Archive for the ‘Democracy’ Category

As Timor-Leste heads to the polls, here’s how Australia can support its democracy – The Conversation

Sunday May 21 is election day in Timor-Leste, when voters decide on 65 members of parliament to represent them. Each election is a reminder of the successful regional and international cooperation that led to Timor-Lestes independence. Its also a reminder of the importance of Timor-Leste as an exemplar of democracy, peace and human rights as foundational values.

It is in Australias interest that this be nurtured.

As a small state facing many challenges, maintaining these values has regional and global resonance. Timor-Leste is an important voice both in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. It is a successful state that, despite difficulties, has been able to be peace-loving and sustain relations with Indonesia.

By contrast, democratic regression, or the worst-case scenario of a failed state, would be an enormous setback for the entire region.

What role should Australia play in keeping this democracy strong?

The history of the Australia-Timor-Leste bilateral relationship is complicated. It includes the vital Timorese assistance during the second world war and Australias tacit approval of Indonesias 1975 annexation. It also includes Australia leading the United Nations International Force East Timor (INTERFET), which in turn led to Timor-Lestes transition to independence following a referendum in 1999.

The two nations have been complexly intertwined through Timor-Lestes journey to independence and democratic development.

There have been instances of unease between the two countries. The most notable was the allegation of Australian spying during negotiations on the Greater Sunrise oil fields. This remains an ongoing issue with the potential to derail ties again.

But there have also been positive steps, such as Operation Astute, an Australian-led military and police deployment. This operation helped stabilise the country during the 2006-2008 political turmoil that culminated in the attempted assassination of President Jose Ramos-Horta and his medical evacuation.

In 2018, Australia and Timor-Leste concluded a treaty establishing their maritime boundaries following a United Nations conciliation process.

The complexity of the relationship means Australia needs to be respectful in relations, but it should not stop Australia from being a partner to support Timor-Lestes democratic processes and institutions.

A recent report outlines how Australia can support Timor-Lestes governance in ways that ensure effective, capable and legitimate institutions that are responsive to people.

Australia has a track record of such programs. The eight-year, $72 million Governance for Development Program supported Timor-Leste agencies to develop good policy and improve systems as well as helping civil society engage with government decision-making. The program worked in areas including public financial management, economic policy, enabling business, public service administration, law reform and financial services.

The Partnership for Inclusive Prosperity (PROVISU) will continue to support good governance and economic policy by providing support to Timor-Lestes central government agencies and economic ministries. Through programs like this, Australia can offer meaningful support to Timor-Leste.

Good governance that responds to citizens needs is a perennial problem. Timor-Lestes nascent bureaucracy makes this a priority issue. Australia should continue to develop partnerships that strengthen institutions so they are able to deal with problems.

An example of this is PARTISIPA, a ten-year $80 million program to improve access to quality basic infrastructure and services. It works in partnership with national and subnational governments to improve the delivery of decentralised services and village-level infrastructure, such as rural water. It continues Australias long-term support for the national village development program and its community-driven processes.

Another area where Australia can contribute is in media.

Timor-Leste has a vibrant media landscape that is among the freest in the region. Australian can support Timor-Leste to ensure its media are strong and robust as well as free, with public interest is at its core. It can also work with local media to strengthen their ability to educate the general public on governance issues, to hold power to account and to promote the rule of law.

An example of this is a recent memorandum of understanding between the ABC and Timor-Lestes public broadcaster RTTL, which includes media development programs. The agreement recognises the vital role both organisations play in informing audiences and contributing to democracy. The ABC will work with RTTL to establish a new English-language news service, helping staff enhance their journalism and content-making skills.

Another priority Australia can engage with is the justice system.

Consultations with Timorese civil society organisations, conducted by The Asia Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D) report, revealed a particular concern about rebuilding trust in the judicial system. Its an area with which Australia has not been greatly involved compared to Portugal.

Australia should also engage with Timorese political parties, recognising the important structural role they play in governance. This can complement continued engagement with formal government institutions and the national parliament. Australia should continue to invest in the protection and promotion of human rights.

