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Kulturkampf – Wikipedia

The German term Kulturkampf(helpinfo) (pronounced [kltukampf], literally "culture struggle") refers to power struggles between emerging constitutional and democratic nation states and the Roman Catholic Church over the place and role of religion in modern polity, usually in connection with secularization campaigns. In the ancien rgime, states were confessional, religion governed private and public life, and the Catholic Church had been closely associated with reactionary governments and ideological conservatism.[1] Thus, "the struggle against the ancien rgime, its remnants, or its restoration was necessarily a struggle against the church" and such conflicts were a central theme of Western European history from the mid-19th century until 1914. [2] [3] [4]

In the historical sense, Kulturkampf refers to such power struggles and legislative campaigns in several countries, e g. in Switzerland (see de:Kulturkampf in der Schweiz), which took a leading role in the 1840s (see: Sonderbund War), in Germany beginning around 1860 and especially their culmination between 1871 and 1876, in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain,[5] Spain,[6] Italy, Austria-Hungary (see de:Maigesetze (sterreich-Ungarn)), Hungary (1890-1895)[7] as well as in the United States and Latin America, e. g. Mexico [8] or Brazil.[9]

With this meaning the term Kulturkampf entered many languages, e.g.: French: le Kulturkampf, Spanish: el Kulturkampf, Italian: il Kulturkampf.[10] It first appeared c. 1840 in an anonymous review of a publication by Swiss-German liberal Ludwig Snell on "The Importance of the Struggle of Liberal Catholic Switzerland with the Roman Curia". But it only gained wider currency after liberal member of the Prussian parliament, Rudolph Virchow, used it in 1873.[11][12]

In contemporary socio-political discussion, the term Kulturkampf (see also culture war) is often used to describe any conflict between secular and religious authorities or deeply opposing values, beliefs between sizable factions within a nation, community, or other group.[13]

Under the influence of ascending new philosophies and ideologies such as the enlightenment, realism, positivism, materialism, nationalism, secularism and liberalism, the role of religion in society and the relationship between society and church underwent profound changes in the 18th and 19th centuries. Many countries endeavoured to strip the church of worldly powers, reduce the duties of the church to spiritual affairs by secularising the public sphere and by separation of church and state and to assert the supremacy of the state, especially in education.[14] Risn Healy argues that across Europe, the Kulturkampf operated mainly on state-level and was found "especially in strongholds of liberalism, anti-clericalism, and anti-Catholicism."[15]

The Catholic Church resisted this development which it portrayed as an attack on religion and sought to maintain and even strengthen its strong role in state and society.[16] With the growing influence of enlightenment and after having lost much of its wealth, power and influence in the mediatisation and secularization of the early 19th century the church had been in a state of decline.[17][18] The papacy at this time was at a weak point in its history, having just lost all its territories to Italy, with the pope a "prisoner" in the Vatican.[19] The church strove to revert its waning influence and to keep sway in such matters as e. g. marriage, family and education and initiated a Catholic revival by founding associations, papers, schools, social establishments or new orders and encouraging religious practices such as pilgrimages, mass assemblies, the devotion of Virgin Mary or the sacred heart of Jesus and the veneration of relics;[20] the pope himself became an object of devotion.[21] Apart from the extraordinary proliferation of religious orders, the 19th. century also witnessed the rise of countless Catholic associations and organisations, especially in Germany and in France.[22] Catholic propaganda including the interpretation of daily events was spread through local and national Catholic newspapers prominent in all western European nations as well as through organized missions and groups dedicated to pious literature.[23]

In the 19th. century, the Catholic Church promulgated a series of contentious dogmas and encyclicals: In

Under the leadership of his successor, Pope Pius IX, in

With its "Syllabus of Errors" of 1864, the Catholic Church launched an assault on the new ideologies condemning 80 philosophical and political statements, mainly the foundations of the modern nation state, as false. It outright rejected such concepts as freedom of religion, free thought, separation of church and state, civil marriage, sovereignty of the people, democracy, liberalism and socialism, reason as the sole base of human action and in general condemned the idea of conciliation with progress. The announcements included an index of forbidden books.[24]

A profound change was the gradual reorganization of the Catholic Church and its expansive use of the media. The popes worked to increase their control of the Church. Heavily criticized by European governments, it was centralized and streamlined with a strict hierarchy, the bishops sought direction from the Vatican and the needs and views of the international church were given priority over the local ones. Opponents of the new hierarchical church organization pejoratively called it ultramontanism.[25] [26]

In view of the churchs opposition to enlightenment, liberal reforms and the revolutions of the 18th/19th centuries, these dogmas and the churchs expressed insistence on papal primacy angered the liberal-minded all across Europe, even among some Catholics, adding fuel to the heated debates.[27][28]

The dogmas represented a threat to the secularized state as they reaffirmend that the fundamental allegiance of Catholics was not to their nation-state, but to the Gospel and the Church and that the popes teaching was absolutely authoritative and binding on all the faithful. Secular politicians even wondered whether "Catholicism and allegiance to the modern liberal state were not mutually exclusive". British Prime Minister Gladstone wrote in 1874 that the teaching on papal infallibility compromised the allegiance of faithful English Catholics. For European liberalism, the dogmas were a declaration of war against the modern state, science and spiritual freedom.[29][30]

The popes handling of dissent of the dogmas, e. g. by excommunication of critics or demanding their removal from schools and universities, was considered as "epitome of papal authoritarianism".[31] In direct response to the Vaticans announcements, Austria passed the so-called May-Laws for Cisleithania in 1868, restricting the Concordat of 1855, and then cancelled the concordat altogether in 1870. Saxony and Bavaria withheld approval to publish the papal infallibility; Hesse and Baden even denied any legal validity. France refused to publish the doctrines altogether; Spain forbade publication of Syllabus of Errors in 1864.[32]

By the mid-nineteenth century, liberal policies had also come to dominate Germany and the separation of church and state became a prominent issue.[33][34]

The Kulturkampf in Germany is usually framed by the years 1871 and 1878 with the Catholic Church officially announcing its end in 1880 but the struggle in Germany had been an ongoing matter without definite beginning and the years 1871 to 1878 only mark its culmination in Prussia and Germany. In the wake of other European countries, most German states had taken first steps of secularisation well before unification. Predominantly Catholic Baden was at the forefront curbing the power of the Catholic Church (1852 1854 Baden Church Dispute) and (1864 1876 Kulturkampf Baden, see de:Badischer Kulturkampf).[35][36] Other examples are Prussia (1830s, 1850, 1859 and 1969), Wrttemberg (1859/1862), Bavaria (1867, see de:Bayerischer Kulturkampf), Hesse-Nassau or Hesse-Darmstadt.

In the 1837 Klner Wirren (Cologne Confusion; article in German) of legal and policy issues regarding the children of mixed Protestant-Catholic marriages,[37] Prussia's final settlement was considered a defeat for the state as it had given in to demands of the Catholic Church.[38] In 1850, Prussia again had a dispute with the church about civil marriage and primary schools[39] and in 1852, it issued decrees against the Jesuits. As in many European countries, Jesuits were being banned or heavily restricted in many of the German states e. g. in Saxony (1831) and even in Catholic ones such as Bavaria (1851), Baden (1860) or Wrttemberg (1862).[40]

Not to be left out, the German areas to the west of the Rhine had already gone through a process of separation of church and state in line with a radical secularization after annexation by revolutionary and Napoleonic France in 1794. After their return to Germany in 1814, many if not most of the changes were kept in place.[41]

In the Vormrz-years, Catholic publications usually portrayed revolutions as negative and dangerous to the existing order as well as to the interests of the Catholic Church. Most of them considered a viable Catholicism to be necessary for the very health of society and state and to be the only true and effective protection against the scourge of revolution.[42] The unsuccessful German revolutions of 184849, which the Catholic Church had opposed, produced no democratic reforms and attempts to radically disentangle state-church relationships failed. In the revolutionary parliament, many prominent representatives of political Catholicism took the side of the extreme right-wingers. In the years following the revolution, Catholicism became increasingly politicised due to the massive anti-modernist and anti-liberal policies of the Vatican.

In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and Franco-Prussian War of 1870 the Catholic Church sided against Prussia and it was an outspoken opponent of German unification under Prussia (as well as of Italys unification).

The Catholic dogmas and doctrines announced in 1854, 1864 and 1870 were perceived in Germany as direct attacks on the modern nation state.[43] Thus, Bismarck, the Liberals and the Conservatives representing orthodox Protestants found the Centre Partys support of the pope highly provocative. Many Catholics shared these sentiments, especially against the popes declared infallibility and the majority of Catholic German bishops deemed the definition of the dogma as "'unpropitious' in light of the situation in Germany". According to the Bavarian head of government, Hohenlohe, the dogma of infallibility compromised the Catholic's loyalty to the state.[44] While most Catholics eventually reconciled themselves to the doctrine, some founded the small breakaway Old Catholic Church.

