Archive for the ‘Democracy’ Category

Reflections on the ‘quasi-federal’ democracy – The Hindu

Despite a basic structure, Indian federalism needs institutional amendment to be democratically federal

Events coinciding with the jubilee of Indias Independence draw attention to the federal structure of Indias Constitution, which is a democratic imperative of multi-cultural India, where the constituent units of the sovereign state are based on language, against competing identities such as caste, tribe or religion. This built-in structural potential for conflict within and among the units, and that between them and the sovereign state, need imaginative federal craftmanship and sensitive political management. The ability of the Indian Constitution to keep its wide-ranging diversity within one sovereign state, with a formal democratic framework is noteworthy. Possibly, with universal adult suffrage and free institutions of justice and governance it is nearly impossible to polarise its wide-ranging diversity within any single divisive identity, even Hindutva; so that, despite its operational flaws, the democratic structure and national integrity are dialectically interlinked. But its operational fault lines are increasingly denting liberal institutions, undermining the federal democratic structure as recent events have underscored.

First, the tempestuous Parliament session, where the Rajya Sabha Chairperson broke down (in August 2021), unable to conduct proceedings despite the use of marshals; yet, the House passed a record number of Bills amidst a record number of adjournments. Second, cross-border police firing by one constituent State against another, inflicting fatalities, which also resulted in retaliatory action in the form of an embargo on goods trade and travel links with its land-locked neighbour.

Such unfamiliar events of federal democracy are recurrent in India, except their present manifest intensity. Legislative disruption was described by a Union Law Minister (while in Opposition) as a legitimate democratic right, and duty. In the 1960s, the Troika around Lohia claimed its right to enter Parliament on the Janatas shoulders to exit on the Marshals; posters with labels such as CIA Agent were displayed during debates; suitcases were transferred publicly to save the government; occasionally, Honorable Members emerged from debates with injuries. This time, in the federal chamber, Honorable Members and Marshals are in physical contact both claiming casualties official papers vandalised and chairpersons immobilised. Even inter-State conflict has assumed a new dimension.

Such empirical realities have led scholars to conceptualise Indias Post-colonial democracy, and federalism, differently from their liberal role-models. Rajni Kotharis one party dominance model of the Congress system has now been replaced by the Bharatiya Janata Party; Myrdalls soft state is reincarnated in the Pegasus era with fake videos and new instruments of mass distraction and coercion. Galbraiths functioning anarchy, now has greater criminalisation in Indias democracy, which includes over 30% legislators with criminal records, and courtrooms turning into gang war zones; it is now more anarchic, but still functioning, bypassing any Dangerous Decade or a 1984.

Federal theorist K.C. Wheare analyses Indias centralized state with some federal features as quasi-federal. He underscores the structural faultlines of Indian federalism not simply as operational. So, while many democratic distortions are amenable to mitigation by institutional professionalism, Indian federalism, to be democratically federal, needs institutional amendment despite being a basic structure. Wheares argument merits consideration.

Democratic federalism presupposes institutions to ensure equality between and among the units and the Centre so that they coordinate with each other, and are subordinate to the sovereign constitution their disputes adjudicated by an independent judiciary with impeccable professional and moral credibility. But Indias federal structure is constitutionally hamstrung by deficits on all these counts, and operationally impaired by the institutional dents in the overall democratic process. Like popular voting behaviour, institutional preferences are based either on ethnic or kinship network, or like anti-incumbency, as the perceived lesser evil, on individual role-models: T.N. Seshan for the Election Commission of India, J.F. Ribeiro for the police or Justices Chandrachud or Nariman for the judiciary.

Indias federal structure, underpinned on the colonial 1935 Act which initiated provincial autonomy, attempted democratising it by: renaming Provinces to autonomous States; transferring all Reserved Powers to popular governance; constitutionally dividing powers between the two tiers; inserting federalism in the Preamble, and Parts 3 and 4 containing citizens Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles; but nothing about States rights, not even their territorial boundaries. This has enabled the Centre to unilaterally alter State boundaries and create new States. The Indian Constitution itself has been amended 105 times in 70 years compared with 27 times in over 250 years in the United States.