Finally, Australia should be a partner for youth civic and political engagement, given the reality of a future political transition from independence leaders to younger generations.

Timor-Leste today lives with a legacy of conflict, which has far-reaching implications. There is significant pressure on government to meet the needs and expectations of the Timorese people. Australia can be a partner to support these goals.

By helping to build a stronger, resilient and prosperous Timor-Leste, Australia is investing in a more secure and stable immediate neighbourhood, which will reap mutual benefits.

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As Timor-Leste heads to the polls, here's how Australia can support its democracy - The Conversation

Democracy Digest: EU Mission to Hungary Sees No Reason to … – Balkan Insight

Despite promising to shore up the medias role as a pillar of Czech democracy, PM Petr Fialas track record in office is questionable. In fact, after his government announced plans to raise VAT on newspapers to 21 per cent, hes being forced to defend himselfagainst accusations that hes actually weakening the countrys quality media by drivingthe last nail in the coffin of Czech newspapers. EU Commissioner Vera Jourova warned over the weekend that the hike of the VAT rate to a European peak risks liquidating Czechias print media, and contradicts an EU trend amid the fight against disinformation to slash rates. Even countries like Poland or Hungary have not taken such steps, she noted. But Fiala appears unconcerned. He doesnt believe the move will kill off any newspapers, and anyway, people get access to information through internet sources, and public media are freely available, so there is no threat of disaster, he shrugged in a TV interview.

At the same time, its notable that the main victims of the higher tax will be the oligarchs that have over recent years bought up most of the Czech press, in a bid to add political influence to their economic power. The leading example of this trend is, of course, former PM and leader of the opposition ANO party, Andrej Babis. And with that in mind, the governing coalition will on Friday convene an extraordinary parliament sessionto discuss a bill that would tighten up the ban on media ownership by members of the government. The ban was introduced in 2016 as part of aConflict of Interest Act, which also banned companies owned by officials fromreceiving state subsidies.Lex Babis, as it was dubbed, forced the billionaire to cede control of his business empire theoretically at least by putting it into trust during his time in government. But the coalition now wants to amend the legislation so that it applies to ownership. Unsurprisingly, ANO has been delaying discussion of the bill for months. The governing parties, which insist the amendment is absolutely not aimed specifically at the ANO leader, say that if the obstruction persists, they will bypass any debate and force a vote next month. In 2021, the EU suspended subsidies to Czechia and demanded it tighten up legislation after finding that Babis had conflicts of interest.

Another bill due in the Chamber of Deputies soon will amend regulations governing the division of publicly-traded companies, which all sounds very dry but it paves the way for a fundamental transformation of Czechias energy sector.Approved by the government on Wednesday, the bill dubbed lex CEZ would reduce the required votes to split companies from 90 per cent of shareholders to 75 per cent, as well as the required quorum. This would allow the government to push through its plans to take control of the production assets of CEZ. Minority shareholders and financing complications have been blocking the energy group, in which the state holds 70 per cent, from building new nuclear reactors the main pillar in the governments energy strategy for years.

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Democracy Digest: EU Mission to Hungary Sees No Reason to ... - Balkan Insight

Lula Is Working to Revive Brazil’s Democracy Against a Powerful Far-Right Bloc – Jacobin magazine

Ever since taking office four months ago, Brazils President Luis Incio Lula da Silva, more commonly known as Lula, has faced the arduous task of rebuilding the countrys institutions, as well as its international image, following the chaotic Bolsonaro administration.

So far, this challenge has generated a mixed bag of successes and failures, with a number of stumbles that have tested Lulas reputation as a political miracle worker. With issues ranging from a conservative-dominated Congress to an antagonistic central bank, the seventy-seven-year-old former union leader is finding governing a harder task than ever as he sets about his third term as president.

Lula campaigned mostly on the idea of a return to more prosperous days for Brazil particularly those of his previous administration. Having left office in 2010 with record-high approval ratings, Lula now relied on voters remembering the 2000s, when Brazil had a strong economy and a rapidly growing middle class that was partly a product of his governments social policies, as well as favorable international relations with both China and the United States.

