already been wanted by the United Nations since 1999. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless given what they deemed convincing evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks[38] and declined demands to extradite other terrorism suspects apart from bin Laden. The request was dismissed by the U.S. as a delaying tactic, and on 7 October 2001 it launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other forces, including the Northern Alliance.[39][40] In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the Afghan interim authorities with securing Kabul. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[41]

NATO became involved as an alliance in August 2003, taking the helm of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and later that year assumed leadership of ISAF with troops from 43 countries. NATO members provided the core of the force.[42] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[43][44] Though outgunned and outnumbered, insurgents from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and other groups have waged asymmetric warfare with guerilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets and turncoat killings against coalition forces. The Taliban exploited weaknesses in the Afghan government, among the most corrupt in the world, to reassert influence across rural areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. ISAF responded in 2006 by increasing troops for counterinsurgency operations to "clear and hold" villages and "nation building" projects to "win hearts and minds".[45][46] While ISAF continued to battle the Taliban insurgency, fighting crossed into neighboring North-West Pakistan.[47]

On 2 May 2011, United States Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan. In May 2012, NATO leaders endorsed an exit strategy for withdrawing their forces. UN-backed peace talks have since taken place between the Afghan government and the Taliban.[48] In May 2014, the United States announced that "[its] combat operations [would] end in 2014, [leaving] just a small residual force in the country until the end of 2016".[49] As of 2015, tens of thousands of people have been killed in the war. Over 4,000 ISAF soldiers and civilian contractors as well as over 15,000 Afghan national security forces members have been killed, as well as nearly 20 thousand civilians. In October 2014, British forces handed over the last bases in Helmand to the Afghan military, officially ending their combat operations in the war.[50] On 28 December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan and transferred full security responsibility to the Afghan government, via a ceremony in Kabul.[51][52]

Afghanistan's political order began to break down with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah by his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in a bloodless 1973 coup. Daoud Khan had served as prime minister since 1953 and promoted economic modernization, emancipation of women, and Pashtun nationalism. This was threatening to neighboring Pakistan, faced with its own restive Pashtun population. In the mid-1970s, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to encourage Afghan Islamic leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to fight against the regime. In 1978, Daoud Khan was killed in a coup by Afghan's Communist Party, his former partner in government, known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). PDPA pushed for a socialist transformation by abolishing arranged marriages, promoting mass literacy and reforming land ownership. This undermined the traditional tribal order and provoked opposition from Islamic leaders across rural areas. The PDPA's crackdown was met with open rebellion, including Ismail Khan's Herat Uprising. The PDPA was beset by internal leadership differences and was weakened by an internal coup on 11 September 1979 when Hafizullah Amin ousted Nur Muhammad Taraki. The Soviet Union, sensing PDPA weakness, intervened militarily three months later, to depose Amin and install another PDA faction led by Babrak Karmal.

The entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in December 1979 prompted its Cold War rivals, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China to support rebels fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In contrast to the secular and socialist government, which controlled the cities, religiously motivated mujahideen held sway in much of the countryside. Beside Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khan, other mujahideen commanders included Jalaluddin Haqqani. The CIA worked closely with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence to funnel foreign support for the mujahideen. The war also attracted Arab volunteers, known as "Afghan Arabs", including Osama bin Laden.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan in May 1989, the PDPA regime under Najibullah held on until 1992, when the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the regime of aid, and the defection of Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum cleared the approach to Kabul. With the political stage cleared of Afghan socialists, the remaining Islamic warlords vied for power. By then, Bin Laden had left the country. The United States' interest in Afghanistan also diminished.

In 1992, Rabbani officially became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, but had to battle other warlords for control of Kabul. In late 1994, Rabbani's defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud defeated Hekmatyr in Kabul and ended ongoing bombardment of the capital.[53][54][55] Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation. Other warlords, including Ismail Khan in the west and Dostum in the north maintained their fiefdoms.

In 1994, Mohammed Omar, a mujahideen member who taught at a Pakistani madrassa, returned to Kandahar and formed the Taliban movement. His followers were religious students, known as the Talib and they sought to end warlordism through strict adherence to Islamic law. By November 1994, the Taliban had captured all of Kandahar Province. They declined the government's offer to join in a coalition government and marched on Kabul in 1995.[56]

The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of costly defeats.[57] Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban.[58][59] Analysts such as Amin Saikal described the group as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional interests, which the Taliban denied.[58] The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995, but were driven back by Massoud.[54][60]

On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia, seized Kabul and founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They imposed their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in areas under their control, issuing edicts forbidding women to work outside the home, attend school, or to leave their homes unless accompanied by a male relative.[62] According to the Pakistani expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban.[63][64]

Massoud and Dostum, former arch-enemies, created a United Front against the Taliban, commonly known as the Northern Alliance.[65] In addition to Massoud's Tajik force and Dostum's Uzbeks, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq and Haji Abdul Qadir. Abdul Haq also gathered a limited number of defecting Pashtun Taliban.[66] Both agreed to work together with the exiled Afghan king Zahir Shah.[64] International officials who met with representatives of the new alliance, which the journalist Steve Coll referred to as the "grand Pashtun-Tajik alliance", said, "It's crazy that you have this today Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara They were all ready to buy in to the process to work under the king's banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan."[68] The Northern Alliance received varying degrees of support from Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and India.

The Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and drove Dostum into exile.

The conflict was brutal. According to the United Nations (UN), the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. The Taliban especially targeted the Shiite Hazaras.[69][70] In retaliation for the execution of 3,000 Taliban prisoners by Uzbek general Abdul Malik Pahlawan in 1997, the Taliban executed about 4,000 civilians after taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998.[71][72]

Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians.[73] The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing "Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people".[69][70]

By 2001, the Taliban controlled as much as 90% of the country, with the Northern Alliance confined to the country's northeast corner. Fighting alongside Taliban forces were some 28,00030,000 Pakistanis and 2,0003,000 Al-Qaeda militants.[56][73] Many of the Pakistanis were recruited from madrassas.[73] A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirmed that "2040 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani." The document said that many of the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan". According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular soldiers, especially from the Frontier Corps, but also from the army providing direct combat support.[59][76]

In August 1996, Bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan and arrived in Jalabad, Afghanistan. He had founded Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen's war against the Soviets, but became disillusioned by infighting among warlords. He grew close to Mullah Omar and moved Al-Qaeda's operations to eastern Afghanistan.

The 9/11 Commission in the U.S. reported found that under the Taliban, al-Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a place to train and indoctrinate fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other jihadists, and plot terrorist actions. While al-Qaeda maintained its own camps in Afghanistan, it also supported training camps of other organizations. An estimated 10,000 and 20,000 men passed through these facilities before 9/11, most of whom were sent to fight for the Taliban against the United Front. A smaller number were inducted into al-Qaeda.

After the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were linked to bin Laden, President Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant training camps in Afghanistan. U.S. officials pressed the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. In 1999, the international community imposed sanctions on the Taliban, calling for bin Laden to be surrendered. The Taliban repeatedly rebuffed these demands.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special Activities Division paramilitary teams were active in Afghanistan in the 1990s in clandestine operations to locate and kill or capture Osama bin Laden. These teams planned several operations, but did not receive the order to proceed from President Clinton. Their efforts built relationships with Afghan leaders that proved essential in the 2001 invasion.

During the Clinton administration, the U.S. tended to favor Pakistan and until 19981999 had no clear policy toward Afghanistan. In 1997, for example, the U.S. State Department's Robin Raphel told Massoud to surrender to the Taliban. Massoud responded that, as long as he controlled an area the size of his hat, he would continue to defend it from the Taliban.[56] Around the same time, top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration flew to northern Afghanistan to try to persuade the United Front not to take advantage of a chance to make crucial gains against the Taliban. They insisted it was the time for a cease-fire and an arms embargo. At the time, Pakistan began a "Berlin-like airlift to resupply and re-equip the Taliban", financed with Saudi money.[80]

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan changed after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings. Subsequently, Osama bin Laden was indicted for his involvement in the embassy bombings. In 1999 both the U.S. and the United Nations enacted sanctions against the Taliban via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, which demanded the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden for trial in the U.S. and close all terrorist bases in Afghanistan.[81] The only collaboration between Massoud and the US at the time was an effort with the CIA to trace bin Laden following the 1998 bombings. The U.S. and the European Union provided no support to Massoud for the fight against the Taliban.

