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Why the U.S. military needs to get out of its strategic comfort zone.

It is now official beyond question. The senior ranks of the U.S. military and foreign-policy leadership have now fully succumbed to the belief that all problems in the Middle East and South Asia must include, at their core, the application of lethal military power. No other alternative is considered. Worse, the military solutions they advocate have literally no chance of accomplishing the national objectives sought. The latest damning evidence: the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan testified before the Senate last week that he believes thousands of additional U.S. troops should be sent back to Afghanistan.

It is difficult to overstate the utter bankruptcy of a strategy designed to bring peace to Afghanistan based on sending large numbers of U.S. service members back into harms way. TheWashington Postreported in early February that Army Gen. John W. Nicholson Jr.said he[3]believes the new president may be open to a more robust military effort that is objectives-based. Questioned by Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R.-S.C.), the general said he can definitely carry out his mission with less than 50,000 coalition troops, but hesitated a bit when asked if he could do so with less than 30,000.

The results of sixteen years conducting counterinsurgency, foreign military training and counterterrorism operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan should argue persuasively against repeating such a strategy. The results have been utter and complete failures on the strategic level. Supporters of using COIN and CT cite the Iraq surge of 2007 as an example of how a properly run operation can succeed. Such endorsements expose a significant lack of understanding of what actually happened in 2007 and, of greater importance, that those individuals have a marked inability to see beyond tactical outcomes.

This story was originally published by The National Interest

The fundamental point that must be understood is that the surge of U.S. troops into Baghdad was not the causal factor in the dramatic reduction of violence. It was a contributing factor and did play a positive role, but without question was not the decisive one. In late 2006 the Sunni insurgency was beginning to buckle under the cumulative weight of attacks by the United States, coalition forces, Shia militias and the Iraqi security forces. The pressure turned into an existential threat, however, when Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)an organization that should have been a natural Sunni allyturned against them.

As was documented in great detail in Gian GentilesWrong Turn[4], Sunni sheikhs recognized that their only chance for survival was to join with U.S. forces against their common AQI enemy. Beginning even before the surge was authorized by President Bush, Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha from Anbar Province approached U.S. soldiers and offered to join with them in ridding Ramadi of AQI. The resulting Awakening began a process that was well under way when Gen. David Petraeus arrived the next year.

To his credit, when Petraeus saw how effective the program was, he successfully expanded it to other areas of Iraq. But it cannot be overstated that Petraeuss efforts were successful primarily because other Sunni leaders saw the effectiveness of Sheikh Sattars efforts and wanted to replicate them. This point cannot be missed: the Sunnis never cooperated with U.S. forces because they believed their future lay with the Coalition, as one generalfamously said[5]in 2008. They rationally saw that without a tactical union with America, they would be annihilated.

Dr. Sterling Jensen, one of the worlds leading experts on the Iraq surge, and Iraqi Gen. Najim al-Jabouri (currently commanding[6]Iraqi forces assaulting Mosul)wrote of this period[7]that in fact, U.S. troops in general were not seen as useful even before the surge. When announcing the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Sattar told the Americans that as long as the U.S. brigade helped locals become card-carrying security forces and be permitted to work in their areas, the U.S. forces could stay on their bases while the Anbaris fought. No such conditions exist in Afghanistan today, nor did they in 2010 when the United States surged thirty thousand troopsand that explains why the Afghan surge did not knock out the insurgency.

Second, there remains a troubling lack of understanding at the most senior levels of U.S. government of the interaction between tactical operations and strategic outcomes. At the time of the Iraq surge, the most oft-cited justification for the operation was that the reduced level of violence provided breathing space to the Iraqi authorities to affect political reconciliation that would ultimately bring stability. But once cleared of the existential threat the insurgency posed to the Shia government, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of the breathing space to eliminate most of his Sunni opponents. These oppressive tactics, in fact, helped facilitate the rise of ISIS three years after U.S. withdrawal from the area. Much the same scenario played out during the Afghan surge of 2010.

