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A year and a half after the developments of August 15, 2021, when the Islamic Emirate regained control of Afghanistan, the situation in the country remains extremely hopeful.

The security situation has improved significantly. Violence levels have dropped sharply over the past 18 months and continue to reach new lows, despite doomsday predictions from critics of the new government in Kabul.

Even in the hotel lobbies of Doha during negotiations, many diplomats had harped on about the possibility of another destructive civil war, unless their demands were met. But the leaders of the Islamic Emirate took this contingency into account and enacted measures to avoid such an outcome.

While gaining control of the entire country, we took steps to weaken the possibility of a renewed war, by answering the concerns of Afghans and adopting the humane Islamic message of general amnesty and brotherhood.

Today, not only has the war come to an end but Afghanistan is being administered by an independent, powerful, united, central and responsible government. This is a first for Afghanistan in more than four decades.

The government has taken steps to disentangle Afghanistan from the crippling reliance on foreign aid which defined the political setup of the past decades. Not only that, we are Afghanising all sectors, making them more accountable to the needs of the local population, and with a focus on capacity building and sustainability. This gives strength to our feeling of ownership of our own territory.

At the same time, we also understand that the globalised nature of modern relations means that all state actors must learn to live in harmony and peace with one another. Such relations should be founded on the immutable principles of equality, mutual respect and cooperation through the pursuit of shared interests. Bearing this in mind, the current government of Afghanistan once again extends its hand of positive engagement to the world.

We think a unique opportunity has emerged to embark on rapprochement between Afghanistan and the world. Domestically, the unity and cohesion of Afghan society are stronger than ever before. We celebrate, and take pride, in our diversity and rich history. We dont believe in imposing the majoritys will on a minority. In our view, every citizen of the country is an inseparable part of the collective whole.

The conditions are ripe for Afghanistan to rise up as a responsible and independent member of the international community and to fulfil its responsibility in promoting global peace and security. The international community, on its part, should reciprocate by welcoming Afghanistan into its fold while paying respect to its independence and assisting it to stand on its feet. Our foreign policy will be based on a balanced and independent approach, that avoids entanglement in global and regional rivalries. We will pursue opportunities for shared interests and peaceful coexistence, based on the principle of equality and respect.

As for our internal affairs, which have at times been misconceived or misconstrued, there remains the need to dispel misinformation and depict an accurate picture of the values and needs of Afghanistan. The religious and cultural sensibilities of our society require a cautious approach. Any government that has not maintained the proper equilibrium, pertaining to such sensibilities, has ultimately faced serious difficulties. This is a lesson that our recent history has emphasised over and over again.

We believe in dialogue and an exchange of ideas, in an atmosphere free from political or economic pressures, and aimed at finding practical solutions and dispelling misunderstandings. Past experiences show that weaponising human suffering does not bear fruit. Alleviating the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is our joint moral responsibility. Seeking to obtain political concessions by perpetuating mass suffering is neither civilised nor morally justifiable.

The primary cause of the ongoing economic crisis is the imposition of sanctions and banking restrictions by the United States. This impedes and delays our efforts to address the humanitarian crisis. The only path that respects the dignity of the Afghan people requires the lifting of sanctions and other commercial restrictions on the country. Space should be created to nurture the spirit and initiative of the Afghan people. Moreover, the US should unfreeze Afghanistans frozen assets, and in line with the Doha agreement, lift all sanctions. What moral and political justifications can the US have for imposing crippling sanctions on a war-torn nation?

We remind the US and others that sanctions and pressures do not resolve differences. Only mutual trust does. Afghanistan has a history of failed states and collapsed governments. Not even global powers and grand alliances were able to prevent this.

What would be the consequence of weakening this government? Surely, such a scenario will be accompanied by a great human tragedy that will not be limited to Afghanistan, but rather usher in new and unforeseen security, refugee, economic, health and other challenges for our neighbours, the region and the world.

