Archive for the ‘Alt-right’ Category

Who is Ryder Ripps, Artist Trying To Take Down Bored Ape Yacht Club ARTnews.com – ARTnews

When Bored Ape Yacht Club launched at the height of last years NFT frenzy, Ryder Ripps shrugged off the collections off-putting imagery. The series of 10,000 cartoon apes were rife with the meme aesthetics of the internets darkest corners, but if you spend enough time online, its something you tend to just look past. Then a few months later, a friend showed him the collections logo beside the Totenkopf, a skull-and-cross bones insignia widely used in Nazi Germany. It dawned on him: The Apes, now viral and promoted widely by crypto-hawking celebrities, might be an elaborate, malicious troll.

I realized this shit was intentional, Ripps, a 36-year-old conceptual artist and creative director who has worked with major artists like Kanye West and Grimes and brands like Nike, Red Bull, and Gucci, told ARTnews. Theyre ruining the internet.

Since December, Ripps has led a crusade against the irreverent collection, its parent company Yuga Labs currently valued at a whopping $4 billion and founders Greg Solano, Wiley Aronow, Kerem Atalay, and Zeshan Ali.

Ripps contends that BAYC, from its logo to the Apes accessories like sushi chef headbands inscribed with kamikaze in Japanese kanji and spiked Prussian Pickelhaube helmets is threaded with racist imagery and ties to the online alt-right. Ripps and Yuga Labs are currently embroiled in a legal battle after the company sued the artist for creating copycat NFTs that Ripps says are meant to satirize the collection. (Yuga Labs and BAYC have previously denied the allegations of racism.)

Ripps has cast himself as Laocoon the priest who begged the Trojans not to let the Greek horse into the city warning that Yugas founders are trying to slip toxic imagery and ideas into the larger culture by packaging it as just another absurd, but ultimately innocuous NFT collection. But is he the best messenger for his warning?

When asked why hes so sure that Solano, Aronow and their counterparts are trolls, Ripps laughed. Takes one to know one, he said.

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Who is Ryder Ripps, Artist Trying To Take Down Bored Ape Yacht Club ARTnews.com - ARTnews

White nationalism, fueled by social media, is on the rise and attracting violent young white men – Arizona Mirror

White nationalists keep showing up in the hearings of the U.S. House committee investigating the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection.

Evidence is mounting that white nationalist groups who want to establish an all-white state played a significant role in the violent attack on the U.S. Capitol that left five dead and dozens wounded.

Thus far, the hearings have documented how the Proud Boys helped lead the insurrectionist mob into the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C, journalist James Risen wrote in the Intercept.

Based on July 12, 2022, testimony from a former Oath Keepers member, the white nationalist group coordinated with the Three Percenters, another group of white nationalists, and the Proud Boys in mobilizing their extremists groups to rally in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6, as asked by President Trump in his Dec. 16, 2020, tweet.

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As a cultural anthropologist who has studied these movements for over a decade, I know that membership in these organizations is not limited to the attempted violent overthrow of the government and poses an ongoing threat, as seen in massacres carried out by young men radicalized by this movement.

In 2020, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security described domestic violent extremists as presenting the most persistent and lethal threat to the people of the United States and the nations government.

In March 2021, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified to Congress that the number of arrests of white supremacists and other racially motivated extremists has almost tripled since he took office in 2017.

Jan. 6 was not an isolated event, Wray testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The problem of domestic terrorism has been metastasizing across the country for a long time now, and its not going away anytime soon.

The Southern Poverty Law Center, a nonprofit civil rights group, tracked 733 active hate groups across the United States in 2021.

Based on my research, the internet and social media have made the problem of white supremacist hate far worse and more visible; its both more accessible and, ultimately, more violent, as seen on Jan. 6 at the U.S. Capitol and the shooting deaths of ten Black people at a Buffalo grocery story, among other examples.

In the 1990s, former KKK leaders including David Duke rebranded white supremacy for the digital age.

They switched KKK robes for business suits and connected neo-Nazi antisemitic conspiracies with broader anti-Black, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic racism.

From the 1990s to the late 2000s, this movement largely built discreet online communities and websites peddling racist disinformation.

In fact, for years one of the first websites about Martin Luther King Jr. that a Google search recommended was a website created by white nationalists that spread neo-Nazi propaganda.

In 2005, the white nationalist website Stormfront.org had 30,000 members which might sound like a lot. But as social media expanded, with both Facebook and Twitter opening to anyone with an email address in 2006, its views got a lot more attention. By 2015, 250,000 people had subscribed to become members of Stormfront.org.

Between 2012 and 2016, white nationalists on Twitter saw a 600% increase in Twitter followers. They have since worked to bring white supremacism into everyday politics.

The Tech Transparency Project, a nonprofit tech industry watchdog group, found that in 2020 half of the white nationalist groups tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center had a presence on Facebook.

Without clear regulations preventing extremist content, digitalcompanies, in my view, allowed for the spread of white nationalist conspiracies.

Racist activists used algorithms as virtual bullhorns to reach previously unimaginable-sized audiences.

White nationalist leaders, such as Richard Spencer, wanted an even bigger audience and influence.

Spencer coined the term alt-right to this end, with the goal of blurring the relationship between white nationalism and white conservatism. He did this by establishing nonprofit think tanks like the National Policy Institute that provided an academic veneer for him and other white supremacists to spread their views on white supremacy.

This strategy worked.

Today, many white nationalist ideas once relegated to societys fringes are embraced by the broader conservative movement.

Take, for instance, the Great Replacement Theory. The conspiracy theory misinterprets demographic change as an active attempt to replace white Americans with people of color.

