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Senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict and Governance Program at Carnegie Europe and Executive Director of the European Partnership for Democracy, respectively

The second Summit for Democracy was held over three days in the last week of March. The event did not attract much media attention and some observers judged the outcomes to be modest. Yet, the government leaders involved agreed that the summit process will continue and promised to explore ways of deepening coordination between democracies.

Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe. He works on EU foreign policy and on issues of international democracy.

South Korea will host a third summit, opening the prospect of more global buy-in for what has been up to now a heavily U.S.-led process. European governments have engaged in the Summit for Democracy, although in most cases so far without according it high-level priority. The summit process could turn into an important strategic platform in the defense of global democratic norms or it could atrophy into irrelevance.

Ken Godfrey is the Executive Director of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD).

European governments still need to decide what they want from the initiative and, more generally, what importance to attach to international democratic coordination. Given all this, we asked noted experts and democracy practitioners for their thoughts on how Europe should position itself in relation to the Summit for Democracy and how it should seek to influence the evolution of the process.

Co-director of the Democracy, Conflict and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

With the second Summit for Democracy over and a third, to be hosted by South Korea, in the works, European governments need to decide what role they want to play in the process. Europe has thus far been divided. A few smaller, mostly northern European states have followed the United States lead and played active roles in the organizing of side meetings and cohort processes around themes like media freedom, civic space, and tech for democracy. On the other hand, most European statesincluding the big four of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdomhave participated only ambivalently and largely perfunctorily. They have been hesitant to embrace the broad U.S. framing of a global divide between authoritarianism and democracy, and uncertain about the value of the summit process, but at the same time they have not been willing to give a full cold shoulder to the initiative.

Thomas Carothers, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peaces Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, is a leading expert on comparative democratization and international support for democracy.

The greatest value of the summit process so far has probably been its role as a spur for the establishment of various joined-up processes among governmental and nongovernmental actors to craft multilateral policy and aid platforms around some key themes. Accordingly, the smaller, more motivated European states should keep pushing to advance these processes and own some of them fully. As they do so, they can attempt to pull the less motivated European states into greater participation, encouraging them to see the next phase of the summit process as less about U.S.-led pageantry and more about taking targeted, concrete policy and aid actions. However, expectations about any significant change of heart about the summit process on the part of most European governments must necessarily be modest.

By doing the above, the motivated European governments can help the Summit for Democracy avoid the fate of an earlier U.S. initiative, the Community of Democraciesdevolution into a ritualistic series of cumbersome, and largely empty gatherings driven by the United States and a changing cast of relatively small democracies that it enlists into hosting roles. In seeking to help achieve tangible policy progress on key themes and to help the summit process evolve into something of lasting substance, motivated European governments can play on their strengths in the democracy domain. These strengths are a proven commitment to and deep experience with pro-democracy multilateralism, cutting-edge thinking and action on some key regulatory policy areas such as tech and democracy, and an enduring consensus across most parts of the European political spectrum on the importance of international democracy support (in contrast to the unsettling of U.S. democracy policy during the presidency of Donald Trump).

Professor of Democracy and International Development at the Birmingham University

The culmination of the Summit for Democracy in Zambia saw the end of another global democracy event. Many have been held over the last few years and many more will be held in the future. But key Western governments have yet to really grasp what effective democracy support actually requires, and what they need to do in order to move from platitudes to policies. Strengthening democracy can no longer be limited to the old-fashioned idea of simply investing in democratic institutions and civil society in every country in which a donor is active. It must also be about rewarding democratic governments with a greater share of aid and economic opportunities and insulating their countries political systems against backsliding.

Nic Cheeseman is professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham.

European governments should prioritize the following three things in helping the next phase of the Summit for Democracy process address the challenges faced by fragile democracies.

Governments around the world are unlikely to see the value of adhering to democracy if aid continues to be distributed with little regard for regime type. Democracies should receive more aid than authoritarian countries, other things being equal.

Some of the opposition parties whose election victories have been the best news stories for democracy in recent years are struggling to retain popular support in government. One reason is that they came to power with impossible expectations placed upon them, but another is that many parts of the world are still suffering an economic form of long COVID, compounded by high food and fuel prices. As Zambias President Hakainde Hichilema recently warned, if governments like his are not supported in delivering services, there is a risk that citizens will turn their backs on democracy. To manage this, fragile democracies need not only aid but also privileged access to beneficial trade relations and debt relief.

Insulating democracies against democratic backsliding means supporting them not only in delivering services in the short term but also in building more effective states. As Ken Opalo has argued, weak state capacity is the most significant barrier to both political and economic development. Constructing more effective states and stronger democracies must therefore go hand in hand.

These three goals form an agenda for the next Summit for Democracy where European states, some of which have a reputation for engaging more consistently and reflectively around the world, will need to play a prominent roleand are likely to be better placed to do this than the United States.