After winning his third term by a narrow margin last year, Lula tried to carry this idea that happy days are here again into his administration. Brazil is back, he proclaimed in his inaugural speech. It was at the same time a promise to the world and a condemnation of the past four years of Jair Bolsonaro.

Lulas rhetoric to date has been consistent with this view. His focus on growing the economy, increasing social spending, and rebuilding Brazils diplomatic standing come right off his 2000s playbook. However, the president has been forced to confront the fact that Brazil and the world are both in radically different situations than the ones he faced on first taking the presidential seat in 2003.

While every Brazilian government since the end of the military dictatorship in the 1980s has ruled through some form of coalition, Lulas grand alliance has tested the limits of Brazils multiparty system. It brings together parties ranging from far-left socialists to center-right neoliberals, generating more than a few dissenting voices and directions within the new government.

This big-tent approach was effective as a United Front for Democracy when confronting Bolsonaro in the 2022 election. Yet the many political forces it contained soon cashed in the promises and concessions they had obtained from the Lula campaign, in many cases receiving high-ranking positions within his administration.

Out of the thirty-seven cabinet positions in his government, only ten are held by Lulas own Workers Party (PT). Simone Tebet of the center-right Democratic Brazilian Movement, who came third place in the presidential election campaigning on a neoliberal platform, became minister for planning and budgets after supporting Lula in the second round of the election.

There were some more controversial appointments. Minister of Communications Juscelino Filho, from the conservative Unio Brasil, came under fire when it was revealed that he had millions in undisclosed assets.

Tourism Minister Daniela Carneiro, who belongs to the same party as Filho, is linked to militias in Rio de Janeiro. Militias allegedly connected to the Bolsonaro family were responsible for the 2018 killing of activist Marielle Franco, whose sister Anielle Franco currently sits in the same cabinet as Lulas minister of racial equality.

Most shocking were the revelations that General Gonalves Dias, minister of the institutional security bureau, played an active part in the January 8 attack on government buildings by disgruntled Bolsonaro supporters who rejected the legitimacy of Lulas election. Dias resigned as minister to date the only member of Lulas cabinet to do so.

This relative stability at cabinet level, even when faced with controversial revelations, might be attributed in part to the need of Lulas government to convey a steady image. When contrasted to Bolsonaros revolving-door cabinet, with ministers resigning or being fired on a routine basis, Lulas unchanging lineup might transmit the message of a return to order and normalcy that he has been clamoring for in speeches.

On a more pragmatic level, Lulas ruling coalition at the moment has razor-thin margins in Congress. The president simply cannot afford to fire ministers from parties whose support he needs not only to pass legislation, but also to prevent political maneuvers against his own person. The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 set a precedent for the removal of unpopular presidents if they lose the support of Congress. The significant victories of far-right candidates in the 2022 legislative elections have only worsened this danger for Lula.

Lulas weak base in Congress also explains the lack of any major legislation passed in the last few months. While on paper the president has the numbers needed to pass laws, when it comes to specific examples of reform, congressmen from parties such as Unio have vocally insisted that they will not vote along party lines to support Lula. On the other hand, members of non-coalition parties like the Progressives have suggested they would be willing to back Lulas legislation in some instances.

In practical terms, this balance of forces has discouraged the Lula administration from pursuing any immediate votes on major issues. A defeat in Congress might damage the already fragile state of the new government in such a polarized political setting.

Unforeseen events have dominated the first four months of Lulas presidency. First and foremost, Lula had been attempting to rebuild regulatory institutions that were stripped clean by the Bolsonaro administration. Agencies such as Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), which are respectively responsible for the struggle against deforestation and indigenous protection, were virtually defunded in the past four years. Lula has committed to empower these bodies.

This was already a hot topic during the election campaign. But the revelation in January of numerous human rights abuses against the Yanomami people, which some have gone so far as to call purposeful extermination, increased the need for government focus on the issue.