With nation-building as priority, the constitutional division of power and resources remains heavily skewed in favour of the Centre; along with Residual, Concurrent and Implied powers, it compromises on the elementary federal principle of equality among them, operationally reinforced by extra-constitutional accretion. While the judiciary is empowered to adjudicate on their conflicts, with higher judicial appointments (an estimated 41% lying vacant), promotion and transfers becoming a central prerogative, their operations are becoming increasingly controversial.

The story is not different for the all India services, including the State cadres. What is operationally most distorted is the role of Governors: appointed by the Centre, it is political patronage, transforming this constitutional authority of a federal link to one of a central agent in the States. Thus, the critical instruments of national governance have been either assigned or appropriated by the Centre, with the States left with politically controversial subjects such as law and order and land reforms. Thus, most of Indias federal conflicts are structural, reinforced by operational abuses.

Yet, there is no federal chamber to politically resolve conflicts. The Rajya Sabha indirectly represents the States whose legislators elect it, but continue even after the electors are outvoted or dismissed; with no residential qualification, this House is a major source of political and financial patronage for all political parties, at the cost of the people of the State they represent.

Possibly, this explains its continuity. Constituting roughly half the Lok Sabha, proportionately, it reinforces the representative deficit of Parliament, which, through the Westminster system of winner-take-all, continues to elect majority parties and governments with a minority of electoral votes. The second chamber is not empowered to neutralise the demographic weight of the populous States with larger representation in the popular chamber; it cannot veto its legislations, unlike the U.S. Senate. It can only delay, which explains the disruptions. Joint sessions to resolve their differences are as predicable and comical as the voice votes in the Houses. Indias bicameral legislature, without ensuring a Federal Chamber, lives up to the usual criticism: when the second chamber agrees with the first, it is superfluous, when it disagrees, it is pernicious.

Historically, party compositions decide when they agree or disagree. Whenever any party with a massive majority in any state finds itself marginalised in the central legislature, it disrupts proceedings, just as popular issues not reflected in legislative proceedings provoke undemocratic expressions and reciprocal repression. Such examples abound in Indias quasi- federal democracy till now.

Empirical and scholarly evidence suggest Wheares prefix about federalism arguably applies to other constitutional goals (largely operationally), while the federal flaws are structural, reinforcing conflicts and violence, endemic in the distorted democratic process. It is a threat to national security by incubating regional cultural challenges to national sovereignty, and reciprocal repression. We might learn from the mistakes of neighbouring Sri Lanka and Pakistan rather than be condemned to relive them. Indias national security deserves a functional democratic federal alternative to its dysfunctional quasi-federal structure, which is neither federal nor democratic but a constitutional basic structure.

Aswini K. Ray is a former Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

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Reflections on the 'quasi-federal' democracy - The Hindu

Why Has East Timor Built the Strongest Democracy in Southeast Asia? – Council on Foreign Relations

Part of a blog series on Southeast Asian and South Asian Democracy.

On the face of it, East Timor would not seem like the most natural place to have built a democracy ranked by Freedom House, in its 2021 edition of Freedom in the World, as Free. In fact, this ranking makes East Timor the only country in Southeast Asia, where democracy has been regressing for over a decade, to be ranked Free by Freedom House. (I serve as a consultant for some Freedom House reports, but not for the report on East Timor.)

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A wide range of other data and anecdotes suggests how far East Timor has come toward democracy. It has built a solidly free state some two decades after Timor was leveled in the conflict that erupted, in 1999, after over 78 percent of Timorese voted to separate from Indonesia after the end of the Suharto dictatorship.

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That 1999 conflict in Timor, led by ravaging militias backed by the Indonesian security forces, not only killed roughly 2,600 but also wrecked much of the infrastructure in tiny Timor, which already was one of the poorest places in Asia. Timor was ravaged again, in 2006, by clashes between its own soldiers and security forces. Timor did rebuild some of its infrastructure, and received significant amounts of foreign aid and a share of the revenues from the petroleum in the Timor Gap.

Still, it remains the poorest country in Asia, a far cry from the high rises of Bangkok or Singapore. Indeed, an article by Jonas Guterres, a former advisor to the Office of the Commissioner at the Anti-Corruption Commission of Timor-Leste, notes that: The 2017 Global Hunger Index categorized the countrys [East Timors] hunger levels as serious, although over the past decade the hunger level has been reduced from 46.9 percent to 34.3 percent. Levels of malnutrition and stunting remain worryingly high.

