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Thailand and Cambodia, two neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, are preparing to hold general elections this year. Thailand is scheduled to hold its polls on May 14, while Cambodia will follow on July 23.

In Thailand, the military-dominated government led by the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) has been employing authoritarian tactics against dissidents, including the use of arbitrary detention and lese-majeste charges. The country experienced mass anti-government protests in 2020-2021 that were fueled by the militarys continued hold on power and the monarchys involvement in governance, but the movement has since lost its momentum.

In Cambodia, the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen has dominated the political system for nearly four decades. Since the 2018 elections, the parliament has been fully controlled by the ruling party following the court-ordered dissolution of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP). In recent years, Hun Sens government has intensified its repression of the opposition, civil society activists, and independent media with intimidation and politically motivated prosecutions.

Thailand has recently changed its electoral system by increasing the number of constituencies from 350 to 400, reducing the number of party-list seats from 150 to 100, and reintroducing the system in which each voter will cast two ballots one for a constituency candidate and one for a political party. These changes are expected to benefit large parties like the PPRP and the opposition Pheu Thai Party, but they may hurt smaller parties that rely on party list seats.

Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.

Pheu Thais Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the younger daughter of former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, has emerged as the most popular choice for prime minister. according to the latest opinion poll. Meanwhile, incumbent Prayut Chan-o-cha only ranks third. Although Pheu Thai is expected to win big, forming the government remains a challenge because the prime minister will be elected by both houses of parliament. Given that all 250 members of the Senate are selected by the military, the military-backed candidate theoretically only needs 126 seats from the House of Representatives to be elected prime minister.

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However, even if Pheu Thai and other opposition parties manage to form a coalition government after the election, the threat of a military coup looms large. Thailand has a history of frequent shifts between democratic elections and military takeovers since transitioning to a constitutional monarchy 90 years ago, and these threats continue to cast a shadow over the countrys political landscape.

In Cambodia, dozens of opposition leaders who were banned from politics following the dissolution of the CNRP have undergone political rehabilitation and regained their political rights, leading to the rise of the reactivated opposition Candlelight Party. The Candlelight Party managed to garner one-fifth of the popular vote in its debut commune elections last year. Compared to the 2017 commune elections, where the CNRP won 44 percent of the popular vote, the Candlelight Partys achievement cannot be regarded as a significant electoral threat to the CPPs rule.

While Thailand has seen the emergence of influential opposition leaders, such as Pita Limjaroenrat of the Move Forward Party and Paetongtarn Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai Party, Cambodia has yet to produce a similar figurehead for its opposition movement since CNRP President Sam Rainsy was forced into exile in 2015 and his deputy Kem Sokha was arrested in 2017. Despite this, the opposition in Cambodia continues to face intimidation, harassment, and politically motivated prosecution by the CPP. The uncertainty surrounding Hun Sens succession plan, which involves passing power to his son Hun Manet, has led the regime to intensify measures to suppress political opposition and independent media organizations. In the first quarter of this year alone, there have been incidents of judicial harassment against Candlelight Party leaders, the shutdown of independent media outlet VOD, and the sentencing of Kem Sokha to 27 years imprisonment on charges of treason.

Against such a backdrop, threats against the opposition and civil society are expected to continue, and genuine and legitimate elections will not be possible. Unlike the elections in Thailand where some level of uncertainty exists, it is already certain that the CPP will continue its rule after the July election. However, the CPP may consider allocating some seats to the opposition to dispel Cambodias image as a one-party state. The CPP itself anticipates winning a majority of the seats with a projected 104, and the remaining 21 seats could potentially be secured by the Candlelight Party.

History has shown that a united and well-organized opposition is a crucial requirement to overcome authoritarianism, especially under the first-past-the-post electoral system. This was evident in Malaysias 2018 and 2022 elections. However, in Thailand, the opposition remains fragmented, which gives the ruling military proxy party an advantage. In Cambodia, although some opposition parties have attempted to merge to challenge the ruling CPP, no opposition has emerged strong enough yet to mount a formidable challenge to CPPs continued rule.

