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ISLAMABAD: Former premier Imran Khans Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party on Friday demanded Chief Election Commissioner Sikandar Sultan Raja and his top team to resign, following a Supreme Court decision criticizing them for misconstruing one of its verdicts and forcing the party candidates to contest the Feb. 8 polls independently.

The apex court upheld the Election Commission of Pakistans (ECP) decision to strip the PTI of its electoral symbol, the cricket bat, for holding intra-party elections that were deemed to be flawed and not in keeping with its constitution.

Subsequently, the ECP rejected the nomination papers of PTI candidates, who were listed as independents with individual electoral symbols.

The court decision that came just weeks before the general elections significantly impacted PTIs ability to present a united front and contest the national polls with full preparation.

The Chief Election Commissioner Sikandar Sultan Raja and all four commissioners of the Election Commission of Pakistan should resign immediately if they have any honor and self-respect after the clear decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Omar Ayub Khan, leader of the opposition in the

National Assembly and PTIs general secretary, said in a social media post.

The Election Commission was biased against PM Imran Khan and PTI, he added. The Election Commission is still biased against PM Imran Khan and PTI.

He also lambasted the electoral watchdog in a press conference, saying it interfered in his partys election campaign before refusing to allocate reserved seats for women and minorities to it on proportional basis.

Earlier, the Supreme Court delivered a landmark 8-5 verdict, saying the PTI party was eligible for these seats in parliament.

The short order made it clear the denial of the election symbol did not affect in any way PTIs right to be a political party or participate in elections.

Reading portion of a minority verdict, Chief Justice of Pakistan Qazi Faez Isa noted the ECP had misinterpreted the courts earlier verdict related to PTIs election emblem.

The ECP by misinterpreting the judgment of this Court dated 13 January 2024, which was regarding non-holding [of] intra-party elections in PTI, wrongly mentioned the said candidates of the PTI as independents in Form 33 of the Election Rules, he said. The ECP had no authority to declare validly nominated candidates of a political party to be independent candidates.

The PTI is currently entitled to around 23 reserved seats in the National Assembly, which does not affect the parliamentary majority of the Sharif-led coalition administration.

Political parties are allocated a total number of 70 reserved seats, including 60 for women and 10 for non-Muslims, in proportion to the number of seats won in general elections. This completes the National Assemblys total 336 seats.

A simple majority in Pakistans parliament is 169 out of 336 seats.

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Pakistan says deeply values cooperation with Afghanistan as ties sour over deportations, militancy - Arab News Pakistan

Remarks by Under-Secretary-GeneralRosemary DiCarlo Press conference following the meeting with members ofAfghan civil society and Special Envoys on Afghanistan Doha, 2 July 2024

*The following is a near-verbatim transcript of todays press conference by Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding AffairsRosemary Dicarlo.

This morning, we heard views from members of Afghan civil society, women and men, who provided us the special envoys and the UN - with valuable insights on the rights of women and minorities in the country, girls education, the media, business and many other issues.

They shared their views and perspectives on the Doha process, as well as on engagement between Afghanistan and the international community generally.

Our exchange was extremely important and useful. You may recall that at Doha II, we also had extensive discussions with a broad range of voices.

This morning, we heard a diversity of views; Afghan civil society is not monolithic.

This wealth of perspectives must continue to be part of this process.

As I said at the meeting this morning and in talks with the de facto authorities, there is a need to build trust on all sides.

We have to have a dialogue thats built on honesty.

It must also be based on principles - those of the UN Charter and the various human rights treaties that Afghanistan is a party to.

We are still at the beginning of this process. We are going to need patience, a lot of it, and we are going to need to be realistic.

This is a process based on the independent assessment the UN Security Council recognized last November.

That assessment called for a more coordinated and structured process, with clear conditions and expectations for all sides.

It also called for a principled, step-for-step approach with a clear understanding of the outcomes and commitments from all sides.

Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, and inclusion of all members of society will continue to be an integral part of all our discussions.

Regarding whats next, as I mentioned yesterday, during the talks with the special envoys and the de facto authorities, there was discussion of creating smaller groups on key issues that are raised in the independent assessment. We will continue that discussion on how to proceed forward.

