By Renard Sexton September 26 at 9:44 AM
The following is a guest post by Renard Sexton, a doctoral candidate in political science at New York University.
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Days ago, the principal contenders to the Afghan presidency announced a power-sharing arrangement that will give both Ashraf Ghani, the declared winner of this years election, and AbdullahAbdullah, the runner-up, a governing role.
Achieving this accord is no small feat; if it holds, this will be the first peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan since 1973. Observers note that it was indeed the threat of violence from supporters ofAbdullah, who claims to have been robbed of the election by malfeasance, that brought the deal to completion.
In practical terms the political bargain represents a divvying up of government posts and their associated foreign aid and other patronage among the two camps. Each leader will be able to reward a proportion of his supporters with plum positions and access, though for both in smaller measures than was expected. In the end, going to war over the election result was not worth it for either side, even though it meant giving up perhaps half of the government patronage apparatus to his rival.
Not so long ago such a rationalist, bargained solution was an impossible dream for Afghanistan. In 1992, shortly after the disintegration of the USSR, the Afghanistan Communist government under President Mohammad Najibullah was swept from power. The numerous armed opposition groups that had spent years trying to eject the Soviet-sponsored regime now had the opportunity to establish a unity government.
Two main factions competed for the top posts in the post-war government. Led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and military chief Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Jamiat-e Islami represented Persian-speaking Sunnis (often lumped into the quasi-ethnic group Tajik) and their allies. In primary opposition was Gulbuddin Hekmatyars Hezb-e Islami, which was largely Pashtun in composition.
The United Nations and Pakistan, along with the United States, attempted to pull together a peace settlement between the various factions in what becomes known as the Peshawar Accords, signed on April 24, 1992. Hekmatyar refused to participate, saying that he would not share power with Massoud, but the other major mujahedeen groups signed on, with Jamiats Rabbani as president and Massoud as minister of defense (Hekmatyar was offered to the post of prime minister).
The next week, Hekmatyar began to bombard the city of Kabul from his mountainside position on the southern outskirts of the city, using his heavy artillery. By this time, fighting had broken out between the various factions, with forces loyal to Massoud and ex-communists under Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum fighting against those of Hekmatyar and another faction of the former Communists. Hezb-e Wahdat and Ittehad-e Islami, both nominally affiliated with the government, also began fighting with each other.
Read more:
Monkey Cage: The spoils of peace in Afghanistan