Both Thailand and Cambodia have a shared history of undemocratically dissolving opposition parties. For instance, in Thailand, the Thai Raksa Chart Party and the Future Forward Party were dissolved in 2019 and 2020, respectively, while in Cambodia, the CNRP suffered the same fate in 2017. There have been concerns that these countries may make similar moves again in response to growing opposition support, but there is currently no indication that either country will resort to such tactics, at least not until the upcoming elections.

The victory of the opposition in Thailand would be a major step toward the countrys democratic advancement, which has been hindered by military dictatorship since 2014. It would also convey an encouraging message to countries in the region that are struggling to transition to democracy, such as Cambodia and Myanmar.

If Thailands PPRP and Cambodias CPP were to win their respective elections, it could lead to further consolidation of power of authoritarian parties in both countries. This could potentially lead to a further erosion of democratic institutions and human rights, with far-reaching consequences beyond these two countries. Such an outcome will only encourage other authoritarian governments to tighten their grip on power and suppress dissent. The developments of these two elections, therefore, warrant close watch.

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The Battle for Democracy: A Look at Thailand and Cambodia's 2023 ... - The Diplomat

This has awakened the eyes of people to see how pervasive and steeped white supremacy is in the very fabric of this country, said the Rev. Stephen A. Green, and how its reflected in every aspect of our government.

All eyes are on Tennessee after two Black lawmakers were expelled from its state House of Representatives, igniting a movement at the intersection of gun violence, racial justice and democracy.

Days after being expelled by the supermajority Republican legislators, state Rep. Justin Jones was unanimously reinstated by the Nashville Metro Council on Monday. On Wednesday, Rep. Justin J. Pearson was also reinstated by the Shelby County Board of Commissioners.

Tennessee state Reps. Justin Pearson (left), Justin Jones (center) and Gloria Johnson (right) hold their hands up as they exit the Capitol building in Nashville on April 3. The three Democrats faced expulsion the two Black legislators were expelled for using a bullhorn in the House in support of gun control demonstrators. Jones got his seat back this week and a vote on Pearsons reinstatement is scheduled. (Photo: Nicole Hester/The Tennessean via AP, File)

Both Jones and Pearson were ousted by Republicans on April 6 after they, alongside state Rep. Gloria Johnson who avoided being expelled with her colleagues by just one vote joined thousands of demonstrators inside the well of the House chamber on March 30 to protest gun violence following the recent deadly mass shooting at The Covenant School in Nashville.

Jones, Pearson and Johnson now known as the Tennessee Three were brought up for expulsion on charges of breaking House rules and bringing disorder and dishonor to the legislative body.

What started as a state-level battle about Tennessees gun laws quickly morphed into a national outcry for justice against what many saw as a display of white supremacy and undemocratic posturing by state Republicans. Some also saw Tennessee as a microcosm of an antiquated and broken U.S. political system historically led and abused by white men.

This has awakened the eyes of people to see how pervasive and steeped white supremacy is in the very fabric of this country and how its reflected in every aspect of our government, said the Rev. Stephen A. Green, an activist who joined the Tennessee Three during a days-long protest of the expulsions.

Green, a friend of Jones, sees what transpired in Tennessee as a watershed moment.

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I think [Republicans] thought that they were going to get away with this, he continued, because they get away with these things so often white supremacy and male chauvinism and them controlling the systems of power [and] the infrastructure of this country.

State Rep. Justin Jones (left) enters municipal court in Nashville, Tennessee, with the Rev. Stephen A. Green (right). The Democratic legislator was reinstated days after being expelled for leading a protest on the House floor for gun reform in the wake of the March 27 shooting at a Christian school in which three 9-year-olds and three adults were killed by a former student. (Photo: Seth Herald/Getty Images)

The white third of the Tennessee Three told theGrio that the role race played in the expulsions of Jones and Pearson is hard to ignore.