We are still at the beginning of this process. And it will take time and patience. But our approach has one goal: helping all the people of Afghanistan.

**Questions and Answers

Question(AFI):Thank you so much, Ms. DiCarlo, for this briefing and yesterdays briefing. My question is regarding the participation of member states at the meeting today. A large number of countries didnt turn to participate in todays meeting and meet with society representatives. What do you make of that? They said that this isan important meeting, and yet it wasnt part of the official meeting that took place in the past two days. Do you agree? Also, some people from Afghanistan and the diaspora community are saying that the people who participated from Afghanistan, either by Zoom or in person, are following the same agenda as the Taliban. Do you agree with that? Do you have anything to share with us?

USG DiCarlo: Thank you. First of all, I think there were a fair number of member states there. Some had travel arrangements and had to leave early. Attendance is optional; the attendance at Doha III is optional. As I said, there were a fair number of countries there who asked some very good questions to the civil society members who were participating. In terms of whether these individuals represented Taliban views or not they represented themselves, and they were very clear that they were representing themselves. And I think, as I said its monolithic. Theres a variety of views. I dont think theres a difference for many of us, whether its the envoys, the civil society members who were there about an end state. There may be different views on how you get there, but I think it was really rich discussion. We heard a lot of different perspectives. We had people from the business community, from private sector, from the press, from womens organizations, from business organizations, micro finance organizations, and it was very interesting, and I think quite a rich discussion.

Question (AFI): (inaudible)

USG DiCarlo: Were they upset? Obviously, I think that civil society, many would like to be at the official meeting, but they were pleased to have the opportunity to speak with some of the envoys and explain what they are doing and what their needs are. Its important for us to understand what is it that various groups need. What are the obstacles to truly either practicing their profession or where do they see as obstacles for a society thats more inclusive, etc. and weve got that perspective.

Question(NHK): Thank you, madam. When will what was discussed today be shared with the de facto government? How many countries today appeared, and how about the members of civil society. How many of them were physically present as well as virtually attending?

USG DiCarlo: I am not going to get into how many were there physically or not physically, but there were eight members of civil society who were there. In terms of number of countries, 15 countries and the EU. I dont think the EU would mind that we mentioned that they were there. We had different counts, and everyone was sort of counting a little bit differently, but 15, 16 reps were there. Again, we understand that some had to leave because of pressing business. I know one in particular who very much regretted that he could not remain for another day. But again, we dont mandate people coming to either Doha meeting or civil society meetings, or any other meetings. It was something we wanted to have as a possibility for the envoys to engage.

Question (DW): (inaudible)

USG DiCarlo: No, the discussion was within us. We are not sharing it beyond. People came on their own behalf and expressed views. We really appreciated it, and I think we learned quite a lot.

Question: My question is that we talked to the Taliban delegation, and they said that there were meetings with UN officials based on counter-narcotics, on banking and on supporting the private sector. Regarding girls education and inclusive government, and human rights, they said that its our internal issue, and we will solve it in our country according to Sharia, based on their interpretation of Sharia, and they said they will solve it according to our tradition. Do you think that such big issues could be internal affairs and could be solved in Afghanistan?

USG DiCarlo: OK, let me just explain that, first of all, we had a general session that encompassed the range of issues that were raised in the independent assessment that was done. Then we had two special sessions, one on private sector, and the other on counter-narcotics. We felt that we had to start somewhere and getting into the nitty-gritty of what the obstacles the de facto authority sees, for example, in developing the private sector and hear from the envoys and what they think could be done. So thats one. In the general session and throughout, issues of human rights, especially women and girls, were raised. You cant speak about private sector without talking about having women and more women in the private sector. It is not just, lets say, the right of women to work. But if 50% of the population is not working, thats pretty bad for a countrys economy. Lets be perfectly clear here. In terms of counter-narcotics, obviously the issue of women was also raised. We have alternative livelihoods. There were some women who were growing these crops, it wasnt just men. We have women addicts that need to be treated. This is an issue that absolutely has to be raised. Our role here is to go issue by issue in the independent assessment and cover those issues in a process. That will take time. Human rights, rights of women and girls factor in all of them. The issue of inclusion, inclusivity is a really important issue. Its not just inclusive governance. Its also inclusive aspects in the society, and that was raised as well. And that will be raised in subsequent meetings as we go along. Is it just an internal issue? Afghanistan has signed on to a number of treaties, international covenants, and agreements that are focused on human rights, civil rights. They are bound by those agreements. It doesnt matter that a government changes; the country has signed on as a country. And in that sense, it is not just an internal issue, and we made that clear.

