Organisers to Open Hong Kong Tiananmen Museum despite Pressures
Organisers move a replica statue called "The Goddess of Democracy" into the first permanent museum in Hong Kong dedicated to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massac...
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Guns N #39; Roses - Chinese Democracy (Live O2 Arena 2012 HD )
Guns N #39; Roses - Chinese Democracy (Live O2 Arena 2012 HD ) Members: . Axl Rose - Vocal, piano . DJ Ashba - Guitar . Ron Bumblefoot Thal - Guitar . Richard F...
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First published Thu Jul 27, 2006
Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory. It does not offer in the first instance a scientific study of those societies that are called democratic. It aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must call on the results of political science, sociology and economics in order to give this kind of concrete guidance.
This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on four distinct issues in recent work. First, it outlines some different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally desirable at all. Second, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to expect from citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories as we will see. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. It also discusses blueprints of democratic institutions for dealing with issues that arise from a conception of citizenship. Third, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation. These last two parts display the interdisciplinary nature of normative democratic theory. Fourth, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and it discusses different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority.
To fix ideas, the term democracy, as I will use it in this article, refers very generally to a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which I mean decisions that are made for groups and that are binding on all the members of the group. Second, this definition means to cover a lot of different kinds of groups that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight to it. It is quite compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to an assembly where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building. Democracy may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct participation of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.
The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. For instance, Joseph Schumpeter argues (1956, chap. XXI), with some force, that only a highly formal kind of democracy in which citizens vote in an electoral process for the purpose of selecting competing elites is highly desirable while a conception of democracy that draws on a more ambitious conception of equality is dangerous. On the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762, Book II, chap. 1) is apt to argue that the formal variety of democracy is akin to slavery while only robustly egalitarian democracies have political legitimacy. Others have argued that democracy is not desirable at all. To evaluate their arguments we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of humanity and society from which they proceed.
We can evaluate democracy along at least two different dimensions: consequentially, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision making; or intrinsically, by reference to qualities that are inherent in the method, for example, whether there is something inherently fair about making democratic decisions on matters on which people disagree.
Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: relatively good laws and policies and improvements in the characters of the participants. John Stuart Mill argued that a democratic method of making legislation is better than non-democratic methods in three ways: strategically, epistemically and via the improvement of the characters of democratic citizens (Mill, 1861, Chapter 3). Strategically, democracy has an advantage because it forces decision-makers to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since democracy gives some political power to each, more people are taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy. The most forceful contemporary statement of this instrumental argument is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues, for example, that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press (Sen 1999, 152). The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.
Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best decision-making method on the grounds that it is generally more reliable in helping participants discover the right decisions. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessment of laws and policies. Democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore, the broad based discussion typical of democracy enhances the critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide decision-makers.
Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on character. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861, p. 74, Elster 2002, p. 152).
Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects.
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Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
According to him, this was visible in attempts to implement Islamic law such as the hudud penal code in Malaysia, which have been frustrated by the need to consider every voice from the public, including the non-Muslims.
Democracy is from the people, by the people, for the people It seems good, but in Islam not everything can be left just to the people, Aminuddin said in the forum on Islam and human rights.
That is why we cannot do anything. We cant even do hudud, we have to ask the non-Muslims. We cant even [ban] alcohol, we have to ask the non-Muslims.
Aminuddin claimed that Western-style democracy was a ruse by developed countries to colonise Muslim nations through soft power, especially those away from the war-torn Middle East.
He also alleged later on that the United Nations was an invention of the Jews.
The Islamist group then expressed that adultery and consumption of intoxicants must be curbed at all cost, as a child born out of wedlock or an alcohol drinker are not fit to rule a country.
Later in the forum, however, the Islamist group was challenged to explain its participation in the 2013 general election given its views on democracy.
Isma contested seven parliamentary seats in the May 2013 polls under the ticket of PAS splinter party Berjasa, but did not manage to win any.
In this current situation, this is the system We still dont have the power, so we have to sit in the current system, Aminuddin retorted.
Thats why in our call, we urge for Muslims to unite, so that we can implement anything which is in our religious teachings We have to play this game at the moment.
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Democracy a tall hurdle to Islamic state, says Isma leader
In my last column, I had outlined the evolution of Western representative democracy from its initial constitutional form to preserve liberty (government for the people), which, with the extension of the franchise, was conjoined with mass electoral representation (government by the people). This period of mass democracy following the Industrial Revolution led to the creation of mass political parties based on a political agenda of the conflict between capital and labour. But, with globalisation limiting the state's autonomy to pursue the redistributive games on which the domestic politics of these mass parties was based, the political agenda has narrowed to largely technocratic issues. Parties, thus, end up with similar programmes, becoming "competing teams of leaders" emphasising their governing rather than representative roles. Instead of the "government by the people", what we get is a government by a governing class, where parties have become primarily office-seeking organisations. The contest even in parliamentary democracies, then, becomes "presidential" between the leaders of the teams seeking office. One of the key functions they continue to perform is to dispense political patronage.