The liberal majorities in the Imperial Diet and the Prussian parliament as well as liberals in general regarded the Church as backward, a hotbed for reactionaries, enemies of progress and cast monastic life as the epitome of a backward Catholic medievalism. They were alarmed by the dramatic rise in the numbers of monasteries, convents and clerical religious groups in an era of widespread religious revival. The Diocese of Cologne, for example, saw a tenfold increase of monks and nuns between 1850 and 1872. Prussian authorities were particularly suspicious of the spread of monastic life among the Polish and French minorities.[45] The Church, in turn, saw the National-Liberals its worst enemy, accusing them of spearheading the war against Christianity and the Catholic Church.[46]

At unification in 1871, the new German Empire included 25.5 million Protestants (62% of the population) and 15 million Catholics (36.5% of the population). Although a minority in the empire, Catholics were the majority in the states of Bavaria, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine as well as in the four Prussian Provinces of West Prussia, Posen, Rhineland, Westphalia and in the Prussian region of Upper Silesia. Since the Thirty Years' War the population was generally segregated along religious lines and rural areas or towns were overwhelmingly if not entirely of the same religion. Education was also separate and usually in the hands of the churches. There was little mutual tolerance, interaction or intermarriage. Protestants in general were deeply distrustful of the Catholic Church.

Unification had been achieved through many obstacles with strong opponents. These were the European powers of France and Austria, both Catholic nations, and the Catholic Church itself, the three of which Bismarck perceived as "Coalition of Catholic Revenge". For Bismarck, the empire was very fragile and its consolidation was an important issue. Biographer Otto Pflanze emphasizes, "Bismarck's belief in the existence of a widespread Catholic conspiracy that posed a threat to both his German and European policies."[47]

In a Protestant empire, the Catholic Church was to lose its good standing which it had enjoyed for centuries in the Catholic-dominated Holy Roman Empire and which it would have continued to enjoy in a German empire united under Austrian auspices. Thus, in 1870, on the eve of unification, the Center Party was explicitly founded to defend the position of the church in the new empire.

Bismarck was highly concerned that many major members and supporters of this new party were not in sympathy with the new empire: the House of Hanover, the ethnic minority of the Poles, the southern German states. In 1871, the predominantly Catholic states of Southern Germany had only reluctantly joined the empire, increasing the overall share of the Catholic population to 36.5%. Among this Catholic share was Germanys largest ethnic minority, well over 2 million Poles in the east of Prussia, who under Prussia and Germany suffered discrimination and oppression[48].. Bismarck regarded the new Centre Party not only as an illegal mixup of politics and religion and the churchs "long arm" but also as a unifying force for Catholic Germans and Poles and thus a threat to the consolidation of the empire. He feared that the Centre Party would frustrate his broader political agendas and he accused the Catholic priests of fostering Polish nationalism as had been done openly in the provinces of Posen and Upper Silesia.[27][49][50] [51] [52]

The Liberals regarded the Catholic Church as a powerful force of reaction and anti-modernity, especially after the proclamation of papal infallibility in 1870 and the tightening control of the Vatican over the local bishops.[53] The renewed vitality of Catholicism in Germany with its mass gatherings also attracted Protestants - even the heir to the Prussian throne, with the king's approval, attended one.[54] Antiliberalism, anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism became powerful intellectual forces of the time and the antagonism between Liberals and Protestants on one side and the Catholic Church on the other was fought out through mud-slinging in the press. A wave of anti-Catholic, anticlerical and antimonastic pamphleteering in the liberal press[54] was answered by antiliberal preaching and propaganda in Catholic newspapers and vice versa.

For these reasons, the government sought to wean the Catholic masses away from the hierarchy and the Centre Party and the liberals demands to curb the power of the churches meshed well with Bismarcks main political objective to crush the Centre Party. According to historian Anthony J. Steinhoff, "Bismarcks plan to disarm political Catholicism delighted liberal politicians, who provided the parliamentary backing for the crusade. Yet, the phrase the left-liberal Rudolf Virchow coined for this struggle, the Kulturkampf, suggests that the liberals wanted to do more than prevent Catholicism from becoming a political force. They wanted victory over Catholicism itself, the long-delayed conclusion of the Reformation".[55]

At least since 1847 and in line with the Liberals, Bismarck had also been of the professed opinion, that state and church should be completely separated and "the sphere of the state had to be made secure against the incursions by the church",[56] although his ideas were not as far reaching as in the United States or in Great Britain. He had in mind the traditional position of the Protestant church in Prussia and provoked considerable resistance from conservative Protestants. This became clear in a heated debate with Prussian culture minister von Mhler in 1871 when Bismarck said: "Since you stopped my plans in the Protestant church, I have to go via Rome".[57] In August 1871 at Bad Ems, Bismarck revealed his intention to fight against the Centre Party, to separate state and church, to transfer school inspection to laymen, to abolish religious instruction from schools and to transfer religious affairs to the minister of justice.[58]

On 22 January 1872, liberal Adalbert Falk replaced conservative Heinrich von Mhler as Prussian minister for religion, education and health. In Bismarck's mind, Falk was "to re-establish the rights of the state in relation to the church". Yet, unlike Bismarck, whose main motivation for the Kulturkampf was the political power struggle with the Centre Party, Falk, a lawyer, was a strong proponent of state authority having in mind the legal aspects of state-church relationships. Falk became the driving force behind the Kulturkampf laws. Although Bismarck publicly supported Falk, he doubted the success of his laws and was unhappy with his lack of political tact and sensitivity. The differences in their attitudes concerning the Kulturkampf eventually put the two politicians at odds with each other.[59][60]

With this background and the determination of church and state, the Kulturkampf in Germany acquired an additional edge as it gathered in intensitiy and bitterness.

From 1871 to 1876, the Prussian state parliament and the federal legislature (Reichstag), both with liberal majorities, enacted 22 laws in the context of the Kulturkampf. They were mainly directed against clerics: bishops, priests and religious orders (anti-clerical) and enforced the supremacy of the state over the church.[61][62] While several laws were specific to the Catholic Church (Jesuits, congregations etc.) the general laws affected both Catholic and Protestant churches. In an attempt to overcome increasing resistance by the Catholic Church and its defiance of the laws, new regulations increasingly went beyond state matters referring to purely internal affairs of the church. Even many liberals saw them as encroachment on civil liberties, compromising their own credo.[63]

Constitutionally, education and regulation of religious affairs were vested in the federal states and the leading actor of the Kulturkampf was Prussia, Germanys largest state. But some of the laws were also passed by the Reichstag and applied to all of Germany. In general, the laws did not affect the press and associations including Catholic ones.[62]

The major Kulturkampf laws were:

The last two laws passed in 1876 were of no practical importance.

The political situation in Europe was very volatile. Initially perceived as a possible enemy hostile to German unification under Prussian leadership, Austria and Germany very quickly became friends and formed the Dual Alliance in 1879. The possibility of a war with France or Russia also became more remote. Therefore, social and economical problems moved to the fore and Bismarcks attention gradually turned to other topics he deemed more threatening such as the increasing popularity of the socialists or more important such as questions of import duties. In these matters he could either not rely on the support of the liberals to pursue his goals or they were not sufficient to form a majority. Bismarck had not been comfortable with the increasing ferocity of the Kulturkampf. Concerning the rise of the Centre Party, the laws had proven to be greatly ineffective and even counter productive. He soon realized that they were of no help battling the Centre Party and as far as separation of state and church was concerend, he had achieved more than he wanted.[77]

In order to garner support for his Anti-Socialist Laws and protective trade tariffs, Bismarck turned his back on the liberals in search of new alliances. The death of Pius IX on 7 February 1878 opened the door for a settlement with the Catholic Church. The new pope, Leo XIII was pragmatic and conciliatory and expressed his wish for peace in a letter to the Prussian king on the very day of his election followed by a second letter in a similar vein that same year.

Bismarck and the Pope entered into direct negotiations without participation of the Church or the Reichstag, yet initially without much success. It came to pass that Falk, vehemently resented by Catholics, resigned on 14 July 1879, which could be read as a peace offering to the Vatican. A decisive boost only came in February 1880, when the Vatican unexpectedly agreed to the civic registry of clerics. As the Kulturkampf slowly wound down the talks lead to a number of so-called mitigation and peace laws which were passed until 1887.[75]

On 29 September 1885, as another sign of peace, Bismarck proposed the Pope as arbiter in a dispute with Spain about the Caroline Islands and accepted his verdict in favour of Spain. In gratitude but to the great horror of Catholics, the Pope awarded Bismarck the Supreme Order of Christ, the highest order of chivalry to be granted by the Holy See. Bismarck was the only Protestant ever to receive this award.