Question (Afghanistan International News Channel): There were a lot of talks and criticism about the secrecy of these three meetings two official and one side event. About today, the names of the participants didnt come out, and they try to not reveal the names and who is participating. Just to clear some minds and also some people who were criticizing this, can give us a quick explanation why these people didnt want to actually have their names come out and introduce themselves? And the whole secrecy about these events why is it so important for details to not come out from these events?

USG DiCarlo: We respect the privacy of participants in any of our meetings, whether it be on Afghanistan or on any issue. And certainly, we dont release the names of people we meet with, particularly if they would prefer that they not be released. I think that that is something that we need to continue as an issue. If they want themselves to maintain or say to the press or anyone else that they were part of it, then that is certainly their prerogative. Thats not something that we do, and this is not just on Afghanistan. Our meetings when we meet, particularly with members of civil society, are closed meetings. And were not hiding anything, but we want to have good discussions and have any participants feel very comfortable.

Question (VoA): Thank you so much. This time, given the criticism of having a separate meeting with the Taliban and meeting separately with civil society activists, it seems as if the Taliban are not going to agree in the future, also, with anyone else. Theyve made it very clear in these two meetings that you have held in February and now. Would the UN again consider repeating this exercise the same way? Or would you, for future meetings, consider changing the format so that the UN does not receive the type of criticism that it has, because the Taliban would not sit with civil society activists, its quite clear.

USG DiCarlo: I would never say never. I think we will see as we go forward how were going to manage this issue. I think its a decision that not only we have to make, but also those who attend, the envoys who attend, on whether they think.. what they think who should be present, if you will. All we want to be able to do is to continue to speak to everybody and have everyones voice heard, and if we can amplify voices who are not, that are not present at a particular event, we are very happy to do that. But again, I would never say never. One thing I want to emphasize is that, if you read the independent assessment, it comes up with a lot of, a number of concerns that Afghanistan has to build its society. It also lists many of the concerns that international community has, where international community feels that Afghanistan is not abiding by its international obligations. A lot of thematic issues. Then at the very end talks about eventually needing an inter-Afghan dialogue. What we are doing is not an inter-Afghan dialogue right now. We are just going through issues at this point, and we want to get various perspectives. But lets be perfectly honest, the citizens, de facto authorities are not ready for sitting down at the table with each other. At least, they werent for this past meeting.

Question: (inaudible)

USG DiCarlo: Thank you and thank you for the interest you have in this process.

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USG DiCarlo on Afghanistan: "Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, and inclusion of all members of ... - Department of...

China's relationship with the Taliban has undergone a dramatic transformation since their initial rise in the 1990s. Initially hesitant, China's engagement with the Taliban has steadily increased, culminating in a complex dance of pragmatism and opportunity following the American withdrawal in 2021. Chinese diplomats visiting Kabul, view the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover as the beginning of a new era of independent development and a transition from chaos to order.

This article delves into the evolving dynamics of the China-Taliban relationship, the gradual recognition of the Taliban, and the question that it poses to the West.

Shifting Sands: China's Priorities in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan

China's core interests in Afghanistan remain constant despite the Taliban regime's return to power. These interests can be categorized into three pillars: connectivity, security, and access to resources such as minerals, oil, and gas.

