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Amore Vero, the yacht owned by a company linked to Igor Sechin, is pictured in the shipyard of La Ciotat in southern France on Thursday. Nicolas Tucat/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Amore Vero, the yacht owned by a company linked to Igor Sechin, is pictured in the shipyard of La Ciotat in southern France on Thursday.

French authorities say they have seized a yacht linked to sanctioned Russian oligarch Igor Sechin.

Sechin served as Russia's deputy prime minister from 2008 to 2012 and is the current CEO of state oil company Rosneft.

He is among the several "elites close to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin" that the U.S. Treasury Department targeted with sanctions last week. The European Union imposed sanctions against Sechin on Monday, calling him one of Putin's "most trusted and closest advisors, as well as his personal friend" and saying the two were in daily contact.

French finance minister Bruno Le Maire announced on Thursday that French authorities had seized Sechin's yacht named "Amor Vero," or "True Love" in Italian at the Mediterranean port of La Ciotat on Wednesday.

"Thanks to the French customs officers who are enforcing the European Union's sanctions against those close to the Russian government," he said, according to a Reuters translation of his tweet.

The 280-foot yacht had been docked in southern France's La Ciotat since early January, and was set to remain there undergoing repairs through the end of March, CNBC reports. But the French ministry of finance said the yacht was preparing to cast off when authorities began their check, which lasted several hours.

The ministry said it had identified Sechin as the main shareholder of the company that owns the yacht, according to The Guardian.

"As part of the implementation of European Union sanctions against Russia and in support of Ukraine, we seized a first yacht," French Minister at the Ministry of Public Action and Accounts Olivier Dussopt wrote in a tweet on Thursday translated by France24.

The U.S. announced a fresh round of sanctions against Russian oligarchs later Thursday.

It enacted "full blocking sanctions" on eight oligarchs and their families and imposed visa restrictions on 19 others as well as 47 of their family members and close associates.

"These individuals have enriched themselves at the expense of the Russian people, and some have elevated their family members into high-ranking positions," the White House said in a statement. "Others sit atop Russia's largest companies and are responsible for providing the resources necessary to support Putin's invasion of Ukraine."

It said those targeted by the sanctions will be cut off from the U.S. financial system, with their assets in the U.S. frozen and their property blocked from use. The individuals named include Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, and billionaire Alisher Usmanov.

Citing data from shipping database Marine Traffic, CNBC has reported that at least four Russian billionaires began moving their superyachts toward Montenegro and the Maldives which doesn't have an extradition treaty with the U.S. after the U.S. and other Western countries announced a raft of sanctions against Russian oligarchs and financial institutions.

President Biden has repeatedly pledged to pursue the crimes of Russian oligarchs, including in his State of the Union address on Tuesday.

"We're joining with European allies to find and seize their yachts, their luxury apartments, their private jets," he said. "We are coming for your ill-begotten gains."

The following day, the U.S. Department of Justice announced "Task Force KleptoCapture," which it says will enforce sanctions and other financial measures imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, seize the assets of people who violate them and leave no stone unturned in investigating criminal acts that support Russia's aggression.

France's announcement comes a day after Forbes reported citing three yacht industry sources that German authorities in the port city of Hamburg had seized Usmanov's superyacht.

The status of the yacht is unclear.

Hamburg officials have since denied the report, with a spokesperson for its economic authority telling The Guardian that "no yachts have been confiscated." Any order to seize properties subject to sanctions would have to come from higher federal customs authorities, they added.

But when the White House announced sanctions against Usmanov and other oligarchs on Thursday, it said the superyacht which it called "one of the world's largest" had been seized by Germany. Officials said property like his yacht and private jet will be blocked from use in the U.S.

The yacht in question, named "Dilbar," measures 512 feet long and is valued at $600 million, both outlets report. It can accommodate as many as 24 guests in a dozen suites, as well as up to 96 crew members, according to luxury yacht comparison site YachtCharterFleet.

Satellite imagery obtained by CBS News shows the superyacht believed to be owned by Putin docked in Kaliningrad, a "highly militarized port in Russian territorial waters" and out of reach of U.S. sanctions.

