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The European Unions 25 February wave of sanctions build on, and significantly expand, its existing sanctions on Russia, imposing wide-ranging restrictions on the Russian economyincluding in respect of Russias access to financial and capital marketsand the oil refining, aviation, and space sectors. More sanctions from the European Union are expected in the coming days, along with announcements on the disconnection of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT system.

The February 25 sanctions package was adopted by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 and came into effect on 26 February 2022. These sanctions build on the regime imposed on Russia by the European Union in 2014 (Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014), together with those adopted by the European Union on 23 February 2022. The new sanctions both strengthen existing restrictions and impose additional restrictions on the trade in goods and associated services to significant sectors of the Russian economy. The new trade sanctions apply irrespective of whether the goods or technology originate in the European Union.

The European Union has imposed new prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer, or export to any Russian person or entity or for use in Russia (directly or indirectly) of specific goods and technologies suited for use in oil refining, together with restrictions on the provision of certain related services and financing. A list of the specified items is set out at the new Annex X to Regulation 833/2014.

There is a temporary exemption (or wind-down period) that effectively allows EU persons to continue to perform a contract (or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of that contract) until 27 May 2022, provided that the contract was entered into before 26 February 2022. Furthermore, specific licences can be sought for the prevention or mitigation of events likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

These new restrictions are in addition to the previous restrictions imposed on Russias energy sector in relation to oil exploration and production and associated services, which restrictions remain fully in effect.

A number of new restrictions have been introduced in relation to Russias aviation and space sector, including prohibitions on

A carve-out has been included which is intended to allow a short window (until 28 March 2022) within which EU persons and entities can execute contracts concluded before 26 February 2022 (and ancillary contracts necessary for the executions of such contracts) that are otherwise prohibited by paragraphs (i) and (iii) above. Notably, the carve-out does not extend to the insurance and reinsurance provisions or the activities in paragraph (ii) above.

A new prohibition introduced on 28 February 2022 pursuant to Regulation 2022/334 prohibits any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements; any Russian-registered aircraft; or any non-Russian-registered aircraft which is owned or chartered, or otherwise controlled by, any Russian person or entity from landing in, taking off from, or overflying the territory of the European Union. A member state may provide a licence on humanitarian grounds or for a purpose that is consistent with the objectives of Regulation 833/2014.

The European Union has expanded the pre-existing restrictions on the export of controlled dual-use items to Russia by removing the previous requirement that the item be intended for military use and/or a military end user, i.e., there is now a blanket ban on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items (and certain associated services) to any Russian person or for use in Russia (subject to certain derogations). Dual-use goods are items that have both a civilian and a military application; they are identified in Council Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

The new sanctions further prohibit the sale, supply, transfer or export of items (and certain associated services) to Russian persons, or for use in Russia, that may contribute to Russias military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector. An extensive list of these items is included at the new Annex VII to Regulation 833/2014 and includes items related to encryption, electronics, telecoms, lasers, navigation and avionics, and computers/electronics.

Certain exemptions apply, including for humanitarian, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes; non-governmental cybersecurity; software updates; temporary use by news media; and personal use. Licences will not normally be required where the exemptions apply. However, it may be necessary in some circumstances to declare any impacted items on customs declaration forms and to inform the competent authority/authorities of the reliance on an exemption.

Specific licences may also be available depending on the items and purpose for which they are intended.

The European Union has imposed additional restrictions on Russias access to capital marketsincluding extending restrictions on dealings involving transferable securities and money market instruments and/or new loans or credit to four additional Russian banks (Alfa Bank, Bank Otkritie, Bank Rossiya, and Promsvyazbank) and to eight state-owned companies (Almaz-Antey, Kamaz, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, Rostec, Russian Railways, JSC PO Sevmash, Sovcomflot, and United Shipbuilding Corporation). These entities are identified at new Annexes XII and XIII of Regulation 833/2014.

Furthermore, the existing measures have been strengthened so that there will be no minimum maturity limit in respect of (i) transferable securities and money market instruments issued after 12 April 2022; and (ii) new loans and credit after 26 February 2022.

From 12 April 2022, it will also be prohibited to list and provide services on trading venues registered or recognized in the European Union for the transferable securities of any entity established in Russia and with more than 50% public ownership.

The new sanctions package also contains further prohibitions relating to transferable securities.

EU financial institutions are prohibited from accepting deposits of more than EUR 100,000 euros (approximately $112,000) from Russian nationals, residents, or entities. In addition, they must report any deposits in excess of these limits by no later than 27 May 2022 and will be required to provide an update every 12 months.