And Timor certainly still has massive economic problems. With its share of the oil from the Timor Gap, its biggest earner, eventually going to dwindle, and the small size of Timor and remote location deterring tourism even before COVID-19, it is still searching for more sustainable drivers of the economy. The vast majority of the population is under age thirty, which could be a boon for the work force but also could lead the country to have large numbers of unemployed young men, always a dangerous situation.

And yet it has taken several important initiatives to build a consolidated democracy. Timor has brought elections down to the community level as physical infrastructure has improved, and community level elections have increased popular participation in democracy. Overall, both the long independence struggle and more recent efforts by Timorese civil society and leaders have convinced many Timorese of the importance of democracy, and turnout for elections is extremely high. With such public interest, and increasingly improved electoral commissions, elections have been held in recent years with minimal or no violence, and minimal if any irregularities.

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It also has worked hard to ensure that women play a major role in elections and governing. And its constitution and norms have strong protections for civil society and an independent media, a far cry from the recent crackdown on reporters in neighboring states like Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, among other countries in the region. Shoestring but aggressive local media outlets put tough questions to politicians in Timor.

Indeed, Freedom House notes that East Timor has held competitive elections and has undergone multiple transfers of power something that cannot be said about many other Southeast Asian states these days. Freedom House also notes that East Timor boasts independent media, a vibrant civil society, and robust discussion among citizens about the government and other related issues.

At a time when Myanmar has been taken over by the army, Indonesia is sliding away from democracy, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte seems to want to extend his grip on power, and Thailand is run by a military-installed regime, perhaps these Southeast Asian regional powers should look to tiny Timor for how to run a democracy.

This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

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Why Has East Timor Built the Strongest Democracy in Southeast Asia? - Council on Foreign Relations

Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy: A Force for Good in the Changing International Order – Foreign Affairs

The story of Taiwan is one of resilienceof a country upholding democratic, progressive values while facing a constant challenge to its existence. Our success is a testament to what a determined practitioner of democracy, characterized by good governance and transparency, can achieve.

Yet the story of Taiwan is not only about the maintenance of our own democratic way of life. It is also about the strength and sense of responsibility Taiwan brings to efforts to safeguard the stability of the region and the world. Through hard work and courage, the 23.5 million people of Taiwan have succeeded in making a place for themselves in the international community.

Emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarian regimes are more convinced than ever that their model of governance is better adapted than democracy to the requirements of the twenty-first century. This has fueled a contest of ideologies, and Taiwan lies at the intersection of contending systems. Vibrantly democratic and Western, yet influenced by a Chinese civilization and shaped by Asian traditions, Taiwan, by virtue of both its very existence and its continued prosperity, represents at once an affront to the narrative and an impediment to the regional ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party.

Taiwans refusal to give up, its persistent embrace of democracy, and its commitment to act as a responsible stakeholder (even when its exclusion from international institutions has made that difficult) are now spurring the rest of the world to reassess its value as a liberal democracy on the frontlines of a new clash of ideologies. As countries increasingly recognize the threat that the Chinese Communist Party poses, they should understand the value of working with Taiwan. And they should remember that if Taiwan were to fall, the consequences would be catastrophic for regional peace and the democratic alliance system. It would signal that in todays global contest of values, authoritarianism has the upper hand over democracy.

The course of the Indo-Pacific, the worlds fastest-growing region, will in many ways shape the course of the twenty-first century. Its emergence offers myriad opportunities (in everything from trade and manufacturing to research and education) but also brings new tensions and systemic contradictions that, if not handled wisely, could have devastating effects on international security and the global economy. Chief among the drivers of these tensions is the rise of more assertive and self-assured authoritarianism, which is challenging the liberal democratic order that has defined international relations since the end of World War II.

Beijing has never abandoned its ambitions toward Taiwan. But after years of double-digit investment in the Chinese military, and expansionist behavior across the Taiwan Strait and in surrounding maritime areas, Beijing is replacing its commitment to a peaceful resolution with an increasingly aggressive posture. Since 2020, Peoples Liberation Army aircraft and vessels have markedly increased their activity in the Taiwan Strait, with almost daily intrusions into Taiwans southern air defense identification zone, as well as occasional crossings of the tacit median line between the island and the Chinese mainland (which runs along the middle of the strait, from the northeast near Japans outlying islands to the southwest near Hong Kong).