European countries with their history of having a more capable state are better suited to partner with fragile democracies around the world in this endeavor. But this will only happen if European governments pull their heads out of the sand and recognize the global rise of authoritarianism for the existential threat it is. Otherwise, what would be the point of organizing another Summit for Democracy if Europe and others do not listen to the warning of the government that co-hosted the latest one?

Executive Director of the Forum 2000 Foundation

After a period of creeping external and internal pressure on democracies, Russias invasion of Ukraine and a more assertive China have made the global geopolitical landscape clearer. In this context, closer democratic coordination is quite clearly needed. It is not so obvious, however, that the two Summits for Democracy have charted the right path for doing so. Despite the time and effort invested in them, it feels like the process has still not properly started. Difficult questions remain unanswered: Is there actual progress in cooperation among democracies as a result of the summits? How sincere is the interest of democratic governments in deepening cooperation? And what are the main objectives of this initiative?

The EUs involvement in the two summits so far was impeded by Hungary not being invited to either, but European democracies should take the initiative in shaping the next stages of the process. Recent security, economic, technological, and other developments have placed it in a vulnerable position, putting its prosperity and its democracy at risk. The EU needs to take a more agile role in global affairs, to look for new approaches, and to pursue its interests more vigorously. In this context, propping up the global rules-based order, strengthening the transatlantic partnership, and enhancing political and economic cooperation with democratic partners around the globe should be natural objectives.

Jakub Klepal is the Executive Director of the Forum 2000.

The Summit for Democracy process has the potential to be an important platform for pursuing these objectives. European governments should focus on three areas: making the process more inclusive, embracing more fully partners and civil society from outside the Euro-Atlantic space, and making the process more strategically focused.

A recent Forum 2000 policy brief titled What is the future for global cooperation on democracy? stressed that democratic states outside the West need to have more ownership in steering the process. The United States decision to invite Costa Rica, South Korea, and Zambia as co-conveners of the second summit and to pass the leadership role to Seoul was a step in the right direction.

Civil society and other relevant nongovernmental actors also need to play an enhanced role. The mobilization of civil society organizations within the summit cohorts has shown that there is significant potential in their involvement. More inclusiveness would widen the reach of the process and deepen its roots. As the Forum 2000 brief suggests, a shift from a process of democratic governments to one of global democrats, allowing for more involvement by civil society from democratic countries and by democracy defenders from nondemocratic ones would make sense. A more substantial interface between governments and nongovernmental actors could also provide fertile ground for fresh ideas and informal networks to emerge and move the process forward. To enable more meaningful participation by civil society organizations with limited resources, the EU and other donors should assist them with sufficient and flexible funding.

Finally, EU states should help the Summit for Democracy process achieve the difficult balance between being more strategic and addressing crucial topics such as Russias war against Ukraine so as to remain credible and relevant, and including democratic actors from the Global South for whom taking strong positions on such topics is complicated. If such a balance is achieved, the summit process could become a platform where not just technicalities but also the strategic interests of democracies worldwide can be discussed and coordinated.

And, if the Summit for Democracy is to function properly, it should be convened in-person. Online and hybrid events have their merit but nothing can replace the depth, the lasting experience, the strong network-building effect, and the media dynamics of high-level personal encounters.

Head of the Transformation of Political (Dis-)order research program at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

As if in two parallel worlds, China and the United States recently hosted two international democracy events. Their goal was supposedly the sameto foster democracy. While the U.S.-initiated Summit for Democracy aims to protect freedoms and core democratic institutions, the Chinese-driven International Forum on Democracy: The Shared Human Values seeks to defend democratic diversity and countries right to separate development paths.

Julia Leininger is the head of the Transformation of Political (Dis-)order research program at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

This was an expression of the rivalry between China and the United States over political orders. But in contrast to the Cold War, today the development of countries in all world regions depends on winning the economic competition in an international capitalist system regardless of their political and ideological orientation. What is more, the global economy potentially provides a space in which interdependencies could at least mitigate conflict, but economic and political rivalries also fuel each other and may promote a downward spiral away from multilateral cooperation toward exclusionary intergovernmental relations. What does this imply for the European Unions role in the next phase of the Summit for Democracy process?

The international and national dimensions of political order have become inseparable. Zambia recently offered a good example of this. While its government co-hosted the recent Summit for Democracy, the opposition used the Chinese forum to denounce the United States for its double standards in international relations. This also reflects the waning credibility of Western states.

In the current geostrategic constellation, the EU needs to further develop its role as a credible supporter and protector of democracy worldwide and if used in the right way the Summit process could be one arena for meeting this goal.

For this, acting credibly means standing up for democratic values without being tainted by the United States sometimes questionable reputation. While the EU has a difficult historical legacy given its member states colonial past, as a supranational actor it can develop a different stance than individual governments. With its Global Gateway initiative, it has already announced a geostrategic initiative that has democracy support as a central element. The EU can also achieve geostrategic strength and credibility by clearly positioning itself at the working level of the summit process rather than by co-hosting a highly visible summit on the superficial frontlines of global rivalry.