Certain exemptions apply, including deposits necessary for lawful trade in goods and services between the European Union and Russia, as well as individuals basic needs, civil society activities, humanitarian purposes, reasonable legal/professional fees, and certain extraordinary expenses (although licences will need to be obtained in relation to most of the above).

Further, while nationals and residents of EU member states are exempt from these measures, financial institutions must provide details of deposits exceeding these limits held by Russian nationals or residents who have acquired EU member state citizenship or EU residence rights through an investor citizenship or residence scheme.

The European Union has prohibited the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Russia.

Exemptions are available for (i) binding financing or financial assistance commitments established prior to 26 February 2022; (ii) the provision of public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of 10,000,000 euros (approximately $11,200,000) per project to small and medium-sized enterprises established in the European Union; and (iii) the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade in food and for agricultural, medical, or humanitarian purposes.

In addition to the restrictions above, following Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/331, the European Union has also designated an additional 99 individuals, including the Russian president and the foreign minister. This list also includes certain Belarusian persons identified as having participated in or supported Russias military activities in Ukraine.

It is already anticipated that the European Union will impose further sanctions against Russia in the coming weeks, including significant further designations against those seen as either benefiting from or supporting those deemed responsible for Russias actions in Ukraine.

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Update: European Union Agrees on Further Sanctions on Russia - JD Supra

Other avenues are available to the EU if it wishes or needs to reduce reliance on Russian gas even more quickly but with notable trade-offs.5 The main near-term option would involve switching away from gas use in the power sector via an increased call on Europes coal-fired fleet or by using alternative fuels primarily liquid fuels within existing gas-fired power plants.

Given that these alternatives to gas use would raise the EUs emissions, they are not included in the 10-Point Plan described above. However, they could displace large volumes of gas relatively quickly. We estimate that a temporary shift from gas to coal- or oil-fired generation could reduce gas demand for power by some 28 bcm before there was an overall increase in the EUs energy-related emissions.

The larger share of this potential decrease in gas demand would be possible through gas-to-coal switching: an additional 120 TWh in coal-fired generation could cut gas demand by 22 bcm in one year. In addition to opportunities to run on biomethane, nearly a quarter of the EUs fleet of gas-fired power plants is capable of using alternative fuels nearly all in the form of liquid fuels. Taking advantage of this capability could displace another 6 bcm of natural gas demand a year, depending on sufficient financial incentives to switch fuels and the availability of those fuels.

If this fuel-switching option were to be fully exercised in addition to the complete implementation of the 10-Point Plan described above, it would result in a total annual reduction in EU imports of gas from Russia of more than 80 bcm, or well over half, while still resulting in a modest decline in overall emissions.

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A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas Analysis - IEA - IEA

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Mikhail Svetlov | Getty Images News | Getty Images

Hungary's Viktor Orban, a longtime ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and thorn in the side of fellow EU leaders, has had a week of sharp reversals and swift political retreats.

After Russia last week formally recognized Luhansk and Donetsk as Russian-backed separatist-controlled regions in Ukraine, the EU started work on an initial round of sanctions against Moscow. But there was one major concern in Brussels: Will Hungary and its nationalist leader Orban approve them?

An EU official, who preferred to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the discussions, told CNBC last week that it was a key moment for Orban to show whether he was loyal to Russia, or the EU.

Fast forward a couple of days and the response from Hungary's prime minister has surprised many political experts and has been welcomed in Brussels.

"It is important that Hungary has joined and fostered EU unity," another EU official, who also preferred to remain anonymous, told CNBC Tuesday.

Orban has often boasted of his close relationship with Putin. Speaking at a joint news conference in early February, Orban referenced how they had worked together for the last 13 years, while adding that the two "have the longest memory of the European Union and Russia's leadership," according to Politico.

Their close links were seen during the coronavirus pandemic, for example. Hungary became the first EU nation to buy a Russian-made Covid vaccine even though it wasn't approved by European regulators.

There have been commercial and energy deals, too. Over the last decade, Hungary has increased its share of imports of Russian natural gas, from 9.070 million cubic meters in 2010 to a high of 17.715 million cubic meters in 2019, according to Eurostat.

But Orban has, so far, chosen the EU in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has turned his back on Putin.

His government announced that Hungary will welcome Ukrainian refugees and is also supportive of Ukraine's membership application to the EU. This is on top of having approved, together with the other EU member states, tough sanctions against Russian oligarchs and the Russian economy.