Despite these worrying developments, the people of Taiwan have made clear to the entire world that democracy is nonnegotiable. Amid almost daily intrusions by the Peoples Liberation Army, our position on cross-strait relations remains constant: Taiwan will not bend to pressure, but nor will it turn adventurist, even when it accumulates support from the international community. In other words, the maintenance of regional security will remain a significant part of Taiwans overall government policy. Yet we will also continue to express our openness to dialogue with Beijing, as the current administration has repeatedly done since 2016, as long as this dialogue proceeds in a spirit of equality and without political preconditions. And we are investing significant resources to deepen our understanding of the administration in Beijingwhich will reduce the risks of misinterpretation and misjudgment and facilitate more precise decision-making on our cross-strait policies. We look to maintain a clear-eyed understanding of the external environment, both threats and opportunities, in order to ensure that Taiwan is prepared to meet its challenges.

At the same time, Taiwan is fully committed to working with other regional actors to ensure stability. In March, for example, Taiwan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a coast guard working group. This working group will improve communication and information sharing between the U.S. and Taiwanese coast guards, while also facilitating greater collaboration on shared objectives, such as preserving maritime resources and reducing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Such an understanding should serve as a springboard for greater collaboration on nonmilitary matters with other partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan has also launched a series of initiatives to modernize and reorganize its military, in order to be better prepared for both present and future challenges. In addition to investments in traditional platforms such as combat aircraft, Taiwan has made hefty investments in asymmetric capabilities, including mobile land-based antiship cruise missiles. We will launch the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency in 2022, a military reform intended to ensure that a well-trained and well-equipped military reserve force stands as a more reliable backup for the regular military forces. Such initiatives are meant to maximize Taiwans self-reliance and preparedness and to signal that we are willing to bear our share of the burden and dont take our security partners support for granted.

At a Taiwanese military exercise in Pingtung, Taiwan, May 2019

Taiwans efforts to contribute to regional security do not end there. We are fully committed to collaborating with our neighbors to prevent armed conflict in the East China and South China Seas, as well as in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan lies along the first island chain, which runs from northern Japan to Borneo; should this line be broken by force, the consequences would disrupt international trade and destabilize the entire western Pacific. In other words, a failure to defend Taiwan would not only be catastrophic for the Taiwanese; it would overturn a security architecture that has allowed for peace and extraordinary economic development in the region for seven decades.

Taiwan does not seek military confrontation. It hopes for peaceful, stable, predictable, and mutually beneficial coexistence with its neighbors. But if its democracy and way of life are threatened, Taiwan will do whatever it takes to defend itself.

Taiwans history is filled with both hardship and accomplishments, and the authors of this history are the people of Taiwan. Over the past few decades, we have overcome adversity and international isolation to achieve one of modern political historys most successful democratic transitions. The key ingredients of this achievement have been patience, resourcefulness, pragmatism, and a stubborn refusal to give up. Understanding both the delicate balance of power in the region and the need for support, the Taiwanese know that practical collaboration is often better than being loud or adventurous and that a willingness to lend a hand is better than trying to provoke or impose a system on others.

While the people of Taiwan have not always achieved consensus, over time, a collective identity has emerged. Through our interactions with the rest of the world, we have absorbed values that we have made our own, merging them with local traditions to create a liberal, progressive order and a new sense of what it means to be Taiwanese.

At the heart of this identity is our embrace of democracy, reflecting a choice that the Taiwanese made and fought for after decades of authoritarian rule. Once the Taiwanese had made that choice, there was no looking back. Imperfect though it may be, democracy has become a nonnegotiable part of who we are. This determination gives Taiwan the resilience to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and provides a firewall against forces, both internal and external, seeking to undermine its hard-won democratic institutions.

A fundamental part of this embrace of democracy is a firm belief that the future of Taiwan is to be decided by the Taiwanese through democratic means. Although Taiwanese in some ways differ in their sense of what exactly this future should look like, we are united in our commitment to democracy and the values and institutions that allow us to fight back against external efforts to erode our identity and alter the way of life we cherish. The great majority of us regard democracy as the best form of government for Taiwan and are willing to do what is necessary to defend it. Those beliefs are tested every day, but there is no doubt that the people would rise up should the very existence of Taiwan be under threat.