Marine Traffic data suggests "the Graceful," Putin's alleged yacht, left Germany two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine.

On Tuesday, the "hacktivist" group Anonymous took credit for changing the yacht's call sign to "FKPTN" and its destination to "hell."

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France seized a yacht linked to a sanctioned Russian oligarch - NPR

When people think of EU policymaking, they generally think of developments within the EUs institutions. But local authorities across Europe are responsible for a wide range of social and economic tasks that are regulated by the EU. Marius Guderjan and Tom Verhelst explain why understanding this local dimension of EU politics is vital for appreciating the impact of the integration process.

Looking at European integration through the prism of local government might seem a little odd at first. Since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, major reforms to the EU have been off the table, and the EU has faced a number of regional and global challenges during the last decade, including the euro crisis, an influx of refugees, the climate emergency, a global pandemic, Brexit, autocratic regimes breaking the Unions fundamental principles and laws, and external security threats at the member states doorsteps.

In response, national governments have returned to more intergovernmental and even unilateral modes of governance to steer through difficult times. Even in less troubled waters, the relationship between the European and the local levels of government were never a hot topic among scholars of European integration. In political science, the study of local government in the EU has remained a niche subject for a rather small community of enthusiasts.

And yet, we believe that the lack of a comprehensive contemporary account of EU-local relations presented an urgent need and a great opportunity for a systematic study. This is why in a new book we link the macro-trajectories of European integration with micro-developments at the local level. Drawing from a combination of European integration theories and approaches (including intergovernmentalism, functionalism, fusion, post-functionalism, multilevel governance and Europeanisation), we introduce the idea of an integration cycle to explain how local government responds to the evolution of European governance in different domains and phases.

Next to the high politics dealt with in Europes capitals, politicians and scholars tend to forget that without cities, towns and counties EU policies could hardly be realised. Local authorities across Europe are responsible for a wide range of social and economic tasks that are regulated by the EU, including environmental change, energy transition, the integration of refugees, healthcare and other essential public services.

Through regulations and directives, but also through policy programmes and funding schemes, local authorities are drawn into the European polity. Policymakers in Brussels have therefore turned to the local level to find effective and innovative ways of developing and implementing their objectives. In particular, the European Commission and the European Parliament clearly acknowledge the essential role of local government for delivering the EUs agenda, as a 2018 Report on the role of cities in the institutional framework of the Union indicates:

new global challenges posed by security and immigration, demographic shift, youth unemployment, challenges relating to the quality of public services, access to clean and affordable energy, natural disasters and environmental protection demand local responses and, therefore, a stronger commitment on the part of cities when designing and implementing EU policies.

In line with our metaphor of an integration cycle, local government is not only at the receiving end of policies and laws coming top-down from Brussels. In response to European integration, municipalities adjust their practices, orientation, organisation and politics both internally and externally. Some local authorities and actors engage proactively in European affairs and connect themselves in European-wide networks and associations; the most prominent examples are the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, and Eurocities.

Local government drives ambitious initiatives that feed bottom-up into European policies around urban mobility, social service provision, environment, procurement, transport, and housing, and has strengthened the local dimension within the Cohesion Policy and the Urban Agenda. Significant constitutional and procedural reforms highlight the growing role of the local level within European integration. The Committee of Regions, the right to local self-government, and the principles of subsidiarity and partnership promoted local and multilevel governance within the EUs formal and living constitution.

While local actors have to make strategic choices on how to approach European decisionmakers, it is often the interplay of formal participation and informal lobbying that provides them with conditional but substantial influence in EU policymaking. According to our findings, local influence has expanded far beyond what is commonly assumed. Being systematically and officially involved in decision-making increases their chances of affecting policy in advance. In turn, informal mobilisation is more effective to wield concrete political power and to prevent unfavourable outcomes and interventions in local autonomy.

Our theoretical reflections suggest that European integration of local government represents a third way between an intergovernmental and a supranational perspective. Functional spillover of constraining laws triggers a sovereignty reflex to preserve local autonomy, while cultivated spillover shifts the focus of local government towards European agendas.

