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A rejected candidate for Charleston County sheriff has sued the South Carolina Democratic Party, accusing it of unconstitutionally keeping him off the upcoming primary ballot with a rule that his attorneys called "completely vague" and "entirely subjective."

Alan Ali, a former Charleston County sheriff's lieutenant, filed the lawsuit on April 12, a week after state Democratic Party officials refused to certify him as a candidate for the party's June 11 primary.

The legal challenge amounts to a last-ditch effort by Ali to challenge Charleston County's Democratic sheriff for the party's nomination, asking the county Circuit Court to certify his candidacy and with haste.

Election officials must finalize the ballots for military and overseas voters by April 26.

A judge could ultimately determine whether incumbent Sheriff Kristin Graziano will face a primary challenger. If the court upholds the party's decision, it would effectively clear the Democratic field for Graziano's reelection campaign in the primary.

The court's decision would have immediate political ramifications.

Rather than focusing on a primary challenger in June, Graziano could instead focus her efforts on fundraising, outreach and messaging for a general election where she is expected to face a fierce challenge. Four Republicans have already lined up to run against her.

Ali, a first-time candidate who was the only declared Democratic challenger running against Graziano, is being represented by Charleston attorney Mark Peper's law firm.

The 62-page lawsuit claims a rule adopted by the S.C. Democratic Party violated Ali's constitutional rights, and argues that party officials were playing political favorites and trying to protect incumbents when certifying candidates.

The suit opens by invoking the words of Coretta Scott King, an icon of the civil rights movement and the wife of Martin Luther King Jr.

"Freedom and justice cannot be parceled out in pieces to suit political convenience," she said. "You cant stand for freedom for one group of people and deny it to others."

S.C. Democratic Party Rule 11, which was adopted in 2022, is at the center of the legal challenge.

Under party rules, any South Carolina Democrat can challenge a candidate's qualifications.

Ali's qualifications were challenged on April 3. In a hearing the next day, he was questioned about being a Dorchester County resident, a longtime Republican voter and a possible contender for this year's Republican nomination for Dorchester County sheriff.

The party's executive council unanimously voted against certifying Ali's ballot application. And at their recommendation, S.C. Democratic Party Chair Christale Spain made the decision not to certify Ali as a candidate.

Spain said she rejected Ali's ballot certification on April 5 because of questions about his loyalty to the Democratic Party.

In an interview with The Post and Courier, Spain called Ali a "Republican." She cited his voting history and his previous flirtation with running for Dorchester County sheriff as a Republican.

Ali described himself to reporters on April 9 as a "moderate."

In a letter explaining her decision, Spain cited Rule 11, saying there was "a question about his support and allegiance to the Democratic Party and the Partys values."

The rule says that the state party chair, in consultation with the party's executive committee, has the right to not certify a candidate if they "demonstrated intent to mislead voters and party officials regarding that candidates support and allegiance to the Democratic Party and the Partys values."

Ali's attorneys questioned its legality. They cited two recent candidates who have previously run in past Republican primaries but were certified by the S.C. Democratic Party as evidence that the party is following this rule at its own discretion.

Ali's attorneys argued the rule is "completely vague, entirely subjective, and serves as nothing more than a 'catch all' provision to be used at the sole discretion and convenience of the SCDP."

They also note that the rules do not clearly define what constitutes the "partys values" nor provide a clear and concise example of how a candidate can prove their "support and allegiance to the Democratic Party."

Ali's attorneys have asked for a speedy hearing on the matter. As of the afternoon of April 12, no hearing date has been set, according to court records.

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Rejected CHS Sheriff candidate Alan Ali sues SC Democrats | Palmetto Politics - The Post and Courier

Democrats, seeking to tie abortion restrictions to former President Donald J. Trump and Republicans, again laid the blame for limits on reproductive rights at Mr. Trumps feet, saying the former presidents statement on Monday calling for abortion restrictions to be decided by states was part of a pattern of extreme lawmaking.