If you listened during our expulsion hearings, if you listened to the questions that were asked of the two young men, it was a different tone entirely than what was used with me, recalled Johnson, who represents a majority-Black district in Knoxville.

The tone to me was demeaning. There was definitely a difference in the questions, like, How dare you speak up or stand up without our permission? You need to act like us and dress like us and speak like us.

Johnson said that systemic racism is undoubtedly present throughout Tennessee, where teaching about race and racism has been banned in K-12 public schools. She said it also exists in this legislature.

The lawmaker recalled a white Republican colleague suggesting a few weeks ago that lynching be brought back as a legal method for implementing the death penalty in the Southern state.

State Rep. Gloria Johnson (center), one-third of the Tennessee Three, speaks in Nashville on April 6 after a vote to expel a fellow Democrat, Rep. Justin Jones, from the governing body. Johnson said Jones and Rep. Justin Pearson, who also was expelled, are critically important in the legislature. (Photo: Seth Herald/Getty Images)

The folks that actually end up receiving the death penalty are very often Black and brown people, and certainly poor people if you live anywhere, you know what that means, said Johnson.

Though the initial cause of the Tennessee Threes protest had nothing to do with race and everything to do with Americas gun violence epidemic, the targeting of the state Houses youngest Black members brought the attention of millions from the streets of Tennessee all the way to the White House.

Johnson, 60, said Jones and Pearson both in their 20s are critically important in the state legislature, particularly as Tennessee, like dozens of states across the country, grapples with the issue of gun violence.

Younger voices arent necessarily being heard and lifted up and voices that are in opposition to the MAGA Republican supermajority that we have, she said. We need a multiracial, multigenerational representation in this body.

The thousands of protesters who took to the streets on behalf of Jones and Pearson after their expulsion notably were multiracial throngs, the majority of them young, something Green says is rare in the South.

This is a form of resistance that is emerging throughout this state, he said. People are sort of coming together because of their angst and [the] inaction. I think that this is going to force there to be a pivot and change.

Tennessee state Rep. Yusuf Hakeem told theGrio that what happened to his Democratic colleagues Jones and Pearson was clearly indicative of the environment we have to deal with up here on a daily or weekly basis.

Hakeem echoed Johnsons contention that young voices are needed in the state legislature.

Theyre helping us refocus on those things necessary, he said, when it comes to civil rights, peaceful protest, and not just accepting what is being told to us our guidelines or rules that keep you in your place when the needs of the people are not being addressed.

Svante Myrick, president of People For the American Way, praised the two Black activists-turned-lawmakers now referred to by some as The Justins for handling their expulsions with righteousness that would impress even the greatest civil rights leaders in American history.

Democratic state Reps. Justin Pearson (left) of Memphis and Justin Jones (right) of Nashville now referred to by some as The Justins attend the April 6 vote in which they were expelled from the state legislature. (Photo: Seth Herald/Getty Images)

Myrick, the former mayor of Ithaca, New York, said he sees the Tennessee Three and the aftermath of the experience as an inflection point.

This is a turning point in history because of the youthful, righteous indignation that these young men represent, he said. Theyre not alone, but they actually are the voice of a generation thats fighting against a status quo. The Justins kicked off this revolution, and the question is, will we see it through?

Generations from now, schoolchildren could read about the Tennessee Three and how their protest against gun violence shined a light on intersectional issues related to race and American democracy.

According to Myrick, if we think well read about this in future history books, we have to ask ourselves what we would want history to say about us at this moment.

Were we active or passive in the face of this injustice?

TheGrio is FREE on your TV via Apple TV, Amazon Fire, Roku and Android TV. Also,please download theGrio mobile appstoday!

The post Tennessee Three seen as a watershed moment for racial justice and democracy appeared first on TheGrio.