This baseless idea observes that Black and Latino people are becoming larger percentages of the U.S. population, and paints that data as the result of an allegedly active attempt by unnamed multiculturalists to drive white Americans out of power in an increasingly diverse nation.

A recent poll showed that over 50% of Republicans now believe in this conspiracy theory.

In 2016, during Trumps presidential campaign, Vice Magazine co-founder Gavin McInnes formed the Proud Boys to further the goals of the alt-right by protecting white identity with the use of violence if necessary.

Proud Boys members are affiliated with white nationalist ideas and leaders, but they deny any explicit racism. Instead, they describe themselves as Western chauvinists who believe in the supremacy of European culture but also welcome members of any race who support this idea.

Along with pro-gun militias such as the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters, the Proud Boys are an experiment in spreading white nationalist ideas to an online universe of potentially millions of social media users.

Data from manifestos posted online by white nationalist groups shows that many mass shooters share a few common characteristics they are young, white, male and they spend significant time online at the same websites.

The alleged shooter in the killing of 10 Black people in a predominantly Black neighborhood in Buffalo on May 14, 2022, described his reason as wanting to stop what he feared as the elimination of the white race.

His fears that people of color were replacing white people came from 4chan, a social media company popular among the alt-right.

In 2019, nine African American church members were murdered in Charleston by a young white man who became radicalized through Google searches that led him to openly white supremacist content.

Massacres in a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and at a synagogue in Poway, California, all took place after the shooters began spending time on 8chan, an imageboard popular with white supremacists and the home of QAnon posts.

For many of these individuals, the most important part of their radicalization was not about their home life or personality quirks, but instead about where they spent time online.

The reasons men join groups like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers and even some liberal groups is less clear.

A former Proud Boy member offered one reason: They want to join a gang, Russell Schultz told CNN on Nov. 25, 2020. So they can go fight antifa and hurt people that they dont like, and feel justified in doing it.

Antifa is a loose-knit group of usually nonviolent activists who oppose fascism.

Other former extremist group members describe seeking camaraderie and friendship, but also finding racism and antisemitism.

But more than any other issue, racial demographic changes are providing recruitment opportunities for white nationalists, many of whom believe that by the year 2045 white people will become the minority in the United States.

In July 2021, the most recent date for which statistics are available, the U.S. Census Bureau notes that of the estimated population of 330 million American citizens, 75.8% are white, 18.9% are Hispanic, 13.6% are Black and 6% are Asian.

What is also becoming clearer is that the spread of white nationalism endangers the idea of a democratic nation where racial diversity is considered a strength, not a weakness.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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White nationalism, fueled by social media, is on the rise and attracting violent young white men - Arizona Mirror

Flags of the alt-right, white supremacists – pennlive.com

AP Photo/Steve Helber

The Southern Poverty Law Center has produced a quick guide to the flags of thefar right that were spotted in Charlottesville over the weekend. Take a look and see the symbols that white supremacists were waiving:

White nationalist demonstrators walk through town after their rally was declared illegal near Lee Park in Charlottesville, Va., Saturday, Aug. 12, 2017. (AP Photo/Steve Helber)

Although not specifically mentioned by the SPLC report, the Confederate flag appeared in many photos of the white supremacist protests in Charlottesville over the weekend.

White nationalists rally at Emancipation Park in Charlottesville. Photo by Evelyn Hockstein for The Washington Post.

This symbol, according to the SPLC, is called the Schwarze Sonne, or Black Sun. It's become a symbol of several far-right, neo Nazi groups. A version of the Schwarze Sonne is inlayed into the marble floor of the Castle Wewelsburg, the castle that Heinrich Himmler made the home of the SS during the reign of the Third Reich, the SPLC says.

AP Photo

This is another version of theSchwarze Sonne. It's used by the Vanguard America-Texas, says the SPLC, and incorporates the star of Texas into the middle of the black sun symbol.

From Southern Poverty Law Center website.

This sign, part of a poster advertising the "Unite the Right" rally, was drawn from Benjamin Franklin's famous "Join, or Die" cartoon. According to SPLC, the groups whose flags are denied here include, from left to right, "Kekistani", "Anti-Communist," "Libertarian," "Nationalist, "Indetitarian/Identity Evropa," "Southern Nationalist," "National Socialist" and "Alt-Right." Included in the Nationalist Socialist flags are Traditionalist Worker Party and Vanguard America.

A quick primer on these groups or terms:

Vanguard America is a white supremacist group that opposes multiculturalism and believes America is an exclusively white nation, according to the Anti-Defamation League.

"Using a right-wing nationalist slogan, Blood and Soil, VA romanticizes the notion that people with 'white blood' have a special bond with 'American soil," says the Anti-Defamation league website.

The above flag is associated with the group, according to SPLC.

Southern Poverty Law Center website

Kekistani:

Kekistan is a fictional country, occupied by kekcstanis who worship the god Kek. Often associated with the alt-right mascot "Pepe the Frog," it's a fiction used by the alt-right to troll liberals and signal their leanings.

The national flag of Kekistan, said theSouthern Poverty Law Center, "mimics a German Nazi war flag, with the Kek logo replacing the swastika and the green replacing the infamous German red. A 4chan logo is emblazoned in the upper left hand corner. Alt-righters are particularly fond of the way the banner trolls liberals who recognize its origins."

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center website

Identitarian: According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, several small American hate groups are spreading variations of identitarianism, a movement that preaches opposition to multiculturalism, and which the organization says often takes fate form of anti-Muslim xenophobia.