By 2001 the change of policy sought by CIA officers who knew Massoud was underway. CIA lawyers, working with officers in the Near East Division and Counter-terrorist Center, began to draft a formal finding for President George W. Bush's signature, authorizing a covert action program in Afghanistan. It would be the first in a decade to seek to influence the course of the Afghan war in favor of Massoud.Richard A. Clarke, chair of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group under the Clinton administration, and later an official in the Bush administration, allegedly presented a plan to incoming Bush National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in January 2001.

A change in US policy was effected in August 2001. The Bush administration agreed on a plan to start supporting Massoud. A meeting of top national security officials agreed that the Taliban would be presented with an ultimatum to hand over bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives. If the Taliban refused, the US would provide covert military aid to anti-Taliban groups. If both those options failed, "the deputies agreed that the United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action."[84]

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only leader of the United Front in Afghanistan. In the areas under his control, Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women's Rights Declaration.[85] As a consequence, many civilians had fled to areas under his control.[86][87] In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban.[88]

In late 2000, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik nationalist and leader of the Northern Alliance, invited several other prominent Afghan tribal leaders to a jirga in northern Afghanistan "to settle political turmoil in Afghanistan".[89] Among those in attendance were Pashtun nationalists, Abdul Haq and Hamid Karzai.[90][91]

In early 2001, Massoud and several other Afghan leaders addressed the European Parliament in Brussels, asking the international community to provide humanitarian help. The Afghan envoy asserted that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and Osama bin Laden, the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for another year. Massoud warned that his intelligence had gathered information about an imminent, large-scale attack on U.S. soil.[92]

On 9 September 2001, two French-speaking Algerians posing as journalists killed Massoud in a suicide attack in Takhar Province of Afghanistan. The two perpetrators were later alleged to be members of al-Qaeda. They were interviewing Massoud before detonating a bomb hidden in their video camera.[93][94] Both of the alleged al-Qaeda men were subsequently killed by Massoud's guards.

On the morning of 11 September 2001, a total of 19 Arab men carried out four coordinated attacks in the United States. Four commercial passenger jet airliners were hijacked.[95][96] The hijackers members of al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell [97] intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and more than 2000 people in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed within two hours from damage related to the crashes, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C.. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, in rural Pennsylvania, after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C., to target the White House, or the U.S. Capitol. No one aboard the flights survived. According to the New York State Health Department, the death toll among responders including firefighters and police was 836 as of June 2009.[98] Total deaths were 2996, including the 19 hijackers.[98]

The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred after the September 11 attacks in late 2001,[99] supported by allies including the United Kingdom.

U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Bin Laden had been wanted by the U.N. since 1999 for the prior attack on the World Trade Center. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless the United States provided convincing evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks.[38] They ignored U.S. demands to shut down terrorist bases and hand over other terrorist suspects. The request for proof of bin Laden's involvement was dismissed by the U.S. as a meaningless delaying tactic.

General Tommy Franks, then-commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), initially proposed immediately after the 9/11 attacks to President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the U.S. invade Afghanistan using a conventional force of 60,000 troops, preceded by six months of preparation. Rumsfield and Bush feared that a conventional invasion of Afghanistan could bog down as had happened to the Soviets and the British.[100] Rumsfield rejected Frank's plan, saying "I want men on the ground now!" Franks returned the next day with a plan utilizing Special Forces.[101] On September 26, 2001, fifteen days after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. covertly inserted members of the CIA's Special Activities Division led by Gary Schroen as part of team Jawbreaker into Afghanistan, forming the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team.[102][103][104] They linked up with the Northern Alliance as part of Task Force Dagger.[105]

Two weeks later, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 555 and 595, both 12-man Green Beret teams from 5th Special Forces Group, plus Air Force combat controllers, were airlifted by helicopter from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan[106] more than 300 kilometers (190mi) across the 16,000 feet (4,900m) Hindu Kush mountains in zero-visibility conditions by two SOAR MH-47E Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks were refueled in-flight three times during the 11-hour mission, establishing a new world record for combat rotorcraft missions at the time. They linked up with the CIA and Northern Alliance. Within a few weeks the Northern Alliance, with assistance from the U.S. ground and air forces, captured several key cities from the Taliban.[102][107]

The U.S. officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 with the assistance of the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other countries.[39][40] The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power and built military bases near major cities across the country. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban were not captured, escaping to neighboring Pakistan or retreating to rural or remote mountainous regions.[citation needed]

On 20 December 2001, the United Nations authorized an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate to help the Afghans maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. It was initially established from the headquarters of the British 3rd Mechanised Division under Major General John McColl, and for its first years numbered no more that 5,000.[108] Its mandate did not extend beyond the Kabul area for the first few years.[109] Eighteen countries were contributing to the force in February 2002.

At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[41]

In August 2003, NATO became involved as an alliance, taking the helm of the International Security Assistance Force.[42] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[43][44]

After evading coalition forces throughout mid-2002, Taliban remnants gradually regained confidence and prepared to launch the Taliban insurgency that Omar had promised.[110] During September, Taliban forces began a jihad recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pamphlets distributed in secret appeared in many villages in southeastern Afghanistan called for jihad.[111]

Small mobile training camps were established along the border to train recruits in guerrilla warfare.[112] Most were drawn from tribal area madrassas in Pakistan. Bases, a few with as many as 200 fighters, emerged in the tribal areas by the summer of 2003. Pakistani will to prevent infiltration was uncertain, while Pakistani military operations proved of little use.[113]

The Taliban gathered into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on isolated outposts, and then breaking up into groups of 510 to evade counterattacks. Coalition forces were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised explosive devices.

To coordinate the strategy, Omar named a 10-man leadership council, with himself as its leader.[113] Five operational zones were assigned to Taliban commanders such as Dadullah, who took charge in Zabul province.[113] Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of attacking Americans using elaborate ambushes. The first sign of the strategy came on 27 January 2003, during Operation Mongoose, when a band of fighters were assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex 25km (15mi) north of Spin Boldak.[114] 18 rebels were reported killed with no U.S. casualties. The site was suspected to be a base for supplies and fighters coming from Pakistan. The first isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.

As the summer continued, Taliban attacks gradually increased in frequency. Dozens of Afghan government soldiers, NGO humanitarian workers, and several U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes and rocket attacks. Besides guerrilla attacks, Taliban fighters began building up forces in the district of Dai Chopan in Zabul Province. The Taliban decided to make a stand there. Over the course of the summer, up to 1,000 guerrillas moved there. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August 2003. In late August 2005, Afghan government forces attacked, backed by U.S. troops with air support. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters killed.

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed control of ISAF.[109] On 31 July 2006, ISAF assumed command of the south of the country, and by 5 October 2006, of the east.[115] Once this transition had taken place, ISAF grew to a large coalition involving up to 46 countries, under a U.S. commander.

From January 2006, a multinational ISAF contingent started to replace U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan. The British 16th Air Assault Brigade (later reinforced by Royal Marines) formed the core of the force, along with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. The initial force consisted of roughly 3,300 British,[116] 2,300 Canadian,[117] 1,963 Dutch, 300 Australian,[118] 290 Danish[119] and 150 Estonian troops.[120] Air support was provided by U.S., British, Dutch, Norwegian and French combat aircraft and helicopters.