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Tennessee Three seen as a watershed moment for racial justice and democracy - Yahoo News

DeSantis is putting the public back in public universities, a recent headline from National Review declared. Conservative politicians, strategists, and pundits love to trumpet the claim that Gov. Ron DeSantiss model of higher-education reform is democracy in action. This is false.

The Florida legislature is currently considering House Bill 999, which would cut professors out of the faculty-hiring process, eliminate funding for all campus diversity, equity, and inclusion programs, and effectively ban any coursework in critical theory, including critical race theory, queer theory, and intersectionality.

Im a fan, conservative writer Nate Hochman said about HB 999, in an interview for the New York Times last month:

All this talk about democratic accountability for public institutions can be seductive. But lest we be swayed by the high-minded rhetoric, lets pause for a moment to consider the meaning of public itself. As Columbia University English professor Bruce Robbins explains, there are important ambiguities when the term is invoked to represent the social whole. Paraphrasing Robbins, public can refer to what is decided on or managed by the community, as well as what is available to or done in the service of the community. The former emphasizes public control, while the latter stresses public access.

The public in public higher education is primarily about access to higher-education institutions that are dedicated to serving the public. Of course, members of the public should have a say in shaping public colleges. But those with the requisite expertise, namely faculty members, must be at the forefront when it comes to making decisions about teaching and research. As the American Association of University Professors has argued for more than a century, this is essential if colleges are to remain true to their mission to generate and disseminate knowledge.

The Atlantic staff writer Tom Nicols warned us back in 2019 that President Donald Trumps disdain for expertise would outlive his administration. Sure enough, following in Trumps footsteps, DeSantis is mounting an aggressive attack on expert knowledge, stripping away the decision-making powers that professors have had for more than a century regarding critical educational matters. HB 999 would sideline faculty by investing state lawmakers, university presidents, and trustees with the power to make decisions on everything from the curriculum to faculty hiring and promotion. Floridas GOP clearly never got the memo that academic freedom and faculty autonomy have helped to make the U.S. higher-education system the envy of the world.

Grandstanding populist rhetoric provides a veneer of righteousness to the DeSantis higher-ed reform agenda. Consider this statement by Christopher F. Rufo, architect of the nationwide anti-CRT crusade and policy adviser to DeSantis: I believe in an uncompromising new conservatism that attempts to restore the authority of the people over their government and lay waste to woke institutional capture.

For Rufo and co., campuses are first and foremost culture-war battlegrounds and they have no qualms about using scorched-earth tactics. Last year, Rufo was one of six new conservative trustees appointed to the New College of Florida, a public liberal-arts college in Sarasota that the DeSantis administration is determined to turn into the Hillsdale of the South. Here is how Rufo described the sea change to come: We will be shutting down low-performing, ideologically-captured academic departments and hiring new faculty. The student body will be recomposed over time: some current students will self-select out, others will graduate; well recruit new students who are mission-aligned.

As one Twitter commentator aptly put it: This is Soviet-era shit.

Rufo has no patience for the powers of persuasion when raw power will do. After Harvard University psychologist Steven Pinker criticized the heavy-handed moves to re-make New College, Rufo replied: Sorry, buddy Were in charge now. Rufo and the other newly installed trustees have already succeeded in replacing the colleges president and abolishing the colleges diversity office, achieving the first steps in what Rufo described as the hostile takeover of New College.

You would need a geologist to sort through all the layers of hypocrisy embedded in the ongoing transformation of public higher education in Florida. On the one hand, the Florida reform model rejects frameworks such as critical race theory, DEI, and intersectionality as too ideological, nothing more than woke indoctrination masquerading as scholarship. On the other, it says universities must promote concepts such as individual rights, patriotism, and Western Civilization. Nothing ideological to see here, right?

At a press conference in January, Rufo said that the purpose of a university is not to push political activism. At around the same time, he released a YouTube video called The Conservative Counter-Revolution Begins in the Universities, in which he outlined DeSantiss plan to recapture territory on Floridas public campuses. All the rhetoric about democracy, accountability, and the will-of-the-people rings hollow given that Rufo has compared his public persuasion campaign to Communist propaganda, openly describing his strategy to turn the phrase critical race theory into the perfect villain.