However, even if the political system is no longer as representative as it was in the golden age of mass democracy, it preserves the essential feature of a liberal democracy: the constitutional order first charted by the United States to preserve liberty. By contrast, as Fareed Zakaria and others have argued, the most common form of democracy to be found particularly in the Third World is "illiberal democracy", which fulfils the representational aspect of democracy through periodic elections but encroaches on personal liberties and the rule of law. Russia and increasingly Turkey today are recent examples. But, India, despite some backsliding, remains a constitutional liberal democracy where the judiciary has by and large preserved liberty. But, as in the West, has the representative element of democracy declined - and if so, is this desirable? Contributions to The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (2009), which summarises the political science findings about various aspects of Indian democracy, provide some answers.
The representative function is fulfilled through political parties. The Congress' single-party dominance has gradually fragmented; no single party at the national level has achieved a parliamentary majority since the 1984 election. This national fragmentation is matched by consolidation at the state level towards bipolarity. These divergent trends are convincingly explained by E Sridharan's application of Duverger's law to a federal polity where elections are based on the first-past-the-post system. This law states that under the first-past-the-post mechanism, voters will increasingly coalesce into two rival parties - third parties and alliances are squeezed out, since they do not have a realistic chance of winning. In a federal system, Duverger's law can apply at the state level, but, as in the different states the two-party system does not consist of the same parties, that leads to a multi-party system nationally. This requires interstate alliances of parties that do not compete on each other's turf, and which, faute de mieux, have to modulate any ideological differences with their coalition partners. This happened with the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition under Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It is now happening under Narendra Modi, who, as Ashutosh Varshney has noted, has departed in his election speeches from the core Hindutva tenets in order to gain power as the head of a moderate NDA coalition.
As Zoya Hussain notes, the evolution of Indian political parties "through a politics of accommodation and consensus" has led to democratic consolidation, which "binds the political class together despite their different party affiliations". It has given historically excluded groups access to the political system. Though voters see parties as essential to democracy, they do not trust them as vehicles of representation and governance. "The absence of internal democracy, dynastic rule, elite capture, and the inability of parties to offer real choices to the people are among the major issues confronting India's parties".
The seeming governance failure of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in its second term has also accentuated a trend among the middle class for a more technocratic form of governance. As Christophe Jaffrelot recently reported, in answer to the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies' State of Democracy in South Asia project: "all major decisions about the country should be taken by experts rather than politicians". In 2008, 51 per cent of the respondents from the "elite" "strongly agreed" and 29 per cent "agreed"; and among the "mass", 29 per cent "strongly agreed" and 22 per cent "agreed". Thus, as in Western democracies, there seems to be a shift in popular attitudes towards technocratic, rather than populist, political modes of governance.
Yogendra Yadav, too, notes that "the issue of political representation itself is declining in salience due to a shift in the locus of decision making from the legislature and executive to independent bodies and the judiciary". Thus, as in Western democracies, the representational aspect is declining, while the constitutional aspect endures.
These emerging trends will be strengthened by the attitudes of the growing urban middle class. As Minna Saavala (Middle-Class Moralities) argues, the traditional urban middle class is being replenished by a "neo-middle class" of other backward classes migrating from the villages. They are an aspiring class, whose caste identity has been eroded. They demand growth that offers them a brighter economic future. They are also intensely religious; they adhere to Hindu rituals in a form of Sanskritisation. But, like their upper-caste compatriots, they want a meritocracy and are against reservations. They are part of the Modi wave. Going by its recent manifesto, the UPA seems to be stuck in its "rights-based" welfarist mode. As in the West, unsustainable political entitlements to income streams are being undermined by globalisation, which leaves the sustainable income entitlements generated by economic growth as the only viable model for continuing economic progress.
Clearly, Indian democracy is veering towards the Western model; elections have become a verdict on the suitability of different teams from the political class, and voters are increasingly uncommitted to parties but are exercising their democratic right to "throw the rascals out". Against this backdrop, good governance while maintaining liberty is likely to be the future of Indian democracy. This is no bad thing; as long as liberty is preserved, in Alexander Pope's words, "For forms of government let fools contest; whatever is best administered is best" (An Essay on Man).