In January 2006, NATO's focus in southern Afghanistan was to form Provincial Reconstruction Teams with the British leading in Helmand while the Netherlands and Canada would lead similar deployments in Orzgn and Kandahar, respectively. Local Taliban figures pledged to resist.[121]

Southern Afghanistan faced in 2006 the deadliest violence since the Taliban's fall. NATO operations were led by British, Canadian and Dutch commanders. Operation Mountain Thrust was launched on 17 May 2006, with. In July, Canadian Forces, supported by U.S., British, Dutch and Danish forces, launched Operation Medusa.

A combined force of Dutch and Australians launched a successful offensive between late April to mid July 2006 to push the Taliban out of the Chora and Baluchi areas.

On 18 September 2006 Italian special forces of Task Force 45 and airborne troopers of the 'Trieste' infantry regiment of the Rapid Reaction Corps composed of Italian and Spanish forces, took part in 'Wyconda Pincer' operation in the districts of Bala Buluk and Pusht-i-Rod, in Farah province. Italian forces killed at least 70 Taliban. The situation in RC-W then deteriorated. Hotspots included Badghis in the very north and Farah in the southwest.

Further NATO operations included the Battle of Panjwaii, Operation Mountain Fury and Operation Falcon Summit. NATO achieved tactical victories and area denial, but the Taliban were not completely defeated. NATO operations continued into 2007.

In January and February 2007, British Royal Marines mounted Operation Volcano to clear insurgents from firing-points in the village of Barikju, north of Kajaki.[122] Other major operations during this period included Operation Achilles (MarchMay) and Operation Lastay Kulang. The UK Ministry of Defence announced its intention to bring British troop levels in the country up to 7,700 (committed until 2009).[123] Further operations, such as Operation Silver and Operation Silicon, took place to keep up the pressure on the Taliban in the hope of blunting their expected spring offensive.[124][125]

In February 2007, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan inactivated. Combined Joint Task Force 76, a two-star U.S. command headquartered on Bagram Airfield, assumed responsibility as the National Command Element for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.[126] Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, the other two-star U.S. command, was charged with training and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces.

On 4 March 2007, U.S. Marines killed at least 12 civilians and injured 33 in Shinwar district, Nangrahar,[127] in a response to a bomb ambush. The event became known as the "Shinwar massacre".[128] The 120 member Marine unit responsible for the attack were ordered to leave the country by Army Major General Frank Kearney, because the incident damaged the unit's relations with the local Afghan population.[129]

Later in March 2007, the US added more than 3,500 troops.

On 12 May 2007, ISAF forces killed Mullah Dadullah. Eleven other Taliban fighters died in the same firefight.

During the summer, NATO forces achieved tactical victories at the Battle of Chora in Orzgn, where Dutch and Australian ISAF forces were deployed.

On 16 August, eight civilians including a pregnant woman and a baby died when Polish soldiers shelled the village of Nangar Khel, Paktika Province. Seven soldiers have been charged with war crimes.

On 28 October about 80 Taliban fighters were killed in a 24-hour battle in Helmand.[130]

Western officials and analysts estimated the strength of Taliban forces at about 10,000 fighters fielded at any given time. Of that number, only 2,000 to 3,000 were highly motivated, full-time insurgents. The rest were part-timers, made up of alienated, young Afghans, angered by bombing raids or responding to payment. In 2007, more foreign fighters came than ever before, according to officials. Approximately 100 to 300 full-time combatants are foreigners, usually from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, various Arab countries and perhaps even Turkey and western China. They were reportedly more fanatical and violent, often bringing superior video-production or bombmaking expertise.[131]

On 2 November security forces killed a top-ranking militant, Mawlawi Abdul Manan, after he was caught crossing the border. The Taliban confirmed his death.[132] On 10 November the Taliban ambushed a patrol in eastern Afghanistan. This attack brought the U.S. death toll for 2007 to 100, making it the Americans' deadliest year in Afghanistan.[133]

The Battle of Musa Qala took place in December. Afghan units were the principal fighting force, supported by British forces.[134] Taliban forces were forced out of the town.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that while the situation in Afghanistan is "precarious and urgent", the 10,000 additional troops needed there would be unavailable "in any significant manner" unless withdrawals from Iraq are made. The priority was Iraq first, Afghanistan second.[135]

In the first five months of 2008, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan increased by over 80% with a surge of 21,643 more troops, bringing the total from 26,607 in January to 48,250 in June.[136] In September 2008, President Bush announced the withdrawal of over 8,000 from Iraq and a further increase of up to 4,500 in Afghanistan.[137]

In June 2008, British prime minister Gordon Brown announced the number of British troops serving in Afghanistan would increase to 8,030 a rise of 230.[138] The same month, the UK lost its 100th serviceman.[139]

On 13 June, Taliban fighters demonstrated their ongoing strength, liberating all prisoners in Kandahar jail. The operation freed 1200 prisoners, 400 of whom were Taliban, causing a major embarrassment for NATO.[140]

On 13 July 2008, a coordinated Taliban attack was launched on a remote NATO base at Wanat in Kunar province. On 19 August, French troops suffered their worst losses in Afghanistan in an ambush.[141] Later in the month, an airstrike targeted a Taliban commander in Herat province and killed 90 civilians.

Late August saw one of NATO's largest operations in Helmand, Operation Eagle's Summit, aiming to bring electricity to the region.[142]

On 3 September, commandos, believed to be U.S. Army Special Forces, landed by helicopter and attacked three houses close to a known enemy stronghold in Pakistan. The attack killed between seven and twenty people. Local residents claimed that most of the dead were civilians. Pakistan condemned the attack, calling the incursion "a gross violation of Pakistan's territory".[143][144]

On 6 September, in an apparent reaction, Pakistan announced an indefinite disconnection of supply lines.[145]

On 11 September, militants killed two U.S. troops in the east. This brought the total number of U.S. losses to 113, more than in any prior year.[146] Several European countries set their own records, particularly the UK, who suffered 108 casualties.[22]

In November and December 2008, multiple incidents of major theft, robbery, and arson attacks afflicted NATO supply convoys in Pakistan.[147][148][149] Transport companies south of Kabul were extorted for money by the Taliban.[149][150] These incidents included the hijacking of a NATO convoy carrying supplies in Peshawar,[148] the torching of cargo trucks and Humvees east of the Khyber pass[151] and a half-dozen raids on NATO supply depots near Peshawar that destroyed 300 cargo trucks and Humvees in December 2008.[152]

An unnamed senior Pentagon official told the BBC that at some point between 12 July and 12 September 2008, President Bush issued a classified order authorizing raids against militants in Pakistan. Pakistan said it would not allow foreign forces onto its territory and that it would vigorously protect its sovereignty.[153] In September, the Pakistan military stated that it had issued orders to "open fire" on U.S. soldiers who crossed the border in pursuit of militant forces.[154]

On 25 September 2008, Pakistani troops fired on ISAF helicopters. This caused confusion and anger in the Pentagon, which asked for a full explanation into the incident and denied that U.S. helicopters were in Pakistani airspace.

A further split occurred when U.S. troops apparently landed on Pakistani soil to carry out an operation against militants in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. 'Pakistan reacted angrily to the action, saying 20 innocent villagers had been killed by US troops'.[155] However, despite tensions, the U.S. increased the use of remotely piloted drone aircraft in Pakistan's border regions, in particular the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) and Balochistan; as of early 2009, drone attacks were up 183% since 2006.[156]

By the end of 2008, the Taliban apparently had severed remaining ties with al-Qaeda.[157] According to senior U.S. military intelligence officials, perhaps fewer than 100 members of al-Qaeda remained in Afghanistan.[158]

In a meeting with General Stanley McChrystal, Pakistani military officials urged international forces to remain on the Afghan side of the border and prevent militants from fleeing into Pakistan. Pakistan noted that it had deployed 140,000 soldiers on its side of the border to address militant activities, while the coalition had only 100,000 soldiers to police the Afghanistan side.[159]

