Archive for the ‘Erdogan’ Category

Erdogan: we will build walls with Iraq and Iran – Rudaw

ANKARA, Turkey Turkeys President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that his country plans to build a wall with Iraq, its southern neighbor, after the country revealed similar plans on the border with Iran earlier in the month, adding that it is to prevent the movements of what he called terrorists.

Turkey has already started constructing a wall with Syria since 2014 with President Erdogan saying on Thursday that they have already completed 650-kilometer long wall on the countrys 911-kilometer border with Syria.

Erdogan has also said that they have plans to erect a wall along its entire Syrian border.

Well do the same along the Iraqi border and in appropriate places along the Iranian border, Erdogan said.

The Syrian Kurdish administration, mainly under the control of the ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD), runs most of the border with Turkey from the other side.

Turkey considers the PYD, and its armed wing Peoples Protection Units (YPG), an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and therefore a terrorist organization.

The PKK is headquartered in the Qandil mountains located on the border between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey. It has been engaged in a three-decades long insurgency against the Turkish state calling for greater national and cultural rights for countrys Kurdish population.

Turkish media earlier in the month reported about Ankaras plans to construct a 70-kilometer long border wall between Iran and Turkey to counter terrorist activities and limiting PKK movements across the 500-kilometer long borders.

Iran welcomed the Turkish move which it said would curtail illegal border trade worth an estimated $2 billion.

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Erdogan: we will build walls with Iraq and Iran - Rudaw

Here’s Erdogan Henchman Who Choked Woman At Turkish Embassy …

The Daily Caller has identified three of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogans bodyguards who were involved in a brutal attack against peaceful protesters earlier this month, including one who was seen choking a woman and throwing her violently to the ground.

Ismail Dalkiran, Servet Erkan and Hakan Gebesare the names of three of the Erdogan goons who took part in the assault of Kurdish protesters on May 16 outside of the embassy in Washington, D.C. All three are part of Erdogans security detail and live in Turkey.

Eleven people were injured in the melee, which began after Erdogans security detail and supporters of the authoritarian attacked a small group of Kurdish protesters positioned across the street from the embassy.

Dalkiran is one of the more visible participants in the violence.

Dark-haired with hints of gray, Dalkiran was seen on video choking Ceren Borazan, a 26-year-old Kurdish woman protesting Erdogans visit. Borazan, who has said in interviewers that her assailant also threatened to kill her, has led a social media campaign to help find her attacker.

TheDC showed Borazan photos of Dalkiran from his Facebook page, and she confirmed that he is the man who assaulted her.

Dalkiran is connected to Erkan and Gebes on Facebook. And it is the involvement of the latter two in the attacks that provides additional proof that Erdogan directly ordered the blitz against the protesters.

Both men were seen in the small circle surrounding Erdogan as he sat in a black Mercedes Benzjust moments before the violent event unfolded.

Gebes, who is thin and sports a mustache, is the man who appears to have relayed instructions from Erdogan to launch the attack. Video shows him receiving commands from a man identified by The New York Times as Muhsin Kose, Erdogans chief of security.

Kose is seen on video leaning into Erdogans vehicle before emerging to speak to Gebes, who nods his head in affirmation before running toward the street where the attack would soon unfold.

Erkan, a large man with a bald head who had been stationed near Erdogans vehicle, was seen on video punching at least two protesters.

Hakan Gebes (encircled in red) receiving orders from Erdogans chief of security. (Youtube screen grab via VOA Turkish)

After around 30 seconds of violence, Erkan is seen walking back into Erdogans tight security circle. He, Gebes, Muhsin and other bodyguards protecting their boss then walk toward the entrance of the Turkish embassy.

Erkan may also be the man who issued commands to carry out the assault.

Analysis of the videos conducted for TheDC revealed a voice shoutingdaln diyor, servetabidaln diyor.That translates to Servet says attack or Servet says dive in. (RELATED: Audio Analysis: Erdogan Goons Were Ordered To Attack Protesters)

Servet Erkan (left), Hakan Gebes, (center right with mustache), Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right, facing away from camera) (Youtube screen grab)

All three of the men left various indications on Facebook that they were visiting Washington, D.C. Dalkiran checked in to the city on May 13. Gebes posted several pictures around the city, including in front of the White House and with several other Erdogan henchmen at a restaurant in the capital city.

Gebes also posted a picture in DC with Erkan and two other men who are most likely members of Erdogans posse.