The bitter reality is that over the past two decades, the Afghan economy was made wholly dependent on foreign aid, almost to the point of addiction. With the screeching halt of foreign aid, there is now a need to address the basic and fundamental needs of the Afghan people.

We recommend that aid should prioritise the creation of jobs and the completion of infrastructural projects with a durable impact. Simply handing out bags of money will not result in sustainable livelihoods for millions of people unless the domestic economy is revived.

The first prerequisite for that is the removal of sanctions, to pave way for the private sector to be revitalised. All obstacles to transnational trade, extraction of natural resources, and the implementation of national mega projects should be removed. We, on our part, remain committed to ensuring a conducive environment and to working with all states based on our shared interests. A self-reliant Afghanistan is in the interest of everyone while a failed Afghanistan jeopardises all.

There is a need for the international community to establish political and economic relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, while respecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We have made important progress in the past year and a half. This, despite the fact that we inherited a collapsed narco-state, with an emptied treasury, unpaid bills, millions of drug addicts, rampant corruption, universal poverty and unemployment and a stagnant economy.

We established a professional security force, maintained nationwide security and ensured that no one uses the territory of Afghanistan against other countries. We have completely banned the cultivation of drugs. We welcome those that remain sceptical to visit Afghanistan and witness these undeniable facts up close.

Similarly, for the first time in decades, an Afghan government procured its budget entirely from domestic revenues. In the past, over two-thirds of the government budget was comprised of foreign grants. Moreover, the government has nationalised economic institutions, ensuring that these institutions serve their domestic mandates. In January, the World Banks latest report reflected these advances.

Furthermore, the government has clamped down on corruption, which, in the past, resulted in Afghanistan being listed at the top of the most corrupt countries. It has also facilitated movement for Afghans who wish to travel domestically or move overseas. This was done to address the demand of the international community; we also retained around 500,000 members of the previous administration, while increasing the size of the public sector.

We do acknowledge that there remain challenges and shortcomings. But their solution requires time, means and cooperation. Broadly speaking, virtually all countries of the world have problems of their own. Yet, we choose to assist and alleviate, rather than shun and exacerbate.

Let us recall that the international military coalition of the past two decades brought in hundreds of thousands of troops, and expended trillions of dollars, yet were unable to obtain their desired outcome. Even now, they have chosen to live in the past, rather than turn a new leaf. They have repeatedly chosen to turn a blind eye to the positive steps of the government, and have only adopted a policy of accusations and pressure.

Hence, there remains a need to understand and accept the reality that one hand cannot clap.

The views expressed in this article are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeeras editorial stance.

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Afghanistan is ready to work with the US, but sanctions must go - Al Jazeera English

Since returning to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban have struggled to contain the Islamic State Khorasan province, or ISIS-K the official Islamic State group affiliate operating in Afghanistan.

Now, a fresh wave of assassination attempts on top Taliban officials has rocked multiple regions across the country and prompted fears of the groups potential to attack targets outside Afghanistan, including U.S. and Western interests.

On March 9, 2023, the Islamic State group claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, the Taliban governor of Balkh province in northern Afghanistan, along with two others. One day earlier, the groups fighters carried out a targeted killing against the head of the water supply department in Afghanistans western Herat province. And most recently, on March 15, the group claimed a failed attack on a Taliban district governor in the eastern province of Nangarhar, a former ISIS-K stronghold.

ISIS-K seeks to advance the Islamic State groups goal of creating a global caliphate based on its own interpretation of Islamic law.

As scholars who have studied ISIS-K for years, we know that the recent attacks are only a few in a long line of attacks the group has carried out or attempted in Afghanistan since forming in 2015.

ISIS-K has tried often successfully to kill government and military officials, media influencers, religious leaders and other civil society figures. The group is also responsible for the bombing that left 13 U.S. service members and scores of Afghans dead in August 2021, following the collapse of the former government and the U.S.-led withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Some of ISIS-Ks ambitious plots have failed. Notable examples include claimed attempts against NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis in 2017, former Afghanistan vice president Abdul Rashid Dostum in 2018, former Afghanistan president Ashraf Ghani in 2020 and former U.S. diplomat in Kabul Ross Wilson in 2021.