After further negotiations between Prussia and the Vatican the Prussian parliament passed 2 additional laws amending some of the Kulturkampf laws.

On 23 May 1887, the Pope declared The struggle which damaged the church and was of no good to the state is now over. The Mitigation and Peace Laws restored the inner autonomy of the Catholic church while leaving key regulations and the laws concerning separation of church and state in place (civic marriage, civic registry, religious disaffiliation, government school supervision, civic registry of clerics, ban of Jesuits, pulpit law, state supervision of church assets, constitutional amendments and the Catholic section in the Ministry of Culture was not reintroduced).

The respective opposing parties in the Reichstag harshly criticized the concessions made by the Vatican and the Prussian government. Windthorst and the Centre Party were dismayed at being sidelined and not being consulted about the concessions the pope made, e. g. about the ban on Jesuits or the civil registry of clerics. None of the partys major demands were met. Instead, the pope even sided with Bismarck on non-religious issues and pressured the Centre Party to support Bismarck or at least abstain, e. g. in the matter of the hotly debated Septennat 1887 (7-year military budget). Many Liberals, especially Falk, objected to the concessions Bismarck made to the Church.

The growth of the Centre Party has been considered a major setback for Bismarck although never publicly conceded. Yet, in spite of strong Catholic representation in the Reichstag, the political power and influence of the Church in the public sphere and its political power was greatly reduced.

Although Germany and the Vatican were officially at peace after 1878, religious conflicts and tensions continued. At the turn of the century, Pope Pius X announced the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, mounting new attacks on historical criticism of biblical texts and any accommodation of Catholicism to modern philosophy, sociology or literature. As of 1910, clerics had to take an oath against all forms of modernism, a requirement later extended to teachers of Catholic religion at schools and professors of Catholic theology resulting in intense political and public debates and new conflicts with the state.[78]

The abolishment of the Catholic section of the Prussian Ministry of ecclesiastical and educational affairs, deprived Catholics of their voice at the highest level. The system of strict government supervision of schools was applied only in Catholic areas; the Protestant schools were left alone. The school politics also alienated Protestant conservatives and churchmen.[79]

The British ambassador Odo Russell reported to London in October 1872 how Bismarck's plans were backfiring by strengthening the ultramontane (pro-papal) position inside German Catholicism:

Nearly all German bishops, clergy and laymen rejected the legality of the new laws, and were defiant facing the increasingly heavy penalties, trials and imprisonments. As of 1878, only three of eight Prussian dioceses still had bishops, some 1,125 of 4,600 parishes were vacant, and nearly 1,800 priests ended up in jail or in exile, nearly half the monks and nuns had left Prussia, a third of the monasteries and convents were closed. Between 1872 and 1878, numerous Catholic newspapers were confiscated, Catholic associations and assemblies were dissolved, and Catholic civil servants were dismissed merely on the pretence of having Ultramontane sympathies. Thousands of laypeople were imprisoned for assisting priests to evade the punitive new laws.[81][82]

The general ideological enthusiasm among the liberals for the Kulturkampf[83] was in contrast to Bismarck's pragmatic attitude towards the measures[84] and growing disquiet from the Conservatives.[85] Apart from the outspoken criticism of the Kulturkampf Laws by the Catholic Church and the Centre Party, there were also a number of Liberals and Protestants who voiced concern at least at the so-called "Kampfgesetze" (battle laws). "Unease concerning the effects of his programme continued to spread among all but the most bigoted priest-haters and the most doctrinaire liberals".[86] Such noted critics outside the Catholic camp were Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken, Emil Albert Friedberg or Julius von Kirchmann. Although they were proponents of state superiority, they regarded some of the laws as either ineffective or as interference in internal church affairs and not consistent with liberal values. Geffcken wrote that "with the intention to emancipate the laity from the hierarchy, the main body of the Catholics was brought in phalanx into the hands of leaders from which it was to be wrested. But the state cannot fight at length against a third of the population, it has no means to break such a passive resistance supported and organized by religious fanaticism. If a statesman desists from the correctness of a measure it only matters that he has the power to enforce it." Even Bismarck who initially saw a variety of tactical political advantages in these measures, e. g. for his suppressive policies against the Polish population took pains to distance himself from the rigors of their enforcement."[87]

The Kulturkampf law considered the harshest and with no equivalent in Europe was the Expatriation Law. Passed by a liberal majority in parliament, it stipulated banishment as a punishment that all civilized peoples considered the harshest beyond the death penalty.[88]

As to the Centre Party, these measures did not have the effect that Bismarck had in mind. In the state elections of November 1873, it grew from 50 to 90 seats and in the Reichstag elections from 63 to 91. The number of Catholic periodicals also increased; in 1873 there were about 120.[74]

The Kulturkampf gave secularists and socialists an opportunity to attack all religions, an outcome that distressed the Protestant leaders and especially Bismarck himself, who was a devout pietistic Protestant.[89]

In the face of systematic defiance, the Bismarck government increased the penalties and its attacks, and were challenged in 1875 when a papal encyclical declared that the entire ecclesiastical legislation of Prussia was invalid, and threatened to excommunicate any Catholic who obeyed. There was no violence, but the Catholics mobilized their support, set up numerous civic organizations, raised money to pay fines and rallied behind their church and the Center Party.

To Bismarck's surprise, the Conservative Party especially the Junkers from his own landowning class in East Prussia, sided with the Catholics. They were Protestants and did not like the Pope, but they had much in common with the Center Party. The Conservatives controlled their local schools and did not want bureaucrats from Berlin to take them over. They were hostile to the liberals, being fearful of free trade that would put them in competition with the United States and other grain exporters, and disliking their secular views. In the Prussian legislature they sided with the Center Party on the school issue. Bismarck was livid, and he resigned the premiership of Prussia (while remaining Chancellor of the German Empire), telling an ally, "in domestic affairs I have lost the ground that is for me acceptable through the unpatriotic treason of the Conservative Party in the Catholic question." Indeed, many of Bismarck's conservative friends were in opposition. So too was Kaiser William I, who was King of Prussia; he was strongly opposed to the civil marriage component of the Kulturkampf.[90]

The Kulturkampf made Catholics more resolute; they responded not with violence but with votes, and as the newly formed Center Party became a major force in the Imperial Parliament, it gained support from non-Catholic minorities who felt threatened by Bismarck's centralization of power.[89] In the long run, the most significant result was the mobilization of the Catholic voters through the Center Party, and their insistence on protecting their church. Historian Margaret Anderson says:

After the Center party had doubled its popular vote in the elections of 1874, it became the second largest party in the national parliament, and remained a powerful force for the next 60 years. It became difficult for Bismarck to form a government without their support.[89][92] From the decades-long experience in battling against the Kulturkampf, the Catholics of Germany, says Professor Margaret Anderson, learned democracy. She states that the clergy:

The Poles had already suffered from discrimination and numerous oppressive measures in Germany long before unification. These measures were intensified after the German Empire was formed[94] and Bismarck was known to be particularly hostile towards the Poles.[95][96] Christopher Clark argues that Prussian policy changed radically in the 1870s in the face of highly visible Polish support for France in the Franco-Prussian war.[97] Polish demonstrations made clear the Polish nationalist feeling, and calls were also made for Polish recruits to desert from the Prussian Army though these went unheeded. Bismarck was outraged, telling the Prussian cabinet in 1871: From the Russian border to the Adriatic Sea we are confronted with the combined propaganda of Slavs, ultramontanes, and reactionaries, and it is necessary openly to defend our national interests and our language against such hostile actions.[98] Therefore, in the Province of Posen the Kulturkampf took on a much more nationalistic character than in other parts of Germany.[99] Not an adamant supporter of the Liberals general Kulturkampf goals, Bismarck did recognize the potential in some of them for subduing Polish national aspirations and readily made use of it. While the Liberals main objective was separation of state and church as essential for a democratic and liberal society, Bismarck saw its use in separating the Polish population from the only supporter and guardian of its national identity. Prussian authorities imprisoned 185 priests and forced hundred of others into exile. Among the imprisoned was the Primate of Poland Archbishop Mieczysaw Ledchowski. A large part of the remaining Catholic priests had to continue their service in hiding from the authorities. Although most of the 185 imprisoned were finally set free by the end of the decade, those who were released emigrated.[citation needed] The official end of the Kulturkampf had little influence on the policies of Germanization which continued in the Polish-inhabited parts of the country.[99]

Around the same time as in Germany, a Kulturkampf was also raging in Switzerland with roots dating back to the 1830 and well beyond to the era of enlightenment and the Helvetic Republic.[100] In fact, it was in the Swiss context that the term "Kulturkampf" first appeared in a publication.[12] The 1830s were years of liberal regeneration and 12 cantons with liberal majorities enacted new constitutions with radical changes in the relationship between state and churches, especially putting education under government control.