China views Afghanistan as a crucial link in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a global infrastructure development strategy. In 2016, China and Afghanistan agreed on BRI integration. This is a position the Taliban regime has endorsed. China seeks to extend BRI westward through Central Asia, leveraging the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar Port. This expansion promises infrastructure development, resource extraction, market access, and a gateway to the lucrative Central Asian region. In August 2023, Taliban regime Deputy Prime Minister Maulawi Abdul Kabir affirmed their support for the BRI and "practical cooperation" with China. Acting Commerce Minister Haji Nooruddin Azizi echoed this sentiment in October 2023, seeking inclusion in BRI and CPEC discussions during the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.

A critical security concern for China is the presence of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) within Afghanistan. China views ETIM as a separatist threat to its BRI projects in South and Central Asia and has repeatedly urged the Taliban to crack down on the group's activities. China's foreign ministrys April 2023 statement on Afghanistan urges more decisive action against terrorism, including the ETIM, and emphasizes the safety of Chinese citizens. It calls for increased counter-terrorism cooperation and international support to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorists. In May 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, emphasizing the need for Afghanistan to fulfill its commitment to fighting terrorism and guaranteeing the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions.

China facilitates trilateral talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan, promoting regional stability and cooperation. These high-level meetings aim to prevent any souring of relations between the Taliban and Pakistan, especially regarding the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and cross-border activities that could threaten BRIand CPEC.

In 2013, China owned 79% of the foreign investment in Afghanistan. However, the pace of Chinese investment slowed afterward, as disagreement arose over the terms of the Aynak Copper Mine that was signed in 2008. Following the Taliban takeover of the country in 2021, Chinese business people rushed to Kabul in search of mining and other business opportunities. The influx of Chinese entrepreneurs to Afghanistan was dubbed the gold rush by Al Jazeera. The rush was so significant that the Chineseembassy in Afghanistanwarned companies and citizens against blindly visiting the country in search of mineral resources due to the Ministry of Mines and Petroleums extremely strict standards for issuing extraction permits. Nevertheless, in January 2023, the Taliban signed a $540 million contract to extract oil from northern Afghanistans Amu Darya basin. In April of the same year, the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that a Chinese company was interested in investing $10 Billion in Lithium and another rare earth mineral.

In November 2022, China officially revived the Pine Nut Air Corridor, resulting in exports of over 1,000 tons to China. Furthermore, in December 2022, China implemented zero tariffs on 98% of Afghan products. Restarting work on the Aynak Copper Mine in Logar and securing new oil and gas extraction contracts in the Amu Darya basin exemplify China's keen interest in resource extraction.

China actively seeks economic opportunities in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Resource-hungry industries drive China's push to integrate Afghanistan into BRI and CPEC projects. However, security concerns, particularly counter-terrorism, necessitate cooperation with the Taliban regime, prompting Beijing's engagement with them.

The Evolving Dynamics: China, Russia, and the West

While China hasn't formally recognized the Taliban government, it has taken significant steps in that direction. They received the Taliban ambassador and allowed them to control Afghanistans embassy in Beijing. In September 2023, China's new ambassador presented credentials to the acting Taliban Prime Minister. On Tuesday, January 30th, China's President Xi Jinping received ambassadorial credentials from the Taliban envoy to Beijing appointed by the interim Taliban administration.

China's pragmatic approach to its relationship with the Taliban reflects a desire to secure its interests, but formal recognition remains a calculated decision. Official recognition could legitimize the Taliban regime, influence the decisions of other nations, and strengthen China's influence in Afghanistan. Conversely, withholding official recognition may be a strategic choice to avoid appearing as the first nation to legitimize the Taliban's oppressive policies toward women and non-Pashtun ethnic groups. For the Taliban, having China's support carries significant political, economic, and strategic benefits, potentially including Chinese investments and the use of China's veto power at the UN Security Council to block sanctions and resolutions against them.

Like China, Russia has allowed the Taliban to manage Afghanistans embassy in Moscow. However, the Russia-Taliban relationship appears less cordial. For example, in April 2023, Russia held regional consultations for peace in Afghanistan, excluding the Taliban, while inviting other regional actors. Unlike China, which commits itself to the principle of non-interference and not commenting on the Taliban regime's domestic policies, Russian officials statements urge the Taliban to form ethnically and gendered inclusive governments. Additionally, the horrific terrorist attack on the Crocus concert hall in Moscow, claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) active in Afghanistan, strained relations.