During the opening months of 2023, the southeast of Brazil was hit by record levels of rainfall which generated intense floods as well as landslides. Flooding is a frequent problem for Brazilian infrastructure. Coming right in the middle of Carnival season, when many people were traveling to the most vulnerable coastal areas, this episode caught governmental officials unawares and led to debates about infrastructure reform. The national tragedy brought Lula together with the Bolsonarist governor of So Paulo, Tarcsio de Freitas, as both men coordinated efforts to provide aid to the affected areas.

The attack on Braslia by Bolsonaro supporters on January 8 galvanized the administration to address the issue of national security and the role of the military. Investigations of the event have revealed extensive knowledge of and support for the attack in the Brazilian armed forces. The relationship between the military and Brazils democratic government, which is complex and uneasy at the best of times, is remarkably tense at present.

During Lulas first and second terms in office, the possibility of a military intervention against the executive had been virtually nonexistent. Yet now, after what we can only categorize as a coup attempt, albeit a remarkably disorganized one, the president has to tread carefully when dealing with the military leadership. The government response to the attacks was immediate, with the justice minister, Flvio Dino, promising swift justice and arrests, going so far as to call those involved terrorists.

As the role of the military in the events of January 8 comes more and more to light, it is yet to be seen whether Lula will pursue a more conciliatory or a more punitive stance toward Brazils military institutions. While he dismissed General Dias from his post following the exposure of his involvement, no charges have been brought forward against the general.

Lulas first major goal is his economic plan, which has brought him into direct conflict with the current president of the Central Bank of Brazil, the Bolsonaro-appointed Roberto Campos Neto. Under Campos Netos guidance, the Central Bank has committed itself to high interest rates, much to the consternation of Lula who believes that lowering the rates might stimulate the economy.

Historically, the Central Bank of Brazil has been autonomous of the elected government, and Campos Neto has the authority to keep interest rates high. However, Lula has expressed indignation at the political leanings of a supposedly neutral figure and the fact that his monetary policy might hasten a recession later this year.

Throughout March, the president issued critical statements about Campos Neto, in a gesture that many considered a breach of protocol. There was intense criticism of Lula from the Brazilian financial sector, which seems to be content with the position of the Central Bank.

There has also been division within the ranks of the PT, as two of Lulas closest advisors, Fernando Haddad and Gleisi Hoffmann, clashed over the economic plan. Haddad, the current Treasury minister who ran as the PT candidate in the 2018 presidential election, has argued for a moderate stance, while Hoffmann, the party president, has called for a more expansive approach to social spending in education and health care.

Lulas comments over the last few months seemed to lean more toward Hoffmann, as he reiterated his classic slogan that education is not an expense, but an investment. Haddads Treasury ministry criticized this argument. The Haddad Plan, as it is known, aims to establish certain caps on expenditure in order to increase the budgetary surplus for the coming years. Whatever Lula thinks about the matter, it seems that the plan will go to a vote in the first congressional semester of 2023 the first major legislative challenge for Lulas government.

On foreign affairs, Lula has attempted to turn back the clock to the 2000s, when Brazils diplomatic goal was to pursue a multilateral global arrangement through the framework of BRICS (the economic partnership of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa).

He has reestablished the governments commitment to the Chinese market and recently taken steps toward severing the countrys reliance on the dollar. On April 12, the first direct transaction between Brazil and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Chinas largest bank, was conducted using the renminbi instead of the dollar, signifying a clear move by Brazil away from the US economic sphere.

The global context, however, is not as benign as it was in the 2000s, when amicable relations between the United States, China, and Russia still appeared feasible. Brazils policy toward Russia, for example, has proved controversial in view of the war in Ukraine: Lulas statement, later retracted, that both countries were equally responsible for the conflict generated intense criticism in the West.

Brazils historic position of benign multipolarity as it was described under the government of Rousseff or the Lula Doctrine as some have referred to it more recently traces its roots back to the time when the country played a key role in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. Brazilian foreign policy rejected the idea of taking an ideological side in favor of pragmatic relations to strengthen regional powers.