Political spillover then activates a small group of entrepreneurial local authorities and actors, who understand that engaging in European affairs is both a necessity and an opportunity for the future of their municipality. Considering the vast diversity of local government across Europe, the different stages of the integration cycle do not equally involve all local authorities. Yet, as local pioneers seek to shape and access EU policymaking both formally and informally, local government completes the integration cycle. Subsequently, this may trigger a new loop of top-down and bottom-up dynamics in return.

We neither suggest that European integration is an ever-continuing, irreversible process, nor that local government is its main driver. The UK and examples from other member states have shown that Eurosceptic politics set clear limits to the integration of all levels. Nevertheless, in times when both long-established and fairly young, democracies are challenged by populist and radical movements, cities, towns and counties can be a vital locus of political discourse and legitimacy.

Taking municipal insights and preferences better into account can make European governance more effective and in line with local practices. It can also help strengthen the links between citizens and EU institutions. This way, the European integration of local government enhances both the EUs input and output legitimacy. After all, local governments are democratically elected stakeholders within the EU with clear expertise concerning their policy challenges on the ground.

Being in direct touch with their citizens, local authorities take a vital role in overcoming national borders and contributing to a mutual understanding of differences and commonalities. It is in this spirit that our research seeks to improve our understanding of local government in the EU for politicians and people working in public authorities at multiple levels, as well as for academics who may find our empirical and theoretical insights useful for their own endeavours.

For more information, see the authors new book, Local Government in the European Union: Completing the Integration Cycle (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021)

Note: This article gives the views of theauthors, not the position of EUROPP European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Gabriella Clare Marino on Unsplash

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Local government in the European Union: Completing the integration cycle - EUROPP - European Politics and Policy

The European Commission's Open Source Programme Office has decided to offer bug bounties on popular open source software. What better way of acknowledging OSS's importance than by a state driven sponsorship?

Open Source Software powers everything, from modern servers, to IoT, to the desktops at work and, as it seems, is at the heart of European Union systems too. While this EU bug bounty initiative is welcome, it is not something new; I covered the origins of the program in 2019, see"EU Bug Bounty - Software Security as a Civil Right".

Back then the bounty was focused on OpenSSL and the Heartbleed bug. As everyone knows OpenSSL is really the cornerstone of todays internet-based communication and as such bugs in it compromise the very fabric of society. From the article:

It is amazing to think that the OpenSSL Software Foundation which is responsible for the maintenance of the OpenSSL library, the cornerstone of safe transactions on the Internet used by millions of websites and organizations, receives just $2000 of donation money per year and has only ONE full-time employee working on the library.

All that was revealed after the discovery of the Heartbleed bug, something that finally shook the waters and motivated the big industry names to support the foundation with proper funding.

As such the EU Bug Bounty initiative was launched as part of the Free and Open Source Software Audit (FOSSA) project, thanks to Julia Reda MEP of the EU Pirate Party, who started the project thinking that enough is enough after severe vulnerabilities were discovered in key infrastructure components like OpenSSL. This prompted her to involve the EU Commission in contributing to the security of the Internet.

Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz, legal expert of Joinup (a venue that enables public administrations, businesses and citizens to share and reuse IT solutions and good practices across Europe)added:

Like bread and beer, free software development is not for free: developers need some incentives, lets say just the money they need for purchasing their bread and beer or for ensuring their family a decent way of life.

In order to provide these incentives, the European Commission is launching in January about 15 bug bounties on Free Software projects that the EU institutions rely on. A bug bounty is a prize for people who actively search for security issues. The amount of the bounty depends on the severity of the issue uncovered and the relative importance of the software.

Now there's another round of cybersecurity sponsorship, but under a new name - European Commission Open Source Programme Office (EC OSPO). This time the EU pays for finding security vulnerabilities in LibreOffice, LEOS, Mastodon, Odoo and CryptPad, with an added 20% bonus for providing a code fix for the bugs discovered.

This bonus is very important as once a vulnerability has been identified and reported in many cases the maintainers of the project are slow in getting a patch out. The bonus tries to incentivize bug hunters to propose fixes it as well as finding vulnerabilities, hence leading to a much shorter response time.