These changes mainly affected the Catholic Church and its clerics resisted the new regulations. On 2 January 1834, at a meeting in Baden, the cantons of Lucerne, Bern, Zug, Solothurn, Basel-Landschaft, St. Gall, Aargau and Thurgau passed the "Resolution of Baden" (see de:Badener Artikel) to assert the demands of the state. A conservative backlash 1839 in Zurich (Zriputsch) and 1841 in Lucerne (in connection with the Aargau monastery dispute), the violent repression of the liberals in Valais by the Ultramontanes and the appointment of Jesuits to secondary schools in Lucerne led to the establishment of Freischar (rebel) forces in various liberal cantons. This in turm prompted the conservative cantons, initially secret, to form the "Sonderbund" (Special Union) in December 1845. In July 1847 the Federal Diet voted to dissolve the Sonderbund, amend the constitution and to expel the Jesuits which led to protests not only by the Vatican but also from the big conservative European powers of France, Russia, pre-revolutionary Prussia and Austria. The liberals had the undisguised support of England. The Sonderbund War broke out on 3. November 1847 and lasted until the surrender of the last conservative canton, Valais, on 29. November. Liberal constitutions were installed in all cantons. With revolutions breaking out in France and Germany threats by these poweres remained empty.

The years from 1830 to the end of the Sonderbundwar are considered the first phase of the Swiss Kulturkampf. A second phase started with various disputes and conflicts in the 1870s.

Walter Munzinger, unhappy with the dogma of papal infallibility, organized the first Swiss convention of Catholics in Solothurn on 18 September 1871 for likeminded Catholics. This convention is considered the beginning of the Christian Catholic Church of Switzerland, a member church of the Union of Utrecht of Old Catholic Churches.

One of the disputes was about the town priest of Geneva, Gaspar Mermillod, who assumed the powers of the bishop for the local Catholics without approval of the government. Despite the protest of the state council Mermillod continued to execute these powers; as a result he was deposed on 20 September 1872. On 16 January, the Roman Curia appointed Mermillod as vicar apostolic for the Canton of Geneva. In response, the Swiss Federal Council expelled him. After pope Pius IX called these proceedings by the Swiss authorities "disgraceful" in an encyclical of 20 November 1873, the Federal Council broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican on 12 December 1873.

After the Council of 1870, bishop Eugne Lachat of the Diocese of Basel proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility in his diocese even though the respective cantons (Solothurn, Lucerne, Zug, Bern, Aargau, Thurgau and Basel-Landschaft) had expressly forbidden him to do so. Two priests in Lucerne and Starrkirch did not acknowledge the new dogma. Lachat deposed and excommunicated them. Thereupon, the cantons Solothurn, Bern, Aargau, Thurgau and Basel-Landschaft deposed the bishop on 29 January 1873 and when the cathedral chapter refused to appoint an interim bishop, on 21 December 1874 they dissolved the diocese of Basel and liquidated Lachat's assets. Lachat moved his office from Solothurn to Lucerne. 97 clerics in the predominantly Catholic part of the canton Berne (today canton Jura) protested against the deposition of the bishop and the dissolution of the diocese. They proclaimed Lachat to be their rightful bishop at which the Federal Council deposed them. Rioting in several villages of the Jura region was quelled by force and military occupation; the 97 clerics were expelled in January 1874. The federal government rescinded this ordninance in 1875 but supremacy over the church by the canton of Berne was confirmed in a plebiscite.

In 1874, Switzerland enacted the second federal constitution which was accepted in a plebiscite. Except for the following restrictions, for the first time, this constitution allowed complete freedom of religion.

In December 1874, the University of Bern established a faculty for Catholic theology with the aim to train liberal-minded Catholic priests for the Jura region.

The Kulturkampf in Austria has roots dating back to the 18th. century. Emperor Joseph II launched a religious policy later called "Josephinism" advocating the supremacy of the state in religious matters. This resulted in far-reaching state control over the Catholic Church in Austria including e. g. the reorganization of dioceses, regulating the number of masses, the transfer of many schools into government hands, state-controlled seminaries, limiting the number of clerics and dissolving numerous monasteries. Protests of Pope Pius VI and even his visit to Vienna in 1782 were to no avail. In the concordat of 1855, the culmination of Catholic influence in Austria, many of the Catholic Churchs previous rights taken away under Joseph II were restored (marriage, partial control of censorship, elementary and secondary education, full control of clergy and religious fund.

In 1886 and 1869, after sanctioning the December constitution, the new cabinet appointed by emperor Francis Joseph undid parts of the concordat with several liberal reforms enacted in the so-called May Laws. Against strong protests from the Catholic Church, the laws of 25 May 1868 and 14 May 1869 restored civil marriage, passed primary and secondary education into government hands, installed interconfessional schools and regulated interconfessional relations (e. g. mixed marriages, faith of children including option of free choice).[101][102]

In a secret consistory, Pope Pius IX condemned the constitution of 1867 and the May laws as "leges abominabiles". In a pastoral letter on 7 September 1868, bishop Franz-Josef Rudigier called for resistance to these May laws. The letter was confiscated and he had to appear before court on 5 June 1869 which, for the first time, lead to public demonstrations of the Catholic population. On 12 July 1869, the bishop was sentenced to a jail term of two weeks, but pardoned by the emperor.

The May laws provoked a serious conflict between state and church. Austria abrogated the concordat of 1855 in 1870 after the promulgation of papal infallibility and abolished it in altogether in 1874. In May 1874, the Religious Act was officially recognized.[103]

The Kulturkampf in Italy is a very early example of the struggles between states and the Catholic Church; Italian liberals and democrats contributed substantially to the secularist project of modernity and had a strong effect on its own history.

Piedmont had a similar role in the unification of Italy as Prussia in Germany and it had been at the forefront in the struggle against the Catholic Church as far back as the 17th century under Victor Amadeus. The Church rejected an edict of 1694 tolerating the Waldensians. In the ensueing dispute, Amadeus prohibited the publication of the popes decree and many dioceses remained vacant. Amadeus demanded secular approval of clerical postings (bishops, priests, monasteries) and for ecclesiastical acts. Repeated negotiations brought no results, all the while the Vatican pronounced excommunications on secular officials and Amadeus countered with severe measures against clerics. The acquisition of Sardinia in 1720 added more issues about Church rights on the island. It was only under the following pope, Benedict XIII that negotiations were taken up again and an agreement was found in 1727 in which the Church relinquished some its previous rights. Under Amadeus successor, Charles Emmanuel, the Kingdom of Sardinia continued to press the Church hard for further concessions concerning ecclesiastical jurisdiction and taxation up to 1750.

As a result of the revolutions of 1848, King Charles Albert granted the Kingdom a constitution, summoned a liberal cabinet and assumed the leadership for the unification of Italy. That same year the Jesuits were banned, as in most Italian states, and a liberal school law was enacted. In 1849, the archbishops of Turin and Sassari were imprisoned. In 1850, ecclesiastical immunities were lifted and ecclesiastical jurisdiction further restricted. 1851 saw the introduction of regulated theological instruction, 1852 the introduction of civil marriage. In 1853 the office of the Apostolic royal steward was secularized. Laws of 1854 banned monasteries, of 1855 the Ecclesiastical Academy of Superga and as of 1856, regulations followed concerning priests and parish administration and the confiscation of Church lands. As of 1852, these policies were enacted under liberal prime minister of the kingdom, Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour who pursued Italian unification with the aim of Rome as the capital. [104]

In 1860, the Kingdom of Sardinia annexed all the Church territories (Romagna, Marche and Umbria) except the Patrimonium Petri and Rome itself which was protected by French troops, The pope excommunicated the "thieves of Church state" Victor Emmanuel proclaimed the Kingdom of Italy and became its first King. Cavour made an offer to the pope, to guarantee the Churchs sovereignty and far-reaching privileges in turn for the Church to give up the city of Rome. Pius IX declined. In 1861, Cavour submitted another offer, adding a regular payment to the pope and the king giving up his right to appoint bishops. Again, the pope declined.

When the French pulled their troops out of Rome due to the Franco-Prussian war, Italy, encouraged by the German envoy von Arnim, seized the remaining Church territory and the city on 20 September 1870 after which Rome became the Italian capital. The Vatican resisted any recognition of the Italian state until 1929. Through the years, the anti-church laws of Piedmont and Sardinia were extended to every expansion and eventually taken over by the new Italian state.