Despite both being Islamist organizations, ISIS-K and the Taliban are strategic rivals locked in a battle that has persisted since ISIS-Ks inception. Targeted assassinations of Taliban security and political officials, across multiple ranks and levels, have been a consistent feature of ISIS-Ks resurgence. The recent killings are simply a continuation of the groups attack priorities.

Assassinations are a fundamental pillar of the Islamic State groups insurgency doctrine, which is adopted by its affiliates and serves multiple purposes.

For one, theyre a way to retaliate against heavy losses. Just days before the latest string of attacks, ISIS-K threatened to amplify its violence after Taliban raids in January and February killed key Islamic State leaders and attack planners.

For another, assassinations can whittle away key leaders in the enemys ranks, as well as foreign influence. The latest issue of the Islamic State groups weekly newsletter, Al-Naba, claimed that Gov. Muzammil was not only a significant player in the Talibans campaign against ISIS-K in Nangarhar, but that he was also acting on behalf of Iran. Countering actual or perceived foreign state influence in Afghanistan even the lifesaving work of international humanitarian groups has been a consistent feature of ISIS-K propaganda and violence.

In addition, assassinations of high-profile opponents serve to raise morale among fighters, prevent defections and boost recruitment. The ability to assassinate top Taliban leaders and commanders showcases ISIS-Ks strength to potential recruit, including from within the Talibans ranks.

Finally, high-profile attacks signal to the Islamic State groups core leadership in Iraq and Syria that its affiliate in Afghanistan deserves continued support and investment. ISIS-K leaders have frequently sent letters to Islamic State group leadership boasting of their successful assassinations and other operations. After the attack on the Kabul airport in August 2021, ISIS-K received new cash payments from top Islamic State group leaders either as a reward, investment or both.

How successful ISIS-K is in rebuilding its insurgency and replicating the caliphate model in Iraq and Syria will depend on a number of factors.

Most important is its continued ability to leverage its strategic alliances and rivalries. Partnering with other jihadist groups in the region helps ISIS-K sustain its capacity for violence. And accusing the Taliban of apostasy for accepting foreign investment and humanitarian aid from infidel or enemy governments including China, the U.S., Iran, Turkey and others helps distinguish ISIS-Ks own brand from its rivals. Targeting killings of such opponents further reinforces this distinction.

A strengthened ISIS-K insurgency in Afghanistan has direct consequences for U.S. and Western security interests. A February 2023 U.S. intelligence report warned of ISIS-Ks desire to attack the West. And on March 16, U.S. CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla testified that ISIS-K will be able to attack American and Western interests outside Afghanistan in less than six months.

Whether or not this assessment is accurate, the recent claimed assassinations by ISIS-K are one of many indicators that point to its growing threat in Afghanistan a threat that we believe the Taliban cant take on alone.

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A string of assassinations in Afghanistan point to ISIS-K resurgence and US officials warn of possible attacks on American interests in next 6 months...

The team is "like a second family in a strange country," defender Fatima Mursal Sadat tells DW.

Until a year and a half ago, when the extremist Islamic Taliban took power in Kabul again, Mursal Sadat was a national team football player for Afghanistan. And in a way, she still is. After all, the 20-year-old wears the Melbourne Victory FC AWT shirt the last three letters standing for "Afghan Women's Team."

A year ago, the Australian club gave Mursal Sadat and her compatriots a new sporting home to "support the Afghan women's national team in their return to football."Since then, the Afghan women have played in the seventh Australian league.

"With all the help we've received, we've settled in well in Australia," says Mursal Sadat. "Life is not too good or too bad because we all are struggling with our family cases and supporting them emotionally and financially."

When Kabul descended into chaos after the Taliban seized power in August of 2021, the Australian government had evacuated the Afghan internationals. Mursal Sadat's family fled to Iran four months later.