In response to the increased risk of sending supplies through Pakistan, work began on the establishment of a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Russia and Central Asian republics. Initial permission to move supplies through the region was given on 20 January 2009, after a visit to the region by General David Petraeus.[160] The first shipment along the NDN route left on 20 February from Riga, Latvia, then traveled 5,169km (3,212mi) to the Uzbek town of Termez on the Afghanistan border.[161] In addition to Riga, other European ports included Poti, Georgia and Vladivostok, Russia.[162] U.S. commanders hoped that 100 containers a day would be shipped along the NDN.[161] By comparison, 140 containers a day were typically shipped through the Khyber Pass.[163] By 2011, the NDN handled about 40% of Afghanistan-bound traffic, versus 30% through Pakistan.[162]

On 11 May 2009, Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov announced that the airport in Navoi (Uzbekistan) was being used to transport non-lethal cargo into Afghanistan. Due to the still unsettled relationship between Uzbekistan and the U.S. following the 2005 Andijon massacre and subsequent expulsion of U.S. forces from Karshi-Khanabad airbase, U.S. forces were not involved in the shipments. Instead, South Korea's Korean Air, which overhauled Navoi's airport, officially handled logistics.[164]

Originally only non-lethal resources were allowed on the NDN. In July 2009, however, shortly before a visit by new President Barack Obama to Moscow, Russian authorities announced that U.S. troops and weapons could use the country's airspace to reach Afghanistan.[165]

Human rights advocates were (as of 2009) concerned that the U.S. was again working with the government of Uzbekistan, which is often accused of violating human rights.[166] U.S. officials promised increased cooperation with Uzbekistan, including further assistance to turn Navoi into a regional distribution center for both military and civilian ventures.[167][168]

In January 2009, about 3,000 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division moved into the provinces of Logar and Wardak. Afghan Federal Guards fought alongside them. The troops were the first wave of an expected surge of reinforcements originally ordered by President Bush and increased by President Obama.[169]

In mid-February 2009, it was announced that 17,000 additional troops would be deployed in two brigades and support troops; the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 3,500 and the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, a Stryker Brigade with about 4,000.[170] ISAF commander General David McKiernan had called for as many as 30,000 additional troops, effectively doubling the number of troops.[171] On 23 September, a classified assessment by General McChrystal included his conclusion that a successful counterinsurgency strategy would require 500,000 troops and five years.[172]

In November 2009, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry sent two classified cables to Washington expressing concerns about sending more troops before the Afghan government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban's rise. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who in 20062007 commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan, also expressed frustration with the relative paucity of funds set aside for development and reconstruction.[173] In subsequent cables, Eikenberry repeatedly cautioned that deploying sizable American reinforcements would result in "astronomical costs" tens of billions of dollars and would only deepen the Afghan government's dependence on the United States.

On 26 November 2009, Karzai made a public plea for direct negotiations with the Taliban leadership. Karzai said there is an "urgent need" for negotiations and made it clear that the Obama administration had opposed such talks. There was no formal US response.[174][175]

On 1 December, Obama announced at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point that the U.S. would send 30,000 more troops.[176] Antiwar organizations in the U.S. responded quickly, and cities throughout the U.S. saw protests on 2 December.[177] Many protesters compared the decision to deploy more troops in Afghanistan to the expansion of the Vietnam War under the Johnson administration.[178]

On 4 September, during the Kunduz Province Campaign a devastating NATO air raid was conducted 7 kilometres southwest of Kunduz where Taliban fighters had hijacked civilian supply trucks, killing up to 179 people, including over 100 civilians.[179]

On 25 June US officials announced the launch of Operation Khanjar ("strike of the sword").[180] About 4000 U.S. Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade[181] and 650 Afghan soldiers[182] participated. Khanjar followed a British-led operation named Operation Panther's Claw in the same region.[183] Officials called it the Marines' largest operation since the 2004 invasion of Fallujah, Iraq.[181] Operation Panther's Claw was aimed to secure various canal and river crossings to establish a long-term ISAF presence.[184]

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Afghanistan: Maps, History, Geography, Government, Culture …

During the cold war, King Mohammed Zahir Shah developed close ties with the Soviet Union, accepting extensive economic assistance from Moscow. He was deposed in 1973 by his cousin Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed a republic. Daoud was killed in a 1978 coup, and Noor Taraki took power, setting up a Marxist regime. He, in turn, was executed in Sept. 1979, and Hafizullah Amin became president. Amin was killed in Dec. 1979, as the Soviets launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as president.

The Soviets, and the Soviet-backed Afghan government, were met with fierce popular resistance. Guerrilla forces, calling themselves mujahideen, pledged a jihad, or holy war, to expel the invaders. Initially armed with outdated weapons, the mujahideen became a focus of U.S. cold war strategy against the Soviet Union, and with Pakistan's help, Washington began funneling sophisticated arms to the resistance. Moscow's troops were soon bogged down in a no-win conflict with determined Afghan fighters. In 1986 Karmal resigned, and was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah. In April 1988 the USSR, U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed accords calling for an end to outside aid to the warring factions. In return, a Soviet withdrawal took place in Feb. 1989, but the pro-Soviet government of President Najibullah was left in the capital, Kabul.

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Afghanistan War | 2001-2014 | Britannica.com

Afghanistan War, international conflict in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 that was triggered by the September 11 attacks and consisted of three phases. The first phasetoppling the Taliban (the ultraconservative political and religious faction that ruled Afghanistan and provided sanctuary for al-Qaeda, perpetrators of the September 11 attacks)was brief, lasting just two months. The second phase, from 2002 until 2008, was marked by a U.S. strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily and rebuilding core institutions of the Afghan state. The third phase, a turn to classic counterinsurgency doctrine, began in 2008 and accelerated with U.S. Pres. Barack Obamas 2009 decision to temporarily increase the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. The larger force was used to implement a strategy of protecting the population from Taliban attacks and supporting efforts to reintegrate insurgents into Afghan society. The strategy came coupled with a timetable for the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan; beginning in 2011, security responsibilities would be gradually handed over to the Afghan military and police. The new approach largely failed to achieve its aims. Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remained stubbornly high, while many of the Afghan military and police units taking over security duties appeared to be ill-prepared to hold off the Taliban. By the time the U.S. and NATO combat mission formally ended in December 2014, the 13-year Afghanistan War had become the longest war ever fought by the United States.

The joint U.S. and British invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 was preceded by over two decades of war in Afghanistan. On Dec. 24, 1979, Soviet tanks rumbled across the Amu Darya River and into Afghanistan, ostensibly to restore stability following a coup that brought to power a pair of Marxist-Leninist political groupsthe Peoples (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party. But the Soviet presence touched off a nationwide rebellion by Islamist fighters, who won extensive covert backing from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and who were joined in their fight by foreign volunteers. The guerrilla war against the Soviet forces led to their departure a decade later (see Afghan War). In the void, civil war reigned, with the Islamist fightersknown as the mujahideenbattling first to oust the Soviet-backed government and then turning their guns on each other.

In 1996 the Taliban seized Kabul and instituted a severe interpretation of Islamic law that, for example, forbade female education and prescribed the severing of hands, or even execution, as punishment for petty crimes. That same year, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was welcomed to Afghanistan (having been expelled from Sudan) and established his organizations headquarters there. With al-Qaedas help, the Taliban won control of over 90 percent of Afghan territory by the summer of 2001. On September 9 of that year, al-Qaeda hit men carried out the assassination of famed mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who at the time was leading the Northern Alliance (a loose coalition of mujahideen militias that maintained control of a small section of northern Afghanistan) as it battled the Taliban and who had unsuccessfully sought greater U.S. backing for his efforts.

The hijacking and crashing of four U.S. jetliners on Sept. 11, 2001, brought instant attention to Afghanistan. The plot had been hatched by al-Qaeda, and some of the 19 hijackers had trained in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the attacks, the administration of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush coalesced around a strategy of first ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan and dismantling al-Qaeda, though others contemplated actions in Iraq, including long-standing plans for toppling Pres. addm ussein. Bush demanded that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar deliver to [the] United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land, and when Omar refused, U.S. officials began implementing a plan for war.