"Orban is an opportunist. He would get very little out of siding with Russia these days.Future support from Putin is very uncertain and might not play well with his own electorate.This is why he goes along with the sanctions," Daniel Gros, distinguished fellow at the think tank CEPS, told CNBC via email.

Orban's office was not immediately available when contacted by CNBC on Tuesday.

"He wants to be a respected leader and senses that his population does not want to have a fight with the EU," Gros said.

Orban is facing an election on April 3 and opinion polls show the race will be tight against the opposition party.

Katalin Cseh, a Hungarian lawmaker at the European Parliament, told CNBC Wednesday that Orban is in a "very difficult" position because he "has tried to sell the idea that Russia is a friend, but Russia is not a friend."

At the same time, Hungarians seem to be in favor of the EU. A poll released in January showed that more than 70% of the respondents consider "disadvantageous" if they were to leave the EU, according to Statista.

Cseh added it is unclear what sort of path Orban would take toward Russia if reelected.

Andrius Tursa, Central and Eastern Europe advisor at consultancy Teneo, told CNBC that those voting for Orban's party in Hungary hadn't previously minded his close links to Russia, but said it would now be interesting to see if public opinion switches in the aftermath of the invasion.

Tursa also said that "pressure from the Europeans" and the "unexpected size" of the Russian aggression likely influenced Orban's decision to support the EU. However, he cautioned that Hungary is against the transit of weapons to Ukraine through its borders.

Hungary's government spokesperson tweeted Tuesday that the country is not sending soldiers or weapons to Ukraine "because that'd put Hungarian lives into jeopardy."

Germany, for example, is among the EU nations sending weapons to Ukraine in what represents a massive shift in policy for the nation.

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Putin loses his key ally in the EU as Hungary's Orban turns on the Russian leader - CNBC

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zalenskyy says Europe has enough strength to stop Russia aggression.

But with war in their front yard what are European leaders willing to do?

Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU commission, laid out on Sunday the aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.

"TheEuropean Union steps up once more in support for Ukraine," von der Leyen said.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin threatens to go nuclear, his war is also being fought online.

Disinformation expert Nina Jankowicz says this is the worlds most digital war.

I think it's all just being laid bare in the brutality of the conflict and the bold faced lies that have been exposed," Jankowicz says.

Today, On Point: How does the West need to respond to walk back from the nuclear line?

Tom Nichols,national security scholar at the U.S. Naval War College. Contributing writer and proprietor of Peacefield newsletter at The Atlantic.(@RadioFreeTom)

Nina Jankowicz, disinformation fellow at the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan think tank. Author of "How To Lose the Information War." (@wiczipedia)

Naomi OLeary, Europe correspondent for The Irish Times. (@NaomiOhReally)

Olga Tokariuk, freelance correspondent. Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. (@olgatokariuk)

On the last two days in western Ukraine

Olga Tokariuk: Here in the western Ukraine, it's relatively calm, definitely compared to what is happening in central and eastern parts of the country. In Kiev ... in southern Ukraine, that is a part of which is under control now of Russian occupying forces. There are heavy battles going on around Kiev. Also in Kharkiv. Kharkiv has been shelled earlier today by Russian artillery, using cluster munitions causing massive casualties and dozens of casualties. That was done deliberately during the talks between Russia and Ukraine, so Russia is escalating again.

"Well, you know, compared to that, it's relatively safe here. There was an air alert last night. And we had to go in the basement at about midnight local time. It was planned about one hour in the bomb shelter before this air alert was lifted, and we were told that we can go back safely to sleep. And there is a curfew. But as I said, it's nothing in comparison to what is happening around Kharkiv.

"The main issue here is we are having a large influx of internally displaced people coming from those areas that are most affected by the fighting. And currently in the house where I'm staying, also, we are hosting six other people who fled from Kiev, and some more people are about to come today. And almost I think every family now in western Ukraine is sheltering someone. Because there is a massive influx of internally displaced people. And some of them also go further west and southwest towards the border between Ukraine and the EU countries such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, so a humanitarian exodus of big proportion.

On unity within the EU

Naomi OLeary: It's been a really momentous weekend. And there's been a striking transformation, I suppose, in the public policy of EU national governments. We're talking about 27 countries. And usually they have different viewpoints on things. But with the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian President Vladimir Putin has achieved almost the opposite of what he wanted. He's not divided, but he's united the European Union. He's caused them to take steps that were once unthinkable. And there's been an outpouring of solidarity for Ukraine.