Civil society has always played a major role in Taiwan. During the period of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang, the Dangwai movement pushed to lift martial law and democratize Taiwan; even after being instrumental in ending martial law, it continued to offer an active and effective check on government power. Today, the extent of Taiwanese civil societys role in governance is unmatched anywhere in the regiona reflection of the trust between elected officials and citizens, who as a result are able to influence policy both through and between elections.

Taiwans civil society has also proved integral to the islands international standing. Taiwans exclusion from the United Nations and most other international institutions could have led to isolation, but Taiwan instead tapped into the tremendous creativity and capacity of its people, allowing us to establish global connections by other meansthrough small businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and various semi-official groupings. Rather than being an impediment, the refusal of many countries to officially recognize Taiwan compelled us to think asymmetrically, combating efforts to negate Taiwans existence by deepening our engagement with the world through nontraditional channels.

In short, despite decades of isolation, the people of Taiwan have succeeded in making a place for themselves within the international communityand transforming Taiwan itself into an economic powerhouse and one of the most vibrant democracies in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwans ability to survive and even thrive as a liberal democracy despite the extraordinary challenges to its existence has important implications for the prevailing rules of international relations. Our bid to play a more meaningful role in the international community is evolving in the context of changing regional politics, with more assertive challenges to the liberal international order, backed by the economic and political power to turn those ambitions into action. With increasing awareness of the potential impact of such authoritarian ambitions, more and more countries have been willing to reexamine their long-standing assumptions about, and self-imposed limitations on, engagement with Taiwan.

Through its evolution as an economic powerhouse and a participatory democracy, Taiwan seeks to beand in many ways already ispart of the solution to emerging challenges with ramifications on a planetary scale, from climate change and new diseases, to proliferation and terrorism, to human trafficking and threats to supply chains. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the world is now so interconnected that the outbreak of a disease in one corner of the planet can, within a matter of months, reach pandemic proportions. In many cases, the speed with which new emergencies arise and spread is beyond the ability of states and existing international institutions to respond. To prepare for future emergencies, the international community must move toward inclusiveness rather than rigidly adhering to current structures.

Getting vaccinated against COVID-19 in Taipei, Taiwan, September 2021

Even as it experienced a flare-up in COVID-19 cases last spring, Taiwan has demonstrated to the world that democratic systems can respond effectively to a pandemic, harnessing the powers of artificial intelligence, big data, and surveillance networks while ensuring that the information gathered is used responsibly. The pandemic has also given Taiwan an opportunity to share its experience with the world and to provide much-needed medical assistance to struggling countries. This is so despite its long exclusion from global institutions such as the World Health Organization, which has left Taiwan little choice but to develop its own methods of cooperating and communicating with international partners. Being left out of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions has encouraged resilience and spurred novel approaches to dealing with challenges and crises of all kinds.

Despite being kept out in the cold, Taiwan has strived to adhere to international protocols, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, amending its domestic laws and seeking its own formulas for meeting increasingly complex challenges. Taiwan is also working proactively with its partners on the development of its region. In 2016, we launched the New Southbound Policy, which facilitates regional prosperity through trade and investment partnerships, educational and people-to-people exchanges, and technological and medical cooperation with countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand. Taiwan is also making investments in these partners through its business community, simultaneously fostering secure supply chains and regional development.

Indeed, with its high-tech leadership and educated and globalized workforce, Taiwan is well positioned to help create secure global supply chains in sectors such as semiconductors, biotechnology, and renewable energyall areas where international cooperation is needed now more than ever. Our semiconductor industry is especially significant: a silicon shield that allows Taiwan to protect itself and others from aggressive attempts by authoritarian regimes to disrupt global supply chains. We are working to further strengthen our role in securing global supply chains with a new regional high-end production hub initiative, which will solidify our position in the global supply chain. Besides making computer chips, Taiwan is active in high-precision manufacturing, artificial intelligence, 5G applications, renewable energy, biotechnology, and more, helping create more diverse and global supply chains that can withstand disruption, human or otherwise.

Taiwan derives additional soft power from expertise and capabilities in a variety of other fields, including education, public health, medicine, and natural-disaster prevention. And these are fields in which our experts and institutions are taking on a growing regional role. Our universities, for example, are prepared to work with other universities in the region to develop Chinese-language training. Our medical facilities are sharing expertise in medical technology and management with partners around Asia. And we are ready to work with major countries to provide infrastructure investment in developing countries, leveraging efficiency while promoting good governance, transparency, and environmental protection. Similar efforts are being made through an agreement with the United States to enhance cooperation on infrastructure financing, investment, and market development in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In short, Taiwan can be a crucial force in the peaceful development and prosperity of our region and the world.