The criteria for choosing particular applications were based on their actual use. All of them are open source solutions used by public services across the European Union:

It seems that the security of desktop apps is considered at par with those of the server-side kind. In some cases client-side attacks can be even more dangerous because desktop apps are consumed en masse, and when exploited it's not just some vague hacking attack happening on the Internet resulting in the leaking of credentials and personal information, buttaking full control of the users' PCs, therefore of their complete digital life.

Bug hunters are called to find security vulnerabilities such as leaks of personal data, horizontal/vertical privilege escalation and SQLi. The highest reward will be EUR 5,000 for exceptional vulnerabilities plus, as already mentioned, a 20% bonus if the fix is also provided. The bug bounty is going to be based on theIntigritiplatform, whichwork with teams of every size, shape and industry based in Europe to secure digital assets, protect confidential information and customer data, and strengthen a responsible disclosure process.

European Commission's Open Source Programme Office starts bug bounties

EU Bug Bounty - Software Security as a Civil Right

Joinup-Software Security IS a Civil Right

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European Union Will Pay For Finding Bugs In Open Source Software - iProgrammer

Second treaty of Maastricht brings full union closer

By John Palmer in Brussels7 February 1992

Foreign and finance ministers from the 12 member states will today sign a treaty which aims to turn the European Community into an economic union and a global political power, before the end of the decade.

They will do so in the Dutch city of Maastricht, which last December saw the bruising climax to years of negotiations for a treaty on European Union.

The Commission, the European parliament, and most EC governments see the Maastricht treaty as an interim stage in the process leading to full European union. The treaty is a legally and politically messy compromise, between the majority who wanted to move faster to union and a minority primarily but not exclusively the British who were determined to slow down if not reverse the trend towards a de facto federal union.This is an edited extract. Read in full.

By Julie Wolf in Maastricht8 February 1992

The French almost missed the show, Norman Lamont opted out and Douglas Hurd wasnt sure what he had signed. But compared to the last time the European Communitys foreign and finance ministers got together in Maastricht, yesterdays ceremony to sign the Treaty on European Union was a breeze.

The Dutch province of Limburg pulled out the stops. There were hussars and a band to welcome the dignitaries, glorious spring flowers everywhere, the Limburg Symphony Orchestra playing Mozart and, of course, a champagne reception and banquet.

Still, there were some hitches. The French delegation, led by the foreign minister, Roland Dumas, and the finance minister, Pierre Beregovoy, steamed in after the pre-signing speeches had started, apparently delayed by a parliamentary debate on the Habash affair. The new Europe goes ahead even without the French, one onlooker commented.

Mr Hurd, meanwhile, responded with an embarrassed laugh when asked what was contained in the two bound volumes the ministers autographed. We had better find out what we signed, the foreign secretary accompanied by Treasury Eurosceptic Francis Maude, standing in for the Chancellor, Mr Lamont was heard telling officials.

Whatever it was, it would not lead to a federal Europe, Mr Hurd said. Logic was now running against more centralisation, with a Europe of 17 or 18 nations likely in the not-so-far-off future.

This was a view not shared by the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, who used his speech to call for a federal Europe, while insisting he was not trying to reopen an old argument.

For the Dutch prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, the treaty was just one step to ever closer union: with would-be members queueing up, he said, negotiations on a new political union treaty might have to begin before 1996.

8 February 1992

With the Maastricht treaty just signed, and Portugals presidency only in its second month, the foreign secretarys unveiling of our new EC logo may appear slightly odd timing. (Not to dwell on the oddness of the logo itself, in which the lion remains half outside the EC symbol.) To announce British presidential priorities five months before we take over begs a fairly large electoral question. Yet it does focus minds otherwise preoccupied upon the vast range of issues raised by European Union which have oddly faded since last years storms. It also poses two very necessary questions: how to ensure a smooth presidential transition, and how to define the enlargement which Britain (like Portugal) sees rightly as an urgent task.