Leading by example is the most promising approach to advancing democratic values. For the EU, this includes promoting democracy in its autocratizing member states and making the case for democracy in all its external fields of action. Conflicting objectives are natural in foreign policy; dealing with them openly and managing them is the real art. For example, greater trade or official development assistance can strengthen autocracies and counteract democratic objectives.

Do no democratic harm must therefore be a key guiding principle for the future of the Summit for Democracy process, applied in a coordinated fashion within and among all external policy fields by democracy-promoting governments. Germany has made an initial push in this direction in its development policy strategy for Africa. For the EU, it should mean breaking down policy silos and connecting policy areas and the work of different directorates. In the Summit for Democracy process, the EU could use its convening power to form a cohort with standard-setters such as OECD GovNet and regional organizations to develop a norm of do no democratic harm, involving decisionmakers from various policy areas, in particular trade and security.

Refined Democracy Narrative. Amid the current global wave of autocratization, democracy support and protection can no longer be based mainly on interstate relations. Many pro-democracy champions are not governments but civil society actors. Where democracy is in danger or where autocracies repress human rights, people fight for a democratic life even across borders. Solidarity with the aspirations of societies becomes a central motive for democracy promotion. The Summit for Democracy needs to pay greater attention to this dynamic.

A contemporary narrative justifying democracy promotion needs to consist of three elements: intrinsic motivation, the instrumental value of democracy, and solidarity between societies rather than states. Although civil society had an important role in the summit cohorts, it is necessary to give nongovernmental organizations from the Global South a more leading role in its next phase. Protecting and supporting democracy under the current conditions requires full buy-in from nonstate actors. The EU can advocate for such a narrative with its networks and based on the lessons learned from its various programs to foster civil society. This could give it more credibility in the eyes of its strategic partners in the Global South.

Executive Director of the Netherlands Helsinki Committee

The second Summit for Democracy passed by without being noticed by those who were not involved professionally. The sense of urgency involved was not translated into a public debate. Europe must use the momentum behind the commitments made and take the outcomes of the summit to the next level by intensifying the defense, renewal, and strengthening of democracies on the continent and beyond.

More action on European democracy is needed in the next phase of the summit process. Not only to fight the rise of autocracy in countries where democracy and fundamental values are already extremely under threat, but also in ones like the Netherlands where democracy needs serious maintenance. The fact that about 30 percent of the population does not feel politically represented in a country that is in general considered a thriving democracy is a matter of grave concern.

Kirsten Meijer is the Executive Director of the Netherlands Helsinki Committee.

The EU should lead by example by defending, renewing, and strengthening democracies in Europe and beyond, but it should only play a facilitating and modest role in the summit process. Other democratic champions, preferably from the Global South, should be in the lead, in solidarity with democratic activists from all around the world.

The EU could further support a meaningful summit process by backing demands for more transparency in it, by supporting its institutionalization and funding, by enhancing the role of cohorts, and by insisting on the engagement of civil society. European actors like the Democracy Under Threat civil society coalition in the Netherlands are ready to contribute, but the support of the EU as a guardian of democratic values is necessary.

Most importantly, the EU should lead by example within Europe itself. First, this means adopting an ambitious version of the Defence of Democracy Package being discussed. This is an important opportunity for the EU to strengthen fundamental freedoms, civic space, free media, and the rule of law as mutually reinforcing principles that underpin democracy. The recently published joint recommendations of civil society and democracy organizations in this regard should be taken fully into consideration and feed into the third summit.

The EU should use the momentum of the recent Summit for Democracy and the commitments that were made. For example, the work of the Civic Space Cohort would provide a great opportunity for the EU to further strengthen its role as a champion in the field of strengthening civic space.

Democracy also needs investment. The EU could improve the functioning of its existing instruments to further strengthen civil society; for example, by providing core funding and by no longer requiring 10 percent co-funding for projects that are funded by its Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values program so as to ensure nondiscriminatory and sustainable access to EU democracy funding.

The EU should continue to use its Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism to the fullest extent. Though this instrument is intended to protect the EUs budget and its financial interests, it also helps put pressure on member-state governments to bring about reforms that are important for upholding democratic values. Corrupt elites undermine democracies to keep political power in their hands and comprehensive anticorruption strategies are key for pushing back against autocracy.

Executive Director of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy

Hundreds of events have taken place during the recent Summit for Democracy and through its Year of Action. These have focused on important issues related to democracy and the threats that undermine it. Enormous efforts have been put in place by governments, civil society, and grassroots and democracy support organizations in many countries. So far, so good.

So why do I sit back with a slight feeling of disappointment, resignation, and worry? Have there been overall tangible results since the first summit in 2021? I am not sure. Those actors that were already engaged with democracy support in different formsindependent media, anticorruption, elections, civil rights organizations, political parties, and so onhave participated. But what is lacking is global joint leadership and a strong will to find new ways of working.