In mid-2009, then commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal sent a classified memo to the president stating that if he didnt get more troops, the United States might lose the Afghan war. In December of that year, President Obama approved the deployment of thirty thousand U.S. troops (on top of the seventeen thousand he had deployed earlier that year), bringing the number of troops by 2010 to nearly one hundred thousand. I was on the ground in Afghanistan during that surge, and can authoritatively confirm that the only thing the surge accomplished tactically was the protection of the Afghan government in Kabul and the security of select lines of communication elsewhere in the country. But it did nothing to quell the insurgency.

In fact, it contributed to the insurgency. The level of violence that McChrystal warned could lose the war in 2009 was radically increased in 2010. When the U.S. forces ended their combat mission in 2014, the violence increased yet again. According to the United Nations, the casualty rate of the Afghan National Security Forces and civilian population were ator nearrecord highs in 2016. Sending in another thirty thousand troops to train and advise Afghan soldiers might help to again secure Kabul and some lines of communication, but it will also cause a spike in U.S. casualties and a predictable increase in insurgent violence throughout the country. What it will not do is defeat the insurgency and end the war. If the United States expands the mission into Afghanistan at this present time, we may well end up committing our armed forces to a permanent state of war.

Lastly, as important as the above points are, the military strategy used by the United States is based on deeply flawed assumptions. General Nicholsonsaid in his Senate testimony[8]that our primary mission remains to protect the homeland by preventing Afghanistan from being used again as a safe haven for terrorists to attack the United States or our allies. Yet there is not now, nor has there ever been, anything special about territory in Afghanistan in representing a threat to the United States. Most of the 9/11 terrorists did their training in Germany, Florida and on the East Coast, not in the caves of Tora Bora. Terrorism has spread like wildfire across the globe, expanding into Southeast Asia, Central Asia, other parts of the Middle East and over millions of square miles in Africa.

There is no more danger to the United States from terrorists that live in Kunar Province than there is from terrorists living in ungoverned territory of Syria, Somalia, Tajikistan, Libya, Yemen, or a dozen other countries. Truly, it defies logic to suggest that the United States must permanently remain militarily active in the one spot of Afghanistan while countries around the globe burn with terrorist presence against which we do nothing.

There are other strategies that have a chance to work. They are not easy and none would guarantee success. But one can virtually guarantee that by repeating the military strategies weve used since 9/11, our efforts will fail. Until senior policymakers discover the resolve necessary to admit these preferred strategies are bankrupt, we can expectregardless of how many troops the president deploysthe fires of terrorism in Afghanistan to burn, American service members to suffer the loss of lives and limbs, and U.S. interests to deteriorate.

This story was originally published by The National Interest

Daniel L. Davis is a retired U.S. Army colonel who served multiple tours in Afghanistan. He is a senior fellow with Defense Priorities. Follow him on Twitter@DanielLDavis1[9].

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Op-ed: How to Lose the War in Afghanistan - Scout

Zimbabwe v Afghanistan, 1st ODI, Harare February 16, 2017

ESPNcricinfo staff

Afghanistan 215 (Stanikzai 50, Cremer 3-46) beat Zimbabwe 99 for 4 (Ervine 38*, Naib 1-12) by 12 runs (D/L method) Scorecard and ball-by-ball updates

File photo - Graeme Cremer's three wickets and Craig Ervine's unbeaten 38 were in vain AFP

A Zimbabwe wicket two balls before rain descended upon Harare helped Afghanistan complete a 12-run win courtesy Duckworth-Lewis. The hosts were ahead by a solitary run according to the D/L method at the beginning of the 28th over, but Rashid Khan's wicket of Ryan Burl - which reduced Zimbabwe to 99 for 4 - meant Afghanistan held the D/L advantage when the weather decided to play spoilsport.