In 1887, under prime minister Crispi, Italy added the abolishment of church tithes; in 1888 it passed a law making access to primary school religious instruction more difficult, in 1889 the pulpit law was added to the criminal code and the law on the "opere pie", putting control of a vast network of endowments and trust funds financing both religious and charitable works into public authority.[105]

Well into the 19th. century, the Catholic Church dominated education in Belgium[106] and every attempt to reform schools was met with fierce resistance by the Catholic Church.[107]

The struggle reached a pivotal point under the liberal government of Walthre Frre-Orban Van Humbeeck (see nl:Regering-Frre-Orban II). From 1879 to 1884 there was a political crisis over state control of education and religious courses in public (see First School War). On 1 June 1879, Frre-Orban passed an Education Act secularizing primary education. The new law imposed recognized diplomas for teachers, stipulated state supervision of all schools and stripped Catholicism of its status as basis of education. Religious instruction in schools was possible outside the curriculum on request of parents. Municipalities were required to supply at least one neutral school and founding or subsidising private schools were banned. A new law on secondary schools was in the same vein. It was to guarantee parents the freedom of choice between religious and neutral schools.[107] By 1883, 3,885 secular schools had opened across the country.

To the Catholic Church this was a declaration of all-out war. It called for a boycott of these new schools and it managed to mobilise almost the entire Catholic camp. Staff and supporters of public schools and parents who sent their children were denied communion and in effect excommunicated. The government cut diplomatic relations with the Vatican and measures against rebellious civil servants and clergy added fire to the heat. The Church required priests to establish a Catholic schools in every parish and attendance of Catholic schools rose from 13 percent to over 60 percent.[108]

In part due to this conflict, the liberals lost the elections in 1884. The Catholic government under Jules Malou amended the Education Law providing public support for religious schools as well and, in 1895, religious education became compulsory in all schools.[107] From then on, with changing majorities in parliament, regulations were made either more in favour of the Church or more in favour of the Liberals, each time to the dissatisfaction of the opposition. The struggle resulted in the development of two opposing school systems: the so-called religious "free schools" and the government schools. The dispute remained unsolved and broke out again in the 1950s (Second School War).[109][110]

In the late 19th century, cultural wars arose over issues of prohibition and education in the United States.[111] The Bennett Law was a highly controversial state law passed in Wisconsin in 1889 that required the use of English to teach major subjects in all public and private elementary and high schools. Because Wisconsin German Catholics and Lutherans each operated large numbers of parochial schools where German was used in the classroom, it was bitterly resented by German-American (and some Norwegian) communities. Although the law was ultimately repealed, there were significant political repercussions, with the Republicans losing the governorship and the legislature, and the election of Democrats to the Senate and House of Representatives.[112][113]

In the United States, the terms "culture war" and "culture wars" refer to conflict in the late 20th and early 21st centuries between religious social conservatives and secular social liberals.[114] This theme of "culture war" was the basis of Patrick Buchanan's keynote speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention.[115] The term "culture war" by 2004 was in common use in the United States by both liberals and conservatives.

Throughout the 1980s, there were battles in Congress and the media regarding federal support for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities that amounted to a war over high culture between neoconservatives and paleoconservatives.[116] Justice Antonin Scalia referenced the term in the Supreme Court case Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), saying "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." The case concerned an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that prohibited any subdepartment from acting to protect individuals on the basis of sexual orientation. Scalia believed that the amendment was a valid move on the part of citizens who sought "recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of political decision making than others." The majority disagreed, holding that the amendment violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The term, translated to Hebrew, (Milhemet Tarbut, ) is also frequently used, with similar connotations, in the political debates of Israelhaving been introduced by Jews who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s.[117]

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Thinking Allowed 1: Who is Winning the Culture Wars …

In 2018, the Frontline Club is partnering with Britains most prestigious non-fiction book prize, The Baillie Gifford Prize, to host a series of events entitled Thinking Allowed. As ever please join us on10 January for an evening of debate, dissent and discussion . Every other month, we will present our audience with a question on a specific contemporary issue and ask two distinguished speakers to argue for their answer.

We are kicking off the first of the series withWho is Winning the Culture Wars?

It has been said that for the last 30 years, the political right won all the arguments about economics and the political left won all the arguments about culture. But in the last few years, it seems that liberals are losing ground across the West, as more nationalistic and socially conservative governments come to power. At the same time, hardly a day passes without a new front being opened in what have become known as the culture wars, whether it be about the nature (or even existence) of institutional racism; the repatriation of museum pieces; the removal of statues of Britains imperial heroes; trans rights, or promotion of diversity as an end in its self. The fierce arguments over safe spaces; free speech; and the right not to be offended are no longer confined to American campuses.

Critics of this new identity politics charge it with the very intolerance and illiberalism it purports to oppose; its advocates argue that they are fighting deeply ingrained prejudice and correcting historic injustice. But who is right?

Toby Mundy is Executive Director of the Baillie Gifford Prize for Non-Fiction. In 2000 he founded Atlantic Books, where he was Chief Executive and Publisher until 2014, when he left to start literary agency TMA Limited. He is also chair of trustees ofWimbledon BookFest, a registered charity; a partner at the management and communications consultancyJericho Chambersandchair of the advisory board ofTheSundayTimesEFG Short Story Award.

Munira Mirza is an adviser on arts and philanthropy. She was deputy mayor for education and culture at the Greater London Authority. She has worked for a range of cultural and charitable organisations including the Royal Society of Arts, the independent think tank Policy Exchange, and Tate. In 2009 she completed her PhD in sociology at the University of Kent. She has written extensively about cultural and social policy in the UK. Munira is a member of the boards of the Royal Opera House.

Afua Hirsch isan author, journalist and broadcaster. She was the Guardian correspondent forWest Africa,the social affairs editor for Sky News, and practised law as a human rights barrister. Her first book, Brit(ish) is about Britishness and identity, and will be published in February2018 by Jonathan Cape.

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Muslim Rapists Gang-Rape, Torture 17 … – culture-wars.com

Two attacks were reported yesterday (16.12.2017) alone. A 17 year old girl was brutally attacked and gang-raped by Muslim rapists in Sofielund, Malm. The attack occurred around 3 AM at a playground, with the victim suffering serious injuries, requiring hospitalization. Latest reports state that the girl was tortured with lighter fluid being poured in her vagina, and setting it on fire.

unconfirmed rumors. A credible source who contacted me, told that the perpetrators sprayed lighter fluid on her vagina and set it on fire

The attacks in Malm have become so common, that the police has advised women not to venture outside alone.

In a separate attack a woman fell victim toa would-be Muslim rapist in central Stockholm around 2 AM. The attacker attacked the victim from behind, groped the young victim and tried to pull down her pants. The woman managed to flee and get help from a taxi driver who drove her to safety.

The attacks should come as no surprise to many Swedes. Police authorities have linked the increasing cases of crime to African and Muslim immigrants as early as the 1970s, as articles from that era reveal.

The largest scandal thus far arose in early 2017, when police detective Peter Springare revealed the crime statistics and the ethnicities of the suspects. He also wrote on social media:

Countries representing the weekly crimes: Iraq, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Somalia, Syria again, Somalia, unknown, unknown country, Sweden, and Half of the suspects, we cant be sure because they dont have any valid papers. Which in itself usually means that theyre lying about your nationality and identity.

At the current rate the problem is getting only worse. As of 2010, around 1.33 million people living in Sweden (population 9.5 million) were foreign born. Out of those 64.6% were born outside the European Union. Sweden will take around 190000 non-Europeans in 2017 alone. As a result Swedes may become a minority in their own lands in a few decades.

In a farcical attempt to stop Muslim rapists, the National Police Commissioner Dan Eliasson decided to give out tolerance wristbands. The idea was to prevent rapes at music festivals and large gatherings. Other European countries with no regard for the well-being of their women have since followed suit, with the Jewish mayor of Cologne issuing tolerance wristbands in wake of New Years festivities. People of African/MIddle-Eastern origin raped or sexually assaulted more than 1000 girls in Cologne on New Years eve 2015.

Investigation the crimes of Muslim rapists can be a dangerous task. Those who speak out in an effort to protect Swedish women, arelabeled racists, Nazis, xenophobes, etc, and their names and identities are recorded by far-left hate-organizations such as Expo Foundation. Just this Friday, Bechir Rabani, a Palestinian-Swedish alternative media journalist was found dead, whileinvestigating the Jewish-Swedish board member of Expo Foundation, Robert Aschberg. While there is no direct evidence of foul play, the circumstances remain suspicious.