Lisbeth Pilegaard is the Executive Director at the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy.

The data in the likes of V-Dems annual democracy reports shows us that more and more people are living under autocracy and that the democratic backsliding is happening faster and faster. This is the case even within the EU. Do we have the right tools, approaches, and funds to counter this worrying development?

The democracy support sector needs to engage in critical self-reflection as to the ways it has worked and the way forward. Not to identify one single solution to fix the problem but rather to foster broader engagement across a group of leaders and countries that will drive this agenda. It is important that European countries show the way. For example, having a frank conversation within the EU could help change the fact that democracy has been like a red rag to a bull within the UN, where leaders avoid having this discussion.

For the next Summit for Democracy that will be hosted by South Korea, I hope for tangible leadership and ambition as to how to take the process forward. One way is a clear willingness among states and their leaders to include democracy and democracy support in their foreign affairs policies and strategies. Europe and others owe this to the 72 percent of the worlds population living under autocratic regimes and who look for hope and concrete assistance to counter the oppression of their human rights and the lack of freedom to express themselves.

Chief Executive of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

A summit should by definition be a top-down event. But three conversations in southern Africa during the recent Summit for Democracy reshaped my views about this one. The first was with a taxi driver who in the time between two Johannesburg traffic lights skewered South Africas political parties more neatly than any academic analysts I know had managed to. The second conversation was with a cross-party group of parliamentarians in Zambia about the climate emergency, to use their term. And the third was with a group of Zambian women activists who said that, with politicians failing them, they simply had to change their whole societies to bring true democracy.

Anthony Smith is the Chief Executive of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

None of these conversations took place in the formal summit sessions. But in different ways, the summit framed them, whether as a conversation starter or a side meeting. Leaders talking about democracy in Africa triggered meaningful conversations about the problems that people face and the failures of the political system in tackling them.

In the Zambia summit meetings, the voices were overwhelmingly African and their focus was clearsolving the multiple economic, energy, health, and education challenges through accountability, clean elections, and inclusion. They said that the focus had to be on the quality of government, deepening democratic culture, and relentlessly pushing for democratic institutions to do their jobs well. It was abundantly clear what would happen otherwise and no mystery to them why democracy mattered.

The summit process should definitely continue. There is no other global forum to discuss democracy in the world. We need to monitor the state of democracy and reinforce those working to deepen democracy at country level.

The summit process should first of all be a high-level, heart-on-our-sleeve signal that democracy matters to all of us across regions, faiths, and generations. We should review reports on the state of democracy in the world and use that data to identify key issues and to target support effectively.

The second aim should be to back those people who are working to strengthen their countrys democracy and to encourage others to do so. Geopolitics shaped the Summit for Democracy process but European contributions to it need to help make a difference at the community level, defending democracy while helping it deliver. In this process, leadership needs to be widely shared beyond Western powers, whose should be more openly acknowledged. As the women I spoke to know, democracy is about behaviors and cultures, not just rules. A massive effort is needed to support community leaders who are changing behaviors, raising standards, and exposing hypocrisy.

The United States did an outstanding job in conceiving the Summit for Democracy and getting it started. But the impact of the process depends in large measure on Europe taking its turn to maintain the momentum. It can do this in partnerships and with thoughtful leadership that recognizes the long-term challenges that countries across the world face in deepening democracy and delivering for their people.

Secretary General of ALDAthe European Association for Local Democracy, and Chair of the European Partnership for Democracy

The Summit for Democracy united democracy supporters and made more tangible their conviction that democracy is not a form of governance exclusively for the West. And, based on the discussions I had around the summit, the message is clear and should be presented to any future one: democracy must be empowered and can deliver better when focused at the local level.

Participatory democracy needs to be prominent in the next phase of the summit process. Participative forms of democracy have immense potential for finding answers to local problems and building communities resilient to authoritarian regimes and forms of governance. The more citizensin particular youth and women, for whom national politics is less accessibleare involved in local democracy by being elected to local government or in being actively engaged in local groups, the more they build up a DNA of democracy that is open to deliberation, negotiation, representation, and everyones contribution.

Antonella Valmorbida is the Secretary General of ALDAthe European Association for Local Democracy, and Chair of the European Partnership for Democracy.

As political parties in cities and regions try out different and interesting experiments with civic lists and citizens movements, local democracy empowered by real decentralization can build or rebuild trust between citizens and institutions. Donors focus on political partiestheir accountability, transparency, and forms of representationshould therefore support their work at the local level.

In this context, a vibrant and aware civil society, engaged and representing the collective interest of the community, is key for democracy. This has been exemplified by the experience of Ukraine since Russias invasion, with local authorities and civil society working together to become the strongholds of resilience and resistance.

The summit process has so far not paid sufficient attention to elections at the local level and needs to do more on this in its next phase. Local democracy and decentralization allow for an easier redistribution of powers and representation than is the case at the national level. Local elections can galvanize interest and engage citizens. The next Summit for Democracy and the implementation of past summit decisions must involve partners at the local level to a greater extent.