The campaign in Afghanistan started covertly on September 26, with a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team known as Jawbreaker arriving in the country and, working with anti-Taliban allies, initiating a strategy for overthrowing the regime. U.S. officials hoped that by partnering with the Afghans they could avoid deploying a large force to Afghanistan. Pentagon officials were especially concerned that the United States not be drawn into a protracted occupation of Afghanistan, as had occurred with the Soviets more than two decades prior. The United States relied primarily on the Northern Alliance, which had just lost Massoud but had regrouped under other commanders, including Tajik leader Mohammed Fahim and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek. The Americans also teamed with anti-Taliban Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan, including a little-known tribal leader named Hamid Karzai.

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The CIA team was soon joined by U.S. and British special forces contingents, and together they provided arms, equipment, and advice to the Afghans. They also helped coordinate targeting for the air campaign, which began on Oct. 7, 2001, with U.S. and British war planes pounding Taliban targets, thus marking the public start of Operation Enduring Freedom. In late October, Northern Alliance forces began to overtake a series of towns formerly held by the Taliban. The forces worked with U.S. assistance, but they defied U.S. wishes when, on November 13, they marched into Kabul as the Taliban retreated without a fight.

Kandahar, the largest city in southern Afghanistan and the Talibans spiritual home, fell on December 6, marking the end of Taliban power. It had been besieged by a force led by Karzai that moved in from the north and one commanded by Gul Agha Sherzai that advanced from the south; both operated with heavy assistance from the United States. As the Taliban leadership retreated into Afghanistans rural areas and across the border to Pakistan, anti-Taliban figures convened at a United Nations (UN)-sponsored conference in Bonn, Ger. With behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the United States, Karzai was selected to lead the country on an interim basis.

An intensive manhunt for Omar, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri was undertaken. Prior to the killing of bin Laden by U.S. forces in 2011 (see below), the Americans were believed to have come closest to bin Laden in the December 2001 battle of Tora Bora (bin Ladens mountain stronghold). But bin Laden was thought to have managed to have slipped into Pakistan with the help of Afghan and Pakistani forces that were supposedly helping the Americans. Critics later questioned why the U.S. military had allowed Afghan forces to lead the assault on the cave complex at Tora Bora rather than doing it themselves. (Indeed, Democratic presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry made this criticism repeatedly during the 2004 general election campaign.) Al-Qaeda subsequently reestablished its base of operations in the tribal areas that form Pakistans northwest border with Afghanistan. Omar and his top Taliban lieutenants settled in and around the Pakistani city of Quetta, in the remote southwestern province of Balochistn. One of the final major battles of the first phase of the war came in March 2002 with Operation Anaconda in the eastern province of Paktia, which involved U.S. and Afghan forces fighting some 800 al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. The operation also marked the entrance of other countries troops into the war: special operations forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway participated.

With the ouster of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the international focus shifted to reconstruction and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. In April 2002 Bush announced a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, promising substantial financial assistance. But from the start, development efforts in Afghanistan were inadequately funded, as attention had turned among U.S. officials to the looming confrontation in Iraq. Between 2001 and 2009, just over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan was appropriated by the U.S. Congress. More than half the money went to training and equipping Afghan security forces, and the remainder represented a fraction of the amount that experts said would be required to develop a country that had consistently ranked near the bottom of global human development indices. The aid program was also bedeviled by waste and by confusion over whether civilian or military authorities had responsibility for leading education, health, agriculture, and other development projects.

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Despite military commitments from dozens of U.S. allies, the United States initially argued against allowing the other foreign forcesoperating as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)to deploy beyond the Kabul area. That choice was directed by the Pentagon, which insisted on a light footprint out of concern that Afghanistan would become a drag on U.S. resources as attention shifted to Iraq (see Iraq War). When ISAF did begin to venture beyond Kabul, its efforts were hampered by the caveats of its component countriesrestrictions that kept all but a handful of the militaries from actively engaging in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The force, overseen by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the organizations first mission outside Europe, was also hamstrung by a lack of troops as international commitments to Afghanistan flagged.

The United States consistently represented the largest foreign force in Afghanistan, and it bore the heaviest losses. By spring 2010 more than 1,000 U.S. troops had been killed in Afghanistan, while the British troops suffered some 300 deaths and the Canadians some 150. Both Britain and Canada stationed their troops in Afghanistans south, where fighting had been most intense. More than 20 other countries also lost troops during the war, though manysuch as Germany and Italychose to focus their forces in the north and the west, where the insurgency was less potent. As the fighting dragged on and casualties escalated, the war lost popularity in many Western countries, creating domestic political pressure to keep troops out of harms way or to pull them out altogether.

Initially the war appeared to have been won with relative ease. On May 1, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an end to major combat in Afghanistan. On the same day, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq have ended. At that time, there were 8,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The first democratic Afghan elections since the fall of the Taliban were held on Oct. 9, 2004, with approximately 80 percent of registered voters turning out to give Karzai a full five-year term as president. Parliamentary elections were staged a year later, with dozens of women claiming seats set aside for them to ensure gender diversity. The 2004 constitution provided Afghanistan with a powerful central government and weak regional and local authoritiesa structure that was in opposition to the countrys long-standing traditions.

Despite vast powers under the constitution, Karzai was widely regarded as a weak leader who grew increasingly isolated as the war progressed. He survived several assassination attemptsincluding a September 2004 rocket attack that nearly struck a helicopter he was riding inand security concerns kept him largely confined to the presidential palace in Kabul. Karzais government was beset by corruption, and efforts to build a national army and a police force were troubled from the start by inadequate international support and ethnic differences between Afghans.

Beginning in 2005, violence climbed as the Taliban reasserted its presence with new tactics modeled on those being used by insurgents in Iraq. Whereas early in the war the Taliban had focused on battling U.S. and NATO forces in open combata strategy that largely failed to inflict significant damagetheir adoption of the use of suicide bombings and buried bombs, known as IEDs (improvised explosive devices), began to cause heavy casualties. Between January 2005 and August 2006, Afghanistan endured 64 suicide attacksa tactic that had been virtually unknown in the countrys history before then. At first the attacks caused relatively few casualties, but as training and the availability of high-powered explosives increased, the death toll began to climb: in one particularly vicious attack in November 2007, at least 70 peoplemany of them childrenwere killed as a parliamentary delegation visited the northern town of Baghlan. Less than a year later, a bombing at the Indian embassy in Kabul killed more than 50; the Afghan government accused elements of Pakistans intelligence service of complicity in the attack, a charge Pakistan denied.

The Talibans resurgence corresponded with a rise in anti-American and anti-Western sentiment among Afghans. Those feelings were nurtured by the sluggish pace of reconstruction, allegations of prisoner abuse at U.S. detention facilities, widespread corruption in the Afghan government, and civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO bombings. In May 2006 a U.S. military vehicle crashed and killed several Afghans, an event that sparked violent anti-American riots in Kabulthe worst since the war began. Later that year NATO took command of the war across the country; American officials said that the United States would play a lesser role and that the face of the war would become increasingly international. This shift reflected the greater need for U.S. troops and resources in Iraq, where sectarian warfare was reaching alarming levels. By contrast, the war in Afghanistan was still regarded in Washington as a relative success.

For commanders on the ground in Afghanistan, however, it was apparent that the Taliban intended to escalate its campaign. The Taliban was earning ample money through donations from wealthy individuals and groups in the Persian Gulf and from the booming opium trade. While poppy cultivation had been dramatically curbed during the Talibans final year in power, the group pushed to revive cultivation as a means of funding its insurgency. Western-backed campaigns to eliminate poppy cultivation or to encourage farmers to grow other crops had little discernible impact; Afghanistan soon became the supplier of over 90 percent of the worlds opium.