Sitting on the frontlines of the global contest between the liberal democratic order and the authoritarian alternative, Taiwan also has an important part to play in strengthening global democracy. In 2003, we established the regions first nongovernmental organization devoted to democracy assistance and advocacy, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. Following the models set by the United States National Endowment for Democracy and the United Kingdoms Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the TFD provides funding for other nongovernmental organizations, international and domestic, that advocate democratic development and human rights. It also works to promote public participation in governance through mechanisms such as participatory budgeting and to encourage youth engagement through initiatives such as the annual Asia Young Leaders for Democracy program. In 2019, the TFD organized its inaugural regional forum on religious freedom, and my government appointed its first ambassador-at-large for religious freedom.

Taiwans strong record on democracy, gender equality, and press and religious freedom has also made it a home for a growing number of global nongovernmental organizations, which have faced an increasingly difficult environment in Asia. Organizations including Reporters Without Borders, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the European Values Center for Security Policy, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom have set up regional offices in Taiwan. From Taiwan, they are able to continue their important work in the region without the constant threats of surveillance, harassment, and interruptions by authorities. We have also made ourselves hospitable to international institutions interested in establishing a presence in the Indo-Pacific, helping turn Taiwan into a hub for advancing the interests of the democratic community.

Meanwhile, the Global Cooperation and Training Frameworka platform jointly administered by Taiwan, the United States, and other partners that allows us to share our expertise with countries around the worldhas fostered creative cooperation on issues such as law enforcement, public health, and good governance. One recent round of GCTF activity, for example, focused on media literacy and how democracies can combat disinformationan area in which Taiwan has an abundance of experience.

Over the past five years, more than 2,300 experts and officials from more than 87 countries have attended GCTF workshops in Taiwan, and the forum will continue to expandoffering a path to greater collaboration between Taiwan and countries around the world, including the United States. Indeed, Taiwan works closely with the United States on many issues, in the service of regional peace and stability. Our hope is to shoulder more responsibility by being a close political and economic partner of the United States and other like-minded countries.

The threat posed by authoritarian regimes has served as an important wake-up call for democracies, spurring them to emerge from their complacency. Although extraordinary challenges remain, democracies around the world are now working to safeguard their values and renew their ossified institutions. Alliances are being rekindled to serve the interests of the international community.

Taiwan may be small in terms of territory, but it has proved that it can have a large global presenceand that this presence matters to the world. It has persevered in the face of existential threats and made itself an indispensable actor in the Indo-Pacific. And through it all, the Taiwanese commitment to democracy has never been stronger: the people of Taiwan know that democracy is the lasting path and the only game in town.

Over the past two years, our handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and our assistance to and collaboration with countries around the world, has offered one more example of the crucial role that Taiwan can play and of why Taiwan matters. Going forward, our high-tech industries, and especially our production of advanced semiconductors, will continue to fuel the global economy. And Taiwans ability to balance ties to various countries while defending its democratic way of life will continue to inspire others in the region.

We have never shied away from challenges. Although the world faces an arduous journey ahead, this presents Taiwan with opportunities not seen before. It should increasingly be regarded as part of the solution, particularly as democratic countries seek to find the right balance between the need to engage and trade with authoritarian countries and the need to defend the values and democratic ideals that define their societies. Long left out in the cold, Taiwan is ready to be a global force for good, with a role on the international stage that is commensurate with its abilities.

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Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy: A Force for Good in the Changing International Order - Foreign Affairs

Events | Credible threat: Attacks against women online and the future of democracy – Loughborough University

Activists. Journalists. Elected Representatives. Public Intellectuals.

When women are vocal about political and social issues, too often they are attacked via social networking sites, comment sections, discussion boards, email, and direct message. Rather than targeting their ideas, the abuse targets their identities. Identity-based attacks are particularly severe for those women from racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups or who work in domains dominated by men. Feminists and women who challenge traditional gender norms are also frequently targeted.