This article is part of the European Democracy Hub initiative run by Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy.

This document was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union.

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How Can Europe Help the Next Phase of the Summit for Democracy? - Carnegie Europe

During typical election campaigns, reasonable people can disagree about whether a government is competent, its policies are effective or its priorities are in step with society.

In Alberta, the United Conservative Party (UCP) governments actions over the past four years have made it clear: the ongoing provincial election campaign is far from typical. Its about something more fundamental.

Throughout its time in office, the UCP has shown disregard for the separation of powers and the rule of law. With the writ about to be officially dropped for the May 29 election, that means the vote is not just about right versus left or conservative versus progressive.

Its about whether Albertans want to place their trust in democratic institutions or continue to erode the safeguards that protect us from arbitrary abuses of power. Any policy debates are moot without settling that question.

How did the UCP put Albertans in this position?

For one, the party has repeatedly attempted to seize power from independent bodies and other branches of government, often successfully.

In the opening months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UCP handed sweeping legislative powers to the health minister, removing the ability of members of the legislature to review changes to laws and regulations.

Only when faced with legal threats and public backlash from allies but against the wishes of his own caucus did former premier Jason Kenney relent and return the authority to the legislative branch.

The UCP has also removed the boards and heads of numerous arms-length agencies. This included replacing the entire Alberta Health Services Board with a single commissioner.

These patronage appointments were meant to centralize control within the UCP government over health care, post-secondary education and other sectors.

The Sovereignty Act had the same intent. The original version would have stolen powers from the federal government, the Alberta legislature and the courts and granted them to the premier.

Once again, the government had to be shamed into amending the bill, making Alberta a national and international laughing stock. And once again, the UCPs anti-democratic impulses were laid bare.

More fundamentally, the UCP has demonstrated a passing fancy for the rule of law. Since coming to power four years ago, there have been several examples:

The firing of the election commissioner before he could complete his investigation into Kenneys leadership campaign;

The then-health minister confronted a neighbour in his own driveway about the doctors critical social media post about him;

The then-attorney general called up a police chief to discuss his traffic ticket;

Premier Danielle Smiths refusal to call a byelection despite the legal requirement to do so;

Smiths stated wish that she could provide political solutions to criminal prosecutions of her supporters, denigrating the courts as legitimate checks on their authority;

Smiths threat to sue a major media outlet in an effort to avoid questions.

One thing is clear. Mired in multiple ongoing investigations into prosecutorial interference, professional misconduct and the partys inaugural leadership race, the UCPs actions indicate it considers itself above the law and beyond reproach.

The sheer volume of misdeeds is shocking and Albertans shouldnt be lulled into thinking that its politics as usual. Just because many of these episodes happened in plain sight, in front of cameras and microphones, that doesnt make them any less egregious.

As much as outsiders attribute these episodes to Albertas Wild West culture, the UCPs anti-democratic approach to governing is not a matter of right-wing political norms.

Its about consolidating power into the hands of the Premiers Office by taking over mechanisms of oversight and control, removing checks and balances altogether and pretending that the rules do not apply to the UCP and its followers. This is a feature of UCP, not a bug. Conservatives usually stand against those sorts of things.

Indeed, not too long ago, Albertans could count on their elected government officials to put a stop to these anti-democratic activities. Those days are behind us, but the election is not.

Normal political campaigns usually feature rousing debates over leadership, priorities, policies and ideas. Voters choose between different governing agendas, not entirely different systems of government. Those days, too, are behind us.

The UCPs record in office now means that a vote for that party is about far more than endorsing a policy platform or conservatism its about choosing party over province. People contemplating casting their ballot for the UCP should understand precisely what that means.

Albertans deserve better. But theyll need to demand it. Thats what democracy requires of us from time to time.

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Democracy itself is on the ballot in Alberta's upcoming election - The Conversation

Narendra Modi is an exceptionally popular prime minister both at home and on the world stage. His approval rating is 76% and he is regularly flattered, praised and courted by global leaders keen to align themselves with India and get a slice of their huge consumer market.

But critics say this is despite Modi and his ruling BJP partys assaults on the independence of vital institutions, from the judiciary to the media. The Guardians south Asia correspondent, Hannah Ellis-Petersen, explains how opposition politicians have also felt they have been targeted in particular Rahul Gandhi of the Congress party, Modis most famous rival.

Nosheen Iqbal hears how an extraordinary case alleging that Gandhi has defamed the entire Modi community could see this heir to Indias most famous political dynasty jailed for two years, just a year before a general election. While author Pankaj Mishra explains why it matters so much and warns that Indias democracy is at a critical point.