The United States, meanwhile, had had only limited success in killing or capturing Taliban commanders. In early 2007, Mullah Obaidullah Akhundthe Talibans number three leaderwas captured in Pakistan, and months later Mullah Dadullahthe Talibans top military commanderwas killed in fighting with U.S. forces. But those were the exceptions. Top insurgent leaders remained at large, many of them in the tribal regions of Pakistan that adjoin Afghanistan. This reality prompted the United States to begin targeting insurgent leaders who lived in Pakistan with missiles fired from remotely piloted drones (see unmanned aerial vehicle). The CIA program of targeted killings was publicly denied by U.S. officials but was widely acknowledged in private. Pakistani officials in turn denounced the strikes in public but privately approved of them as long as civilian casualties were limited. The United States repeatedly threatened to expand its drone strikes beyond Pakistans tribal areas and into regions such as Balochistn if Pakistan did not demonstrate greater cooperation in battling the Taliban, a group it had long fostered.

U.S. Pres. Barack Obama went to the White House promising to focus attention and resources on the faltering war effort in Afghanistan. On Feb. 17, 2009, he approved sending an additional 17,000 U.S. troops, on top of the 36,000 U.S. troops and 32,000 NATO service members already there. Three months later Obama took the rare step of removing a commanding general from a theatre of war, replacing Gen. David McKiernan with Gen. Stanley McChrystal. While McKiernan was shifting U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, Obama and other top officials had concluded that a more radical change was needed. McChrystal was brought in to implement a new strategy modeled after the surge strategy in Iraqone in which U.S. forces would focus on protecting the population from insurgents rather than simply trying to kill large numbers of militants. The strategy also involved trying to persuade enemy fighters to defect and ultimately encouraging reconciliation between the Karzai government and Taliban leaders.

Soon after assuming command, McChrystal concluded that he did not have enough troops to execute the new strategy, and in September 2009 he laid out his concerns in a confidential report, which was subsequently leaked to the press. McChrystal predicted that the war would be lost within a year if there was not a significant troop surge. After an intensive Afghan policy reviewthe second one by the Obama administration in less than a yearthe president delivered a speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on December 1 in which he announced a major escalation in the war effort, with 30,000 additional troops being deployed to Afghanistan by the summer of 2010. The new strategy led to an increase in U.S. combat deaths; notably, during the first three months of 2010, U.S. deaths were approximately twice what they had been over the same period in 2009.

The surge in U.S. forces was accompanied by a dramatic escalation of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistanone of which killed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. But the CIA also paid a price in late December 2009 when an al-Qaeda double agent detonated a suicide bomb at a Bagram air base in the eastern province of Khost, killing seven from the agency.

In early 2010 the surge began with an assault on the insurgent-held town of Marja, in the southern province of Helmand. U.S. Marines achieved a relatively quick victory, even as McChrystal planned a more ambitious offensive in Kandahar. Obama visited Afghanistan for the first time as president on March 28, delivering a stern message to Karzai that he needed to clean up corruption in his government. Karzai had won a new five-year term in an August 2009 election that was tainted by widespread allegations of fraud. Karzai vowed in his inaugural address to stamp out corruption in his government, but there were few signs in the short term that he had done so.

Meanwhile, Karzai announced that he would attempt to reconcile with the Taliban; he repeatedly invited Mullah Omar to meet with him, but the Taliban leader steadfastly refused. Under intense pressure from the United States, Karzai lashed out in April 2010 and even threatened to join the Taliban if the international community did not stop meddling in Afghan affairs. Troubled by the comments, the White House threatened to revoke Karzais invitation to meet with Obama in Washington, D.C., but the visit occurred as scheduled, with Karzai and Obama at least outwardly making efforts to mend their relationship.

Pakistan offered to mediate Afghan peace talks, but Pakistans ultimate attitude toward the Taliban remained a matter of great controversy. In February 2010, Pakistani security forces arrested the Afghan Talibans second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a move interpreted by many U.S. officials as a reflection of Pakistans desire to work with the U.S. and Afghan governments to stem the groups influence. But others, including Kai Eide, the former top UN official in Kabul, said Baradar had been a leading Taliban proponent of reconciliation and that the arrest was intended to scuttle efforts to end the war through a political, rather than military, solution.

The military command structure in Afghanistan abruptly changed again in June 2010, when Obama replaced McChrystal with Gen. David Petraeus after McChrystal and some of his aides made disparaging remarks to a Rolling Stone magazine reporter about Obama and other top administration officials, including Vice Pres. Joe Biden, National Security Advisor James L. Jones, and special representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke. The comments underscored festering tensions between U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan and some members of the Obama administrations civilian leadership. In explaining the change of command, Obama said, I welcome debate among my team, but I wont tolerate division. Despite the switch, Obama vowed that U.S. strategy in Afghanistan would not change. Petraeus, considered the leading architect of counterinsurgency doctrine in the U.S. military, was expected to continue McChrystals emphasis on protecting the Afghan population from insurgents, building Afghan government institutions, and seeking to limit civilian casualties.

Shortly after McChrystals dismissal, a cache of classified documents relating to the Afghanistan War was published online by the whistle-blowing journalistic organization WikiLeaks and prereleased to several newspapers, including The New York Times, Der Spiegel, and The Guardian. The information was mainly in the form of raw intelligence gathered between 2004 and 2009, and WikiLeaks cumulatively termed it the Afghan War Diary. It detailed previously unreported civilian deaths, indicated that a U.S. special forces unit was tasked with capturing or killing the persons on a list of insurgent leaders, revealed that the Taliban had employed heat-seeking missiles against aircraft, and suggested that the Pakistani intelligence service had been working with Taliban forces in spite of substantial U.S. aid to Pakistan for its assistance in combating militants. The U.S. government criticized the disclosure as a security breach but stated that the substance of the leak corresponded with other known intelligence and did not contain new information.

Developments with some of the primary objectives of the warapprehending key al-Qaeda leaders and dealing with the Talibanwere front and centre in 2011. Nearly 10 years after eluding capture at Tora Bora in Afghanistan, bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces on May 2, 2011, after U.S. intelligence located him living in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pak. The operation, a raid carried out by a small team that reached the compound by helicopter, led to a firefight in which bin Laden died. The next month U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates confirmed for the first time that the U.S. government was holding reconciliation talks with the Taliban, although he stressed that efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict were still in the preliminary stages. Then, on June 22, Obama announced an accelerated timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, saying that the United States had largely achieved its goals by disrupting al-Qaedas operations and killing many of its leaders. The plan called for the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to be reduced by as many as 30,000 within a year, in preparation for a complete withdrawal of combat forces by the end of 2014. Hours after Obamas announcement, French Pres. Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France would also begin to withdraw its 4,000 soldiers from Afghanistan. In September, efforts to end the long-running conflict suffered a setback when Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former Afghan president and a key figure in reconciliation negotiations, was assassinated by a suicide bomber.

A series of incidents in early 2012 heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Afghan government and provoked public outrage. In mid-January, a video showing U.S. Marines urinating on dead Afghans circulated in the media, drawing apologies from U.S. officials. Weeks later, Afghans rioted and held protests over reports that U.S. soldiers had disposed of copies of the Qurn at a military base by burning them. Then, on March 11, a U.S. soldier allegedly left an American base near Panjwai and broke into several homes, shooting dead 17 Afghans, mostly women and children. The incident provoked widespread demonstrations and a sharp condemnation from Karzai. Days later, the Taliban suspended participation in talks with the United States and the Afghan government.

Later that year NATOs efforts to train and equip the Afghan army and police were hampered by an increase in attacks in which Afghan soldiers and police turned their weapons on NATO soldiers. These attacks forced NATO troops to institute more rigorous screening procedures and to suspend the training of certain units.

Meanwhile, in early 2012, U.S. and Afghan negotiators reached agreements regarding two issues that had been sources of friction between the Obama and Karzai administrations. The first agreement, signed in March, set a six-month timetable for the transfer of Afghan detainees held by the U.S. military to Afghan custody. The second agreement, signed in April, established that Afghan forces would oversee and lead night raids to apprehend or kill Taliban leaders. These raids, previously led by U.S. special forces, had since 2009 become a major component of the campaign against the Taliban. Afghan leaders, however, had long objected that the raids violated Afghan sovereignty and that surprise invasions of private homes ultimately alienated public opinion and increased support for the insurgency.