Sources (in Swedish/English)

Fria Tider, Fria Tider, Fria Tider, Aftonbladet, Expressen, The Times, Daily Mail, Nyheter Idag

Sander Laanemaa was born in Estonia in 1984. In 2011 he graduated from the Estonian Maritime Academy as a deck officer. During his studies he took an interest in history, philosophy, psychology, and the occult. His research guided him deep into the rabbit hole, which ultimately led to the creation of Culture Wars.

Sander is fluent in English, Swedish, Finnish, and Estonian.

He has given a number of lectures on various topics on maritime affairs, and also on ancient history and the faults of contemporary social movements.

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Reevaluating the Culture Wars – American Affairs Journal

REVIEW ESSAY

A War for the Soul of America:A History of the Culture Warsby Andrew HartmanUniversity of Chicago Press, 2015, 384 pages, $30

In America, culture war is a term of surprisingly recent origin. It dates from the early 1990s, and the conflict it signified was declared over almost as soon as it was named. In his convention speech, Pat Buchanan referred to the culture wars, Irving Kristol wrote in 1992, I regret to inform him that those wars are over, and the Left has won. Despite occasional conservative successes, the Left completely dominates the educational establishment, the entertainment industry, the universities, [and] the media. Reminiscing about his notorious Republican convention speech twenty-five years later, Buchanan admitted Kristol had been right.

Even so, the conflict over sex, gender, curricula, and religious expression dragged on into the 2000s, lending a certain coherence to American politics. James Davison Hunters Culture Wars (Basic Books, 1991)a blend of sociological analysis and frontline reportage that popularized the termnoted that sectarian hostilities between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews had been replaced by orthodox and progressive cleavages cutting across the major religions. For more than a decade, Hunters analysis served as a reliable guide to the cultural terrain.

This decade, however, social critics have largely caught up with Kristol. The legalization of same-sex marriage, especially, struck what seemed a note of finality. New York Times reporter Jonathan Martin wrote that historians could remember 2015 as the year when deeply divisive and consuming questions of race [and] sexuality . . . were settled in quick succession, and social tolerance was cemented as a cornerstone of American public life. Andrew Hartmans A War for the Soul of America (2015) was published two months before Obergefell v. Hodges, but it partakes of the same spirit. As a historian of the culture wars, Hartman offers not just an account but an epitaph. This book gives the culture wars a history, he writes, because theyarehistory. The logic of the culture wars has been exhausted. The metaphor has run its course.

Today, however, these premature judgments have been reversed, and Hartmans book unwittingly helps explain why. Alongside his argument that the culture wars have ended, his major claim is that the rise of identity politics since the 1960s is an essential part of the story, equal in significance to the rift between orthodoxy and progressivism. These arguments cut against each other. Religious conflict has subsided dramatically, but identity politics remains potent, throwing off more cultural sparks than it did a decade ago. As the country becomes more diverse, less religious, and more aware of the economic valences of group identity, cultural conflict has increased, with expectations of more strife on the way.

That presents a deeper challenge to the culture wars supposed victors than at first may appear. It is trouble enough that history has disobeyed the Left yet again. Worse still, the fault may not lay with history at all, and not simply with a resurgent Right, but to a large extent with the Left and the party politics of the Democrats. The disagreements dominating the Left today over what counts as good and true cultural change, and who gets to decide, undermine the whole idea of a coherent, uniform shift in American culture. With the goalposts in flux, liberals and progressives have become deeply unsure of how to assess the strength of their cultural politics.

Who caused the culture wars in the first place? A firm consensus on the questionif it ever existedhas been lacking for over a decade. Hartman, for instance, set out to debunk the answer put forth by Thomas Frank in Whats the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (Metropolitan Books, 2004). In one sense, Frankwho doubled down on putting economic politics above cultural ones in Listen, Liberal: Or, What Ever Happened to the Party of the People? (Metropolitan Books, 2016)has been stuck arguing from the margins. On his telling in Kansas, culture clashes are forgettable skirmishes. Republican operators stir them up to benefit material interests running counter to those of their so-called base. Supply-side tax cuts, deindustrialization, de-unionizationthese are the terrible achievements of our time, and the Left, drawn into the trap of cultural politics, has surrendered its power to stop them. Frank believed even Republican voters would themselves resist, absent the hallucinatory appeal of wedge issues like guns and abortion. He took for granted that working-class Americans were getting their fundamental interests wrong. Frank reintroduced the Left to the idea of false consciousness, this time as Midwest populism, not continental philosophy.

George W. Bushs victory over John Kerry seemed to confirm Franks thesis. The specter of same-sex marriage drew so many evangelicals to the polls, Americans were told, that it tipped battlegrounds states like Ohio into Bushs column. It was what many on the leftand the rightwanted to hear. Almost everybody I encounter in politics is familiar with Franks bestseller, wrote the columnist Robert Novak. Soon candidate Barack Obama, the authoritative voice of his party, was recorded at a San Francisco fundraiser giving a now-infamous variation on the Frank thesis. You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania and, like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for twenty-five years and nothings replaced them, he said. And its not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy toward people who arent like them . . . as a way to explain their frustrations.

Political scientists were less impressed than the future president. A year after Kansas, Larry Bartels argued that white voters in the bottom third of the income distribution have actually become more reliably Democratic in presidential elections over the past half-century. In fact, what pundits and historians condescendingly refer to as symbolic cultural issues become increasingly important to voters the more money they have. Andrew Gelman showed that Kansans had consistently voted 10 percent more Republican than the national average for a very long time, making Franks false-consciousness theory what the experts call overdeterminedunnecessary to explain the phenomenon. Even if economic issues were important, cultural ones were too, and not simply because they were roundabout expressions of class-based anger.

Hartmans critique of Frank is differentqualitative, not quantitative. He takes a long view of the culture wars, seeing them as repercussions of the sixties, that mythologized time of troubles which came late in that decade and stretched into the next. Contra Frank, events like the 1965 Moynihan Report, the fight over the ERA, and even Dan Quayles attack on Murphy Brown are not exactly forgettable. Beyond that, however, they draw our attention to something more than the sum of their parts: a deep and protracted public argument about how much of our traditional culture ought to be retained and honored.

Hartman describes that culture, or really a version of it, as normative America, meaning an inchoate group of assumptions and aspirations shared by millions of Americans during the postwar years. These were bourgeois values like hard work and personal responsibility, social mobility and delayed gratification, sexual restraint and defined gender roles. But they also included racist, sexist, homophobic, and conservative religious norms. The key for Hartman is that social normativity did not give way on its own. While, in Franks telling, the characters with agency are the Rights market-driven profit-seekers, who subvert mainstream values because its good business, Hartman subscribes to Corey Robins theory of the reactionary mind, which defines conservatism as a meditation onand theoretical rendition ofthe felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back. Conservatives cannot be prime movers, or leading agents of change; they can only be counterrevolutionaries, responding to stimuli. The culture wars, therefore, are not attributable to the Right but to the Left. Intriguingly, this means Hartman at least partly agrees with the populist conservative interpretation of the past fifty years that Frank derides. But where Frank is concerned with restoring economic liberalism to its pride of place on the left, Hartman locates political agency with the cultural radicalswhat he calls the New Left.

But is the New Left a discernable entity? Or is it an idea that attributes agency to a thing that doesnt exist? The early historians of the New Left tended to restrict the term (in an American context) to Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), several kindred groups and journals, and maybe some prototypical intellectuals like C. Wright Mills and Paul Goodman. Hartman follows a historiographical trend that broadens the scope of the New Left beyond white college students like SDS spokesman Tom Hayden. His usage may be the broadest of all: the New Left becomes an amorphous zeitgeist packing in the sexual revolution, all of the sixties liberation movements, and most of the varieties of identity politics to emerge in the second half of the twentieth century. In fairness, the temptation is strong to throw all these cultural changes under a single heading, and an argument could be made in Hartmans defense. I am partial, however, to the New Left historians who reject this baggy-pants approach. Some sympathetic scholars are reluctant to acknowledge the limits of the New Lefts political success, writes Douglas Rossinow in The Politics of Authenticity (Columbia University Press, 1998). They give it as much credit as possible by conflating the categories of New Left, the movement, and the sixties. Postwar feminism, for example, sprang up among mainstream liberals, and its less important radical strain was more of a backlash against the male-dominated New Left than an allied movement.