Unlike China and Russia, the United States and the European Union have not allowed the Taliban to assume control over Afghanistans embassies within their territories. Despite this, the Taliban-controlled central bank of Afghanistan receives significant financial support indirectly through the United Nations, with periodic shipments of $80 million every 10 to 14 days. The Taliban regime's alignmentor lack thereofwith international norms on human rights and women's rights remains a significant point of contention. The group has strategically avoided actions that might provoke Western powers directly, such as permitting anti-Israeli demonstrations in Kabul and other cities. However, they have shown support for regional dynamics contrary to Western interests, such as backing Iran's retaliatory measures against Israeli actions.

It appears increasingly unrealistic to expect the Taliban to adopt liberal ideals voluntarily, respect for human rights, or inclusive policies toward women and non-Pashtun ethnic groups. In the background, armed resistance groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) have geared up their attacks in Kabul and other cities. The disillusionment among political forces that once hoped for a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban is growing, as evidenced by the escalating rhetoric and actions of armed resistance groups. These groups advocate for democratic processes and elections as a pathway out of the current regime's extremism, presenting the US and EU with potential allies. Supporting these democratic resistance movements could emerge as a strategic avenue for the US and EU to influence Afghanistan's future in a direction that aligns more closely with international norms and promotes human rights.

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China-Taliban Relationship: China Navigates a New Afghanistan with the Taliban as its Rulers - Friedrich Naumann Foundation

Afghanistan, a country plagued by invasion, occupation, and domestic conflicts, is approaching a historic turning point in its turbulent history. The implications of decades of strife, compounded by current developments, resonate not just inside its boundaries, but also throughout the region, notably in neighboring Pakistan. As Afghanistan faces continuous problems ranging from political instability and economic downturn to humanitarian crises and human rights violations, the implications for Pakistan become far-reaching and more complex.

Afghanistans recent past has been affected by several waves of conflict and intervention. The Soviet invasion in 1979 ushereda protracted era of resistance and internal struggle, culminating in the creation of the Taliban in the 1990s. The US-led interventionfollowing the 9/11 attacks attempted to disrupt terrorist networks and restore stability. However, despite enormous global efforts and investment over the last two decades, Afghanistan remains plagued by violence and insecurity.

The withdrawal of US forces in 2021 provoked a swift comeback of Taliban, resulting in the fall of the Afghan Government and the resumption of control by Taliban. This power transfer has not only resulted in predicted stability, but has brought about a new era of uncertainty and turbulence. The Talibans harsh governance model and discriminatory policies have alienated a huge portion of the Afghan populace, sparking internal opposition and compounding humanitarian disasters.

One of the most significant concerns about Afghanistans instability is the spread of extremist organizations and their cross-border activities. Talibans rise has led to other extremist organizations, notably ISIS-K, that continues to pose substantial security challenges in Afghanistan and adjacent countries, such as Pakistan.

The instability across the Durand Line has immediate security consequences for Pakistan, which has a long and porous border with Afghanistan. The flood of refugees, arms smuggling, and militants freemovement between the two countries all worsen Pakistans security issues. To minimize the spillover effects of Afghanistans conflict, Pakistans military has been conducting counterterrorism operations throughout its border areas. Furthermore, the continued presence of extremist organizations in Afghanistan has traditionally had an impact on regional stability, influencing Pakistans attempts to combat terrorism inside its own borders. The Afghan Talibans nefarious connections with militant groups in Pakistans tribal areas have occasionally caused strain in diplomatic relations and besides hindering efforts to cooperate on security problems.

Afghanistans economic collapse, caused by the withdrawal of foreign aid and the implementation of sanctions, has far-reaching implications. The Afghan economy, which was already unstable, has plunged into a crisis, resulting in increasing unemployment, widespread poverty, and an emerging humanitarian disaster. The failure of Afghan banking system and currency depreciation have compounded financial missenses, plunging millions of Afghans into extreme destitution besides causing widespread displacement.