After the end of the Cold War, this doctrine rejected the US role as a hyperpower, instead favoring trade with emerging markets such as those of China and India. This was an approach that Lula wholeheartedly embraced during his first two terms. Yet it has become much more difficult to follow in an increasingly polarized world. For Lulas government, preserving a relationship with Russia and approaching the Chinese market might mean distancing oneself from the US and European spheres, even inadvertently.

Thus far, Lulas administration has had to deal with environmental, human rights, and political crises that have in many ways detracted from its long-term policy proposals. However, that situation is rapidly changing, as the government has brought forward its new economic plan and begun clarifying its foreign policy agenda. Over the coming months, Lulas ability to articulate his agenda through such a troublesome Congress, prevent an economic recession, and preserve a multipolar diplomatic relationship for Brazil will be put to the test.

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Lula Is Working to Revive Brazil's Democracy Against a Powerful Far-Right Bloc - Jacobin magazine

‘There will be only one voice’: Hong Kong stifles its grassroots democracy – Financial Times

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'There will be only one voice': Hong Kong stifles its grassroots democracy - Financial Times

Democracy Digest: Orban Says West Under Attack From ‘Progressive Biological Virus’ – Balkan Insight

Orban reiterated his governments narrative that Hungary was in chaos before he took over in 2010. He paid a backhanded tribute to George Soros, saying that if the Hungarian-born US billionaire had not launched his migration program, we would never have made it into the headlines. He called all progressive causes gender ideology, pro-migration, wokeness a biological virus that undermines the nation state, and if the nation state is defeated, the West will go under. Orban called the foreign policy of the US Democrats part of this virus that is leading us into war, omitting to mention it was Russia that invaded Ukraine. Finally, he advised his fellow politicians in attendance among them former Czech PM Andrej Babis and Slovenias Janez Jansa that if they want to win elections, they need to put this slogan on their flags: No migration, no gender, no war. He urged participants to take back the liberal strongholds of Brussels and Washington, hoping for Trumps return to the White House and a far-right victory in the European elections in 2024.

Elsewhere in Hungary, protests in Budapest demanding better pay for teachers and a 21st-century education system that includes an Education Ministry not part of the Interior Ministry turned violent on Wednesday evening when students clashed with police in front of Orbans office in the Castle District. The PMs office has been cordoned off for months, purportedly due to construction work in the vicinity. Opposition politicians have several times tried to pull down the barricades, which they argue obstructs the media from putting any questions to politicians arriving to see the PM. Journalists are also blocked off from government politicians at the parliament. The students began their protest on Wednesday in downtown Budapest, ending their march in front of the PMs office up in the Castle Hill. They brought along whipped cream sprays to hand to police as child protection sprays, urging them to use those instead of tear gas. The police were not amused. When the students started to remove the cordons, they replied with tear gas and batons. One student beaten up was barely 16 years old, the media reported. The opposition Momentum partys deputy leader was handcuffed and held in custody for hours. This was the most violent clash since last years election. The pro-government media dismissed the protests as organised by far-left activists.

The three-day visit of Pope Francis appeared to meet all expectations in Hungary, as both those who are pro-government and those who are critical found the messages delivered by the head of the Catholic Church positive and reassuring. Orbans activity on social media hit record highs as he introduced his populous family to the pope and posted family photos with him, although stealing the slogan of the LGBT community family is family caused uproar, given it trended as a line for criticising his governments restrictive family policies that practically banned adoption for same-sex couples. The government rolled out its disingenuous peace narrative, underlining that the Vatican and Hungary are the only two countries in Europe advocating for peace in Ukraine. It also welcomed Franciss praising of its family policies and condemning gender ideology in his speech. The other side, however, highlighted how the pope urged people to open their doors to migrants and the poor. The pope also found time to meet Metropolitan (bishop) Hilarion, a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church in Budapest, with whom he discussed peace and offered help in the repatriation of Ukrainian children.

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Democracy Digest: Orban Says West Under Attack From 'Progressive Biological Virus' - Balkan Insight