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The court case pushing Indian democracy to the brink podcast - The Guardian

ON APRIL 3, 2022, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbn and his Fidesz-MPP party won two-thirds of the National Assembly seatsa parliamentary supermajorityfor the fourth consecutive time since 2010. In his 12 years in power, Orbn has revised the Hungarian constitution, transformed the state, substantially weakened the prospects for political opposition, and instituted a new quasi-authoritarian regime of national cooperation that he has billed as illiberal democracy or Christian democracy. In the coming years, it can be assumed that Orbn and his government will do their best to further entrench this regime and continue to promote its examplesomething Orbn has heretofore done with great success.

Orbn has been amply rewarded for his efforts. He has accumulated vast political power, which he has used to enrich his family, friends, and principal supporters, thus further reinforcing his kleptocratic rule. He has used his power to reshape electoral law, the media system, and the cultural and educational system; to marginalize critics and opponents; and to intimidate independent civil society institutions, most notoriously through the passage of a Lex CEU that forced Central European University to leave its Budapest home and reopen in Vienna. This has made him the scourge of the European Unionwhose rule of law and transparency requirements he has regularly floutedand the bane of supporters of civil and academic freedom everywhere.

It has also made him a hero of the transnational far right, a symbol of resistance to the supposed tyranny of human rights, gender equality, woke elitism, and liberalism more generally. He has long been lionized by the US populist right: fted at Conservative Political Action Committeemeetings; idolized by Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, and Patrick Deneen; and regarded as a pioneer of a new kind of illiberal regime that promises to save civilization from an evil humanistic overclass. In late January, Orbn fanboy Rod Dreher, writing in the misleadingly titled far-right journal The American Conservative, celebrated the political lesson that Florida Governor Ron DeSantis has learned from Orbn, namely to take the war against left ideological hegemony to the institutions. And the Claremont Institutes The American Mind ran an adulatory piece by Luke Larsona fellow of the Orbn-funded Mathias Corvinus Collegiumabout Hungary on the Cutting Edge, celebrating how Orbn prefigured Donald Trump, inspired right-wing populism, and now finds himself at the forefront of political change in the West.

Zsuzsanna Szelnyi agrees that Orbns Hungary represents the cutting edge. And it terrifies her. Szelnyi, an author, former politician, and current director of Central European Universitys Budapest-based Leadership Academy, was one of the original core members of Orbns Fidesz party. Working closely with Orbn in opposition to the Communist regime, she participated in the roundtable discussions negotiating the 1989 transition to democracy and served as a Fidesz MP from 1990 to 1994, the period of Hungarys first democratically elected government. She then left the party, along with many other liberals who became increasingly disenchanted with its increasingly opportunistic, nationalistic, and anti-liberal positioning. From 1994 to 1996, Szelnyi worked in the Education Ministry under the coalition government led by the Socialist Party. She then worked for a number of transnational NGOs and European institutions, including the Council of Europe, before returning to Hungarian political life in 2012 as a co-founder of the liberal Together party. She returned to parliament from 2014 to 2018 as a strong opponent of Orbns government, before exiting from electoral politics again in 2018 when Together failed to defeat Orbn and then fell apart.

Szelnyis new book, Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orbn and the Subversion of Hungary (2023), is a powerfully written, insider account of the transformation of Fidesz from a liberal group of Young Democrats opposing authoritarianism to an anti-liberal group of middle-aged opponents of liberal democracy, and of Orbn himself from a charismatic tribune of freedom to a fervent proponent of traditional Christian family values and Magyar Greatness. This transformation provides what Szelnyi calls a detailed twenty-first century autocratic playbook, charting the key elements of the new politics of intolerance.

The core of the book is part two, called Establishing Control. Here, Szelnyi describes in depth the illusion of democracy created by Orbns overhauling of parliament, attacks on judicial independence, and alteration of election law; the ways that Orbn has drawn on EU and IMF funding to establish a Hungarian form of crony capitalism while simultaneously mobilizing his base against the tyranny of these very institutions; the financial and bureaucratic means by which Orbn has attacked the independent press and essentially press-ganged into service almost all of Hungarys media institutions; and his implementation of these institutions to wage a permanent campaign of vilification and intimidation against his political opponents and autonomous civil society institutions. Much of this has been well documented by a range of commentators. But Szelnyi adds important detail to how Orbns autocratic innovations have actually worked, showing how they have frustrated politicians, journalists, legal professionals, and academics seeking to defend liberal democracy.

It is in its nuanced discussion of the political dynamics behind Orbns electoral conquest and exercise of political power that the real importance of this book lies, especially for an American readership. Indeed, the parallels between the rise of Orbnism and the rise of Trumpism are glaring.