Chasing 216, Zimbabwe lost both openers inside six overs. They lost their third wicket with their total at 44 in the 15th over, but a 55-run fourth-wicket partnership between Burl and Craig Ervine (38*) started what looked like a Zimbabwe recovery. Rashid trapped Burl in front of the stumps in the 28th over and Zimbabwe got no time to recover as the rain came down.

Afghanistan had chosen to bat but the hosts kept the visitors in check. After opener Mohammad Shahzad fell early, Noor Ali Zadran (39) and Rahmat Shah (31) added 67 runs for the second wicket. By the 25th over, Graeme Cremer removed both set batsmen before captain Asghar Stanikzai struck his seventh ODI half-century to help Afghanistan along. He scored 50, helping Afghanistan's total move past 150, before his dismissal was followed by a string of wickets towards the end of their innings. That meant they were all out in the 50th over for 215.

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Afghanistan win on D/L after Burl falls just before rain - ESPNcricinfo.com

The writer is director of Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University Nebraska at Omaha.

The war in Afghanistan has been the longest in the history of the United States and now is inherited by President Donald Trump. So far, more than 2,000 U.S soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan and billions of dollars have been spent to help the people of Afghanistan.

The U.S. took action in Afghanistan not because the country has rare natural resources but because it was a strategic safe haven for the terrorists who planned the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Al-Qaida and Taliban forces, along with their backers, utilized this power vacuum in the 90s for their regional interests, with global consequences.

What goes on in Afghanistan cannot be contained within the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan. The incidents occurring there have had global implications, as demonstrated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and al-Qaidas presence in Afghanistan.

Abandoning Afghanistan now would make a marked regression to pre-9/11 Afghanistan, a place of civil wars and a nest of terrorists. One might argue Afghanistan will not revert to what it was under the Taliban, but even relatively minor instability in Afghanistan could make it more attractive to the elements of global terrorism. The current instability in North Africa provides a practical illustration of the dangers in such a situation.

Indeed, Islamic State fighters are emerging in considerable numbers in the north and east of Afghanistan. Many of these Islamic State fighters are of Central Asian descent and view Afghanistan as a potential staging ground for their operations in Central Asia.

Afghanistan is located in an area with rich petro-chemical resources. These energy resources are vital not only for Russia but also for U.S. allies in Europe, plus Turkey and India. Any power vacuum or instability in Afghanistan would likely spread to the rest of Central Asia, as shown during the period of Taliban rule.

More importantly, Afghanistan is the only country in the region that is friendly toward the United States and is willing to host U.S. forces. By having a military presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. can address any potential threat emanating from that region to which it cannot respond from off-shore bases or ships in the Indian Ocean or in Turkey.

The biggest concern, then, is not just the problems in Afghanistan but that any spillover that could threaten the long-term American interests in the region, particularly trade and security interests.

Afghanistans neighbor is Iran, with which the U.S. has had a contentious relationship since 1979. It is not expected that this relationship would improve under President Trump. Trump disapproved of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.

The U.S. needs a friendly country in the region to keep Iranian power in check and keep neighboring nations from slipping into an anti-U.S. sphere. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a buffer zone between Iran and U.S. interests in the Middle East.

With Iraq unable to serve as that buffer, a strong and stable Afghanistan could counterbalance Irans expanding influence in the region.

Allowing conditions to deteriorate in Afghanistan would only further raise concern about the countrys southern neighbor, Pakistan. That country, with a population of more than 180 million, has active nuclear weapons coupled with an unstable security and political situation. Pakistans national government faces an alarming security challenge as it is unable to exert control over considerable areas of the country such as Baluchistan province.

Al-Qaida, the Haqqani network and the Taliban have safe havens in Pakistans tribal areas. Gen. John Nicholson, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in January that the Talibans leaders can still repair to their safe havens in the tribal areas of neighboring Pakistan. They enjoy protection from the criminal Haqqani network in places such as Quetta (a Pakistani city), out of the reach of major U.S. combat power.

