Archive for the ‘Erdogan’ Category

Why Turkey Waited to Approve Sweden’s NATO Membership – Foreign Policy

This week, Turkeys parliament finally approved Swedens bid for NATO membership, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan swiftly ratified the measure.

Swedens NATO accession has dragged on for more than a year. While every other NATO member aside from Hungary supported Stockholms accession, Turkish leaders accused the Scandinavian country of harboring Kurdish terrorists. They demanded that Sweden tighten its anti-terrorism laws, extradite people accused of terrorist activities in Turkey, and resume arms sales to Turkey. The United States seems to have linked approval of Swedens NATO membership to future U.S. sales of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey.

As Swedens membership process stalled, analysts warned of the alliances decline and offered a range of proposed carrots and sticks to rein in Ankara. Some went so far as to suggest that Turkey be expelled from NATO, despite such an action being nearly impossible under its charter.

These concerns and threats come at a time when it has become common for U.S. experts to describe Turkish foreign policy as transactionalmeaning that Turkish national interests override NATOs common values. Once a reliable, Western-oriented U.S. ally, they argue, Turkey is now pursuing its own interests, which often run counter to those of the United States and European countries.

It is worth looking to history to understand Turkeys posture. The country waited nearly four years before it was finally allowed join NATO in 1952. The experience convinced Turkish policymakers that relations with the United States, NATO, and Western countries always involve a degree of bargaining. Turkish-NATO relations in the seven decades that followed have often reinforced this view, sometimes in Turkeys favor and sometimes to its detriment.

American NATO official Charles M. Spofford signs the protocol to admit Greece and Turkey into NATO in London in 1952.Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

Turkeys efforts to join NATO and other U.S.-dominated postwar institutions occurred under conditions of extreme insecurity for the country. Turkish leaders kept their country neutral during World War II, accepting aid from Britain and France without committing themselves as belligerents and selling war materials to Germany. At the conflicts end, Turkey found itself with few friends among the Allied victors. And it was surrounded on several sides by communist-controlled regimes: Bulgaria in the west, and the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Soviet republics in the northeast.

In neighboring Iran, the Soviet Union and Britain occupied the north and south of the country, respectively. The Soviets supported the autonomy of the regions Azeri and Kurdish ethnic groups; Turkish leaders have long opposed the latter separatist movement. Soviet officials also pressured Turkish leaders to renegotiate treaties regulating transit through the Bosporus and Dardanellesstraits and cede control of several northeastern border provinces. To Ankara, the Soviet threat seemed existential.

Rather than comply with Soviet demands, Turkey turned to Britain and the United States. With London unable to maintain its expansive role in the eastern Mediterranean, Washington increased its commitments to Turkey and Greece, directing aid to both countries via the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

But U.S. and Western European leaders stopped short of including Turkey in NATO. Ankara first inquired about membership in 1948, when the alliance was taking shape, but it was rebuffed. Turkey tried again in 1950 but was offered only associate status. Western leaders objections to full Turkish membership were not based on the ideals of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law enshrined in the NATO charter; the military alliance included Portugals dictatorship. Rather, their reasoning was strategicnot wanting to extend NATOs political and military commitments so far east.

Turkey did not gain firm U.S. support for its NATO membership until after 1950 and 1951, when Ankara sent thousands of Turkish soldiers to fight alongside the United States in some of the most brutal months of the Korean War. Washington proposed Turkeys accession in May 1951, and support from and the whole NATO Council followed. Turkey was admitted in 1952, along with Greece.

From the beginning, Turkeys relationship with NATO was transactional. By demonstrating their willingness to place Turkish citizens in harms way to contain communist expansion in Korea, Turkish leaders convinced their Western peers that Ankara had strategic value. Turkeys geographic position between Europe and Asiaand on major waterwaysseemed beneficial to the Western alliance in the event of war with the Soviet Union. So did Ankaras large army.

Greek Cypriots participate in a communist-backed demonstration in Nicosia against the plan to enlarge the NATO peace force in Cyprus in 1964. Central Press/Getty Images

Though Turkey was often able to extract benefits from NATO, the country was not always on equal footing with its Western counterparts. Turkish leaders felt their national interests were subordinated to those of the United States and other allies. Washingtons willingness to bargain with the Soviet Union over U.S. nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis was one example of this dynamic. But the main source of frustration was Cyprus.