When Orbn won his first landslide victory in 2010, he declared that today a revolution has happened at the polls. [] The Hungarians have given their verdict on an era. Like Trump a decade later, Orbn regarded his political opponents as a blight on a prostrate nation, and saw his victory as a political, even metaphysical, triumph of national greatness. Elections, he made clear, are not really about fair partisan competition, actual citizen preferences, and peaceful alternations of power. What followed was a quite deliberate, and often candidly articulated, effort to topple the only recently installed liberal democratic order, and to establish a new regime of what he called national cooperation. Orbn was relentless (Szelnyi recently described him as a Machiavellian genius) in his pursuit of power, his disregard for liberal democratic norms, and his hostility towards political opponents, even when these were former colleagues or friends. Szelnyi quotes Lszl Kvrone of Orbns closest associates and the current Speaker of the National Assemblyoutlining the Fidesz approach to opposition: The greatest political opponent is always the one who is closest to you. Orbn and Kvr are practitioners of a politics in the style of the 1930s revolutionary conservative legal scholar (and Nazi supporter) Carl Schmitt. There are no shades of gray in Orbns political universe; one is either with him or against him. And since he imagines himself to represent the authentic will of the Hungarian nation, to be against him is to be against the nation itself.

Exploiting every opportunity presented by Hungarys distinctive history and post-1989 political system, Orbn and Fidesz have managed to succeed in a way that other far-right leaders and parties in Europe have not, and in a way that the MAGA Republican party has notyet.

But it is worth noting that Orbn and Fidesz are in it for the long haul. Indeed, their electoral defeat in 2002, after having led a coalition government since 1998, can be regarded as the moment when their scorched-earth assault on liberalism kicked into high gear, with Orbn casting doubt on the elections legitimacy, announcing that [t]he nation cannot be in the opposition! In the years that followed, as Szelnyi explains, Orbn and his followers regularly mobilized angry and sometimes violent crowds, who in 2006 attacked the state television building and the parliament building itself: Between 2006 and 2010 Fidesz took politics on to the streets, and its representatives in Parliament regularly obstructed parliamentary proceedings. In short, for Orbn, it was outraged electoral defeat that energized his 2010 comeback and the politics of vengeance that has followed ever since. Does this sound familiar?

While legal and institutional changes have been at the center of Orbns aspirational new regime, lying behind these changes, and powering them, has been the relentless prosecution of a culture war against liberalism. Szelnyi brilliantly analyzes Orbns brazen effort to control Hungarian historical memory. In 2002, in the midst of a heated political campaign, he allocated government funds to create the controversial Budapest House of Terror, directed since its founding by Orbn crony Mria Schmidt. In 2018, he ordered the removal of a statue honoring Imre Nagy, the martyred communist hero of the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 (Orbn first rose to prominence during the 1988 reburial and tribute to Nagy, a demand of the anticommunist opposition), on the 60th anniversary of his execution by the Soviets in power, and the monuments replacement with a Red Terror memorial originally created under the quasi-fascist and antisemitic dictatorship of Admiral Mikls Horthy, who ruled Hungary from 1920 to 1944. Orbns allies have attacked independent historians, and he has funded the creation of new historical institutes, such as the perversely named Veritas Institute, designed to promote a more patriotic understanding of Hungarian history.

Orbn has also waged a relentless assault on what he has called gender ideology, which he claims has overtaken and polluted the Hungarian nation. He has regularly attacked LGBTQ+ rights and womens rights, and his government has sought to purge teaching about these topics from educational institutions, revoking the accreditation of gender studies programs at the two universities in the country that offered them. As a government spokesman explained: The Governments standpoint is that people are born either male or female [] and we do not consider it acceptable for us to talk about socially-constructed genders, rather than biological sexes. Orbns government has thus appointed itself the supreme scientist, educator, and moral custodian of the nation.

Orbn has successfully accomplished what Trump began in the White House and what Governor Ron DeSantis is currently pioneering in the Florida state house, as he surely positions himself for an eventual run for presidenthe has managed to channel widespread public fear and confusion about social change into a vigorous attempt to demonize feminists and trans activists, immigrants, and outsiders of all kinds; to attack all forms of liberalism; and to use control of state institutions to entrench a socially reactionary and politically authoritarian regime. Embraced at last Augusts CPAC meeting in Dallas, Orbn pulled out all the stops, rallying the crowd to fight a culture war against the Woke Globalist Goliath, and declaring frankly that [w]e cannot fight successfully by liberal means because our opponents use liberal institutions, concept, and language to disguise their Marxist and hegemonist plans. Perhaps most ominously, he lashed out at race mixing as a threat to national identity. As Voxs Zack Beauchamp reported:

The purpose of the speech was simple enough: to tighten the bonds linking Orbnism with the Trumpism that dominates the American right. The Hungarian populist sees the potential in that connection. His closing lines called on conservatives across the Atlantic to coordinate our troops in the fight against liberalism, exhorting them to gear up to remove Joe Biden from office (you have two years to get ready). The stakes, in his telling, are the very future of our civilization.

The West is at war with itself. We have seen what kind of future the globalist ruling class has to offer. But we have a different kind of future in mind, Orbn told the crowd. The globalists can all go to hell. I have come to Texas.