"And the EU had been ready for this. They had some sanctions ready, but they were rapidly overtaken by events. The public horror at the invasion was such that national leaders began to come under really fierce pressure to do more, to isolate Russia more and to help Ukraine more. And in response to that, over the weekend, we saw a series of really historic shifts in policy. From Germany announcing enormous arms investment, to the EU paying for lethal military aid itself.

The EU is funding military equipment, including fighter jets, to Ukraine. How much of a difference is that from the EU that we knew in the past?

Naomi OLeary: It's astonishing. The agreement was reached incredibly quickly on Sunday. What it is is there have been efforts for years, like you mentioned, for the EU to do more to cooperate on defense. All of its member states have some kind of national defense. And it's been argued for a very long time that if they work together, if they cooperate, they'll be one of the world's biggest military forces. But that cooperation has been very slow in coming. Not much public appetite for military spending, usually. And also the nervousness, I mean, you know, governments are not so sure about whether it's a good idea to sort of club up on it.

"But the major step forward that we saw this weekend is, for the first time, a decision to jointly fund arms for a conflict. 450 million has been set aside for that. The agreement was reached incredibly quickly. It didn't have to be written anew. It was actually a program that had been designed and agreed last year. It's just that it had never been used for lethal aid before, so that was ready. Everyone came on board. There were three countries that traditionally have a neutrality policy, and they were able to opt out of being involved, of their cash going to military aid. But they used what's called constructive abstention. So that means they don't mind other people going ahead and doing it. And that was Ireland, Malta and Austria.

"So the rest of the EU member states clubbed up, and arms have already reached Ukraine. Now, under this program, there's anti-tank systems that have come from the Netherlands, you mentioned fighter jets. That is a separate agreement that is bilateral between, I believe, the countries of Bulgaria and Poland. Bulgaria and Poland happen to have the kind of fighter jets that Ukrainian pilots know how to fly, MiGs. ... But those two governments are supposed to be lending them, making them available. But that's not actually under the joint EU fund. It's actually a separate thing.

On Zelenskyy's appeal for EU support

Olga Tokariuk: The EU and NATO membership have been for a long time. Major Ukrainian foreign policy goals and now is the moment to raise these issues again, as the world stands in solidarity in Ukraine. But also, finally starting to understand why Ukraine was pressuring, and was insisting that it needs to join this alliance. This is a moment to put that back on the table. The war is still going on, but we already have to think about the future and how Ukraine will come out of this war. Well, actually here in Ukraine, I would say that we are sure that Ukraine will win.

"The problem is that we don't know what the human cost of it will be. Because it is clear that Russia is willing to impose huge losses and attacking residential areas and stuff like that. ... I hope they will not do what they did in Syria and in other places, but they are showing that they are prepared for that. But despite that, Ukrainians keep their spirits up, and we are absolutely sure now that there could be no further obstacles and delays to Ukraine's accession into the EU.

"And well, I would say personally, also in NATO, this should be on the table. Ukraine has demonstrated that it is a part of the West. There could be no doubts about that. Everything told by Russia before, it is abundantly clear that it is not true. Ukraine doesn't want to be part of Russian sphere of influence. And especially after this war, this argument is just completely discredited. So that would be also kind of something that Ukrainians really deserve.

On the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU

Naomi OLeary: When it would have been really useful for the EU to have done something about moving towards Ukraine's accession to the bloc would have been before the invasion. The situation is that the Ukrainian government is operating from basements under bombardment. Accession to the European Union is a technical, long process with many steps. It's not something that can really go on during the war situation, during an invasion.

"What the declarations that we are hearing now with Ursula von der Leyen, suggesting that the Ukraine belongs in the EU and other comments like that. What those are are statements of political solidarity, [they are] political statements, it doesn't mean like in technical terms about, it doesn't mean much in terms of unofficial accession. That's really something for the future. It was something that would take a very long time. Certainly, this war, at least as so far as it's gone, will have helped public opinion, I think. In terms of helping Western European public opinion to maybe warm again to the idea of admitting more member states. Because in recent years, the whole concept of expanding the EU had become controversial. Because there had been difficult issues with the integration of existing states.

Is this a more cohesive European Union action than you've seen before?

Tom NicholsWe have seen it before, but not in over 40 years. Putin has made the classic mistake that his Soviet predecessors made, which was over the years he's had a Europe that's been somewhat, I won't say, divided, but disagrees about how to deal with Russia. Mostly interested in just doing business, leaving aside the old grudges and conflict. And through his own stupidity, I mean, he's not a stupid human being, but this is really stupid strategy. Through his own strategic errors, he has united Europe against him, again.