Servet Erkan (left), Hakan Gebes, and two other men in Washington, D.C.

Erkan received praise from his compatriots after returning home to Turkey.

The valiant man who ordered the attack against the traitors in America, wrote a man who posted a photo with Erkan on Twitter in the days after the attack.

It is unlikely that the three men will face criminal charges over the attacks. Like numerous others involved in the fight, the trio are likely covered by diplomatic immunity. But they could potentially be blocked from entering the U.S. should Erdogan one day return.

None of the men responded to requests for comment submitted through Facebook. The Turkish embassy also did not respond to an email request for comment.

Ismail Dalkiran (Facebook)

The State Department has claimed it is investigating the incident. The agency also rebuked the Turkish government in the strongest possible terms last week.(RELATED: Meet The Erdogan Goon Who Kicked A Woman During Embassy Brawl)

Four private citizens have already been identified as attackers.

Eyup Yildirim, an American citizen who owns a construction company in New Jersey, was identified by TheDC as one of the men seen kicking a female Kurdish protester named Lucy Usobyn.

Cousins Alpkenan Dereci and Ahmet Dereci, both wearing street clothes, were also seen punching protesters. They appear to have previous connections to Yildirim.

The New York Times also identified a man named Sinan Narinas kicking Usobyn. He confirmed to The Times that he kicked Usobyn but said he did not know she was a woman.

Usobyn has told TheDC that she suffered a concussion from the attack and will require six weeks to fully heal.

None of those men are likely to have diplomatic immunity, so it is unclear why they have yet to be arrested.

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The Sultan is dead, long live Bayce Erdogan Sultan! – Open Democracy

Poet and Islamist ideologue, Necip Fazl Ksakrek. Wikicommons/ Berildeman. Some rights reserved.Sultanism is on the rise. Beyond Turkey, the election of Trump in the US, the resilience of Putinism in Russia, all point out the emergence of highly personalized regimes of a certain type. What distinguishes sultanism from other forms of authoritarian regimes is its unrestrained personal rule beyond ideological constrains and rational legal forms, leading to the gradual removal of checks and balances in the system. Even though sultanism is traditionally more common under authoritarian regimes, features of neo-sultanism can nowadays also exist in so-called `democratic and societies of transition.

Max Weber developed the concept of sultanism primarily based on unbounded personal discretion. Weber understood sultanism as an oriental form of despotism, deriving the term from the Ottoman state. But his study of the Ottoman Empire as a sultanistic regime appears to have been less meticulous than his inquiries into China, and India. In fact, the Ottoman state was a highly sophisticated construct, with its separate palace, military, and religious hierarchies, and its millet system for management of non-Muslim religious communities. In this sense reducing the entire Ottoman system and history to mere unrestrained personal rule could be seriously misleading, not least because there were serious attempts and movements to limit the powers of the Sultan from 1876 onwards.

The kind of sultanism we are currently witnessing reflects a more universal form: all sultanisms have some common features but some are more pronounced. Not long ago Chehabi and Linz argued that sultanism arises when traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments, primarily based on the discretion of the ruler. They accept that the term can be interpreted as having an `Orientalist subtext with Islamic connotations. What I would like to call neo-sultanism, on the other hand derives its legitimacy from popular support leading to elected dictatorships. These are not necessarily hereditary regimes but may portray strong features of patrimonialism.

Here I will limit my arguments to the Turkish context under Erdogans increasingly autocratic rule. Erdogan has been called islamo-fascist, neo-facist, neo-Ottomanist etc. but I would like to contend that these terms are not particularly helpful in making sense of the rise and consolidation of Erdogans regime. Although aware of the ideological ambiguities surrounding the term, neo-sultanism, I will deliberately risk deploying it, since there is a need for a serious debate to understand the shaping forces of the new presidential regime in Turkey.

Although claiming to be above and beyond ideologies, Erdogans neo-sultanism has been influenced by a cluster of ideologies that represent a continuity in the strong state tradition in Turkish history. His highly personalised authoritarian rule is rooted in and inspired by a combination of hegemonic ideological traits that can be located in the events leading to the emergence of modern Turkey.