"Put simply, identitarians want regions and nations that are different from one another but at the same time culturally and ethnically homogenous within their borders," the SPLC website says.

Identity Evropa, founded in Oakdale, Calif., focuses on recruiting college-age, white students , "targeting disaffected young men by branding itself as a fraternity and social club," the SPLC says.

Ben, a 21-year-old KKK member from Harrison, Arkansas, attends the rally at Emancipation Park in Charlottesville, Va. Photo by Evelyn Hockstein for The Washington Post.

Southern Nationalist:

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, white nationalist groups espouse white supremacist or white separatist ideologies, often focusing on the alleged inferiority of non-whites.

Groups listed in a variety of other categories - Ku Klux Klan, neo-Confederate, neo-Nazi, racist skinhead, and Christian Identity - could also be fairly described as "white nationalist."

Al.com reports that a leading Southern nationalist group,the Alabama-based League of the South, still advocates for secession from the union.Al.com reports:

The League of the South's longtime president, retired university professor Michael Hill of Killen, Alabama, posted a message in July that began, "Fight or die white man" and went on to say Southern nationalists seek "nothing less than the complete reconquest and restoration of our patrimony -- the whole, entire South."

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center website

This is the Southern Nationalist flag, says SPLC. It has some variants:

This is another variation of the Southern Nationalist flag

From SPLC website: This flag is the flag of the National Socialist Movement, which it says is the oldest National Socialist group in the United States.

National socialism is also called Nazism. The National Socialist Movement website spells it out, demanding"the union of all Whites into a greater America"... and "Only those of pure White blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. Non-citizens may live in America only as guests and must be subject to laws for aliens. Accordingly, no Jew or homosexual may be a member of the nation."

From Southern Poverty Law Center website

According to the Anti-Defamation League, the Traditionalist Youth Network, founded in May 2013, is a white supremacist group that spouts a racist interpretation of Christianity.

Its members "often speak out against multiculturalism and are anti-Semitic," the ADL website says. "TYN claims to be for 'diversity' but defines diversity as each ethnic group promoting its own heritage and traditions while living apart from each other."

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center website.

Like the Traditionalist Youth Network, the Traditionalist Worker Party "is a white nationalist group that advocates for racially pure nations and communities and blames Jews for many of the worlds problems. Even as it claims to oppose racism, saying every race deserves its own lands and culture, the group is intimately allied with neo-Nazi and other hardline racist organizations that espouse unvarnished white supremacist views," says the Southern Poverty Law Center.

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center website

This is the flag of the American Guard, which the Southern Poverty Law Center describes as "hardcore nationalists dedicated to physically opposing leftists at events and rallies." Its ranks include aging and former racist skinheads and a at least one klan member, says the SPLC.

Matthew Heimbach, center, voices his displeasure at the media after a court hearing for James Alex Fields Jr., in front of court in Charlottesville, Va., Monday, Aug. 14, 2017. A judge has denied bond for Fields accused of plowing his car into a crowd at a white nationalist rally. (AP photo/Steve Helber)

Read more

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Flags of the alt-right, white supremacists - pennlive.com

January 6 Hearings Rile up Alt-Right Extremists Online – Business Insider

Alt-right extremists watch the January 6 hearings, too and there is a corresponding spike in conspiracy theories and denial about the veracity of the hearings' findings when they air, says an expert who monitors their online chatter.

On Telegram, Parler, 4Chan and other sites, chatter turns to who they think reallystormed the Capitol, said Ross Frenett, CEO and founder of Moonshot, a DC-based global counter-terrorism organization.

"You get spikes in talk about 'This was all antifa,' and 'This was all FBI,' and "This was an inside job' all a big part of what they talk about," Frenett told Insider.

Alt-right sites on Telegram include a recurring hearing "Watch Party" "Well tonight is the big finale," one user posted hours before Thursday's hearing and some very active Proud Boys and Oath Keepers chapters.

"J6 Committee Deceives a Nation!" "Proud Boys Infiltrated!" and "Proud Boys Did Nothing Wrong" were common memes on Proud Boys chapter channels in the lead-in to Thursday's hearing.

Pleas for contributions to the legal defense of Enrique Tarrio mingle with links to InfoWars and Gateway Pundit "exclusives" promising details on "leaked evidence" and "Liz Cheney's Bogus Seditious Conspiracy Charges."

"It's an attempt, when legitimate documents and findings are released, for them to release their own documents," said Frenett.

"Then it becomes, 'He said, she said' to the members, right? They say, 'Well, there are two sides to this.'"

During the last hearing, on July 12, a fake or doctored FBI surfaced on 4Chan and was shared many thousands of times in the following 24 hours, said Frenett.

"It claimed to be evidence that the FBI knew that the Proud Boys weren't violent, and that the Proud Boys weren't involved in this at all," he said.

"It's basically groups that are pro-Oath Keepers, pro-Proud Boys, their Telegram groups. A bunch of anonymous folks that sit at the center of these various ecosystems," said Frenett, whose group informs the Department of Homeland Security on emerging trends and risks.

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January 6 Hearings Rile up Alt-Right Extremists Online - Business Insider

When Did Racism Begin? – The Chronicle of Higher Education

Does racism have its roots in the ancient and premodern past, or is it a product of Western modernity? That question has animated a significant body of recent scholarship on ancient, medieval, and early-modern texts and cultural practices. In his 2015 editorial introduction to a journal issue on race and the Middle Ages, the medievalist Cord Whitaker wrote that the question of races relevance is solved: yes, the Middle Ages have been thoroughly raced. But has it?