This toxicity comes with economic, professional, and psychological costs for those targeted, but it also exacts societal-level costs that are rarely recognized: it erodes civil liberties, diminishes our public discourse, thins the knowledge available to inform policy and electoral decision-making, and teaches women that activism and public service are high-risk endeavours to be avoided. Sarah Sobieraj traces these underexplored effects, showing that when identity-based attacks succeed in constraining women's use of digital publics, there are democratic consequences that cannot be ignored.

Sarah Sobieraj is an award-winning teacher and researcher with expertise in US political culture, extreme incivility, digital abuse and harassment, and the mediated information environment. Her most recent book, Credible Threat: Attacks Against Women Online and the Future of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2020), examines the impact of identity-based digital abuse on womens participation in social and political discourse. She is also the author of The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility (Oxford University Press, 2014) with Jeff Berry, and Soundbitten: The Perils of Media-Centered Political Activism (NYU Press, 2011).

Professor Sobieraj edited (with Rob Boatright, Danna Young, and Tim Schaffer) A Crisis of Civility?: Political Discourse and Its Discontents (Routledge, 2019). Additionally, she is currently co-editing the Oxford Handbook on Sociology and Digital Media with Deana Rohlinger, which is due out in 2021. Professor Sobierajs most recent journal articles can be found in Information, Communication & Society, Social Problems, PS: Political Science & Politics, Poetics, Political Communication, and Sociological Theory.

Her work has also been featured in venues such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, Politico, Vox, CNN, PBS, NPR, the American Prospect, National Review, the Atlantic, Pacific Standard, and Salon. Sobieraj serves on the advisory board of the Social Science Research Councils Disinformation Research Mapping Initiative, is a member of the National Institute for Civil Discourse Research Network, and is a faculty associate with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.

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Events | Credible threat: Attacks against women online and the future of democracy - Loughborough University

Call for bids Strengthening democracy and human rights in DRC and the CAR – GOV.UK

The UK aims to strengthen democracy and human rights in DRC and the CAR by tackling the root causes of human rights violations, strengthening institutions and governance, promoting and protecting human rights and supporting democracy and the rule of law.

The target thematic areas for this programme in 2021/22 are to improve respect of human rights in DRC and the CAR, including through reinforcing the rule of law and access to justice for all.

We are particularly interested in bids that include elements focussing on some or all of the following: support for parliamentary scrutiny through parliamentary committees; support for proper implementation of laws; access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable individuals, reinforcement of due process and reinforcement of institutional support for human rights, such as proper functioning of existing human rights monitoring mechanisms.

We are looking to fund a maximum of 1-2 project in DRC and 1 in CAR and we would therefore welcome bids for projects of $30,000 - $100,000.

Applicants are invited to submit a project proposal and Activity Based Budget in English and send them electronically to Daisy.Clark@fcdo.gov.uk copying Ange.NangiMawete@fcdo.gov.uk.Please include DRC: Human Rights and Democracy in the subject field. The deadline for submitting concept bids is 17.00 (GMT) 9th September 2021.

Please consider the below tips when designing your project:

Projects should aim to start in September 2021 and end in March 2022.

Projects should plan to spend 90% by the end of December 2021.

Payments are normally made quarterly. Payments are normally made after the completion of project activities. Advance payments are not usually possible.

We require monitoring reports, which should include a detailed financial report. At the end of a project, we require a completion report, including a detailed financial report.

Project bids should ensure that the services are designed and implemented in a manner that respects international human rights norms, considers gender impact and is designed and implemented in accordance with the do no harm principle.

We have a zero-tolerance approach to aid diversion, including any associated inappropriate behaviours, and the implementing partner would be required to comply with our strict fraud and misuse of funds mechanisms.

We have a zero tolerance for inaction in tackling sexual exploitation, abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH). The implementing partner would take all reasonable and adequate steps to prevent SEAH.

Duty of care for all staff and participants in the engagement activities shall lie with the implementing partner.

We are particularly looking for suppliers who can demonstrate:

A strong track record of successful project delivery in DRC and/or the CAR and who will be able to draw on previous lessons learned to mitigate against unintended consequences of interventions.

Active consideration of gender inequality including by ensuring that where possible women are offered places in any training and capacity building activities funded by HMG, and included in training and consultative panels.

Please Note: Due to the volume of bids expected, it is unlikely we will be able to provide feedback on unsuccessful bids.

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Call for bids Strengthening democracy and human rights in DRC and the CAR - GOV.UK