The New Lefts politics shook out into two varieties, one of procedure and one of solidarity. On the procedural front, its members believed that bureaucratic organizations had grown so large that they outstripped the reach of democratic accountability. The New Left followed the sociologist C. Wright Mills, who argued in The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, 1956) that the federal government, the military establishment, and many giant corporations formed an intricate set of overlapping cliques, which were defined not so much by conspiratorial partnership but by an unprecedented convergence of interests between them. Academics, of course, often found themselves lumped right in.The New Lefts solution to corporate power was participatory democracy, where voluntary associations would connect the public as directly as possible with those who made decisions. It was an attempt to kill what SDS president Carl Oglesby called the colossus of history, our American corporate system, with a thousand paper cuts in the form of endless local meetings.

This was itself a culture war (against corporate liberalism rather than conservative mores), but it was so unsuccessful that Hartman mostly ignores it. He is more interested in the New Lefts solidarity with marginalized groups, and in the identity-based movements that replaced the New Left and managed to gain footholds in the universities. The story of that transformation has been told many times, often in tones of threnodic despair. What was . . . distinctive about the [SDSs] Port Huron Statement (1962), what excited student activists around the country, Todd Gitlin wrote, was its rhetoric of total transfiguration. In a revival of the Enlightenment language of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, SDS spoke self-consciously . . . about the entire human condition. This appeal to commonality, to universal humanism, did not survive the end of the decade. The participatory ethos, with its emphasis on decentralization, interacted with the politics of racial solidarity in unforeseen ways. Expectations, moreover, rose faster than conditions could change. The result, as Gitlin explained in The Twilight of Common Dreams (Metropolitan Books, 1995), was a bleakly centrifugal politics:

If society as a whole seemed unbudgeable, perhaps it was time for specialized subsocieties to rise and flourish. For this reason . . . the universalist impulse fractured again and again. In the late 1960s, the principle of separate organization on behalf of distinct interests raged through the movement with amazing speed. On the model of black demands came those of [radical] feminists, Chicanos, American Indians, gays, lesbians. One grouping after another insisted on the recognition of difference and the protection of their separate and distinct spheres.

Gitlin saw this as a tragedy. A New Left based on universalist hope dismembered itself into a postNew Left politics of separatist rage. The retreat to the university, meanwhile, was a retreat from relevance. The culture wars amounted to the Right occupying the heights of power as a miscellany of interest groups identified with the Left marched on the English department. Twenty years ago, this was a conventional view. While the Democrats were busy making concessions to the Republicans, the Left had become sullen, arcane, and merely observant. It had become Henry Adams with tenure and a ponytail. Leftists in the academy have permitted cultural politics to supplant real politics, the philosopher Richard Rorty wrote in the mid-nineties. They are spending energy which should be directed at proposing new laws on discussing topics . . . remote from the countrys needs.

Hartmans A War for the Soul of America rejects this distinction between self-indulgent cultural politics and real politics. Its goal is to recast the culture wars so that they seem important in their own right. It is not that Hartman has revelations to make about Andres Serranos Piss Christ or, say, the 1986 assault on Stanfords Western Civ curriculum. His point is that these episodes now look less like distractions from one grand struggle and more like harbingers of another. They appear more significant now that the host of every awards show makes nervous jokes about the whiteness of the nominees, the CEO of a major corporation is forced to resign for having a view of marriage that was nearly universal twenty-five years ago, and even a liberal lion like Stephen Colbert is attacked within days of his first show because of the racial makeup of his writing staff. Hartman is right that elements of the New Left goaded us in this direction. So did mainstream liberalism. But A War for the Soul of America does not sufficiently explain the relationship between the two. In his chapters on feminist politics, race relations, and higher education, Hartman brings on liberals in supporting roles, though it is sometimes hard to integrate them with an opening schema emphasizing the immeasurably influential New Left. (We get one page on the McGovern campaign and brief assertions that the New Left reshaped . . . to some extent, the Democratic Party.) When Hartman declares that the sixties gave birth to a new America, he is ascribing the maternity above all to the New Left. However, it is possible to flip the emphasis. As Louis Menand wrote in 1988,

The 60s was not a crisis of liberalism. It was in a sense the epitome of life in the liberal society. . . . For procedural victories the 60s is nearly unrivaled in our history. It produced the series of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Mapp v. Ohio (1961), that applied federal due process requirements to the states via the 14th Amendment; the criminal rights casesEscobedo v. Illinois (1963), Gideon v. Wainright (1963), Miranda v. Arizona (1966); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with the sweeping anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX; the [Economic] Opportunity Act of 1964, with the mandate for maximum feasible participation in its Community Action Programs; Reynolds v. Sims (1964)one man, one vote; the Voting Rights Act of 1966; the free speech cases Times v. Sullivan (1964) and Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969); the privacy cases Griswold v. Connecticutt (1965) and Roe v. Wade (1973); the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

These acts and decisions, Menand continued, for better or worse, and more decisively than anything associated with the New Left or the counterculture, define the society we live in today. Almost thirty years later, this remains a compelling argument. The New Left was not responsible for the enduring conflict over abortion, to take one especially striking example. In large part, the culture wars were the publics sulky adjustment to a concentrated burst of liberal reforms.

With the role of mainstream liberalism de-emphasized, Hartmans history has three major players. If the New Left was the cultural Big Bang, then the Christian Right and secular neoconservatives were the gravitational forces checking its expansion. Hartman labors to be fair, but his politics are apparent even in the selection of material. While he happily recounts the fundamentalist opposition to evolutionary biology, he neglects to inform his readers that there was also a culture war against Darwinian explanations of human behavior. The storm of controversy provoked by E. O. Wilsons Sociobiology led to an August 1977 cover story in Time. Several months later, a group of protesters seized the stage as Wilson was about to give a lecture and dumped a pitcher of ice water on his head. As he noted in 1994, The ice-water episode may be the only occasion in recent American history on which a scientist was physically attacked, however mildly, simply for the expression of an idea.

Hartman is nevertheless right to distinguish conservative Christians and neoconservatives, and since the Christian backlash has received the most attention, he deserves credit for giving the neoconsIrving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, James Q. Wilson, and the restthe prominence they deserve. These men were influential well beyond their numbers. (To complain that the dominant intellectual voice in public life today is neoconservative is to register a perfectly legitimate gripe, said the New Republic in 1987.)

Neoconservatism became notorious for its hawkish foreign policy, but it began as a strain of thought among journalists and social scientists who were preoccupied with domestic issues. It began, in fact, as an upgraded form of mid-century American liberalism. In the first half of the twentieth century many American conservatives, especially those of a pious bent, took a long view of cultural decay, regarding a spiritual corruption like nineteenth-century Darwinism as continuous with a secular corruption like the New Deal state. Hartman rightly notes that the neoconservatives, in contrast, believed our decline resulted from much more recent phenomena. In the mid-1960s, most of them were satisfied with the course of liberal civilizationup to and including its New Deal reforms. It needed defending from Communists and extending to African Americans. Then three related domestic developments shook their faith in liberalism and turned them into heretics: first, the authority of academia was overthrown on campus; second, the authority of morals was overthrown in family and sexual life; third, the authority of the law was overthrown in our major cities, where neoconservatives were mugged by reality in the most literal sense.

Unfortunately, Hartman doesnt explain why the liberal neocon reaction against New Left radicalism was so influential and enduring. If A War for the Soul of America has a refrain, its that the sixties were liberating to some, frightening to others, a phrase that Hartman repeats several times. It encapsulates his view that the sixties were a mind freakan exogenous shock to the traditionalist psyche. He neglects that progressive post-sixties developments caused large groups of people to regress in ways both material and psychological.

Take the issue of crime. Hartmans treatment of the post-1965 crime wave is his books greatest failure. An uninformed reader would be left with no indication of the underlying sociological trends which fueled the culture wars. In one characteristic line, Hartman writes that crime was an issue that aligned the neoconservative imagination with white working-class sensibilities. The language hereimagination, sensibilityrelegates crime to the realm of symbolism. In fact, violent crime soared 367 percent in the twenty years after 1960, and neoconservatives seized control of the discourse because they treated the problem with the seriousness it deserved. It was the condition of the Upper West Side of Manhattan under liberal rule, Adam Gopnik wrote in the New Yorker, far more than what had happened to Eastern Europe under socialism, that made neocon polemics look persuasive. Chicago made international headlines in 2012 after reaching the dubious milestone of 500 homicides. In 1974, the figure was almost double that970. The following year, in the midst of the deepest economic slump since the Great Depression, city residents told Gallup pollsters that their biggest problem was crime, naming it more often than unemployment or the high cost of living.

The cultural consequences were manifold, but Hartman is not interested in exploring them. It is telling that the rise and fall of violent crime almost perfectly mirrors his chronology of the rise and fall of the culture wars. Crime was a pervasive menace for a wide class of city-dwellers in the thirty years after 1960 (to an extent that it is not for as wide of a class today). Fear of crime profoundly influenced elections and bled into many areas of cultureparticularly intocinema, where futuristic visions routinely and mistakenly projected the crime spike as continuing, exponentially, into the twenty-first century. One of the best books on mass incarceration after 1980, William Stuntzs The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Belknap, 2011), blames an excess of leniency for the partisan bidding war that led to putting millions in prison. You cannot shirk the basic task of government (protecting citizens from violence) without courting an ugly popular backlash. The damage to liberal credibility festered for decades afterward.