"The majority of [the players']families are currently out of the country but some families could not afford to leave the country and they are still in Afghanistan with fear in their hearts."

Fear for the relatives is a constant companion of the footballers in exile, says Sadat: "We are all afraid that if the Taliban find our families, their lives will be in danger because of us." After all, self-confident, educated women who play football like Mursal Sadat do not fit into the Taliban's worldview.

With their flight from Kabul, the Afghanistan women's national team ceased to exist, according to football's governing bodyFIFAand to the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). Afghanistan have not featured in the FIFA women's team rankings since early 2022. The AFC also recently withdrew the country from the women's Olympic qualifiers for Paris 2024, which begin next April.

At the end of February, a statement by the Afghanistan Football Federation (AFF) caused a stir when it announced the formation of a new women's national team and inviting Afghan women living abroad to apply. Apparently,the person still officially listed as the AFF media director, now living in Albania, was responsible for the statement andhadthe support of FIFA.

"The announcement was taken down by the federation,"Khalida Popal, a former team captain, tells DW. "And the federation made announcements on local media that nobody outside Afghanistan can represent them, and they have no plan to re-create the Afghan women's national team."

Popal became the first captain of an Afghan national women's football team in 2007. In 2018, she and at least four other female playersaccused then-AFF President Keramuddin Keram of repeated sexual assaults. FIFA banned later Keram for lifeafterinvestigating the accusations.

Meanwhile, Popal has lived in Denmark for years and has usedher organization "Girl Power,"to helprefugee womengain more self-confidence and independence through sports.

In 2021, it was Popal and her organization who orchestrated the evacuation of the Afghan national team to Australia. In early January, Popal and Afghan Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzaico-authored an article in the British newspaper The Guardiancallingon FIFA to officially recognize the Afghan team in exile in Melbourne as the national team of Afghanistan.

"It would mean the world to me and my team here if we could get clearance from FIFA to represent our country and see the Afghanistan flag fly among other countries," says Mursal Sadat.

"We and the women who played soccer before us made lots of sacrifices on this path and we did not play with our lives to quit soccer after a while. We did it to play soccer again and show the world that an Afghan girl can fight for her dreams and goals."

Khalida Popal, on the other hand, sounds disillusioned. "As one of the players who played in the very first national team of Afghanistan and fought hard with my teammates to make history and make women's football part of the culture in Afghan society, it's sad to see now it's fading away and it was all for nothing," she says.

"I was expecting more from FIFA and sports governing bodies, but once again they've shown women's football is always the second and not the priority."

Popal is particularly angry that FIFA did not even consider it necessary to respond to repeated requests from the team in Australia, and to Popal's and Yousafzai's initiative.

"It's a shame that the organization that has been calling itself the governing body of football has not yet come up with a single statement to at least stand in solidarity with the players. By staying silent FIFA is indirectly supporting the decision of the Taliban, telling women that they belong in the kitchen."

A DW request to FIFA for comment has also gone unanswered. DW asked FIFA why it is not taking any action against the Afghanistan Football Federation. Article 4 of the FIFA Statutes threatens, among other things, the suspension or even expulsion of an association in the event of gender discrimination.

According to Popal, female footballers in Afghanistan are still in danger: "We still have our U15 national team stuck in Afghanistan," says the 35-year-old.

Fatima Mursal Sadat is also in contact with players in her home country who have asked her and Popal for help. "I feel so guilty when I can't help them and there's not much I can do. I'm doing my best to be their voice and raise their voices to the point where the whole world can see what is going on there," she says.

"I have lots of dreams for my future and the most important one is to play for the Afghanistan national team once again and see Afghanistan as an unresistricted country."

This article was originally written in Germanand translated by Kyle McKinnon

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Afghanistan: the national women's football team that isn't - DW (English)

DOHA, QatarNo, it wasnt worth it.