In that election, a broad group of opposition parties, ranging from the Socialists to the Greens to the right-wing Jobbik party, came together under the banner of United for Hungary. They agreed to select a common prime minister candidate via a joint primary, to present a single list for all single-member parliamentary seats, and to share a common program that centered on the defense of liberal democracy. The winner of the October 2021 primary, Pter Mrki-Zay, was a former member of Fidesz, a Christian conservative and a center-right small-town mayor who seemed to have broad appeal beyond conventional urban-based and liberal constituencies. (As political analyst Gbor Tka has noted, Mrki-Zay would be a Never Trump Republican in America.)

United for Hungary was the source of much hopefulness for liberal democrats. And yet, it won only 57 seats, nine less than the opposition total in 2018. Meanwhile, Fidesz won 135 seats, a gain of two, while Our Homeland, a new far-right party that split from Jobbik, won seven seats. Orbns far-right, illiberal regime emerged from the election stronger than before. Szelnyi describes this result as disastrous, a dramatic defeat that left the opposition demoralized and confused. And she makes clear that, while opposition unity in 2014 and 2018 had been impaired by partisan rivalries and real ideological differences (for example, liberal parties had been understandably reluctant to coalesce with the historically xenophobic Jobbik party), the oppositions main obstacle in 2022 was simply Orbns overwhelming power. His success during his first three terms as prime ministerin attacking independent media and cultural institutions, tilting the electoral system to his advantage, using budgetary control to reward friends and punish enemies, and propagandizing against liberalismhad enabled him to entrench his party in power and to build a strong base of popular support.

In short, the election seems to signify that Orbn had succeeded in superseding the liberal democratic regime change of 1989 with his own anti-liberal regime change. Szelnyi notes that this regime is not without vulnerabilities. Its corruption undermines its policy effectiveness, putting it in violation of EU regulations, which could bring pressure on the regime (though EU pressure thus far has proven relatively feckless and ineffectual). And the regime lacks support in key cities, especially Budapest, which remains an oasis of liberal democratic power in an expanding desert of illiberalism.

At the same time, Szelnyi closes on a note of pessimism: There will be no easy revival of democracy in Hungary. The years-long entrenchment of illiberalism will pose a serious challenge for any future Hungarian government. Observing that democracy is a difficult and fragile achievement, she concludes that her historically privileged generation, who believed that history always moves forward, have squandered this chance, and that the most we can do now is, with all our strength, help the next generation, so that they can carry on pushing Hungarian democracy forward and manage to overcome the forces of autocracy, which are always ready to pounce.

The forces of bigotry and autocracy have successfully managed to pounce on, and to suffocate, Hungarys fragile liberal democracy, at least for now. The United States has not reached that stageyet. But the Republican Partyin Congress, in state houses across the country, and soon in the 2024 presidential campaignis working hard to follow Orbns autocratic playbook, to wage culture war against liberalism, to Orbnify electoral institutions, and to entrench its own power. Will liberal democrats here be able to keep the forces of autocracy at bay, and to push American democracy forward? That remains to be seen. But what is certain is that we can only succeed if we take seriously the experiences, and the failures, of our compatriots elsewhere. Szelnyis book is an excellent place to start.

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Is Hungary's Present the United States' Future?: On Zsuzsanna ... - lareviewofbooks

Tonight, the Minnesota House of Representatives passed theDemocracy for the People Act, according to an official release.

The legislation protects the freedom to vote, reduces the influence of dark money and foreign influence in Minnesota politics and ensures fair and inclusive democracy for all Minnesotans, the news release said.

The act also creates automatic voter registration and allows 16- and 17-year-olds to pre-register to vote. The bill also allows all Minnesota voters to choose to vote by mail on a permanent absentee ballot list.

Additionally, the bill would create penalties for spreading false information about voting 60 days before an election and protect voters and election officials from harassment. An individual convicted of interfering with a person registering to vote or casting a ballot could face a gross misdemeanor or be sued.

This is a critical moment for our democracy,said Representative Emma Greenman (DFL Minneapolis), the author of the bill. We know that solving our most significant challenges requires all of us to come together and build a democracy that centers the voices of all Minnesotans. Minnesotans gave us a mandate to act with urgency to protect and strengthen our democracy, and that is what this legislation does. In the North Star State, we are showing the country what a strong, inclusive, multi-racial democracy looks like.

The bill also removes language barriers by requiring voting instructions and ballots to be provided in non-English languages.

The legislation aims to close dark money loopholes and increase transparency of who is contributing to Minnesota elections. It also prohibits foreign-influence corporations from making direct contributions to candidates or political parties.

Our democracy works best when all Minnesotans have the opportunity to participate and make their voices heard, said Speaker Melissa Hortman. Minnesotans want to ensure that voters always will have the biggest say in the decisions that will impact their lives. Our legislation will strengthen the freedom to vote, protect our democratic institutions and Minnesota voters, and empower voters, not corporations or wealthy special interests in our elections.

More information about the Democracy for the People Act is available here. Video of the debate and vote can be found on the House Public Information page.

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Minnesota House of Representatives passes the Democracy for the ... - KSTP