Higher-education reform in the Sunshine State is not a good-faith effort to put the public back in public universities. Indeed, it imagines that adult taxpayers are the only members of the public who count and confuses public accountability with public control. As taxpayers, we will hold our city accountable for maintaining the local roads, but we wont tell the construction crews what kind of asphalt to use when the potholes need fixing.

The public good is eroded when state colleges are governed by diktats that tell professors what they can and cannot teach. If legislators and political appointees are put in charge of curriculum and hiring decisions, the quality of public higher education in Florida will plummet. With state intervention in the DeSantis mold, Floridas colleges really will be in the business of indoctrination.

The rest is here:
Conservative Attacks on Higher Ed Are Attacks on Democracy - The Chronicle of Higher Education

Sudans political factions are negotiating the formation of a new transitional government, a major step toward a civilian-led government that is long overdue nearly eighteen months after a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Once the parties do form a new governmenttalks are continuing past a previously announced April 11 target dateperhaps its most critical task will be to clarify what role Sudans security forces will have in the country going forward.

To ensure that Sudans transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudans leaders and those who support Sudans transition to democracy can take now.

Sudans military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudans civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudans armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudans leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudans security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudans legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudanand work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutionspreventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudans civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the countrys civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudans transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudans authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudans economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudans militias, including the RSF.

As Sudans economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

The United States can help Sudans transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudans new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudans economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudans natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudans authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actorsincluding the United Arab Emirates and Egyptto encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudans democratic progress.

Sudans transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudans civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Councils Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

Image: Protesters march during a rally against a signed framework deal between political parties and the military that provides for a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections and would end a standoff triggered by a coup in October 2021, in Khartoum, Sudan December 8, 2022. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

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As Sudan's transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the ... - Atlantic Council

Two years ago, private mercenaries allegedly hired by Haitian American businessman Christian Emmanuel Sanon assassinated Haitian President Jovenel Mose in his residence in Port-au-Prince. Sanon and six other people have been charged by U.S. authorities for their role in the assassination. Ever since, Haitis political and economic situation has further declined, pushing it even closer to the brink of collapse.

Two years ago, private mercenaries allegedly hired by Haitian American businessman Christian Emmanuel Sanon assassinated Haitian President Jovenel Mose in his residence in Port-au-Prince. Sanon and six other people have been charged by U.S. authorities for their role in the assassination. Ever since, Haitis political and economic situation has further declined, pushing it even closer to the brink of collapse.

Violent, tragic crises like the one in Haiti are why the U.S. Congress passed the Global Fragility Act (GFA) in 2019 in an effort to redefine Americas response to fragile and volatile states worldwide. Unlike past congressional attempts at promoting stability and peace within crumbling democracies, the GFA aims to get ahead of the problemto shift the United States from its back foot to its front. In pursuit of that purpose, the State Department formulated the Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and on March 24, President Joe Biden transmitted to Congress10-year plansfor realizing the strategy across the laws priority countries.

The priority countries were chosen based on a number of factors including the level and risks of fragility and violent conflict, political will within the countries, the opportunity for the United States to have an impact, other international commitments, and the security and economic interests of the U.S. Alongside Haiti, the other priority countries include Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and the region of costal West Africa (consisting of Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin).

But our strategy and its 10-year plans risk failing to address the key drivers of conflict in Haiti. Given the promise of the GFA, that would be a colossal missed opportunity.

In its strategy for Haiti, the United States outlines two objectives: thefirst,advancing responsive and accountable governance and security; thesecond,supporting an engaged and prosperous citizenry. For the first objective, it recommends working with the Haitian National Police to develop and implement security programming across the country. Currently, however, Haiti only has 10,000 police officers to address security, down from 16,000 at the end of 2021.