In the video he released, Mr. Trump said that states should decide through legislation and make it the law of the land, and in this case, the law of the state. A handful of Republicans disagreed, saying he did not go far enough by not endorsing a federal ban or discussing it at all. But Democrats, who have identified reproductive rights as a top campaign issue this year, argue that Mr. Trump effectively did endorse a total ban by leaving the decision to states who will implement one and that, if re-elected, he will enact a total ban on the procedure something Mr. Trump has not specifically said he would do.

In a blistering 604-word statement, President Biden said via his campaign that Mr. Trump was responsible for creating the cruelty and the chaos that has enveloped America since the Dobbs decision, referring to the 2022 Supreme Court ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson, which overturned Roe v. Wade. The president said that his opponents abortion stance has created a crisis of his own making. Mr. Trump, he said, is lying about the number of Americans who support abortion restrictions and scrambling to craft a message around his record.

Heres what Donald Trump doesnt understand: When he ripped away Roe v. Wade, he ripped away a fundamental right for the women of America that the United States Supreme Court had affirmed and reaffirmed for 50 years. As a fundamental right, it didnt matter where you lived, Mr. Biden said in the statement.

The president also challenged Mr. Trumps false statement that Americans widely support restrictions on abortion and said the former president made a political deal to appoint Supreme Court justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade in exchange for support from anti-abortion voters.

Trump admits as much in his statement today, Mr. Biden said. Having created the chaos of overturning Roe, hes trying to say, Oh, never mind. Dont punish me for that. I just want to win.

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Biden and Other Democrats Tie Trump to Limits on Abortion Rights - The New York Times

Mirroring changes in the U.S. population overall, registered voters have become more educated, more racially and ethnically diverse, older, and more religiously diverse over the past three decades.

Many of these changes have altered the makeup of both parties, but several have had a more pronounced impact on the Democratic Party than the Republican Party.

As the United States has become more racially and ethnically diverse, so too has the electorate.

Today, 67% of registered voters are White, 13% are Hispanic, 11% are Black and 4% are Asian. In 1996, when President Bill Clinton was running for reelection, 85% of voters were White, 4% were Hispanic, 9% were Black and about 1% were Asian.

Both parties are more racially and ethnically diverse than three decades ago, but not to the same degree. There has been more change in the composition of the Democratic coalition than the Republican coalition.

The electorate has grown older in recent decades. Currently, about six-in-ten voters are ages 50 and older (29% are 50 to 64 and 29% are 65 and older). By comparison, 41% of voters were 50 and older in 1996.

Reflecting this broader change, both parties voters are significantly older now than they were 20 years ago. But today Republican and Republican-leaning voters tend to be older than voters in the Democratic coalition. (In 1996, there was very little difference between the age profiles of the two parties.)

The share of voters with a bachelors degree or more has increased significantly among registered voters since 1996, from about a quarter (24%) to four-in-ten today.

Voters with a high school degree or less education have declined roughly in parallel, so that now about three-in-ten have a high school degree or less (28%), compared with nearly half (47%) in 1996. The share of voters with some college experience but no bachelors degree has remained relatively stable across this period (32% today, 29% in 1996).

The dual trends of increasing education levels and increasing racial and ethnic diversity over the last three decades have resulted in dramatic changes to the electoral landscape.

White voters without a bachelors degree remain the largest single group of voters across education levels, race and ethnicity. But where they once represented a clear majority (63%) in 1996, they are now about four-in-ten voters overall (38%).

Overall, about two-in-ten voters are Hispanic (9%), Black (7%) or Asian (2%) and without a bachelors degree.

Non-Hispanic White adults with a bachelors degree or more represent 28% of voters today, which is up modestly since 1996 (21%). Approximately one-in-ten registered voters are Hispanic (3%), Black (3%) or Asian (3%) and have bachelors degrees.