Successive governments since 1970s, under the leadership of right-wing party leaders such as Turkes, Demirel and Ozal also strongly favoured presidentialism above parliamentarianism. It is not surprising for instance that Erdogan secured the support of the veteran nationalist party head, Bahceli, as an ally in the referendum for a `Turkish style, that is, a presidential system, doing away with checks and balances and concentrating power in the office of the presidency. The ideological traditions of Islamism, nationalism, conservatism and neo-liberalism, have always existed in modern Turkeys history along discernible lines and movements in different combinations and articulations, particularly after the1950s which witnessed the first peaceful transfer of political power in Turkish history. This is not to suggest that the Republican Party (the CHP, in power in a one-party state until 1946) was not guilty of this one nation sovereignty logic. But parliamentary sovereignty, at least in rhetoric, was more appealing to its leading cadres. Erdogan has been much more successful in fusing statism, nationalism and religious conservativism, combined with market fundamentalism in comparison with his right wing successors.

Erdogan sits on the tip of an iceberg that represents a historical power block originating from the late Ottoman period. It is repeatedly argued that the political pendulum in Turkey swings between Kemalist secularism and religious conservatism. According to this binary view, Turkish society is divided along secular conservative religious camps. This false dichotomy is simplistic. And like all false dichotomies it leads to false conclusions. In fact Kemalism, in the true sense of the Kemalist ideology, has not been in power in Turkey since the end of the Republican Peoples Partys one-party regime in 1950.

The coming to power of the conservative Democrat Party in 1950 elections marked a clear transition from utopian republicanism to a national conservative regime with authoritarian inclinations. Even the Turkish armed forces gradually abandoned a pure Kemalist ideology but not their role as protector of state and sovereignty. Their attempt in 1960 to reintroduce Kemalism failed, confronted by the same conservative nationalist Islamist power block. By the 1980s, the armed forces had become much more defensive and apologetic about the credentials of Kemalism and regarded the CHP as yet another failed political party on a par with the Islamic and conservative parties. It seems the Turkish military was well-aligned with the exigencies of neo-liberalism and identity politics in Turkey in leaving the orthodoxy of Kemalism behind.

I would like to make a bold claim here: in Turkey the state has indeed been the sole power since its inception, with its claims to hegemonic legitimacy justified by the protection accorded by conservative, nationalist and Islamist parties alike to the core component of the state the Turkish and Sunni Muslim nation. The problem has consisted in who speaks for and controls the state, and protects the state against the others of Turkish Sunni core identity rather than protecting its citizens, regardless of their religious affiliations and ethnic background, against the state. Raison detat, devletin bekasi has always been the prevailing ideology. Historically, the Gulenist movement has been an integral part of this historical ideological block. The recent spat between Gulenists and Erdogan was an internal fight within the same hegemonic block over the ownership of the state and its institutions. The nature of this conflict was not strictly about ideological differences, but a power struggle over the hegemony of the state and its use of force.

It is often claimed that Erdogan is a neo-Ottomanist. But this label is not accurate as the history and the political system of the Ottoman Empire was highly chequered and complex. In fact, Erdogans neo-sultanism has been inspired by one particular sultan, namely, Sultan Abdulhamid who is Erdogans favourite. Abdulhamid, known as the Red Sultan( 1876-1909), attempted to revive Pan-Islamism and the status of Khalif as a last resort to holding the Empire together. Abdulhamid is also known in Kemalist discourse as a despotic sultan who suspended both the first short-lived Constitution and the Ottoman Parliament in 1878 after seizing absolute power.

Erdoan also admires the Islamist-conservative poet and political ideologue Necip Fazl Ksakrek (1904-1983) and often recites his poems in public. Kisakurek is a favoured poet and writer in nationalist and conservative Islamic circles. He was also an advocate for the introduction of a totalitarian Islamist regime inspired by the Turkish-Islamist synthesis in Turkey, to be ruled by a supreme leader he called Bayce (The Head Exalted One). Erdogans desire to install a presidential system in Turkey has been inspired by Kisakureks Basyuce concept as the representative of the Sunni majority. His understanding of national will is not the peoples of Turkey but of that predominant Turkish Sunni majority. (See Necip Fazil Kisakurek, deolocya rgs, Plait of Ideology, first published in 1963.)

Moreover, the fashionable distinction between the elitist, westernized so-called white Turks and the allegedly real and authentic nation composed of so-called black Turks, as produced and widely disseminated by the AKP in pro-government think tanks and media, also appealing to some liberal circles in Turkey and abroad, stems from Ksakreks oeuvre. Erdogan attacks western educated white Turks at every opportunity, while presenting himself as the saviour of the marginalized religious conservative masses by the Republic, black Turks, the resented and the downtrodden (mazlum).