Cyprus won independence from Britain in 1960 with a power-sharing agreement between its Greek majority and Turkish minority. When the deal broke down in 1963, Turkey began preparations to invade the island to protect its Turkish population.

But then-U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson informed the Turkish government that it could not count on NATO support should an invasion lead to Soviet intervention in Cyprus. Johnsons letter to Ankara stoked anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey, putting Turkish leaders who supported the allianceand its various financial and security benefitsin a tough spot.

A decade later, when Turkey did intervene in Cyprus, NATO membership worked to its advantage. In 1974, Greeces military regimewhich had come to power in 1967supported a coup in Cyprus. Turkey responded by taking control of a third of the island, which remains divided to this day.

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw Turkey as more important than Greece and worried that pushing Ankara could result in a left-wing regime taking power. Unconvinced, Democrats in the U.S. Congress voted to halt weapons sales to Turkey. The Ford administration responded to the embargo, which would not fully end until 1978, by convincing West Germany and other NATO allies to increase weapons exports to Ankara.

The government in Ankara responded to the embargo by allowing several additional Soviet aircraft carriers to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and ending unilateral U.S. access to bases in Turkey. On the eve of NATOs annual summit in May 1978, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit refused to sign on to a joint declaration and told reporters that he saw no threat to Turkey from the USSR. He added that a continued U.S. embargo was likely to reduce Turkeys contribution to NATO.

Two months later, the U.S. Senate voted to lift Turkeys arms embargo. By bargaining with NATO, Turkeys leaders satisfied short-term public anger with the United States without wholly undermining their countrys long-term strategic relationships. Transactional diplomacy had paid off.

Then-Turkish National Security Council chair Kenan Evren walks with other officials a few months after a military coup in Ankara, Turkey, on Nov. 10, 1980. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

After Turkeys 1980 coup, NATO membership again became useful for the country. Military leaders emphasized their determination to honor NATO commitments. They also made conciliatory moves, offering potential territorial concessions in Cyprus (although they never followed through) and supporting the reintegration of rival Greece into NATOs command structure following its withdrawal during the 1974 crisis.

These gestures came as the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War again placed Turkey at the center stage of U.S. strategyand gave Turkeys military rulers more room to maneuver. The United States increased its aid to Ankara even amid reports of torture, investigated by Amnesty International, which prompted countries such as Denmark and Norway to freeze their financial support. By 1991, only Israel and Egypt received more U.S. military aid than Turkey.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR between 1989 and 1991 threatened to make NATO irrelevantand diminish Turkeys importance to its Western allies. In part to reassert Turkeys centrality to Western interests, then-Turkish President Turgut Ozal gave his support to the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. He also liberalized Turkeys economy to encourage foreign investment. In return, Ozal hoped to secure concessions from the United States and other allies in Europe, such as increased access for Turkish textiles in the U.S. market.

NATO began to expand its ambitions in ways that suited Turkish interests. The alliance provided Turkey with additional aircraft during the Gulf War to deter Iraqi attacks. It chose to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Turkey was concerned about Serbian attacks against Muslims. There was even talk of an enhanced partnership between Ankara and Washington. The United States and other NATO allies played crucial roles in the 1999 capture of a key Kurdish separatist leader. That same year, the European Union formally acknowledged Turkeys candidacy for membership.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is surrounded by security on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 10, 2023. Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Despite these developments, Turkey in the 1990s was rocked by economic crises, violence, and political instability. The chaos of these years helped discredit established parties and bring Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2003.

Initially, the AKP intensified Turkeys efforts to engage with Western allies. But there were multiple setbacks. Turkeys European Union membership talks stalled following Cypruss admission to the bloc and the elections of European leaders such as Germanys Angela Merkel and Frances Nicolas Sarkozy, both of whom opposed Ankaras EU membership.

As the AKP lost the support of Western-oriented groups in its coalitionincluding liberals and the Gulen religious movementErdogan became reliant on political factions that advocated for a Eurasianist foreign policy that was less Western and more engaged with Russia and Central Asia.