The Democratic Party does not have a single dominant bloc of voters across education levels, race and ethnicity.

Americans have become less Christian and less religious in recent decades, and the electorate reflects those changes. Two-thirds of voters identify with a Christian denomination, while about a quarter say they are religiously unaffiliated (26%). Fifteen years ago, about eight-in-ten voters were Christians (79%) and 15% were unaffiliated. (We used different questions about religious affiliation prior to 2008, so comparable data only goes back 15 years.)

These broader trends of declining shares of Christians and increasing shares of religious nones have impacted the demographic composition of the two parties coalitions in diverging ways.

Among GOP voters, the shares who identify as White evangelical Protestants (30% now, 33% in 2008) and White Catholics (18% now and in 2008) are little changed over the past 15 years. White nonevangelical Protestants have declined as a share of Republican and Republican-leaning voters from 22% to 15% over the same period, while religious nones have grown from 9% to 15% of GOP voters.

Today, White evangelical (5%) and White nonevangelical Protestants (10%) are 15% of the Democratic coalition, down from 28% 15 years ago. The share of Democratically aligned voters who are Black Protestants has changed very little over this period (15% then to 14% now).

The electorate continues to have more voters who call themselves conservative than call themselves liberal. About a quarter of voters say they are liberal (16%) or very liberal (8%), while 37% say they are conservative (26%) or very conservative (10%).

Almost four-in-ten voters say they are moderate (36%).

These shares are little changed since 2019.

The Republican coalition is overwhelmingly conservative: 49% of Republican-aligned voters say they are conservative and 20% say they are very conservative. About three-in-ten GOP voters say they are moderate (27%), and there are very few liberal identifiers in the party (less than 5%).

The Democratic coalition is more ideologically mixed than the Republican coalition. Among voters who associate with the Democrats, about half say they are very liberal (16%) or liberal (31%), while nearly as many say they are moderate (45%). Around 6% say they are conservative.

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Changing demographics of US voters and Republican, Democratic coalitions, 1996-2023 - Pew Research Center

State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Washington D.C. West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Puerto Rico US Virgin Islands Armed Forces Americas Armed Forces Pacific Armed Forces Europe Northern Mariana Islands Marshall Islands American Samoa Federated States of Micronesia Guam Palau Alberta, Canada British Columbia, Canada Manitoba, Canada New Brunswick, Canada Newfoundland, Canada Nova Scotia, Canada Northwest Territories, Canada Nunavut, Canada Ontario, Canada Prince Edward Island, Canada Quebec, Canada Saskatchewan, Canada Yukon Territory, Canada