Any further instability in Pakistan would threaten India, which Pakistan regards as its archenemy, along with U.S. security interests in South Asia.

History in recent decades has proved that abandoning Afghanistan is in the interest of no one. As a country with strategic geopolitical importance, Afghanistan should not be left alone where it can easily once again become an attractive place for those who threaten global peace, security and regional prosperity.

Continued here:
Sher Jan Ahmadzai: US must not abandon Afghanistan - Omaha World-Herald

On the side of a busy street in Kabul, Afghanistan, there is a restaurant that feels like an oasis away from the traffic jams, constant smog, and terrorist threats. Soothing piano music plays in the background as groups of young women enjoy traditional Afghan dishes. Bost, a restaurant for women and entirely run by women opened its doors in the capital of Afghanistan in September last year. Here, women can feel sheltered from the prying eyes of men for a while.

I wanted to have a place where I could feel safe, where I could enjoy my time sitting in a corner, reading, writing, or even listening to music without getting disturbed or being stared at, says Homira Kohzad, one of the restaurants founders. If you go to different restaurants in different parts of Kabul, you dont feel safe. Harassment is common in the city, and its one of the main reasons why women are hesitant about going out, whether its to restaurants or for a walk down a street.

During the Taliban rule in the late 90s, women could not go outside without a mahram, a male relative, and a burqa that covered their entire faces and bodies. But after the fall of the regime in 2001, women came out of their houses, and many replaced the burqa with a simple headscarf. According to Kohzad, men have had a hard time getting used to seeing women around, which often results in unwelcome attention. Its also why male relatives can be reluctant to let women go to restaurants alone, even if there is a designated family section. (Women, for their part, might feel equally uncomfortable in a restaurant full of single men.)

But at Bost, women can be seen sitting alone and sampling the restaurants mouth-watering specialties such as shola, a rich lentil dish with their female friends or sometimes with their mothers. In this setting, male chaperones are not needed. The women who come here are often educated and liberal, and many are dressed in modern clothes. Because they do not have to worry about getting stared at, they can wear what they want. In the beginning, I saw some women coming with their husbands, but after a while the women started coming alone because the men had noticed this place is only for women and families, Kohzad says. According to her, it was a matter of building trust.

Opening a restaurant as a woman is, of course, already something special in Afghanistan. The restaurant is undoubtedly Kohzads baby: She trained the staff and designed everything from the menu to the interior, which is an interesting blend of traditional Afghan and modern Western style.

But what makes Bost even more unique than its clientele is the fact that it employs women who live in Kabuls womens shelters. The restaurant was originally a project of the Afghan Women Skills Development Center, or AWSDC. The organization, where Kohzad worked as a project manager, provides training and education to women and maintains a number of shelters in the country for victims of gender-based violence. AWSDC was already running a catering business as a source of income generation for the shelters residents. Kohzad thought the idea could be expanded into the restaurant space.

Afghans love to eat, she says. And most of the women are expert chefs. Some of these women, oh my God, they make food thats melting in your mouth; its like heaven. So why not use their skills? Currently, the restaurant employs 17 women 10 in the kitchen, and seven in the front of the house all of whom live in AWSDC shelters. According to Kohzad, they come from various backgrounds; most are quite young, around 20 years old. Some of them faced family violence, domestic abuse, and they have been living with us for several years, she says. Some had to escape from home because their parents were addicted to drugs.

Soraya, 20, has worked as Bosts co-chef since the beginning for four months now. She also prepares delicious fresh-squeezed juices and special coffees in restaurants juice bar. About two years ago, her life changed drastically. I was living in Lahore, Pakistan, with my family, Soraya says. One day, there was a suicide attack and both my parents were killed. I lost everybody; I didnt have anyone. One of her neighbors took her to Kabul, but abandoned her in an area near the citys largest prison. I was completely unfamiliar with Kabul, Soraya says. But luckily a lady took me to her home and sheltered me for the night. The next morning Soraya went to a police station, where she told authorities she didnt have anyone in the city. The police took her to a shelter.