The agreements in March and April concerning detainees and night raids cleared the way for the United States and Afghanistan to reach a further agreement in May outlining a framework for economic and security cooperation between the two countries following the withdrawal of NATO combat troops in 2014. The agreement expressed the United States commitment to continuing military support for the Afghan government after 2014, although it left unanswered the question of whether or not some U.S. and NATO forces would remain in Afghanistan as trainers and advisers after 2014. That was to be determined by a separate pact, the Bilateral Security Agreement. Even though the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan remained deeply unpopular, many Afghans feared that a sudden withdrawal would allow the country to slip into civil war or chaos.

The issue of leaving foreign troops in the country after the end of NATO combat operations remained unresolved until the last half of 2014. Karzaiby then in the last months of his presidencyhad refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement before leaving office, and the election of his successor was delayed by a lengthy recount. In late September 2014 Ashraf Ghani was finally inaugurated as president and immediately signed the Bilateral Security Agreement, which authorized an international force of approximately 13,000 to remain in the country. The U.S. and NATO formally ended their combat mission in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014.

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Home | Kabul, Afghanistan – Embassy of the United States

The United States condemns the deplorable attacks against worshippers at Shia shrines in Kabul yesterday evening and against Ashura mourners today in Balkh province. We send our deepest condolences to the families and friends of those killed and injured. Such attacks are clearly intended to drive sectarian tension in Afghanistan. We commend the government and security forces of Afghanistan for their response to these attacks and their commitment to the peace, security, and prosperity of their country and a future for Afghanistan free of sectarian violence.

We strongly condemn yesterday evenings attack on worshippers at Kabuls Kart-e-Sakhi shrine and extend our deepest condolences to families and friends of the victims of this senseless and cowardly act. This attack is another demonstration of contempt for religious tolerance and communal harmony by the enemies of peace and progress in Afghanistan. As demonstrated at the recent Brussels Conference, we and our international partners remain committed to standing with the people of Afghanistan in working toward a peaceful and prosperous future.

The following is the text of a joint communique issued by the 75 countries and over 22 international organizations participating in the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. The Brussels Conference was opened by H.E. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and H.E. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, and concluded by H.E. Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Full Communique

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reminds U.S. citizens that serious threats to safety and security exist in the city of Kabul and throughout Afghanistan. The threat of kidnapping is high. The potential also exists for protests to occur in Afghan cities at short notice. Full Message

We welcome todays accord negotiated and concluded by the Government of Afghanistan and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a step in bringing the conflict in Afghanistan to a peaceful end. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process that results in armed groups ceasing violence, breaking ties with international terrorist groups, and accepting the Constitution, including protections for women and minorities.

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Afghanistan UN-Habitat

Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)

Location:Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Farah, Bamyan and Nili

Main Partners:Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), Kabul Municipality, Afghanistan Land Authority (ARAZI)

Recognising the importance of land, H.E. President Ashraf Ghani has made urban land regularisation and improving tenure security a priority of his National Unity Government:We commit ourselves to legalizing all properties that have legal flaws Since the properties do not have credible legal basis, a vast capital of our people is perpetually under threat. At the same time, one of the results is that our cities can never take the shape of civic cities and citizens cannot tend to their rights and obligations as citizens.

The vast majority of urban Afghans live in under-serviced, informal housing with little tenure security and very poor access to basic services such as water and sanitation. This is particularly so in Kabul, where 66% of the dwelling stock is comprised of irregular housing (over 280,000 dwelling units), including 10% of the total dwelling stock located on hillsides. The majority of informal housing can easily be upgraded through a community-based regularization process that improves tenure security, infrastructure and services.

Afghan cities concentrate considerable problems of poverty, inequality, youth exclusion and gender inequality, which are a result of weak municipal governance and insufficient pro-poor focus on shaping inclusive urbanisation. Nearly one-third of the urban population lives in poverty (29%, over 2 million Afghans), denied access to affordable and well located land, housing, and services. Gender inequality is a major challenge in cities with urban women and girls facing significant structural barriers to their full social and economic participation in urban life. Cities are home to a disproportionate number of youth (between 15 and 24), who constitute nearly a quarter of the urban population (23.6%), notably higher than in rural areas (17.8%). Yet cities are not providing jobs and opportunities commensurate with demand with youth becoming increasingly disenfranchised.

As of 2014, the challenges of urban poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic marginalization are getting worse due to the international drawdown and economic slowdown. Urban poor households, IDPs, and female-headed households are, and will continue to be most affected from these macro-economic changes. Yet global experience has shown that urbanisation is a source of development, not simply a problem to be solved. The inevitable and positive urban transition presents both opportunities and challenges given the current form and structure of the major cities.

The National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan has recognized the transformative role of urbanisation and is prioritizing urbanisation in its Self-Reliance reform agenda, noting that cities should be drivers of economic development, and municipalities and urban development can contribute to national state building and peace-building objectives.

Afghanistan is heading now in its Transformation Decade (2015-2024) where greater emphasis is being placed on self-sufficiency as international troops withdraw and aid is reduced. For municipalities, this means increasing their local revenues, and spending it more effectively and accountably. This is in line with the stated vision of H.E. President Ashraf Ghani and the NUG:

By expanding cities we can collect hundreds of millions of dollars through municipalities and since municipalities have the legal right to spend, it is our pledge that we will create the widespread participation of citizens so that people take part in creating and boosting conditions for urban living.Experience has shown that the Afghan communities are a key part of the solution. Urban Community Development Councils (CDCs) and Gozar Assemblies (GAs) have demonstrated enormous capacity to organise, find solutions to local social and infrastructure challenges, and engage in peacebuilding efforts. This latent energy needs to be harnessed within a more participatory municipal governance framework and utilised to address local land, planning and governance bottlenecks.

Future of Afghan Cities Programme (FoAC)

Location:National programme, focusing on five city regions and 20 strategic District Municipalities

Main Partners:Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), Kabul Municipality, Afghanistan Land Authority (ARAZI)

Never before in its history has Afghanistan had such an enormous opportunity to lay strong foundations for a sustainable and prosperous urban future. A combination of forces are currently in place that, if urgently harnessed, can set Afghanistan on a path to harnessing its cities, and their rural-urban linkages, for economic development, improved sub-national governance and stabilization.

This convergence of positive forces includes:

The Realizing Self Reliance paper presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan (2014) clearly articulates the reform priority for urban development;

Making cities the economic drivers for development. In order to do so we need to improve living conditions and service delivery in urban centers. Urbanization will need to be managed by reducing disparity between rural and urban areas and thereby controlling rural-to-urban migration. Establishing metropolitan development authorities and funds will allow for coordinated development planning and professionalized management. (Realising Self-Reliance (2014) National Unity Government of Afghanistan, p.12)

Afghanistan Urban Peacebuilding Programme (AUPP)

Location:Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar, Kunduz, Herat, Farah, Bamyian and Nili Cities

Main Partners:Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Ministry of Urban Development (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Ministry of Interior (MoI)

Afghanistan is one of the worlds fastest-urbanizing countries. Although the countrys population remains predominantly rural, the break-neck pace of urban growth ensures that the proportion of citizens living in cities will triple in 35 years. Every year, Afghan cities grow by over 320,000 people placing enormous pressure on local governments and security providers to provide services and achieve safe, peaceful, and inclusive cities.

Cities concentrate the risks associated with insecurity and disorder, such as chronic poverty, steep inequality, and reduced solidarity compared to rural villages. Afghanistans cities absorb vast displaced populations and confront urgent demands for basic services and infrastructure. Swollen with rural-urban migrants, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and returnees the cities relegate most of their inhabitants to deprived informal settlements, a situation that aggravates exclusion, illegitimizes the state, and fuels various forms of violence and insecurity. Women and girls, young people, and IDPs and returnees are particularly marginalized and vulnerable, excluded from public space as well as public decision-making, and are disproportionately affected by urban insecurity and exclusion.