With police officers underpaid, ill-equipped, and facing increasing dangeranaverageof five officers a month were murdered between July 2021 and January 2023the police haveceded controlof most of the capital, Port-au-Prince, to violent gangs. Some estimates now put theamountof territory in Port-au-Prince controlled by gangs at 90 percent. Security is so poor that Haitis embattled prime minister and acting president, Ariel Henry,requestedintervention from foreign troops to quell the violence.

Even if the Haitian National Police can push back the gangs, and the United States can achieve success in its first objective, the second goal of supporting an engaged and prosperous citizenry will be equally challenging to achieve. Complicating matters is public perception of Henry as illegitimate, in part because he was named prime minister in the days before Moses assassination but was never formally installed in the role. Henrys request for foreign troops was seen as an attempt to shore up his power. The request was not met well in Haiti as previous interventions, including the U.S.-led intervention in 1994 and the 15 years of consecutive U.N.-led peacekeeping operations from 2004 to 2019 all failed to result in lasting democratic change.

Indeed, Henry is not helping his case. Haiti has not had a single elected official inpowersince January in either house of the Haitian Parliament. Henry haspromisedelections this year, intending to swear in a new set of elected representatives in 2024, but he failed to live up to the same pledge in 2021 and so far has not set a date for an election this year.

Another avenue for security and stability is the Montana Accord of August 2021, released by the 13-member Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which draws support from groups across Haiti including unions, human rights organizations, and religious groups. The accord is promising,providingthe basis for a transition in Haiti that will lead to a new democratic government.

But so far, negotiations between Henry and Montana Accord drafters have yielded nothing. Crucially, the United States has not announced support for the accord itself, instead pushing for Henry and the accord drafters to reach a mutually agreeable resolution. This stems from the GFA strategy, which calls for prioritizing locally driven solutions,statingthat the United States ought to work with both national and local leaders to ensure that Haitians are protagonists in shaping their own future.

The United States must realize the GFAs full potential. Despite the inability of the Haitian National Police to control the violence engulfing Port-au-Prince, the United States should not heed Henrys calls for a militarized intervention. Such interventions have failed to bring lasting stability to Haiti. Indeed, they compound Haitis many problems. Worse, agreeing to an armed intervention now risks allowing Henry to cement power, further deepening the crisis of illegitimacy gripping Haitis government.

Its time to go back to the drawing board. The GFA strategy should shift its focus to the front footto first promoting a democratic transition, rather than supporting a constantly deteriorating policing situation with no clear path to improvement. Announcing U.S. support of the Montana Accord is a good start, but there are other actions the United States can take short of this step.

In November, the United States sanctioned four Haitian politicians, accusing them of involvement with gangs and drug trafficking. The bipartisan Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2022 would expand the number of Haitians involved in illegal activities who are targeted by sanctions and introduce reporting on the linkages between individuals and gangs, helping to highlight corruption among the Haitian elite.

The U.S. and its allies enjoy a large amount of leverage over Henrys government, providing transport of armored vehicles to Haiti for use by the police, and once helped legitimize Henrys rule by announcing support for him as leader in the aftermath of Moses death. The United States can use its leverage to force Henry to the negotiating tableeither with the Montana Accord or push him to set a timeline and hold elections this year.

Doing so might help the United States accomplish the second objectivean engaged and prosperous citizenry.In the process, the United States may also be able to accomplish the strategys first objective of advancing a responsive and accountable security sector in Haiti. The United States has an opportunity to make a difference this time, but its strategy risks emphasizing security at the cost of democracy, delaying a real change in Haiti once again.

As part of passing the GFA, Congress acknowledged Haitis precarious situation and the failures of past U.S. interventions. Our strategy under the GFA should build on that acknowledgment and set a course to peace and prosperity for an important neighbor. Lets not miss that opportunity.

Originally posted here:
Haiti Needs Help to Restore Functioning Democracy - Foreign Policy