Despite having to go through something so difficult, Soraya has been able to find meaning in her job. Im happy now, she says as she prepares mantoos, lamb-filled dumplings with a splash of yogurt and lentils on top. Now I know that I can do things in my life.

I feel good and powerful. I can have my own money and I can spend it on my children.

Manizha, 27, is also happy to have found a job at Bost. She is originally from the north of the country, from the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Manizha was married off to a man who already had a wife. As the second wife, she faced many difficulties with her in-laws. Manizha gave birth to two children, a daughter and a son, but the problems in the family only increased. My husband moved to Saudi Arabia and I was left behind with my children, she says. I needed money to feed them, but he did not send us anything. Finally, my in-laws told me to go back to my fathers home. But her parents had died a long time ago, and for her brothers, she was just an additional burden.

Left with no other choice, Manizha took her children and came to the shelter in Kabul. Her brothers were not happy about this, however, and felt she was bringing shame to the family. The society in Afghanistan considers women who run away from home loose, and theres stigma associated with living in a shelter. Because of this, these women are sometimes sexually abused when they go outside, Kohzad explains, and its difficult for them to find employment beyond the shelter.

For Manizha, her move to the shelter happened four years ago, and to this day, she constantly fears her brothers will come after her or her children. Maybe when my children are in school, my brothers will kidnap them, she says. Her dream is to save some money and leave Afghanistan. Today she is happily preparing dishes, such as bolani, a flatbread with vegetable filling, in the kitchen. I feel good and powerful. I can have my own money and I can spend it on my children, she says.

Customers are kept largely unaware of the staffs backgrounds. According to Kohzad, Most families, if they became aware of the fact that these women are from shelters, wouldnt come here. Therefore, to ensure the safety of the women, we mostly keep it confidential, she says.

But the plan is to eventually become more open about this. Anything you want to do in Afghanistan, it needs time. When people see that they are not different from other women or other families, they would forget it. The restaurants goal is to ultimately become a franchise operation, but Kohzad also wants to prepare the women for jobs elsewhere. We give them the opportunity to learn and to be able to stand up on their own feet, Kohzad says. Maybe they want to become managers of one of these franchises. Or maybe later on they want to open their own restaurants.

The younger generation of working women has claimed Bost as their own.

Most importantly, however, We want them to feel safe, Kohzad says. If they feel safe, it would be easier for them to communicate and show a better picture that, see, we are women who have faced some challenges, abuse, or domestic violence in our houses, but we are working here, we are like you. Employing these women has also had another benefit: The fact that all the waitstaff is female helps convince families to allow their women to come to Bost without a male chaperone.

Tahmina Kargar, 25, has come to Bost to enjoy her lunch hour with her colleagues from the BBC. The thing that sets this restaurant apart from others is the fact that women work here. I feel safer and I like the environment. And also the food, she says while enjoying a steaming plate full of lobia, kidney beans in tomato gravy.

Kargars colleague Fauzia Ameeri, 29, has come to Bost for the second time. She agrees that the female staff makes women feel more comfortable. It also feels safer to come here with our male friends because in other restaurants there are lots of people around and we face different kinds of people. I dont know what they might think, but from their reaction we can understand that they dont like men and women to go for lunch together.

The younger generation of working women has claimed Bost as their own more than any other group in the city. They need a place where they will not be judged, Kohzad explains as she slowly gets back to her work, not minding the fact that her headscarf has long since fallen to her shoulders. Thanks to Bost, there is now a place in Kabul where women can breathe freely for a while.