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remain catastrophic, with millions of people in desperate need of assistance. The severe weather conditions including the floods in upcoming monsoon season intensify the suffering, especially among vulnerable groups like children and the elderly. The inability of humanitarian organizations to access certain regions due to ongoing conflict hampers relief efforts, compounding the humanitarian crisis.

The turmoil in Afghanistan has enormous strategic, economic, and humanitarian repercussions for Pakistan. A peaceful, state and prospering Afghanistan is always in favour of Pakistan. Nobody wants to have fire sparks in its backyard. That is the reason, Pakistan has always supported peace and stability measures in Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to face security concerns from extremist organizations operating along its border with Afghanistan. The surge of migrants, as well as the smuggling of weaponry and narcotics, put extra strain on Pakistans security apparatus. Efforts to safeguard the border and combat extremist elements necessitate ongoing monitoring and coordination with Afghan authorities.

Economicinstability in Afghanistan has serious implications towards Pakistan, particularly in bordering districts, where trade and cross-border trading are affected. Pakistan has provided humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees, while also seeking foreign assistance to deal with the crisiss economic consequences.

Pakistan has one of the largest Afghan refugee populations in the world. The surge of people escaping conflict and economic hardship in Afghanistan puts a strain on Pakistans resources, such as healthcare, education and infrastructure. Pakistan continues to face considerable challenges in managing refugee populations, while guaranteeing humane treatment and access to essential amenities.

Diplomatically, Pakistan has played an important role in promoting peace talks and negotiations to stabilize Afghanistan. Pakistans relations with the Afghan Taliban are complex and impacted by a variety of variables, including security concerns and considerations for regional stability. However, Pakistans efforts to mediate and foster negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban have been met with uneven results, reflecting the larger obstacles of attaining long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan. Pakistans support for a peaceful and inclusive political agreement in Afghanistan remains critical to regional stability and security.

To put it simply, Afghanistans continued turmoil has far-reaching consequences for its immediate neighbor, Pakistan. To address these difficulties, a coordinated regional approach is required, as well as international cooperation and support. As Afghanistan continues to struggle for stability and recovery, Pakistans role as a vital regional actor remains critical. Pakistan could assist to build peace and stability in Afghanistan by resolving security issues, supporting economic recovery efforts, and emphasizing humanitarian assistance, all of which advance mutual interests and promote regional prosperity. The road ahead is riddled with difficulties, but concentrated efforts and continuous involvement provide promise for a more peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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Afghanistan: A Nation In Turmoil And Its Regional Implications OpEd - Eurasia Review

Taliban officials attended a rare, United Nations-led conference of global envoys to Afghanistan on Sunday, the first such meeting Taliban representatives have agreed to engage in, after organizers said Afghan women would be excluded from the talks.

The two-day conference in Doha, Qatar, is the third of its kind. It is part of a United Nations-led effort, known as the Doha process, started in May 2023. It is meant to develop a unified approach for international engagement with Afghanistan. Envoys from around 25 countries and regional organizations, including the European Union, the United States, Russia and China, are attending.

Taliban officials were not invited to the first meeting and refused to attend the second meeting, held in February, after objecting to the inclusion of Afghan civil society groups that attended.

The conference has drawn a fierce backlash in recent days after U.N. officials announced that Afghan women would not participate in discussions with Taliban officials. Human rights groups and Afghan womens groups have slammed the decision to exclude them as too severe a concession by the U.N. to persuade the Taliban to engage in the talks.

The decision to exclude women sets a deeply damaging precedent and risks legitimatizing their gender-based institutional system of oppression, Agns Callamard, the secretary general of Amnesty International, said in a statement referring to the Talibans policies toward women. The international community must adopt a clear and united stance: The rights of women and girls in Afghanistan are nonnegotiable.

Since seizing power from the U.S.-backed government in 2021, Taliban authorities have systematically rolled back womens rights, effectively erasing women from public life. Women and girls are barred from getting education beyond primary school and banned from most employment outside of education and health care, and they cannot travel significant distances without a male guardian.

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Taliban Talks With U.N. Go On Despite Alarm Over Exclusion of Women - The New York Times