Of all the conflicts between Turkey and its NATO allies in the post-Cold War era, the most central has been over relations with Kurdish nationalist groups. Washington has repeatedly looked to Kurdish groups to act as local partners in military operationsfirst against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and later against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile, anti-Kurdish measures taken by governments in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have helped create a sizable, politically active Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Sweden is one of the most notable examples. There, a closely divided parliament in 2021 allowed a legislator who had fought with Iranian-Kurdish guerrillas in her youth to cast the deciding vote securing additional support for Kurdish groups in Syria.

But the actions of a single legislator were not at the root of Turkeys unwillingness to grant Sweden a quick NATO accession. In fact, Sweden itself is not the issue. Sweden was the first country after Turkey to designate the PKKthe Kurdistan Workers Partyas a terrorist organization in 1984, and other NATO member countries, such as Germany, also have influential Kurdish diasporas.

Rather, Turkeys leaders decided to pick a fight within NATO because the alliance remains one of the few venues where they can exert pressure on Western peers. Through NATO, Ankara can draw attention to its security concernsand gain importantconcessions along the way.

See the original post:
Why Turkey Waited to Approve Sweden's NATO Membership - Foreign Policy

Erdogan again opposes sanctions on Iran and declares intent to boost trade – Nordic Research and Monitoring Network

Levent Kenez/Stockholm

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during his visit to Ankara this week, stated that the trade volume between the two countries has not reached the desired level due to the sanctions imposed on Iran. Erdogan expressed disapproval of the Western sanctions, emphasizing the importance of cooperation in establishing security, stability and prosperity in the region.

President Erdogan reaffirmed Turkeys commitment to the previously set goal of achieving $30 billion in trade volume with Iran, reflecting the understanding that economic cooperation is crucial for mutual benefit. He acknowledged that bilateral trade, which reached approximately $22 billion in 2012, has declined in recent years, attributing it to the sanctions on Iran and the global pandemic.

The main reason for this decline has been the sanctions imposed on Iran and the pandemic. Although the pandemic is now behind us, the inhibiting effects of sanctions on trade persist. As Turkey, we consistently maintain our principled stance, expressing our disapproval of unilateral sanctions and emphasizing that resorting to such pressure tactics does not serve the intended purpose, he said.

Erdogan underscored Turkeys refusal to terminate its economic and trade relations with Iran despite the challenges posed by the sanctions, adding, Due to the sanctions, we are currently facing issues in our business relations with Iran, especially stemming from the banking system. We hope that these and similar issues will be resolved promptly.

During the Turkey-Iran Business Forum organized as part of President Raisis visit, Turkish Minister of Trade mer Bolat stated that a new customs gate would be opened between Turkey and Iran. He mentioned that once Iran completes the necessary preparations, the gate will be accessible for the transit of trucks. Bolat added that Turkey would continue to serve as a gateway to the West for Iran.

Furthermore, an agreement was reached between Turkey and Iran regarding the establishment of new free-trade zones.

As Erdogan navigates the challenges posed by US and EU sanctions imposed on Iran, his track record raises growing concerns about the effectiveness of his approach. Turkey assisted Iran in circumventing US sanctions through state-owned Turkish lender Halkbank, currently facing trial in New York federal court. The corruption scandal, exposed in 2013, revealed collaboration between President Erdogan, his family members and key ministers with Iranian-Turkish businessman Reza Zarrab to help Iran evade US sanctions. While Turkey had permission to sell food to Iran under the humanitarian exemption, the documents were falsified, and instead, gold and cash were sent to Iran in exchange for natural gas, with Halkbank acting as an intermediary agent.

Zarrab, arrested in Miami in 2016, cooperated with the prosecutor and testified in the 2017 trial of Halkbanks deputy general manager, Mehmet Hakan Atilla. Zarrab confessed to his role in the scheme to help Iran evade sanctions and bribery to secure his release after his 2013 arrest in Turkey.

The Erdogan government dismissed the police chiefs and prosecutors who uncovered the scandal, accusing them of being affiliated with the Glen movement, a critic of the Turkish government on various issues. In March 2019 they were sentenced to life in prison for allegedly attempting to overthrow the government.