Erdogan is the most powerful leader for more than a decade in Turkey, yet he manages to emerge from every crisis as the martyr of history, accusing internal and external forces of working against him, including leaders of foreign countries, financial institutions and international media. This is a siege mentality that often seems to work in his favour.

The Ottomanization of public space has been another feature of Erdogans neo-sultanist drive. Erdogan has often announced crazy projects that have included grandiose schemes for bridges, a canal to parallel the Bosphorous, cavernous shopping centres and prestige projects such as the, mega mosque on one of Istanbuls beauty spots, Camlica Hill, ostensibly the biggest airport in Europe and so on. These projects are often named after great Ottoman Sultans and figures.

Reviving the Ottoman Barracks in Taksim Square was no random choice as the rebellion against Sultan Abdulhamid started there. Like the Ottoman Sultans, Erdogan wants to be remembered as the great architect to rebuild and recreate in the image of the Ottoman Empire. As Ufuk Adak puts it, the imposition of a Disney Park narrative of Ottoman history on the traditional structure and skyline of Istanbul has led to an overly simplified and callous recreation of the past.

The Ottoman state was the owner of all land in terms of a trusteeship which was not alienable. As sociologist Caglar has argued, unlike the Ottomans Erdoan thinks of public land as his property to alienate, develop and sell as he wishes. Public space will be privatised in the best neoliberal manner. All this has been justified within a retro developmentalist discourse

It is crucial to understand the spatial dimension of Erdogans neo-Sultanistic hegemony. He was a two-term mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s where he served his political apprenticeship. Space acts as an integral element of Erdogans hegemony. The transformation of public space reflects the outcome of the uneven capitalist development in the lopsided crony-capitalist-led urbanization, where the size of mega-building projects, flashy shopping centres next to deprived regions and poor neighbourhoods, act simultaneously as the signs of development and aspiration. Erdogans hegemony heavily relies on the production of everyday geopolitics in urban space. In this sense the reproduction of the space itself tends to restructure society.

In Turkey, Erdogan is sole sovereign in defining the exception. Erdogans neo-sultanistic regime has established a permanent state of emergency. It was the political theorist Carl Schmitt in his examination of conditions in the democratic German Weimar Republic who first touched on the notion of a state of exception. Schmitt essentially conceived of constitutionality as something decided by sovereign power which could also decide the exceptions to it. Through its justification of infinite detention and the surveillance of citizens, law is appealed to in order to effectively create spaces of exception within democratic societies devoid of law. Erdogans constitutionally mandated exception now becomes a rule which abrogates both constitutionality and the rule of law over the democratic order and institutions.

It is no accident that Erdogan put the extension of a state of emergency at the top of his governments agenda the day after claiming victory in a contested and apparently rigged referendum on a new constitution that dramatically extends his powers. Even before the referendum, Erdogan ruled with decrees side-lining the Parliament. So far, the decrees have allowed Erdogan to jail more than 40,000 people accused of plotting a failed coup, to fire or suspend more than 140,000 additional people, including academics, to shut down about 1,500 civil groups, repossess universities, arrest at least 120 journalists, and close more than 150 news media outlets.

Erdogan is the new sultan of Turkey. As a result of the referendum he has acquired extraordinary powers unprecedented in Turkish history since the times of Ataturk.

However, the legitimacy of his regime is not without question. He won the referendum by a very narrow majority. The referendum took place under the state of emergency and undemocratic conditions. The outcome of the referendum was not particularly favourable to Erdogan. Erdogan seems moreover to have lost his urban support base, including the neighbourhoods of Istanbul that carried him to where he is now.

He has managed to codify his de facto powers by the symbolic approval of `the people in whose name he will exercise sovereignty. The fact remains that a highly divided, polarized and personalized regime in Turkey has become difficult to sustain. Official laws and rules are now subservient to a whole range of informal laws centred on family, religious affiliations, ethnicity and personal allegiance to Erdogan. The all-powerful Erdogan is now Turkeys new Sultan, Turkeys Basyuce.