Maija Liuhto is a freelance journalist based in Kabul, Afghanistan. She writes for Al Jazeera English, the Christian Science Monitor and GOOD Magazine, among others. Ivan Flores is an independent visual journalist based in Kabul covering conflict, political, and cultural issues. Editor: Erin DeJesus

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How One Restaurant in Afghanistan Improves the Lives of Women - Eater

It is now official beyond question. The senior ranks of the U.S. military and foreign-policy leadership have now fully succumbed to the belief that all problems in the Middle East and South Asia must include, at their core, the application of lethal military power. No other alternative is considered. Worse, the military solutions they advocate have literally no chance of accomplishing the national objectives sought. The latest damning evidence: the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan testified before the Senate last week that he believes thousands of additional U.S. troops should be sent back to Afghanistan.

It is difficult to overstate the utter bankruptcy of a strategy designed to bring peace to Afghanistan based on sending large numbers of U.S. service members back into harms way. The Washington Post reported in early February that Army Gen. John W. Nicholson Jr. said he believes the new president may be open to a more robust military effort that is objectives-based. Questioned by Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R.-S.C.), the general said he can definitely carry out his mission with less than 50,000 coalition troops, but hesitated a bit when asked if he could do so with less than 30,000.

The results of sixteen years conducting counterinsurgency, foreign military training and counterterrorism operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan should argue persuasively against repeating such a strategy. The results have been utter and complete failures on the strategic level. Supporters of using COIN and CT cite the Iraq surge of 2007 as an example of how a properly run operation can succeed. Such endorsements expose a significant lack of understanding of what actually happened in 2007 and, of greater importance, that those individuals have a marked inability to see beyond tactical outcomes.

The fundamental point that must be understood is that the surge of U.S. troops into Baghdad was not the causal factor in the dramatic reduction of violence. It was a contributing factor and did play a positive role, but without question was not the decisive one. In late 2006 the Sunni insurgency was beginning to buckle under the cumulative weight of attacks by the United States, coalition forces, Shia militias and the Iraqi security forces. The pressure turned into an existential threat, however, when Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)an organization that should have been a natural Sunni allyturned against them.

As was documented in great detail in Gian Gentiles Wrong Turn, Sunni sheikhs recognized that their only chance for survival was to join with U.S. forces against their common AQI enemy. Beginning even before the surge was authorized by President Bush, Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha from Anbar Province approached U.S. soldiers and offered to join with them in ridding Ramadi of AQI. The resulting Awakening began a process that was well under way when Gen. David Petraeus arrived the next year.

To his credit, when Petraeus saw how effective the program was, he successfully expanded it to other areas of Iraq. But it cannot be overstated that Petraeuss efforts were successful primarily because other Sunni leaders saw the effectiveness of Sheikh Sattars efforts and wanted to replicate them. This point cannot be missed: the Sunnis never cooperated with U.S. forces because they believed their future lay with the Coalition, as one general famously said in 2008. They rationally saw that without a tactical union with America, they would be annihilated.

Dr. Sterling Jensen, one of the worlds leading experts on the Iraq surge, and Iraqi Gen. Najim al-Jabouri (currently commanding Iraqi forces assaulting Mosul) wrote of this period that in fact, U.S. troops in general were not seen as useful even before the surge. When announcing the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Sattar told the Americans that as long as the U.S. brigade helped locals become card-carrying security forces and be permitted to work in their areas, the U.S. forces could stay on their bases while the Anbaris fought. No such conditions exist in Afghanistan today, nor did they in 2010 when the United States surged thirty thousand troopsand that explains why the Afghan surge did not knock out the insurgency.

Second, there remains a troubling lack of understanding at the most senior levels of U.S. government of the interaction between tactical operations and strategic outcomes. At the time of the Iraq surge, the most oft-cited justification for the operation was that the reduced level of violence provided breathing space to the Iraqi authorities to affect political reconciliation that would ultimately bring stability. But once cleared of the existential threat the insurgency posed to the Shia government, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of the breathing space to eliminate most of his Sunni opponents. These oppressive tactics, in fact, helped facilitate the rise of ISIS three years after U.S. withdrawal from the area. Much the same scenario played out during the Afghan surge of 2010.

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How to Lose the War in Afghanistan - The National Interest Online (blog)