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Country United States of America US Virgin Islands United States Minor Outlying Islands Canada Mexico, United Mexican States Bahamas, Commonwealth of the Cuba, Republic of Dominican Republic Haiti, Republic of Jamaica Afghanistan Albania, People's Socialist Republic of Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of American Samoa Andorra, Principality of Angola, Republic of Anguilla Antarctica (the territory South of 60 deg S) Antigua and Barbuda Argentina, Argentine Republic Armenia Aruba Australia, Commonwealth of Austria, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh, People's Republic of Barbados Belarus Belgium, Kingdom of Belize Benin, People's Republic of Bermuda Bhutan, Kingdom of Bolivia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana, Republic of Bouvet Island (Bouvetoya) Brazil, Federative Republic of British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos Archipelago) British Virgin Islands Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria, People's Republic of Burkina Faso Burundi, Republic of Cambodia, Kingdom of Cameroon, United Republic of Cape Verde, Republic of Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad, Republic of Chile, Republic of China, People's Republic of Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Colombia, Republic of Comoros, Union of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, People's Republic of Cook Islands Costa Rica, Republic of Cote D'Ivoire, Ivory Coast, Republic of the Cyprus, Republic of Czech Republic Denmark, Kingdom of Djibouti, Republic of Dominica, Commonwealth of Ecuador, Republic of Egypt, Arab Republic of El Salvador, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Faeroe Islands Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Fiji, Republic of the Fiji Islands Finland, Republic of France, French Republic French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon, Gabonese Republic Gambia, Republic of the Georgia Germany Ghana, Republic of Gibraltar Greece, Hellenic Republic Greenland Grenada Guadaloupe Guam Guatemala, Republic of Guinea, Revolutionary People's Rep'c of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Republic of Heard and McDonald Islands Holy See (Vatican City State) Honduras, Republic of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China Hrvatska (Croatia) Hungary, Hungarian People's Republic Iceland, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq, Republic of Ireland Israel, State of Italy, Italian Republic Japan Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait, State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon, Lebanese Republic Lesotho, Kingdom of Liberia, Republic of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein, Principality of Lithuania Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Macao, Special Administrative Region of China Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Malaysia Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Republic of Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania, Islamic Republic of Mauritius Mayotte Micronesia, Federated States of Moldova, Republic of Monaco, Principality of Mongolia, Mongolian People's Republic Montserrat Morocco, Kingdom of Mozambique, People's Republic of Myanmar Namibia Nauru, Republic of Nepal, Kingdom of Netherlands Antilles Netherlands, Kingdom of the New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Republic of the Nigeria, Federal Republic of Niue, Republic of Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway, Kingdom of Oman, Sultanate of Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Palau Palestinian Territory, Occupied Panama, Republic of Papua New Guinea Paraguay, Republic of Peru, Republic of Philippines, Republic of the Pitcairn Island Poland, Polish People's Republic Portugal, Portuguese Republic Puerto Rico Qatar, State of Reunion Romania, Socialist Republic of Russian Federation Rwanda, Rwandese Republic Samoa, Independent State of San Marino, Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal, Republic of Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles, Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Slovakia (Slovak Republic) Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia, Somali Republic South Africa, Republic of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Spain, Spanish State Sri Lanka, Democratic Socialist Republic of St. Helena St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Pierre and Miquelon St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Suriname, Republic of Svalbard & Jan Mayen Islands Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Switzerland, Swiss Confederation Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan, Province of China Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand, Kingdom of Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Togo, Togolese Republic Tokelau (Tokelau Islands) Tonga, Kingdom of Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda, Republic of Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland Uruguay, Eastern Republic of Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of Wallis and Futuna Islands Western Sahara Yemen Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe

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Biden wins Wyoming's caucuses, with Democrats in Alaska still to get their say in the nomination - Bozeman Daily Chronicle

It’s been a dreary political winter for President Joe Biden. He’s buried under an avalanche of adverse polls showing perilously low public approval ratings as well as scant enthusiasm even among loyal Democratic voters.   

The blizzard of bad news, however, doesn’t mean Biden will lose his job next November. That’s especially true if his opponent is the rabidly divisive Donald Trump, who is kryptonite to American democracy.  

But the president’s consistently poor job performance numbers and the fact that he’s trailing Trump in many polls reflects a general Democratic failure to consolidate and expand the anti-Trump majority Biden assembled in 2020. 

Over the past three years, Democrats have made little headway on their top strategic imperative: winning back working Americans. On the contrary, Trump has expanded his already enormous margins among white working-class voters even as Democratic support among Black and Hispanic non-college voters continues to erode.  

It turns out that Biden’s policies and major legislative accomplishments are far more popular with progressive activists and college-educated cosmopolitans than with working-class voters. Democrats have been pitching their political message to the wrong audience — in effect, preaching mainly to the choir — and need to adjust their aim.   

That starts by understanding what non-college voters actually want from their political leaders, rather than what those leaders think they should want. To that end, the Progressive Policy Institute, where I am the founder and president, recently commissioned a major YouGov survey of working-class attitudes nationally and in seven key 2024 battleground states. 