The six monthly EC presidential cycle generates an arbitrary but on the whole positive sort of democracy by alphabet. Though unkind words have been said about the recent sequence of presidential terms by Europes smaller nations (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and now Portugal) there are advantages in the perspective from a smaller power base. Portugal has largely shaken free of the Atlanticist outlook which once placed it at the same table with Britain. Six years of growth since entering the Community has created a feeling of benefit in Lisbon which Britain does not share. Its energetic Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro says he hopes to pay back this help by working hard on a European approach. Portugal has its own interests, particularly in agriculture where its farmers will be served by the pursuit of a reform which is neither radical or superficial. But Lisbon can still talk more credibly of a universalist approach than Paris or Bonn or London with their substantial and sensitive national interests. Portugals location also encourages a proper concern that the South, both of Europe and beyond, may suffer if western resources and attention are focused exclusively upon eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union. Portugals commitment to press ahead at once with all the dossiers which have been generated by Maastrichts three pillars, rather than establish priorities, may yet come unstuck by June. But in a period when the main task is to establish new structures and agendas for political and economic union which flow from the decisions of the last summit, such a broadly based effort still makes sense.

The issue of enlargement has itself been potentially enlarged by the mounting pace of disintegration in the east since Maastricht was agreed. The task for the Portuguese presidency ahead of the next Lisbon summit is to define both an adequate strategy and its institutional consequences. The EFTA applicants clearly have to be dealt with first, but how much wider should the EC go, and how soon? The Treaty of Rome should not be a closed club, but different forms of decision making will have to be devised for a Community which could number 15 quite soon and 20 or more by the end of the decade. By the normal economic criteria even Hungary and Poland would hardly be ready to join by the next review in 1996. But are these necessarily the right tests to apply? The ECs patronage in central and eastern Europe serves a far more urgent purpose of immunisation against the risks of instability, even without formal defence guarantees. The real task may be how to find new forms of association, with much more meaningful political body, in which the frontiers can be extended without diluting the ECs core strength. Enlargement has been tarnished by the suspicion that it can serve as an alibi for slowing the agreed pace of union. But the EC may yet be faced with new crises in the east which inevitably result in some slackening of effort elsewhere.

Beyond the Treaty and enlargement lies the still broader role of the EC as a future superpower. Here too a country which in modern times has never claimed great power status may more easily regard the EC as a great world actor. Certain EC members, Lisbon suggests, could play a more prominent part in dealing with areas where they have special leverage, as Portugal itself does over East Timor. Similarly as the Middle East peace process flags, it would be appropriate for Britain particularly when it becomes president to claim a higher EC role.

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Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht archive, 1992 - The Guardian

10 February 2022

The European Union wants to encourage investment in "sustainable" activities to help it get to net-zero by 2050.

The European Union aims to be climate neutral by 2050. To help that process it has come up with a system to "facilitate sustainable investment". The Taxonomy Regulation provides investors with guidance on economic activities that can be considered environmentally sustainable. It also obliges European companies to report their level of taxonomy-aligned undertakings. Any activity excluded from the list faces being cut out of sustainable finance products and will find itself at odds with long-term EU policy objectives.

There has been a split within the European Union over whether or not nuclear power - and natural gas - should be included as being "sustainable". Nuclear energy was left out of the initial Delegated Act pending further assessment. But this further assessment by the EU Joint Research Centre,reviewed by two further expert bodies, concluded that the technology is sustainable. As a result, the Commission has now taken steps to included nuclear energyas a transitional activity in the taxonomy by adopting a Complementary Delegated Act (CDA).

Supporters of nuclear power, including 12 EU member states who publicly backed its inclusion, say that nuclear is a low-carbon power source that must be part of any energy mix to tackle climate change, and does not cause more significant harm than other industries included in the taxonomy. They say that the science, and evidence-based policy support its inclusion. Opponents say that it should not be included because radioactive waste means it is not sustainable. For the European Union it has been one of the highest profile recent issues where France - which backs nuclear - is on the opposite side to Germany.

Sectors which are responsible for about 80% of the EUs direct greenhouse gas emissions have been initially targeted, including:

In future the taxonomy is expected to be expanded to cover more economic sectors.