The recent scholarship on medieval racism resolutely rejects, and seeks to overturn, a prior consensus, broadly dating from the 1990s, that the concept of race is both modern and Western. What constituted modernity was up for grabs depending on the scholar, it could be as early as the 1700s or as late as the 19th century but there was general agreement that what we witness in ancient and premodern history is xenophobia, prejudice, and ethnocentrism, but not racism. The origins of racism, these scholars argued, were tethered to the rise of centralized states or nationalism or anthropology or biological science in other words, the appendages of modernity.

But by 2019, the Trump presidency, the specter of white supremacy, and increasingly tense and ugly exchanges on social media among medieval scholars (as well as between scholars and alt-right pundits), ensured that the annual International Congress on Medieval Studies, in Kalamazoo, Mich., was so politically charged and fractious that it made the front page of The New York Times. At the core of these divisions both at the conference and, more broadly, in the published scholarship is the fraught question of whether race and racism are viable categories in the study of the European premodern.

For the scholars who answer that question in the affirmative, the old consensus that race is a uniquely modern construct is a political, historical, and scholarly provocation. From this perspective, the language of racism (as opposed to ethnocentrism, for example) is necessary to make legible the prejudices of the ancient and premodern past and the atrocities committed in their name. It was historically legitimate to speak of ancient, medieval, or early-modern racism because discrimination was directed at racialized groups, for instance, Jews and Moors.

The scholarship thus produced mobilizes contemporary politics insisting on the relevance of the medieval past to the racial configurations of our current moment but it does so through an appeal to a mid-20th-century historical methodology: the history of ideas.

For the 20th-century historian Arthur Lovejoy, one of the great architects of the history of ideas, to trace an idea through history involves identifying behind the surface-dissimilarities a recognizable coherence, that is, the continuity of old elements, which holds the mass together, thus permitting us to see the real units, the effective working ideas, which, in any given case, are present. Ideas, to be sure, will be shaped, reconfigured, modified, and altered through the course of history, and discerning such shifts is a crucial component of the historians task. It involves knowing as far as may be known, the thoughts that have been widely held among men on matters of common human concernment, to determine how these thoughts have arisen, combined, interacted with, or counteracted, one another. But this task is enabled only by the prior recognition of an essential form, a unit-idea sufficiently intact and retaining enough cohesion and familial features that its constancy over time (through all the provinces of history in which it figures) can be the object of historical narration. Tossed and battered by the waves of time, unit-ideas always rise to the surface revealing an essential constancy of form, a resilient continuity, and a conceptual durability that the particularity of history fails to erode.

The influence of this historical methodology can be gauged not only by the journal founded in its name and the innumerable authors who broadly followed its precepts, but also by the lengthy critique that it inspired: Quentin Skinners influential 1969 essay Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas. While Skinner was not alone in his criticism of the history of ideas, the systematicity and breadth of his engagement have made his essay a classic touchstone in debates about the origins and persistence of concepts of time.

Skinners overarching criticism of the history of ideas consists of a general accusation of anachronism. The perpetual danger manifest in seeking to conceptualize an argument in such a way that its alien elements are dissolved into an apparent but misleading familiarity resides not only in masking some essential inapplicability of the historical material, but also in imposing thoughts, concerns, and practices upon a past that may not in fact have shared or even conceived of such thoughts, concerns, or practices.

While Skinners caution reiterates the mantra of historians everywhere, namely, Thou Shalt Not Commit Anachronisms, what interests me here are the specific weaknesses Skinner identifies that make the history of ideas particularly susceptible to charges of parochialism.

The first of these criticisms is of the practice of identifying and tracing a given doctrine (e.g., equality, progress, Machiavellism, the social contract) through history even when historical actors signally failed to recognize or name the doctrine with which they are being credited. Thus begins the search for a prehistory, a nascent whisper, a promising prototype hiding in the wings preparing for its moment in the teleological drama. As the historian duly sets out in quest of the idea he has characterized, Skinner writes, he is very readily led to speak as if the fully developed form of the doctrine was always in some sense immanent in history, even if various thinkers failed to hit upon it, even if it dropped from sight at various times. Such a quest for origins occasions endless debate almost wholly semantic, though posing as empirical about whether a given idea may be said to have really emerged at a given time, and whether it is really there in the work of some given writer.

Where the necessary words that correspond to a given doctrine do not conveniently avail themselves, historians of ideas and this is Skinners second criticism have resorted to a misleading fetishism of words (progress, equality, sovereignty, justice ) wherein the repetition of a given word or words across numerous texts over a historical period is privileged as evidence for the continuity of an idea. The word and idea morph into one, such that an essential coherence can then be detected and mapped.

This approach not only mistake[s] the word for the thing but also belies the changed connotations, the historical particularity, within which words are embedded. Moreover, the very proposition that ideas retain within them an essential meaning, an immutable core that transcends the specificity of culture and time, is dubious not least because it accords ideas an ethereal and transcendental quality. Even in those instances where we perhaps learn that the expression was used at different times to answer a variety of problems, this in itself does not reveal what questions the use of the expression was thought to answer in any given historical period. Furthermore, we can never grasp from such a history what status the given idea may have had at various times.

Cognizant of the perils of such an approach, historians of ideas increasingly appealed to historical context. Herein lies Skinners third criticism: While drawing attention to the historical context within which a text is produced is no doubt of some value, it can also have the effect of simply beg[ging] all the questions: the social context, it is said, helps to cause the formation and change of ideas; but the ideas in turn help to cause the formation and change of the social context. The primary problem, Skinner argues, is that while contextualization might aid in locating a text in a given historical moment, it does not ipso facto allow us to understand the work itself. The context mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is said. It needs rather to be treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate.