In 2019 US federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York indicted Turkish state lender Halkbank on six counts, including fraud, money laundering and sanctions offenses, related to its involvement in a multi-billion dollar scheme to evade US sanctions on Iran. The indictment outlined that between 2012 and 2016, Halkbank and its officers used money service businesses and front companies in Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere to violate and evade prohibitions against Irans access to the US financial system. Halkbank knowingly facilitated the scheme, engaged in fraudulent transactions and lied to US regulators about its involvement.

A news report published by The New York Times on October 29, 2020 said the Turkish government and its officials engaged in lobbying for several years to dismiss the case against Halkbank. The article outlined that the administration of former US President Donald Trump, at the request of Erdogan, worked extensively for an extended period to get the charges against Halkbank dropped.

It was also noted that the same request had been conveyed to the Barack Obama administration. In August 2016, Erdogan allegedly asked the then-vice president Joe Biden, to dismiss Preet Bharara, at the time the US attorney for the Southern District of New York.

Simultaneously, Erdogan was reported to have sought the extradition of Zarrab.

There have been reports in the Turkish media suggesting that Erdogan tried to delay Swedens NATO membership in order to engage in negotiations with the Biden administration. It is claimed that these negotiations included the Halkbank case.

In April 2023 the US Supreme Court rejected Halkbanks claim of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

Nordic Monitor previously reported that there has been a notable surge in the creation of startup companies in Turkey by Russian and Iranian nationals, according to official statistics. This suggests a strategic move by Moscow and Tehran, viewing the Turkish market as a viable avenue to navigate and alleviate constraints imposed by Western sanctions.

Data from the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) reveals that Russians led in establishing 592 new companies in Turkey from January to August 2023. Predominantly structured as limited liability companies, these ventures position Russians at the forefront of foreign investors creating enterprises in the Turkish market. In a similar trend, Iranians established 515 new businesses during the same period, with the majority structured as limited companies.

The majority of foreign-owned companies were classified under the category of non-specialized wholesale trade, indicating their establishment to engage in wholesale trade across a diverse range of products.

Read this article:
Erdogan again opposes sanctions on Iran and declares intent to boost trade - Nordic Research and Monitoring Network

Why Erdogan and Netanyahu have decided to seek closer ties – Arab News

The highly anticipated encounter between the leaders of Turkiye and Israel, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu, finally occurred on Tuesday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. This was the first documented meeting between the two leaders. The two countries had close ties until the infamous Mavi Marmara incident of 2010, which was a pivotal moment in the relationship between Tel Aviv and Ankara.

Key highlights from the meeting, which were shared with the press, included an agreement to arrange mutual visits; the possibility of Erdogan visiting Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in the near future; cooperation on various fields such as energy, technology, innovation, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; discussions regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations; and efforts to normalize Israels relations with Saudi Arabia.

The meeting took place a day after Erdogan expressed support for the US administrations initiative to broker an Israeli-Saudi deal, as he believed it could help reduce tensions in the region. It also occurred in the context of warming relations between the two countries, following Israeli President Isaac Herzogs visit to Ankara in March, which marked the first high-level Israeli visit since 2008, and Foreign Minister Eli Cohens meeting with the Turkish leader in February. Indications of improved ties were also apparent in Erdogans speech at the UNGA. In contrast to previous years, he refrained from criticizing Israel.

Erdogan has a long history of animosity with Netanyahu, with the two leaders having publicly exchanged harsh words for many years. Few leaders have experienced such prolonged tension with Erdogan as Netanyahu. Therefore, the meeting held greater significance than merely two ambitious leaders coming together; it reflected the repercussions of multiple factors operating on three levels: domestic, regional and the involvement of the US.

Beginning with the role of the US, the improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations has consistently been intertwined with Ankaras relations with America and the Jewish lobby there. This lobby has significant sway in either bolstering or undermining Turkiyes relations with Washington. Historically, its support has proven beneficial for Ankara in various cases, such as the Armenian issue, Greek claims and arms sales.