Thats how an advisor to Iraqs prime minister responded to journalist Peter Bergens oft-asked question about the American invasion of Iraq. Bergen posed it on stage at a conference of counterterrorism professionals here just a few days shy of the 20th anniversary of the invasions start, and Mohammed Al-Darraji answered bluntly.

The human and financial cost of the American destabilization of Iraq left behind a failed state. And in recent weeks, new alarms are sounding about the security threats simmering from Iraq to Afghanistan that can be traced back to that fateful decision so long ago.

In their own remembrances this week, Western news pages and airwaves are filled with heartrending stories recalling the horrors of that war, the folly of nation-building, the unpunished culpability of the American politicians who ordered it, the way it changed the military, the lasting trauma of its veterans, and the relentless grief for those who died. Our collective sentiment for the Iraq War remains overwhelmingly negative, angry, and unsettled.

But looking forward, the outlook for Iraq, the region, and the adjacent global war on terrorism is once again alarmingly bleak. In the past month, generals, journalists, officials, and activists have issued new warnings.

"Saddam [Hussein]'s brutal regime was replaced with a dysfunctional kleptocracy that can't deliver to its people," Simona Foltyn, an international journalist who lives in Baghdad, said at the Global Security Forum last week.

The annual counterterrorism-focused event included a panel on Iraq, and gloom about the past war and the future was palpable. Despite five successful elections and relatively peaceful power transfers since Saddam, Foltyn said Iraq's fragile post-war political system is more entrenched than most outsiders realize.

"There's almost an infinite level of fragmentation...that keeps destabilizing the country.," she said.

And should democratic governance fail, Muqtada al-Sadr is still there, waiting to take advantage.

Omar Muhammed, formerly known as the activist MosulEye, was less interested in reliving the invasion than highlighting Iraqs long list of current problems, like water, energy dependence, and thousands of missing or encamped people from the war and later ISIS occupation.

Every day there is a new problem or a new challenge in Iraq. Every day there is more and more poverty, and drinking water is as scarce as any other material. The U.S. invasion in 2003, he said, destabilized the entire social stability of the country.

Gen. Erik Kurilla knows this. The commanding general of U.S. Central Command has been shuttling to the region at a frenetic pace. He told the Senate last week that ISIS, now based in Syria, maintains the capability to conduct operations within the region and has the desire to strike outside of it.

Kurilla likes to talk about ISIS as three parts. First is the at-large organization, about which he says, I think we have contained ISIS, but the ideology is uncontained and unconstrained.

Second is the ISIS army in detention. There are over 10,000 ISIS detainees spread across 26 different prisons in northeast Syria, Kurilla said.

Last year, 1,000 made it over the outside wall in a breakout and 400 were killed in a 10-day fight with U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces.

Third is the camps for refugees and displaced persons, as at al-Hol, where 51,000 people live, over half of whom are children. They're at risk from radicalization. About 50 percent of the camp holds someespouses, some form of ideology according to the camp guards, the camp administrators, and the residents. And the other half are trying to escape ISIS. Half of the internally displaced persons there are from Iraq. The repatriation rate back to Iraq is so slow Kurilla estimates it will take another four years to move them all out.

It is all a direct result of the spiral of chaos caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. By now its well documented that the invasion sparked a series of violent extremist terrorist movements and a corrupt trail of divided governments. Al-Qaeda gave way to the Islamic State has mostly morphed from the Iraq-Syria border regions clear into Afghanistan. There, with no U.S. troop presence since the evacuation of 2021, the threat from ISIS-Khorasan is much worse.

It is my commanders' estimate that they can do an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months with little to no warning, which includes targets in Europe, Kurilla told the committee. He estimates ISIS-K could have the ability to strike the United States homeland in six months.

Since the U.S. withdrawal, the Islamic State in Afghanistan has tripled its attacks, increased propaganda, and is expanding to become a regional organization by "actively trying" to absorb minor groups. "IS-K is growing in strength."