The final and related weakness endemic to some of the literature within the history of ideas is what Skinner identifies as the mythology of prolepsis, that is, the effort to credit a historical actor with views that are in fact outside of her historical time. Thus, to follow Skinners example, Jean-Jacques Rousseaus writings may have appealed to 20th-century totalitarian politics, but to interpret his writings as a deliberate, conscious defense of totalitarianism is to read back in time a political significance that had yet to materialize.

What is common to the scholarship on both the ancient and premodern origins of racism is the implicit presumption that racism is an empty vessel residing outside of the history it is said to contain. Racism is thought to retain enough conceptual cohesion that it precedes the history that it then particularizes. In short, racism resembles Lovejoys unit-idea in the constancy of its recognizable, essential form the historical intransigence of racism is the presumptive condition for the histories of which it is then the object, histories that cross centuries if not millennia.

The study of the historical lineage of race involves the question of origins wherein, as Skinner said, we enter the endless debate as to when a given idea may be said to have really emerged. Is it possible, Benjamin Isaac asks, that some of the essential elements of later (modern) racism have their roots in Greek and Roman thinking? Nicole Lopez-Jantzen suggests that the early Middle Ages may hold the key to providing a bridge between classical and medieval forms of racial categorization. Alternatively, according to Geraldine Heng, one of the most prominent scholars in this subfield, race-making can be gleaned in the texts and practices of the later Middle Ages evident through the treatment and representation of Jews, Muslims, Gypsies, and Saracens. Then again, perhaps it is in the early-modern period that we first encounter racist thought following the conquests in the New World and the beginnings of modern chattel slavery so argues George M. Fredrickson. The 18th century has also been a strong contender for racisms origins the zenith of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the fetishism for taxonomies systematizing (and hierarchizing) human difference. Or is race the child of 19th-century modernity (here I must confess my own allegiance), nursed by empire, nationalism, ethnography, and the biological sciences?

Such efforts to secure race/racisms conceptual and material origins render this debate susceptible to the criticisms Skinner identified. We begin with an idea without a name. As Peter Erickson observed, before defending scholarship that locates the origins of racism in Renaissance texts, I know of no other area of scholarly investigation in which the overall interpretative stance and conceptual framework so directly and completely hinge on the status and legitimacy of a single word. Erickson is alluding to the unhappy fact that race cannot boast a classical lineage. In an otherwise contentious debate, there is consensus that race enters European languages sometime between the 12th and 15th centuries, and even then, it more often refers to horse and dog breeding, lineage (usually in reference to the nobility), and blood.

Thus, it is not possible, la Lovejoy, to trace the idea of race through appeal to the continuity and repetition of the word. This inconvenient truth has not stopped historians from recognizing, through unfamiliar vocabularies and language, the presence of race in the ancient, medieval, and early-modern periods. Scholars documenting premodern racism have sought to identify like-words that are called upon to stand in for race gens, natio, stock, tribe, ethno, blood, lineage, and family. Functioning as precursors to a future yet to materialize, the historian is very readily led to speak as if the fully developed form of the doctrine was always in some sense immanent in history. We encounter in the literature such phrasing as protoracism, nascent racial characteristics, and incipient racial ideology. Premodern racism then comes to constitute the origin point from which modern racism is, as Lynne Tarte Ramey puts it, the inevitable outcome of centuries of thought that preceded it. It is, in Charles de Miramons words, the forge where race was minted, the intellectual scaffolding where what Diego von Vacano calls the seeds of what would later be called racism could be planted on, as H.M Bracken says, ground well prepared for social Darwinism.

Scholars who defend the presence of premodern racism are right to point to the intense forms of discriminations and violence against, as well as the xenophobic representations of, Jews, Roma, Saracens, and Moors in European texts of the medieval and early-modern period. But are they right to feel aggrieved by the failure of theorists of modernity to recognize such practices and textual representations as forms of racism? Their contention is that even if the word race did not exist, racist practices did. That the historical actors themselves may not have recognized their actions as racist (or consciously rejected such categorization as todays racists often do) need not prevent us, armed with the benefits of hindsight (and equipped with a concept) to see what is really going on.

The problem is that in seeking family resemblances, we potentially obstruct our understanding of the historical context. This is evident in the oft-repeated appeal to premodern literatures on monsters and wild men as evidence of ancient, medieval, and early-modern racism. Here, representations of the monstrous populations inhabiting distant climes whose bodies are human/animal hybrids are translated into racialized figures wherein highly selective readings extract references to blackness as signifying innate theories of biologism in what are otherworldly accounts of difference.

It should not surprise us that a quest for references to skin color dominates much of the scholarship on ancient, medieval, and early-modern racism. If race is absent in premodern vocabularies, no such claim can be made for colors or at least, black, white, green, purple, red, which all figured in the medieval lexicon. What our premodern brethren saw, when they saw color, is impossible to know with any certainty the confused description (at least for moderns) of what the classical and medieval world identified as purple is well documented. What is clear, however, is that in the European Middle Ages, black and white were charged descriptors that often conveyed moral meaning.

Thus, the most suggestive evidence for ancient and medieval racism resides in the normative evaluation accorded to black and white. It is an argument made famous in Winthrop Jordans influential work White Over Black (1968) where he argued that a long cultural history of pejorative associations with the concept of blackness congealed, if incalculably in the body of the African slave. Jordans thesis has been embraced by more recent scholars. By the time of Shakespeare, Ania Loomba argues, there had been a long tradition, dating back to the Romans, that equated blackness with lechery. Similarly, Thomas Hahn insists that throughout the ancient world and the Middle Ages, the black-white binary persistently conveys deep-seated symbolic meaning in both written and visual contexts, and thus, it seems hard to accept that the ancient cultural registers habitual associations of blackness with evil and death, for example did not leak through and suffuse the cultural identities of black peoples.