Working Americans are acutely aware that the last 40 years have not been kind to people like them. Two-thirds say they are worse off and economic pessimism is even higher in the critical swing states of Arizona, Michigan and Pennsylvania. 

The high cost of living is overwhelmingly (69 percent) their top economic worry. And little wonder: The economist Robert Shapiro reports that the average annual wage income of working Americans, corrected for inflation, has declined by more than three percent compared to real wage gains of 4.1 percent under Trump. 

Asked why prices have risen so much, 55 percent of these picked “government went overboard with stimulus spending, overheating the economy” over the impact of the COVID recession and supply chain bottlenecks as the economy recovered. 

The Biden administration has laid heavy emphasis on reviving U.S. manufacturing. These voters no doubt would like to see that happen, but they are looking elsewhere when it comes to opportunities for their children.  

Their top choice (44 percent for all voters and 57 percent for Hispanics) was the communications and digital sector; only 13 percent saw their kids working in manufacturing. These findings are consistent with other PPI research that suggests many Washington policymakers have a skewed mental picture of America’s working class. 

The iconic blue-collar workers in manufacturing and construction constitute only a third of today’s non-college workforce, notes PPI’s Ed Gresser. There are many more workers — and women — in health care, retail, hospitality and personal services. 

That likely helps to explain why these working-class voters don’t see a strong connection between union membership and their upward mobility. Just 6 percent say joining a union would be the best way to acquire a good job and career, and only 15 percent saw a “federal push for stronger unions” as important. 

Another progressive priority that Biden unfortunately has championed — college loan forgiveness — misfires badly with these voters, even though many of them report some college. A mere 11 percent favor the plan, while a whopping 56 percent (including 59 percent of independents and 51 percent of Hispanics) say paying off this debt isn’t fair “to the majority of Americans who don’t get college degrees.” 

Only 9 percent believe a college degree would help them most to get ahead. What they want, instead, is more public investment in apprenticeships and career pathways (74 percent) plus “affordable short-term training programs that combine work and learning.” 

Our survey confirms that Democrats have forfeited their title as the party of prosperity for average working families. 

Working-class voters trust Republicans more to manage a growing economy, promote entrepreneurship, keep the debt and deficits under control and handle crime, immigration and national security. The GOP also has the edge on some important cultural or values dimensions: protecting personal freedom, strengthening private enterprise and respecting hard work and individual initiative.  

Democrats are trusted more to combat climate change, manage the clean energy transition and protect reproductive freedom. They have a disconcertedly narrow lead (five points) on respecting democratic institutions and elections. 

The survey also suggests that Democrats would be wise to temper progressive enthusiasm for a more powerful federal government committed to wealth distribution and economic equality.   

Just 19 percent of non-college voters favor that position. Thirty-four percent embrace the conservative goal of a small government that spends and taxes less. Most (47 percent) choose a pragmatic middle option: a federal government that actively steers the economy but mostly by promoting and protecting free markets.  

More hopefully for Democrats, the survey finds that on three staples of cultural war politics — immigration, crime and gender — more working-class voters gravitate to center-ground solutions than extreme ones.  

For example, on immigration — a top concern for these voters — the progressive left’s open border position gets support from only 15 percent, while 32 percent back the populist right’s demands to shut down the border. A majority (53 percent) embrace the pragmatic position that reform should reduce illegal entry and increase legal immigration to help our economy grow.  

Our poll also has bad news for red-state Republicans pushing universal voucher bills that give parents public subsidies to send their kids to private and religious schools. Only 34 percent of working-class voters supported this approach; 60 percent want tax dollars to flow only to public schools. 

Since 2016, Democrats have been assiduously wooing young activists and college-educated professionals. The result is a smaller, more left-leaning coalition. To prevail against Trump and right-wing populism, they’re going to need a bigger party.  

Will Marshall is the founder and president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

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To win back the working class, Democrats must adjust their aim - The Hill