In Erdogans new sultanate, the distinction between regime and state is blurred and the institutions are hollowed out. Consequently, the constitutional faade and the futile referendum do not mean much. In Erdogans new sultanate, official laws and rules co-exist with and are often subservient to a whole range of other "informal" laws centred on his family, religious affiliations, business interests or simply personal allegiance to Erdogan. Erdogans sultanate is characterized by corruption, patrimonialism and buttressed by an increasingly subservient army and party. His personality cult may lead to dynasticism. Having lost much of his initial social support and strong base, he now has to rely on fear, rewards and nepotistic networks. He will be sustained by kleptocratic relationships and rule with a constitutional faade lacking institutional structures.

Erdogans extremely personalized sultanistic regime, is in reality fragile, ineffective, and potentially unstable. Its institutions could, as a result of an inability to cope with a sudden economic downturn, produce his downfall. Sultanistic regimes do not last long. As the legitimation of the regime is solely based on his highly and extremely personalized power, should this figure be overthrown or die, the sultanistic regime collapses. Fascist regimes organize their society strictly according to their ideology: in neo-sultanictic regimes society is organized according to the whims of the sultan, ideology is deployed only when it serves their personal interests and supreme authority lies above the state and its institutions.

Link:
The Sultan is dead, long live Bayce Erdogan Sultan! - Open Democracy

Has SADAT become Erdogan’s Revolutionary Guards? AEI … – American Enterprise Institute

As the one year anniversary of last summers coup attempt in Turkey nears, many problems remain with the narrative of events put forward by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turkish media which he tightly controls. Among the most important questions yet unanswered, however, revolves around the activities of SADAT, a private paramilitary group which emerged from the shadows on the evening of the coup: Eyewitnesses say SADAT members fired into crowds and Turkish military officers suspect SADAT snipers to be responsible for at least some of the casualties that occurred on the trans-Bosporus bridge.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan greets members of parliament from his ruling AK Party during a meeting at the Turkish parliament in Ankara, Turkey, May 30, 2017. REUTERS/Umit Bektas.

Adnan Tanriverdi, a former general dismissed for his Islamist leanings after the 1997 coup, founded SADAT in 2012. After the coup, Erdogan brought Tanriverdi into his office as chief military counselor. Thanks to a rule change made at Erdogans direction, many Islamists dismissed from the military who found refuge in SADAT subsequently re-joined the military with retroactive credit for promotions they did not receive in the military because of early termination.

That I have written about Tanriverdi and SADAT sporadically over the past year is a reflection of the degree to which they are a conversation among current, retired, and purged Turkish military officers; eyewitnesses who say SADAT was firing indiscriminately at civilians during the coup; NATO defense attaches stationed in Turkey; as well as officials stationed at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The conclusion is the same: SADAT appears increasingly to act as Erdogans personal militia or a Turkish equivalent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

SADAT should raise eyebrows. Its website says it both provides conventional and unconventional military training and can supply weapons, explosives, and other equipment to its clients, but it appears to do much more than that. Even inside Turkey, suspicions about the group run deep. Ali Riza Ozturk, for example, a member of parliament from the center-left Republican Peoples Party (CHP), officially queried the Turkish government about SADATs involvement in training and equipping extremist and terror groups including the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) in Syria. Ozturk also asked whether the governments refusal to allow members of parliament to inspect a camp in the Hatay province was related to SADATs presence and training in that camp. The government did not respond substantively to the question, and has even removed the transcript of Ozturks questioning from the record.

Turkish officers and counterterror officials also raise concern about SADATs recruitment and training in Central Asia and Europe. Prior to Russias recent rapprochement with Turkey, the Russian government included SADAT in a report to the United Nations about Erdogan and his familys support for terror organizations in Syria. Turkish analysts also believe SADAT aids both in recruitment in Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan for Syrias most radical Sunni Islamist groups, and the transfer through Turkey of those recruits. Indeed, when in 2015 Russia investigated nearly 900 people traveling to fight in Syria and Iraq, Russian authorities found that 25 percent had connections to SADAT. Nor is the problem one rogue group operating under the radar. According to fighters captured by Russian security forces as they sought to return to Russia, Turkish consulates in Russia evidently provided Turkish passports for the fighters from the Caucasus trained by SADAT to fight with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front.

Perhaps the Russian penchant for fiction masquerading as news disqualifies Russian-sourced investigations, but in this case the Russian conclusions coincide with those of European counter-terror authorities. In Europe, many politicians assume online recruiting is the main mechanism by which young Europeans radicalize and volunteer to fight for the Islamic State but, increasingly, it appears that SADAT might be engaging in a more low-tech approach. Reportedly utilizing the assistance of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), a pro-Erdogan lobby group, SADAT has identified and recruited a number of European national foreign fighters for terror groups like the Islamic State and Nusra Front. Again, the Turkish government appears more deeply involved as SADAT apparently enabled nationals from Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden to acquire current Turkish passports.