There has been a pile of informed ink written about the Iraq Wars 20-year legacy, much of it hard to read. And there is good documentation of Iraqs difficulties today. But as the world (and the Pentagon) focuses on the pending Cold War with China and Russias hot war in Ukraine, we should also be reminded by this anniversary that there is simply more work ahead of us in Iraqand because of it.

More here:
20 Years Later, Terrorism Simmers from Iraq to Afghanistan, Officials Warn - Defense One

It has been 20 months since the Taliban took over Kabul. Warfare has indeed ended but the lives of millions of Afghans have not improved. Afghanistan faces a severe humanitarian and human rights crises, which threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions.

While the Taliban has managed with the help of the UN to continue certain government functions, it has violated basic human and civil rights, clamped down on dissent, and rejected any form of national dialogue or political inclusivity.

The country is now ruled by a small circle of secluded leaders who are bent on rooting out dissent and erasing women from public life, even if it means deepening the international isolation of the country and further impoverishing the population. Without changes to this core of the system, there is a hard limit to how much governance can improve and how stable the country can get.

As the Taliban tries to gain international recognition, it is important to scrutinise its performance in government so far.

After waging war for two decades, the Taliban has been able to settle into the Afghan state unexpectedly well. The Afghan bureaucracy has been effectively incorporated into the reestablished Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). With the exception of those working in the judiciary and the security sector, most lower and middle-ranking public servants have kept their jobs for now and are receiving their salaries, although at reduced rates.

Despite a chaotic transition, the World Bank, UN agencies and the IEA have worked out an arrangement to sustain the provision of health services on par with pre-August 2021 levels.

Under a deal with the IEA, the UN is also sending regular shipments of $40min cash in order to be able to operate in the country, given the restrictions on the Afghan banking sector. Most of this money goes to much-needed food assistance and the delivery of basic health services. It also indirectly stabilises the Afghan currency and prevents a complete economic collapse.

The education sector has taken a major hit after the Taliban banned girls from attending secondary school and university at public and private intuitions. That is causing incalculable harm to the Afghan youth and the future of the country.

However, the Taliban have been paying the salary of female schoolteachers for now. Remarkably, enrollment numbers in primary schools for both boys and girls haveincreasedin some areas of the country as security has improved.

The Taliban has alsomanaged to pay the countrys electricity import bill,ensuring power supply to most of the country, although regular blackouts continue. Its government is alsopushing forward with important water management projects undertaken before 2021, but resource constraints could hinder further progress.

After the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the country underwent a massive economic shock, with the gross domestic product (GDP) shrinking between 30 and 35 percent. Today the countrys economy is no longer in freefall due to the cessation of hostilities and the UN cash transfers.

However, the new economic equilibrium has left virtually the entire country in poverty and two-thirds of the population in need of international assistance to survive. A major beneficiary of international assistance, the urban-based middle class has been completely wiped out as the flow of foreign funding ceased.

The Taliban government has managed to collect some budgetrevenue, despite the economic contraction. The mining industry has helped boost both public revenue and exports.

The Talibans ministry of agriculture also collects religious levies ofushrandzakatfrom farmers, but it is unclear how much they amount to since this revenue category is not integrated into the reporting system of the Ministry of Finance. The Taliban also continues to tax the illegal drug industry, another unreported source of revenue.

While the Taliban leadership is eager to publicise revenue collections, itremains secretive about expenditures. Save for a mini-budget released soon after it resumed control, the Taliban has not been transparent about how it spends the money it collects. Some analystssuggest that the security sector and not social services may make up the bulk of the government budget.

In 2022, merchants surveyed by the World Bankreportedthat they were benefitting from lower levels of corruption and safer roads, but they were suffering from the sanctions, legal uncertainty, increased taxes, and an impoverished customer base. But recent decrees issued by the Talibans Amir al-Muminin, Hibatullah Akhunzada, that are meant to curb nepotism and bribery within the Taliban government may indicate increasing incidence of corruption.

According toILO reports, the Afghan job market has sharply contracted. Joblessness and reduced earnings have affected millions, primarily women, undermining the economic resilience of poor families. Restrictions on womens presence in public have hurt women-owned businesses and female workers, leaving home-based work as the only option for many women.