Community-Led Urban Infrastructure Programme

Location:Kabul Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad

Main Partners:Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Ministry of Urban Development (MUDA), Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), Municipalities of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad

In 2014 the number of security and economic related displaced families has reached a record of 755,011 persons (Sept. 2014, UNHCR). In September 2014 alone 33,240 persons have been displaced. The overwhelming majority are migrating into urban areas considered to be safer, with more livelihood opportunities and access to services. The arrival of such migrants into regional cities as well as Kabul city will rapidly exert pressure on local infrastructure and services exacerbating pre-existing vulnerability conditions. This will impact on the way urban development is managed particularly in settlement planning and providing access to basic services, infrastructure and labour markets.

While much has been achieved to address the needs of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees, rural-urban migrants and the other urban poor, the continuous large numbers of migrants moving towards Kabul and other cities makes it urgent that the new Government through this project can continue to secure and stabilize urban areas through community empowerment and improvement of living conditions of the people.

Local Integration of Vulnerable Excluded & Uprooted People (LIVE-UP)

Location:Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat

Main Partners:Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation (MoRR), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG); Kabul, Herat & Jalalabad Municipalities

Through the Local Integration of Vulnerable Excluded & Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) project, UN-HABITAT is supporting the Government of Afghanistan to pursue an inclusive, sustainable response to displacement.

Since 2002, over 5.6 million Afghans have returned to Afghanistan after taking refuge in neighbouring countries. In addition there are currently over 850,000 registered Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Afghanistan. Urban areas exert considerable pull factors on the displaced, attracted to the relative security and increased economic opportunities offered by cities. This coupled with rural-urban migration has led to the unprecedented growth of Afghanistans cities over the last decade. Returnees and IDPs however face major obstacles to re-building their lives, accessing rights and services and fully integrating with local communities. The LIVE-UP project, made possible with the support of the European Commission Delegation to Afghanistan aims to make significant improvements in the lives of some of the most vulnerable Afghans and create a precedent for local integration as a response to displacement.

Afghanistans rapid process of urbanisation presents significant challenges as well as opportunities. The development of cities can be harnessed as a tool to improve the access to services, living conditions and economic conditions of the population. The traditional approach to displacement in Afghanistan of creating distinct townships for IDPs, typically located large distances from urban areas has been shown to not be an effective or sustainable response to displacement. LIVE-UP aims to integrate displaced communities into the urban fabric, leveraging the benefits of the urbanisation process and giving communities a platform to rebuild their lives.

Through UN-HABITATs tried and tested Peoples Process of service delivery, the project supports communities through the provision of trunk infrastructure, improved access to services and improved shelter for extremely vulnerable households. Afghanistan Minister for Refugees and Repatriation H.E Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi visited for the first time Maslakh IDP Settlement in Injil District, Herat to officially launch the LIVE-UP project. Speaking at the launch Minister Balkhi thanked UN-HABITAT for its commitment and perseverance in assisting displaced Afghans.

National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

Location:Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Balkh, Panjshir, Nangarhar

Main Partners:Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); Provinces of Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Balkh, Panjshir, Nangarhar.After two decades of war, Afghanistans governance system has been weakened. In response, the Government of Afghanistan and UN-HABITAT have contributed to the design of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which is initially aimed at strengthening the network of some 30,000 self-governing community institutions.

The NSP is a national priority programme of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA), executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and development (MRRD) and funded through multiple sources. As the single largest development programme in the country and reputed to be the second-largest in the world, NSP has an approved budget of US$ 2.7 billion over the period from mid-2003 to September 2016. NSP proposes to cover a total of around 37,000 rural communities in Afghanistan with a first round of block grants and a total of around 12,000 of these with a second round of block grants.

Known in Dari as Hambastagi Milli and in Pashtu as Milli Paiwastoon, NSP is based on the Afghan traditions of Ashar (i.e. community members working together on a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure) and Jirga councils comprised of respected members of the community. Islamic values of unity, equity and justice are also encouraged.

The State of Afghan Cities Programme (SoAC)

Location:National programme, focusing on 34 Provincial Capitals, including Kabul

Main Partners: Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG); and Kabul Municipality, 33 Provincial Municipalities.Rapid urbanization is both an opportunity and a challenge for Afghanistan. As cities grow, it is vital that policy makers and city leaders have access to reliable and verifiable information in terms of urban indicators to support decision-making.

Lacking detailed knowledge of the demographic, economic, cultural, physical and environmental dynamics of Afghan cities, and the capacity to collect and use such information, many planners and decision makers are operating in a climate of uncertainty, allocating resources to immediate and pressing issues rather than investing in progressive change over the long term.The costs of this widespread information and capacity deficit are both immense and immeasurable, and accrue in, for example, the form of expanding informal settlements, land grabbing, decreasing agricultural land, deepening social problems, rising urban inequality, and greater insecurity.

The problem persists because the international community has, for the last decade, focused largely on implementing short-term security-related programmes, mostly in rural areas, through parallel structures rather than building government and civil society institutions and capacities for sustainable, regular monitoring and data collection/use for development. There has been a focus on getting things done rather than on ensuring and developing sustainable monitoring mechanisms. The result is that while urban institutions have been built, they lack the capacities and resources for appropriate monitoring of the urban sector, which is required to formulate evidenced-based policies and plans.

Safety Nets and Pensions Support Project (SNPSP)

Location:Yakawlang District, Bamyan Province

Main Partners:Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)

Afghanistan is a landlocked, mountainous state situated between central and south Asia with an estimated population of approximately 30 million people and a land area of 653,000 square kilometres. Despite the increased levels of external assistance provided by the donor community in recent years, more than one third of all Afghans still live in poverty, with the nation having one of the worlds lowest average per capita incomes. Afghanistan is ranked 175th among all nations on the UNDP Human Development Index1.

Even if the nature of the crisis in Afghanistan may not have changed drastically in terms of humanitarian needs or levels of violence, the international community is unanimous in describing the current situation as one of transition. This allows for new forms of aid, such as cash transfers, and has stimulated the direct involvement of the government in humanitarian aid coordination and, to some degree, delivery.

There is a common understanding that the use of cash assistance is appropriate in situations of chronic crisis or during transitional phases such as that being experienced by Afghanistan. The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) is initiating a Social Safety Net project (under the Afghanistan Social Protection Program, known as ASPP) in selected districts of Ghor, Paktya, Bamyan and Kunarha provinces. The purpose of the program, which is a cash assistance intervention, would be to assist eligible poor families with young children to maintain adequate levels of nutrition during the winter season, and to promote human capital development.

The program is using a Poverty Scorecard (based on a Proxy Means Testing Approach) to identify eligible households. The Proxy Means Testing (PMT) method will be used in the selected five districts of four provinces. With this project proposal UN-Habitat is applying for the facilitation of the program in Yakawlang District Bamyan Province in 143 communities with a total of 19,866 families2.

Over the last 10 years the Government of Afghanistan implemented the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) with the goal of building peace and solidarity amongst the people and to empower them to be responsible for local level governance and development. This flagship programme of the Government of Afghanistan has covered all the provinces of the country reaching over 21,000 villages. UN-Habitat has to date played a key role in assisting the government in the design of the programme and was responsible for implementation of the programme in 3,283 villages across nine provinces throughout Afghanistan, including Bamyan Province.

As part of the National Solidarity Programme Community Development Councils (CDCs) were formed for each village through a transparent election process. The CDCs were empowered through a process of experiential learning to plan and undertake their own development work so they could be responsible for local level governance. The NSP has been hailed by development practioners and the World Bank as one of the best community empowerment programmes anywhere implemented on a national scale.

The communities that have benefitted from the NSP, as well as the government, now consider that it is crucial to consolidate the hard-won gains to further the cause of peace-building through addressing some of the particular needs identified by the communities that could not be met by NSP. This includes facilitating access to services and support for the extremely poor and most marginalized members of the communities through the established CDCs.

Please see the State of Afghan Cities discussion papers below

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Afghanistan UN-Habitat