An economic activity must substantially contribute to at least one of six environmental objectives without causing significant harm to the others:

The European Commission has included certain nuclear and gas activities in the "transitional"category of activities - ones that "cannot yet be replaced by technologically and economically feasible low-carbon alternatives, but do contribute to climate change mitigation and with the potential to play a major role in the transition to a climate-neutral economy, in line with EU climate goals and commitments, and subject to strict conditions, without crowding out investment in renewables."

- Advanced technologies with closed fuel cycle ("Generation IV") to incentivise research and innovation into future technologies in terms of safety standards and minimising waste (there is no end date for this bit);

- New nuclear power plant projects for energy generation, which will be using best-available existing technologies ("Generation III+"), will be recognised until 2045 (date of approval of construction permit);

- Modifications and upgrades of existing nuclear installations for the purposes of lifetime extension, will be recognised until 2040 (date of approval by competent authority).

The CDA sets out many safety and waste-related requirements for nuclear activities to be considered sustainable, in addition to specific Do No Significant Harm criteria. Many of these are in line with existing EU regulation and expectations but some go beyond. In general the requirements are more restrictive than for other energy technologies already included in the first Delegated Act. The special requirements include:

- Accident Tolerant Fuel, which is not yet commercially available for all reactor types, mustbe used at all existing plants and Gen III new-build by the year 2025.

- The project has been notified to the Commission and the Commission has given its view whether all criteria have been satisfactorily addressed.

-A high-level waste repository to be operational by 2050, and for final disposal facilities for low and intermediate-levelwaste to be operational in the country where a given project is based.

- Nuclear fuel cycle activities are currently not included in the CDA as enabling activities and nuclearinvestments outside the EU remain excluded from the taxonomy.

The European College of commissioners backed the plan and among the pro-nuclear power countries there was a welcome that nuclear power was included in the taxonomy but the warmth of the welcome was tempered by some of the restrictions and conditions on what was included, as well as the expiry dates.

For those countries opposed to nuclear powerthere was disappointment at its inclusion. Austriasenergy and climate minister Leonore Gewessler called it "greenwashing"andis threatening to take legal action. WWF Europe called on the European Parliament to vote down the plan.

European nuclear trade body Foratoms Director General Yves Desbazeille welcomed the CDA but said some of the criteria put forward for nuclear would "prove very challenging to attain" and "we remain disappointed that nuclear continues to be treated as a transitional technology we firmly believe that it contributes to climate mitigation objectives and does not cause more harm than any other power-producing technology already considered as taxonomy compliant."

Sama Bilbao y Len, director general of the World Nuclear Association, said: The adoption of this CDA is a hugely important milestone that the international financial community cannot afford to ignore the Commission has been right to reject political pressure to keep nuclear excluded from the taxonomy. But in seeking a politically acceptable compromise, it has produced some conditions that are not scientifically justified or applied consistently to other energy technologies. This will hinder the EU from achieving its energy and environmental goals.

The European Unions decision to include nuclear in its "sustainable"list has been closely watched around the world. It will have implications for EU investors and businesses operating outside the union, as well as foreign investors into Europe. The EU's decision is also likely to set a precedent for countries around the world as they set their own sustainable investment frameworks and work out which technologies to prioritise for support in the path towards net-zero.

The European Parliament (whose members are elected by voters across the union every five years) and the European Council(which is made up of the governments of the 27 member states) have four months to scrutinise the Complementary Delegated Act. They can request an additional two months of scrutiny time if they need it.

To stop the CDA coming into force there needs to be a reinforced qualified majority opposing it in the European Council - so at least 20 member states representing at least 65% of the EU population would have to oppose it. Given the number of countries known to back it, this seems extremely unlikely to happen. TheEuropean Parliament because it can object if a majority of its members vote against it in plenary (i.e. at least 353 MEPs).

If the European Council and the European Parliament do not object to it, the Complementary Delegated Act will enter into force and apply as of 1 January 2023.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

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A guide to the EU's 'green' taxonomy - and nuclear's place in it : Energy & Environment - World Nuclear News