The argument is an appealing one, for unlike the unfamiliar vocabulary of gens, tracing the negative correlation between blackness and black skin in ancient and premodern times resonates with more-modern conceptions of race as biological and innate. Thus, numerous scholars have sought to defend the presence of race/racism in antiquity, the European Middle Ages, and the early-modern era by offering evidence of the ubiquitous (and negative) references to blackness within the cultural imaginations of these periods.

It is in the Middle Ages, Steven Epstein tells us, that blackness and whiteness come to acquire their normative valence and color prejudice becomes a sustaining ideology. The evidence draws from theological interpretations of the Song of Songs with respect to themes of color, ethnic prejudice, and racism; in the identification of whiteness with Christianity and blackness linked with hell as well as with heathen culture that Lisa Lampert observes in Wolfram von Eschenbachs epic 13th-century poem Parzival; and in the 14th-century chivalric romance King of Tars, wherein the Saracen king metamorphizes from black to white upon conversion to Christianity, thereby demonstrating what Heng calls the normativity of whiteness, and of the white racial body, as the guarantor of normalcy, aesthetic, and moral virtue. In all cases, Whitaker writes of the English and European Middle Ages, whether attributed to excessive heat, burnt blood or associated with unrestrained sexual passion blackness denotes abnormality. Similar arguments have been made for the early-modern period, with Shakespeares Othello bearing witness to the color coding of Renaissance racism. To these examples can be added the blackness of Ham, his banishment to Africa, and identification with slavery.

Some scholars, inclined to see race/racism as a feature of the modern era, have offered counterarguments: Benjamin Braude points out that Hams association with Africa, let alone with blackness, is an invention of the 19th century; while G.K. Hunter says that those who often bore the brunt of medieval discrimination (the Jews, for example) were not always physiologically distinct, and that, while the Moor was often disparaged, it is unclear what this designation actually entailed beyond its generic conflation with heathen. Moreover, between the 13th and 16th centuries, Europeans did not identify themselves as white but rather referred to what Valentin Groebner calls an astonishing range of skin colors including ulivigna (olive colored), deep red, vermeille (crimson), and even verdtre or verdastro (greenish) the vagaries of an ever-changing, fluid combination of ones bodily liquids. Whiteness itself was not always an enviable color. Patrizia Magli quotes the 16th-century physiognomist Giovanni Battista della Porta to that effect: The moon is of a white color and thus it follows that white is the color of lunatics, phlegmatics and shy individuals.

Yet others have argued that colors, including white and black, were fluid categories with unstable and changing meanings. For Jane Schneider, we need only think of the Black Magi, the Black Madonna, Christ as black, and the close association between black robes and the ascetic ideas of the good Christian. Indeed, if at times blackness stood in opposition to Christianity, on other occasions it was an integral medium for symbolizing the values of the religion: It could connote modesty, austerity, and a pointed rejection of the temptations and sensual indulgences of the East.

In short, there is a danger in projecting contemporary racial associations with black and white upon a distant past. Indeed, it is often more revealing of our own cultural embeddedness within the racialized present than evidence of racism in premodern times. The conceptual slippage is not uncommon. James Dee, for example, asks why Bernard Knox, in a 1992 Jefferson lecture, should insist that the Greeks were undoubtedly white only to then say, or to be exact, a sort of Mediterranean olive color. What modern preoccupations are entangled in such insistence?

How do we begin to interpret the normative associations that circulate in and through medieval appeals to blackness and whiteness within a context where God is not an object of the mind but a condition of being? When white and black are sometimes better understood as luminosity and darkness the quest for salvation through knowledge of Gods magnificence or for redemption in the knowledge of mans fall? In what register do we contemplate the racial body when the impassive immutability that such singularity and coherence denotes was foreign to premodern styles of reasoning? Instead, what we witness are bodies tethered to the movement of planets and stars, transformed through baptism and conversion, afflicted by the imbalance of the four humors that are themselves inflected through color, altered by climatic conditions, and at times, even liminal in their form part human, part animal, wild, monstrous.

Extracting, abstracting, and translating medieval vocabularies of color into the conceptual familiarity of race presumes a continuity that is difficult to sustain when confronted with two incommensurable structures of thought: one, the premodern, where colors acquire meaning through a constellation of statements that are tethered to cosmic sympathies and antipathies, Gods benevolence and divine judgment; the other, the modern, where red, brown, black, and white bodies signified the normal and pathological, the primitive and the civilized, missing links and evolutionary stages.

To try to bridge the gap between such foreign conceptual schema and modern notions of race, some scholars seeking to trace the premodern origins of race/racism have complemented textual exegesis with a wealth of historical detail. Thus we learn from Heng of the 1215 Fourth Lateran Councils Canon 68, which mandated distinct dress codes for Jews and Muslims and of the series of English rulings requiring that the Jewish minority be compelled to wear badges; from David Nirenberg of the expulsion or forced conversion of Jews from Spain between 1341 and 1492 and the expulsion of all Moors from Spain in 1492; from Emily C. Bartels of the 1596 and 1601 open warrants by Queen Elizabeth I to deport Negars and Blackamoors; from Arthur Little of the 1554, 1562, and 1612 decrees to banish or police Gypsies within England, and the 1594 decree to banish the Irish.