The meeting held greater significance than merely two ambitious leaders coming together

Sinem Cengiz

However, following the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, the Jewish lobby changed its stance, leaving Turkiye vulnerable. The US went on to back several decisions that were contentious from a Turkish perspective. Over the years, Ankara has come to recognize that, without the backing of the Jewish lobby, it is challenging for it to make further strides in its relations with the US.

The second factor at play is the shifting regional dynamics that have prompted the two countries to reassess their relations. Historically, regional developments have been a significant driver in shaping Turkish and Israeli calculations toward each other. In the past, when Turkiye faced threats from its neighbors, namely Iraq, Iran and Syria, it tended to draw closer to Israel. Similarly, for Israel, the Iranian threat has consistently been a motivating factor in forging closer ties with Turkiye and other regional powers. The significance of the Iranian factor should not be underestimated in Tel Avivs signing of the historic Abraham Accords with Bahrain and the UAE.

Moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020, which culminated in Azerbaijans victory over Armenia thanks to Turkish and Israeli support, played a role in thawing relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara. One of the consequences of the war was the diminishing influence of Iran in the region. Israels support for Azerbaijan was primarily driven by Tehrans support for Armenia. In seeking to establish a closer relationship with Baku, Israel, which also hosts a sizable Azerbaijani diaspora, provided support against Yerevan. This common cause brought Tel Aviv and Ankara together once again.

The third factor to consider is the situation in Syria, where both countries face similar threats. Moreover, Israel is uneasy about Turkiyes close contacts with Iran and Russia on the Syrian file. Tel Aviv does not want Turkiye to align itself with the Russian-Iranian axis.

From the Turkish perspective, there have been concerns about the close energy ties between Israel, Greece and Cyprus, particularly in regard to the EastMed pipeline, which aims to export Israeli and Egyptian liquefied gas to Europe.

For Turkiye, improving its ties with Israel is part of a broader overhaul of its foreign policy

Sinem Cengiz

For Turkiye, improving its ties with Israel is part of a broader overhaul of its foreign policy a policy that had left Ankara isolated in the region. Turkiye is also expected to strengthen its ties with the Gulf countries, so the restoration of ties with Israel aligns with this policy as well as with the US-mediated Abraham Accords. Turkiye is now not as vocally against the Abraham Accords as it was when they were signed in 2020.

At the domestic level, it is worth noting the observation of prominent scholar Louis Fishman, who has written: If you look at the two countries domestic politics, they perhaps are much more alike than different, like two peas in a pod.

Netanyahu has faced legal challenges for several years, including allegations of corruption, fraud and breach of trust, which have triggered a political crisis in the country. He needs to demonstrate to the public that he is reconciling with former regional rivals for the sake of the economy. In Turkiye, the situation mirrors this, as Ankara is striving to break its regional isolation to attract financial investments.

Both countries now seek to increase bilateral trade, even though it is important to note that Turkiye remained a key trading partner of Israel even during the height of the tension between the two countries. In recent months, they have also discussed the idea of an Israel-Turkiye natural gas pipeline, though the likelihood of such a project materializing appears extremely low for a variety of reasons.

Thus, economic and energy-related interests, closely linked to domestic gains, shifting regional dynamics and the US factor, play a predominant role in the new phase of Turkish-Israeli relations initiated by Erdogan and Netanyahu.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view

Read more:
Why Erdogan and Netanyahu have decided to seek closer ties - Arab News

Deadlocks get resolved, Trkiye pleased with developing … – Anadolu Agency | English

NEW YORK

Trkiye is pleased with its developing cooperation with the US, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday.

"We have resolved most of our deadlocks during talks with (President Joe) Biden, and we have decided to hold more talks," said Erdogan during a roundtable discussion with think tank representatives in New York, where he is taking part in the UN General Assembly.

The Turkish leader said the two nations will strengthen cooperation in efforts against terrorism, which he said poses threats to both countries."

In reference to US support for the terrorist YPG/PKK in northern Syria, Erdogan stressed that there can be no partnership with terror groups.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks at the 13th Concordia Annual Summit in New York, United States

"Every development in our region demonstrates how wrong the distinction between good terrorists and bad terrorists is. There is no negotiation with terrorists and no friendship or partnership can be established with them," he said.

In his remarks, Erdogan also mentioned Trkiye's contributions to solving global and regional problems, promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, and addressing injustices within the international system.

