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Dance For Democracy Aam Aadmi Party
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Dance For Democracy Aam Aadmi Party - Video
Flimpoman They talk about democracy YouTube sharing
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Flimpoman They talk about democracy YouTube sharing - Video
Its no wonder Secretary of State John Kerry has been walking on eggshells when discussing potential US support to the Syrian rebels. As The Washington Post reported earlier in the week, a renewed discussion to supply the rebels with body armor, armed vehicles, and military training has arisen. Until now, the support from the United States had been non-lethal aid along the lines of humanitarian assistance (such as medical supplies and packaged meals), funding for communications and logistical support, as well as an American invitation to the leader of the rebels to discuss the situation. To date, any combat-related supplies the rebels have received has come from their own conquests of government bases or supposed help from nations like Qatar, Turkey, and, predictably, Saudi Arabia.
Not surprisingly, Syria is one of the last places the Obama administration would want itsboots on the ground or its military munitions ending up in the wrong hands; however, as the situation continues to spiral downward, Kerry stated in Paris, we need to help them to deliver basic services and to protect the legitimate institutions of the state, indicating a concern of state failure lest the international community take another stab at aiding the rebels.
However, recent scholarship suggests that U.S. hesitation to intervene in Syria or provide arms thus far may come from a somewhat consistent and historical aversion to military commitment, Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding. According to a new study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released on U.S. Policy Responses to Potential Transitions, the U.S. has historically gone to great extents to avoid using its military during conflict driven political transitions. The report goes on to show that over a 22 year span (1989-2010), the United States has most often defaulted to a non-response or issuing a statement, rather than imposing economic aid or sanctions, engaging in diplomatic efforts, offering military supplies, joining multilateral military action, or invoking unilateral military action.
In effect, as the CSIS researchers point out, the question of intervention in Syria is not just figuring out the contemporary strategy, but anticipating the consequences in the decade to follow it. The possibility of a failed state, marginalized groups facing increasingly dire livelihoods and further regional chaos loom ahead regardless of any action taken by the United States or others. Ultimately, the Obama administration is looking to offer some form of support to the rebels before their following and credibility diminishes or Iranian influences pervade the porous Syrian border.
Syria is not the only former French-colonized country that has the leading superpowers hanging in the balance. The dilemma in Mali has been pressing upon the worlds leaders to direct attention toward the nation without inflaming an incredibly sensitive and volatile region. Largely credited to the spillover of armed mercenaries in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, Mali had until now been seen by the U.S. as one of the more stable West African nations, despite a faade of democratic rule peppered with bribes, kickbacks, and corruption involving its leaders.
But Kerrys comments on Mali in Paris were sung to a different tune. Kerry voiced that despite transportation, intelligence, and other U.S. support to the French-led offensive, There has to be an African solution, ultimately. And our shared goal now should be that African and U.N. entities step up, so that France has the ability to step back. The different takes on Syria and Mali can be seen as informed by current strategic interests. Though eager to stamp out strains of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda in the region, Kerrys remarks indicate that the Obama administration is being incredibly tactful to not jeopardize its presence in regions where it is already working to curb Al-Qaedas influence (presumably Afghanistan).
The question then becomes whether there is anyone more willing to take the lead when France eventually takes a step back. Though ideally an African solution to an African problem would suit, the disparate interests of the neighboring African governments, the African Union, and the Western powers makes Kerrys proposition more difficult. Both Syria and Mali share the common roadblock that caused Somalia to turn into a debacle in the 1990s: the intelligence terrain is lacking without the eyes, ears, and interlocutors that eventually made Egypt easier to address by the West.
Roadblocks not only come from internal politics and faulty governance in each of these nations, however. Limited appetite for U.S. presence in international crises at the moment can be evidenced by the brutal debate over domestic issues like the impending sequestration debacle, economic instability, the inconclusive and unpredictable aftermath of aid or intervention, and the shadow of two prior military operations hanging over the heads of Americans.
On the other hand, Russia and China are rattling the discussions further, as the former seeks to hold on to its role at the table and the latter to expand and assume a larger role in the global playing fields, particularly the mineral-rich African nations. As such, the U.S. cannot simply ignore the impasses. Refraining from intervention to the extent that the U.S. has done may be prudent, but should not transition their role into bystanders as the conflicts deepen. As Marc Lynch of the Center for New American Security indicates, arming the rebels with American munitions does not mean the rebels will be able to simply defeat the Syrian army. Instead, the Obama administration ought to be strengthening the legitimate authority of the rebels and more persistently encouraging a U.N. Resolution that emboldens them.
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Democracy Arsenal
Nigeria's postponed election is an embarrassment of bad choices.
Last week, Victor, a carpenter, came to my Lagos home to fix a broken chair. I asked him whom he preferred as Nigerias next president: the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, or his challenger, Muhammadu Buhari.
I dont have a voters card, but if I did, I would vote for somebody I dont like, he said. I dont like Buhari. But Jonathan is not performing.
Victor sounded like many people I know: utterly unenthusiastic about the two major candidates in our upcoming election.
Nigeria's Horror in Paris's Shadow
Were Nigerians to vote on likeability alone, Jonathan would win. He is mild-mannered and genially unsophisticated, with a conventional sense of humor. Buhari has a severe, ascetic air about him, a rigid uprightness; it is easy to imagine him in 1984, leading a military government whose soldiers routinely beat up civil servants. Neither candidate is articulate. Jonathan is given to rambling; his unscripted speeches leave listeners vaguely confused. Buhari is thick-tongued, his words difficult to decipher. In public appearances, he seems uncomfortable not only with the melodrama of campaigning but also with the very idea of it. To be a democratic candidate is to implore and persuade, and his demeanor suggests a man who is not at ease with amiable consensus. Still, he is no stranger to campaigns. This is his third run as a presidential candidate; the last time, in 2011, he lost to Jonathan.
This time, Buharis prospects are better. Jonathan is widely perceived as ineffectual, and the clearest example, which has eclipsed his entire presidency, is his response to Boko Haram. Such a barbaric Islamist insurgency would challenge any government. But while Boko Haram bombed and butchered, Jonathan seemed frozen in a confused, tone-deaf inaction. Conflicting stories emerged of an ill-equipped army, of a corrupt military leadership, of northern elites sponsoring Boko Haram, and even of the government itself sponsoring Boko Haram.
Jonathan floated to power, unprepared, on a serendipitous cloud. He was a deputy governor of Bayelsa state who became governor when his corrupt boss was forced to quit. Chosen as vice president because powerbrokers considered him the most harmless option from southern Nigeria, he became president when his northern boss died in office. Nigerians gave him their goodwillhe seemed refreshingly unassumingbut there were powerful forces who wanted him out, largely because he was a southerner, and it was supposed to be the norths turn to occupy the presidential office.
And so the provincial outsider suddenly thrust onto the throne, blinking in the chaotic glare of competing interests, surrounded by a small band of sycophants, startled by the hostility of his traducers, became paranoid. He was slow to act, distrustful and diffident. His mildness came across as cluelessness. His response to criticism calcified to a single theme: His enemies were out to get him. When the Chibok girls were kidnapped, he and his team seemed at first to believe that it was a fraud organized by his enemies to embarrass him. His politics of defensiveness made it difficult to sell his genuine successes, such as his focus on the long-neglected agricultural sector and infrastructure projects. His spokespeople alleged endless conspiracy theories, compared him to Jesus Christ, and generally kept him entombed in his own sense of victimhood.
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Democracy, Deferred