And yet, even when we move from texts to practices, we still confront the problematic Skinner identified, namely that appeals to historical context can sometimes beg the question. Racism is the interpretive lens through which texts and practices are recognized as racist even as these same texts and practices are evidence of racism. The circularity of the argument is further accentuated when scholars seek recourse in definitions to ground the periodization they then wish to defend. Definitional fiat ensures that the determinative characteristics of race/racism identified by the scholar obligingly correspond with the historical period within which he or she locates its origin.

Scholars challenging the modernity of the concept of race protest against Kwame Anthony Appiahs tripartite model of history, which distinguishes between the ethnographic representations of antiquity, the theologically inspired prejudices of the early modern, and a 19-century racism born of nationalism and biologism. They do so by insisting on changing the definition of race itself. As Erickson asserts, race is relevant for the Renaissance, but the concept has to be redefined.

Whether an author begins with a definition or not, the very logic of origins presumes demarcations that include, among other things, a judgmental cataloging of thinkers: to put it crudely, who is and who is not a racist. A given historical thinker is thus denounced or praised, chided for omissions or credited for foresight. Plato, for instance, is emblematic of the proto in Benjamin Isaacs formulation of protoracism, since long before Francis Galton coined the term eugenics, we recognize an earlier articulation and defense of this doctrine in the writings of a fourth-century philosopher.

To define race requires that distinctions be made: conceptual delineations between xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and racism; between theological, civic, and biological renderings of difference, and so on. The underlying presumption is that to locate racism in a given period is also an exercise in delineating what is not racism. For this reason, Geraldine Hengs efforts to assign racisms origins to the European Middle Ages is striking for the sheer breadth of her definition: Race is one of the primary names we have attached to a repeating tendency to demarcate human beings through differences among humans that are selectively essentialized as absolute and fundamental, in order to distribute positions and powers differentially to human groups. Race is a structural relationship for the articulation and management of human differences, rather than a substantive content.

We are left wondering, along with William Jordan: Is every hatred a form or variant of racism?

What is behind the impulse to trace the origins of racism back to an ancient and premodern past and to seek that past in the present? Efforts to accord ancient or medieval origins to what have more commonly been identified with modern history are not, of course, limited to scholars of race/racism, but what is striking about the scholarship on premodern racism is not only the sheer volume of literature that has been produced over the past 20 years, but the tone of aggrievement that much of this literature conveys. The scholarship that I have cited here offers detailed histories and close textual readings, but they also articulate, to varying degrees, a sense of outrage, deep frustration, aggravation, indignation, and anger. What concerns me is not the passion itself (a much-needed corrective to the dull soberness of academic prose) but the reasons provoking the often-polemical style that informs much of this scholarship. This rhetoric is less focused on the injustices of the past than the perceived injustices of the present: the willful failure of contemporary scholarship to recognize that ancient and premodern racial history continues to inform the politics of today.

Some scholars regard this refusal as tantamount to a pervasive racism within the academy, what Arthur Little calls a white melancholia that posit[s] and valorize[s] an imaginary historical moment when humanity was both white and unraced. Or, according to Whitaker, it represents an erasure of a black presence from the European medieval past, thereby consigning modern blacks to a history without the authorizing length and depth available to whites. As Peter Erickson and Kim F. Hall put it, We can only conclude that these acts of refusal [to recognize premodern racism] are due to a pathological averseness to thinking about race under the guise of protecting historical difference. It is perhaps the correlation being drawn between the whiteness of the Anglo-American academy (particularly in classical, medieval, and Renaissance studies) and the refusal to acknowledge racism in the premodern past that accounts for why Dorothy Kim appeals to the quantifiable weight of difference as the opening gambit in her introductory essay in Literature Compass: This is the first special issue on race or volume on race in the premodern past that also includes a 60 percent (including myself as the writer of this introduction) demographic of scholars who identify as medievalists of color.

It is apparent that the driving force behind recent efforts to establish a premodern origin for racism stems from the desire for, and an insistence upon, political relevancy the insistence that ancient, medieval, and early-modern history continues to have a bearing on and was foundational to the making of our contemporary moment. Thus, arguments proffered by some historians that premodern prejudice be identified in terms of xenophobia or ethnocentrism rather than racism have been roundly rejected. The reasons offered are explicitly polemical racism, it is argued, carries a resonance, a legibility, a political, contemporary currency that other terms do not.

Similarly, it is against this backdrop of demands for the topicality of the premodern to the immediacy of present-day politics that has enabled an imaginative crisscrossing of cultures and temporalities. Key elements that form the foundations of both colonial expansion and nineteenth century scientific racism can already be located in certain strands of medieval discourse evident, Lynn Ramey continues, in early scientific treatises on conception and on what would come to be called genetics (my emphasis). Heng moves from recounting the persecution of Jews in the 13th century manifest in various royal and church edicts to 20th-century apartheid in South Africa and 21st-century targeting of Kurds in Turkey. Peter Abelards 12th-century erotic imaginings of black women is a premonition of what is to come: the modern-day saga of Strom Thurmond or the historical saga of Thomas Jefferson. The assignment of badges or stars that Jews were compelled to wear in the 12th, 13th, and 20th centuries are, for Hahn, all modes of legally mandated racial profiling. The figure of Othello and the racialism that informs Shakespeares play are paralleled, in Kyle Gordys work, with the former U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell. Modern Islamophobia is just the most recent iteration of premodern religious racism perpetuated against Moor, Saracens, and Turks. The modern conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis and Bosnians and Serbs are all evidence of a return to the cultural racisms that are said to define the Middle Ages and the early modern.