Turning to the ongoing war in Ukraine, Erdogan said Ankara is actively working towards ending the conflict with a just and lasting peace. He stressed Trkiye's commitment to diplomacy as a means to establish permanent peace in all conflict areas and to expand its network of international friendships.

The president also highlighted the importance of strengthening international solidarity, particularly in the non-partisan fight against terrorist groups such as the PKK, Daesh/ISIS, and the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), a terror group which in 2016 launched a defeated coup against Trkiye that killed thousands of people.

He also emphasized the need for a dignified and safe return of Syrian refugees to their home country.

President Erdogan is currently in New York to attend the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. He is set to deliver his address to the session on Tuesday.

Originally posted here:
Deadlocks get resolved, Trkiye pleased with developing ... - Anadolu Agency | English

Erdogan returns to Turkey after securing thaw with Israel on US trip – Al-Monitor

ANKARA Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Thursday returned to Turkey from his four-day New York visit after cementing Turkeys regional fence-mending with Greece and Israel.

Erdogans one-on-one schedule on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly largely focused on regional diplomacy, including meetings with Israeli, Greek, Iraqi and Algerian leaders. Erdogan also met with NATO Secretary GeneralJens Stoltenberg on Monday.

Erdogans meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday marked the first-ever official face-to-face meeting, as relations between the two were highly strained during Netanyahu's previous terms in office (2009-2021).The two countries restored their diplomatic ties last July as part of Ankaras regional fence-mending push, which aimed to overcome Turkeys regional isolation and economic hardships by restoring its ties with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In the statement after the meeting, "The two leaders mutually invited each other for visits to Israel and Turkey and it was agreed that these visits would be coordinated and take place soon, the Israeli side said.

Shortly before the New York meeting, Israels Channel 2 reported thatErdogan is interested in arranging a trip to Israel as soon as possible to pray at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque to mark the centennial of the Turkish Republic, which was founded on Oct. 29, 1923.

Netanyahu was scheduled to travel to Turkey last July in what would have been the first visit to Ankara by an Israeli prime minister in 14 years but the trip was postponed, with the Israeli government citing health reasons.

Erdogan also reached out to Israel's supporters in a meeting with 15 Jewish leaders, where he denounced anti-Semitism.

The meeting according to the Jerusalem Post included "attendees from the Conference of Presidents and various other Jewish organizations, as well as rabbis, leaders of the Turkish Jewish community, and Turkish Jewish Americans."

The Turkish leaders meeting withGreek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Wednesday, meanwhile, saw an agreement on a date for the resumption of the confidence-building talks between the two countries' defense ministries. The setting of a date for talks came as the latest in a series of steps the two countries have taken to resolve their conflicting territorial claims in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas following the disaster diplomacy after the devastating February earthquakes that hit southern Turkey.

No NATO breakthrough

Following Erdogan-Stoltenberg meeting, the Turkish president said: "We will remain one of the most active supporters of NATO missions." But he gave no indication of a timeline for the Turkish parliament to ratify Sweden's membership.

Erdogans postponement of a Turkish parliament vote on Swedens pending NATO membership accession after he greenlighted it in July drew the ire of Western capitals, particularly Washington.

The tensions became public when Erdogan said earlier month that his country was seriously upset over Washingtons linking a Turkish request to buy new F-16 fighter jets from the United States to Swedens NATO membership, which is pending ratification by Turkey and Hungary. His remarks came after his brief chat with US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi.

Dropping his yearlong objections, Erdogan greenlighted the Swedish accession to NATO under a trilateral statement by NATO, Turkey and Sweden on the sidelines of NATOs Vilnius summit in July. Yet later he announced that he would not initiate the ratification process until October when the Turkish parliament returns from a summer recess.

His remarks on the sidelines of the G20 summit earlier this month further increased uncertainty over the Swedish bid."It is not possible for me to say 'yes' [to Sweden] alone unless such a decision is approved by our parliament, he told journalists in New Delhi.

The issue will likely be a top agenda item during Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidans scheduled meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Friday.

Read more from the original source:
Erdogan returns to Turkey after securing thaw with Israel on US trip - Al-Monitor