In the service sector, telecommunication is being instrumentalised for surveillance and censorship. While it might have avoided complete collapse, thebanking industry is still in a crisiscaused by sanctions and liquidity shortages. The Talibans Central Bank wants toreplace conventional banking with Islamic finance,but no clear timeline or guidelines have been developed yet.

Despite initial hopes for a different outcome and the formation of an inclusive government, the Taliban has effectively resurrected the Islamic Emirate, putting power firmly in the hands of the movements top religious figures.

The current administration still operates as a caretaker government with no timetable put forward for when a permanent government should be expected. This may be due to the fact that when this cabinet was formed, it caused serious internal tensions, as various factions within the Taliban competed for posts.

Meanwhile, Akhunzada, aided by a Kandahar-based cohort of religious scholars and a few trusted government officials, has increasinglyassertedhis power over the entire state, silencing and sidelining internal critics. The tensions between Kabul and Kandahar, as the two loci of the groups power, have become increasingly public.

Currently, there is no prospect of intra-Afghan dialogue or reconciliation beyond the Taliban offering protection to Afghan politicians associated with the previous regime who choose to return. While the Taliban have promised amnesty for all, the documented instances of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture, often targeting ex-military officials, raise serious questions about the IEAs ability and willingness to enforce the amnesty uniformly.

Despite publicly conciliatory messages towards Afghanistans ethnic and religious minorities, the IEA has excluded them from power and failed to protect them from attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Afghanistans independent media has collapsed, as the Taliban cracked down on free speech and foreign funding stopped. Public criticism isnot tolerated and is regularly punished.

Through a brutal and bloody campaign, the Taliban was largely able to suppress the armed resistance to its regime in the north, but tensions in the area remain. ISKPremains the most serious internalthreat targeting Taliban officials and religious minorities in Afghanistan, having carried out regular deadly attacks since August 2021.

The Taliban has suspended the prosecution departments, purged the judiciary, and abolished the independent bar association. Judges have been directly appointed by the group; female judges no longer run trials.

In court, the Hanafi School of Islamic law is applied to resolve disputes and punish any act that the judge may deem punishable. In public, the police and officials of the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice summarily discipline citizens who are found to be in violation of the Talibans uncodified rules of proper behaviour.

No data on crime rates is available but anecdotal evidence suggests crime remains rampant. The Taliban has employed old methods to try to control the situation, reintroducing public hanging, flogging, and shaming. The religiously prescribed punishments of hudud are still rarely enforced; instead,courts punish various acts using their discretionary power (taizir) or authorising retaliation in kind under the Islamic doctrine ofqisas.

The Taliban hassuspendedthe laws of the country pending a complete review which is yet to be concluded. However, outside the judiciary, administrative laws are still used to keep the bureaucracy and revenue collection running.

The Taliban has also made the final judgments of courts pre-August 2021 reviewable upon challenge. In case of a challenge, the Supreme Courts highest fatwa-making body,dar ul-fatwa,acts as the court of revision for those decisions and could vacate an existing judgement.

The Taliban has not released a draft constitution. The administrative and legal regulations for courts adopted by the judiciary are drawn heavily from the Ottoman-era codification of the Hanafi School of Islamic law.

These legal, political and economic developments of the past 20 months point to the fact that the Taliban has managed to settle down into the seat of power in Kabul and take the reins of the state. Its government has managed to provide the general population with some basic services and economic stability, but those largely remain contingent on humanitarian assistance.

The model of governance the Taliban has established clearly concentrates power in the hands of the Amir al-Muminin and a small circle of trusted associates. That form of decision-making does not bode well for the countrys future. Unless there is a dramatic change in the core of this system, the Afghan state under Taliban rule will remain a poor, unstable, repressive theocracy.

The views expressed in this article are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeeras editorial stance.

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The Taliban in government: A grim new reality is settling in - Al Jazeera English