For scholars who locate racism in the medieval period, there is a historical continuity, an essential sameness, that tethers the European Middle Ages to modernity. The frequent charge of anachronism meted out against this scholarship has been met with scorn and derision, dismissed by Erickson and Hall as a a scare tactic and conversation stopper intent on what Ian Smith derides as fetishizing historical accuracy. Charges of anachronism have provoked the counteraccusation of ahistoricism that purportedly lies at the heart of histories centered on races recent origin. Implicit in modernist histories, the thinking goes, is the suggestion that racism, like modernity itself, emerges out of a temporal vacuum, what Heng calls a big bang wherein all history before the modern is essentially relegated to a space outside of real time.

But surely it is possible to speak of conversations across time without presuming a continuity of meaning over time. No one would dispute the centrality of pagan writings, such as those attributed to Plato and Aristotle, to the theological meditations of Augustine and Aquinas, respectively. Machiavellis sardonic introduction to The Prince is directed against the advice manuals to rulers popularized by ancient and medieval writers; his Discourses on Livy is inspired by Roman Republicanism. Sigmund Freud reads Sophocles, Hannah Arendt disputes Hegel, Jacques Derrida returns to Rousseau, Jean Rhys gives literary voice to Bronts mad woman in the attic, Adrian Piper performs Kant, John Rawls revives Locke, Judith Butler rereads Antigone, the 18th century turns to antiquity, the 19th century packages the Middle Ages.

All such engagements, disputations, anachronisms, nostalgia, and interpretations are part of what has been collectively identified as the hermeneutics of Western traditions of thought, and insofar as such texts, practices, and thinkers are continually interpellated into the present of the author who engages them, they are securing the continuity of that interpretive history. As Sanjay Seth has recently argued, The text is not just an object of the past belonging purely to the present; it comes to us already interpreted, not as a mere object but as a tissue of interpretation. And collectively, such historical interpretations and textual exegesis constitute the traditions out of which we reason. But we need not presume that such reason must be singular and constant throughout time. While the contemporaries of any given period have taken up the texts and practices of their historical predecessors and revived, engaged, contested, and reimagined them, they have done so within the possibilities and constraints of radically distinct epistemic frameworks. In other words, one can acknowledge rupture and historical discontinuity without disavowing the continuity that underwrites Western hermeneutics.

One can recognize, for example, the long history of Christian vilification of Jews and Muslims without thereby presuming that medieval renderings of heathens and infidels share the same conceptual meaning as contemporary anti-Semitism or Islamophobia. Building on the work of a number of scholars, Jonathan Judaken argues that we cannot simply postulate causal links across time between anti-Jewish animus and persecution nor, as with the overexpansive use of the term racism, appeal to a notion of anti-Semitism as eternal or as teleologically culminating in the Nazi genocide.

Thus, in the Latin Christian Medieval context, where God was the precondition for and locus of knowledge, ritualistic practices defined social existence at all levels. Those who engaged in forms of worship that failed to adhere were rendered legible (and in their legibility derided, ostracized, persecuted, violently expelled, and at times, killed) within and through this epistemic framework. Therefore, as Judaken argues, the ostensibly malformed foot of the Jew was a sign of his affiliation with the devil in the Middle Ages, whereas in a modern context, it was appealed to as an indicator of his ineligibility for military service and consequently citizenship in newly forming nation-states.

Scholars of medieval racism, however, will sometimes argue that approaches like Judakens have the effect of not only marginalizing the significance of these historical periods (a significance that continues to haunt the present) but also conferring upon the premodern past a diminutive status (the precursor to the real time of modernity) or worse still, untethering it from the modern altogether. The implication seems to be that to recognize other ages or cultures as imagining and inhabiting worlds incommensurable to that of the modern West renders them somehow impoverished and deficient.

Efforts by scholars of medieval racism to counter such narratives of lack by insisting that what defined European modernity always already existed, does not dethrone the privileging of the modern. On the contrary, it reaffirms it. Absence is conflated with abjection. In this vein, the relevancy of the Middle Ages is presumed to reside in its familial resemblance to the modern; being essentially the same, it must have historical value. Inadvertently, modernity constitutes the yardstick against which the medieval arrives at self-definition.

While medievalists are absolutely right in their criticism of a long lineage of scholarship that has identified the modern West as the instigator of history, thus marking the medieval (and non-West) as prehistorical and implicitly (if not explicitly) inferior, the answer is not to then insist that the conditions and practices of the modern West (be it nationalism, individuality, or racism) must therefore be extended to all societies in order to counter the linear temporality they rightly deride.

The oft-repeated complaint by scholars of medieval racism that the failure to recognize the ubiquity of racial prejudice in the historical period they study is somehow derisive, dismissive, nostalgic, or romanticizing need not logically follow. We can be cognizant of the myriad ways in which specific populations within medieval and early-modern Europe were represented, victimized, exiled, and discriminated against without insisting that sympathetic histories can be pursued only if they are accorded the status of modern categories biological thinking, miscegenation, religion, eugenics, premodern genetics, evolutionary progress, and yes, racism. Some 50 years ago, Skinners critique of the history of ideas revealed with historical and theoretical precision the inevitable limitations that arrest any historical endeavor that posits concepts as empty vessels immune to the ravages of time. And yet, it is this particular mode of historical inquiry that has re-emerged with a vengeance in the field of race studies.

This essay is adapted from The Origins of Racism: A Critique of the History of Ideas, which appeared in History & Theory.

See more here:
When Did Racism Begin? - The Chronicle of Higher Education