On March 22, 2017, Erdogan declared, Europeans across the world will not be able to walk the streets safely if they keep up their current attitude towardsTurkey. Later that day, a terrorist mowed down several tourists in front of the British parliament. That was likely coincidence, but recent kidnappings of Turkish dissidents in Malaysia, Turkish spy rings in Europe, self-described Turkish civil society organizations in the United States reporting on dissidents and opponents, and the recent assault on protesters in Washington, DC, should all raise concerns about what Erdogan and his proxy organizations and militias are up to, for they are certainly escalating.

It is clear that SADAT follows and enforces Erdogans agenda without the constraints of being a government entity.

It is clear that SADAT follows and enforces Erdogans agenda without the constraints of being a government entity. Such a conclusion makes sense not only because of circumstantial evidence, but rather because Erdogan has made SADATs leader one of his top aides on par with if not more influential than the commander of the Turkish General Staff. Certainly, this raises questions about their activities in the run-up and during the coup, but it should also raise questions about Turkeys growing role as a terror sponsor. It seems that Erdogan envisions SADAT in the same way that the supreme leader of Iran views the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a force to ensure political loyalty at home and as a means to conduct terrorism abroad while maintaining plausible deniability in order to avoid accountability as much as possible for its actions, blaming them on rogue elements when necessary.

Despite Erdogans bluster and bombast, Turkey is weak. Erdogan risks presiding not over a great Ottoman resurgence, but rather Turkeys collapse. Against this backdrop, he is pursuing the strategy of the weakutilizing terrorism in pursuit of ideological goals and to kneecap those who stand in the way of further power or wealth consolidation. Its all well and good for NATO officials to talk about Turkeys military with all the diplomatic niceties of decades past but, alas, the face of Turkish power today is increasingly SADAT rather than the Turkish army.

Link:
Has SADAT become Erdogan's Revolutionary Guards? AEI ... - American Enterprise Institute

Javier El-Hage about the message to Erdogan published in The Washington Times: Dictators should never be simply … – Fairpress (blog)

all institutions that allowed them to make it to the highest officer in the first place. Dictators use their international trips to bathe themselves in false legitimacy (by posing shaking hands with democratic leaders) and at the same time try to demoralize democrats back home.

FP: What were the reactions to that ad?

Javier El-Hage: Except for a few twitter messages by Erdogan supporters telling us not to insult the Turkish president, the response on Twitter, email and elsewhere was overwhelmingly positive. The majority of people in democracies, jointly with the thousands of Turkish citizens that have been persecuted by Erdogans regime, agree with us, so their retweets and words of support after seeing the campaign were very loud and significant for us.

FP: What do you think about President Trumps decision to visit, in the span of a very short time, three countries that are the biggest prisons for journalists (Egypt, China and Turkey)?

Javier El-Hage: Unfortunately, President Trump isnt an outlier on this. Except for exceptional international leaders like the Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt in the 1960s (who broke diplomatic relations with Francos Spain, Trujillos Dominican Republic, Castros Cuba and others) this type of engagement with dictators (for reasons of national security, economic interest, or simply diplomatic kindness) has long been par of the course in the international relations of even the worlds longest and strongest democracies. We want to change this.

Although we think the downfall of severing diplomatic ties with dictators would be much less consequential than many intellectuals in democracies tend to believe, we do not necessarily advocate for this policy from the outset. However, it is key that democrats ask difficult questions to their dictatorial counterparts and afford respect for those persecuted under their regimes, since otherwise the anti-democratic world order that dictators tend to promote will come back to bite them anyway.

The Trump administration could lead on this front, but, after his visits with Erdogan and several Middle Eastern dictators, we are not holding our breaths. Still, we are fortunate to operate from a democratic country, so as part of this countrys free civil society we will continue to exercise our right to freedom of expression and call on democratic leaders to be tough on dictators, even as we know that this makes democratic leaders uncomfortable (perhaps more so than dictators, who are accustomed to simply crush dissent).

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Javier El-Hage about the message to Erdogan published in The Washington Times: Dictators should never be simply ... - Fairpress (blog)