Hartmans coverage of the sexual revolution is better but still seriously inadequate. The pages on Phyllis Schlaflys campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment are some of the most vivid and sophisticated in the book. But again, a clear explanation of the trends culture warriors were responding to is lacking. The book does not stress nearly enough the remarkable paradox of the sexual revolutionthe reality that, as Bill Wasik has written, of all the mass utopian notions of the twentieth century, the sexual revolution was both the most spectacularly successful and, in the end, the most thwarted. Hartman is more apt to write with the sweeping finality of a Mr. Sammler. The traditional family, he says, suffered its dissolution in the 1970s, when family values became pass. The fruits of the sexual revolution were much more ambiguous. New Left propaganda notwithstanding, as Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam have noted, the very women who have benefited most from their newfound freedoms, the well-off and the well educated, are also the most likely to accept a conservative understanding of what marriage is and ought to bea lifelong commitment that predates childbearing and exists in large part for the benefit of children. White women with college degrees have a nonmarital birth ratio that is not very different from the overall figures of the Eisenhower era. The sexual revolution had ramifications in a very precise sense: it led to different consequences for different socioeconomic cohorts. Hartman seems vaguely aware of this, but he cannot bring himself to analyze it. He writes at one point that class increasingly determines access to abortion and a whole lot more. Those last five words shy away from an essential truth about why culture-war arguments keep coming back.

The neoconservatives, by contrast, were alert to these developments from the beginning. The neocon urtext is the 1965 Moynihan Report, a Johnson administration paper warning that increasing rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing among African Americans would vitiate the promise of the civil rights revolution. Hartman gives a fair description of the controversy surrounding this report, although he chides Moynihan for being cagey about the relative importance of cultural and economic factors in driving up illegitimacy. Hartmans own inclination is to blame the negative consequences of the sexual revolution on economic changes such as deindustrialization. It is a curious bias for someone trying to reclaim the significance of the culture wars. (One wonders how Hartman would explain the sturdiness of the American family during the Great Depression.) But as sociologist Andrew Cherlin has written, Neither cultural change nor economic change would have been sufficient by itself to produce a group of non-college-educated young adults who now have a majority of their children outside of marriage. The truth is that social science has not progressed beyond the need for Moynihans caginess, which is to say his muddled causation. And that goes double for our cultural historians.

The coda to A War for the Soul of America takes a curious step back to Thomas Frank, arguing that capitalism, more than the state, has brought about cultural revolution. As Hartman writes, Capitalism sopped up sixties liberation and in the process helped dig the grave of normative America. He could have put a finer point on the historical irony. The thesis that the New Left kicked off a culture war which is now decisively over ought to leave liberals decidedly unsettled if, as is the case, a left-wing guerrilla campaign against corporate liberalism ended with corporations as the most powerful of liberal culture warriors. The point shines through in Joseph Heath and Andrew Potters illuminating Nation of Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture (HarperBusiness, 2004). Hartman notes it only sardonically, at books end.

One could write an updated version of Franks own The Conquest of Cool (University of Chicago, 1997), in which corporations engage in progressive (rather than transgressive) culture-warring, to distract from widespread discontent with rising inequality and dwindling opportunities. In the absence of Hartmans Normative America, there is money to be made in Woke Consumerism. As Tara Isabella Burton has noted, the public has to find some outlet for an affirmation of values, and capitalism increasingly fills the void through inclusive yet quasi-tribal branding and consumption.

Whether or not corporations have effectively ended the culture wars, Hartman is surely correct that we need a new terminology to speak adequately of the post-Obergefell era. Descriptive categories often mutate into historical periodizations: literary modernism ended in the 1930s, alternative rock is synonymous with the mainstream music of the 1990s. Culture war is falling victim to the same fate. It evokes the paisley ties, loose-fitting suits, double-bridge eyeglasses, and bleary C-SPAN videos of the Clinton years. It reflects a time when social conservatism was not a token sound bite at a prayer breakfast but a formidable power on the national stage, one in which Democrats like Tipper Gore often played as outsized a role as Quayle Republicans. As Peter Beinart wrote in an Atlantic essay, the decline of organized religion has not stopped Americans from viewing politics in terms of us and them. It has led Americans to define us and them in even more primal and irreconcilable ways. As cultural conservatives become more secular, they tend to redraw the boundaries of identity, de-emphasizing morality and religion and emphasizing race and nation. Identity politics on the left, meanwhile, is stronger than a decade ago. Today, the goal is statistically equivalent outcomes for every race, gender, and social group. Recognition of the massive emotional force behind this and similar objectives was missing from the spate of election postmortems which counseled the Democratic Party to move beyond identity liberalism. Critics such as Mark Lilla ignored the central grievance of the ideology they were attacking, preferring to treat identity politics as a near-disorder cured by better pedagogy and a recommitment to citizenship.

Both of those things would help, but it is hard to see how Lilla can win the argument. When identity actors lack concrete options to achieve equity, they tend to shift to the broader and more abstract realm of culture, taking comfort in symbolic victories. The age of identity liberalism must be brought to an end, Lilla declared in the New York Times. The only way that would happen is if our elites decided to roll back the politics of race, sex, and gender, and our corporations decided to stop using identity as a marketing strategy. For better and for worse, the soul of American liberalism remains at once too optimistic and too eschatological for that to happen anytime soon.

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Reevaluating the Culture Wars - American Affairs Journal

Trumps Empty Culture Wars – The New York Times

The N.F.L.-national anthem controversy, the latest Trump-stoked social conflagration, is a quintessential bad culture war. It was trending that way already before Trump, because the act of protest Colin Kaepernick chose to call attention to police shootings of unarmed black men sitting and then kneeling for The Star-Spangled Banner was clearer in the calculated offense it gave than in the specific cause it sought to further, clearer in its swipe at a Racist America than its prescription for redress. (That Kaepernick sported Fidel Castro T-shirts and socks depicting cops as pigs did not exactly help.)

But in his usual bullying and race-baiting way, Trump has made it much, much worse, by multiplying the reasons one might reasonably kneel for solidarity with teammates, as a protest against the presidents behavior, as a gesture in favor of free speech, as an act of racial pride and then encouraging his own partisans to interpret the kneeling as a broad affront to their own patriotism and politics. So now were arguing (I use the term loosely) about everything from the free-speech rights of pro athletes to whether the national anthem is right-wing political correctness to LeBron Jamess punditry on the miseducation of Trump voters and the specific issue that Kaepernick intended to raise, police misconduct, is buried seven layers of controversy deep.

You could say, its always thus with culture wars and racial battles, but in fact it isnt and doesnt need to be. Arguments about race were often toxic in the 1970s and 1980s, but there were core policy issues that could be argued and ultimately compromised over crime and welfare and affirmative action and across the 1990s they were, to some extent, and as they were overt racial tensions eased considerably. In 2001, two-thirds of Americans (and more blacks than whites) described race relations as somewhat good or very good, and while the white view was usually slightly rosier thereafter, the two-thirds pattern held for more than a decade until Ferguson, Mo., and Black Lives Matter and the other controversies of the late Obama years, followed by the rise of Trump, sent racial optimism into a tailspin.

For hope to resurface, we need specific issues and potential compromises to re-emerge. In particular, we need a public argument clearly tethered to the two big policy questions raised by police misconduct and the broader crime and incarceration debate.

First, can we have the greater accountability for cops that activists reasonably demand, in which juries convict more trigger-happy officers and police departments establish a less adversarial relationship to the communities they police, without the surge of violence thats accompanied the apparent retreat of the police in cities like Baltimore and Chicago?

Second, can we continue the move toward de-incarceration supported, not that long ago, by Republicans as well as Democrats without reversing the gains that have made many of our cities safe?

These are hard questions that can be answered only gradually, through trial-and-error and with various false starts. But they are questions that could have answers, that could point to a stable policy consensus around race and criminal justice, in a way that our present Make America Great Again versus Youre All White Supremacists culture war does not.

For those answers to matter, for them to depolarize our country, we need a social and cultural debate focused on the substance that Colin Kaepernicks choice of protest unfortunately obscured, and Donald Trumps flagsploitation has deliberately buried. Not an end to culture war, but a better culture war in which victory and defeat can be defined, and peace becomes a possibility.

Link:
Trumps Empty Culture Wars - The New York Times