"This happened in the late '70s when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Led to the confrontations of the 1980s. It's really remarkable. I mean, some pundit got off a great tweet over the weekend that said Putin had ended Swedish neutrality and German pacifism all in one weekend. Which is, you know, kind of really a remarkable thing to say. And when you have even the Swiss talking about joining, you know, sanctions ... and things like that. I mean, there has to be some sense in Moscow that 30 years of Soviet and Russian diplomacy has now just collapsed in a big heap. Simply because Putin got this crazy idea that he was going to recreate the Soviet space.

On what might happen next

Tom Nichols:That's a good observation. That Putin is somebody from the 21st century, really. I mean, history for him stops somewhere around 1985, and the 21st century certainly didn't happen. There are two things. Well, first, I just want to emphasize something Nina just brought up, about being careful about information. This is going to sound odd, but you know, the average consumer, you don't need to know exactly. You're not in the situation room.

"You're not in the Pentagon, you're not at Downing Street. You can wait ... wait until a little time passes to start digesting that news. I think people wanting to know things instantaneously is opening opportunities for the Russians to feed kind of toxic material into the mainstream. What I'll be looking for is whether or not Putin renews the offensive. Because this whole thing has gone bad. He expected to end in four days, and now I want to see if he takes a pause or if he starts it up again."

The Atlantic: "How Should the U.S. Respond to Putins Nuclear Provocation?" "Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered Russias strategic nuclear forces to raise their alert status."

The Atlantic: "How Ukraine Could Become a Nuclear Crisis" "The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not a nuclear crisis. Yet. Concern about the role of nuclear weapons is perfectly understandable, however, now that a paranoid dictator has led Russia into a major war in the middle of Europe, attacking a country that shares a border with four of Americas NATO allies. A nuclear crisis is unlikely, but not impossible.

The Irish Times: "EU funds weapons for Ukraine in steely policy shift" "The European Union has hardened its response towards Russia, announcing a 450 million fund for weapons for the Ukrainian army while working to isolate Moscow internationally."

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Inside the European Union's response to the Russia-Ukraine war - WBUR

According to UNICEF, approximately 165,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe between January and December last year, with most E.U. countries reporting a large increase in arrivals. For example, there were 25,852 arrivals in Spain and 41,000 arrivals in Italy respectively. The rapid change was a result of conflict and political instability in the Middle East and Africa, poor economic conditions, drought, and famine. The ongoing nature of these issues makes it difficult to predict when migration will increase from year to year.

Irregular migration has disastrous consequences. A shipwreck off the Libyan coast in April saw 130 lives lost, and 45 people, including children, drowned off the same coast in August. Last December, three boats capsized in Greece, causing 31 deaths. This was the worst death toll in the Aegean since 2015. While most refugees die at sea, others suffocate in trucks, are run over by cars, or die of exposure when they reach Europe. The International Organization for Migration reports that almost 23,000 people have died in the Mediterranean since 2014, including 848 children. An estimated 1,465 people died or were reported missing in the Mediterranean Sea, a favourite route to Europe, in 2021, and 785 have died crossing the Atlantic Ocean, attempting to reach the Canary Islands. Most of these people are from impoverished or war-torn countries and are simply seeking better, more peaceful lives.

The Western Mediterranean route from Africa, through the Middle East and Southeast Asia into Greece and the Balkans has become increasingly choked with draconian policies from Italy. Since 2018, the country has attempted to stop arrivals by funding Libyan coastguard vessels to monitor Libyan waters and drag back boats. Former Interior Minister Matteo Salvini also prevented rescue vessels from docking in Italian ports. Human Rights Watch reports that the Italian and Libyan Governments struck an agreement in February 2021 to renew their cooperation for another three years, despite the clear absence of an orderly pathway for seeking asylum in Libya. However, Italy reversed many of its harsh policies on boat turnback and prosecuting search and rescue at sea late last year, re-establishing residency permits on humanitarian grounds and allowing recognized refugees and undocumented children to remain in Italy when awaiting a visa decision. This change in policy could save thousands of innocent lives.

In contrast, Greece saw a marked decrease in arrivals last year. Greek policies involve the rebuilding or improvement of refugee camps on five Aegean Islands and one near the land border with Turkey. The camps are expected to hold up to 13,000 people and are designed for temporary containment with the intention of returning refugees to Turkey, creating poor, often dangerous conditions. This can be seen in the Moria camp fire on the island of Lesbos in 2020. The Greek government also implements a strict turnback policy, with the Coast Guard forcibly returning boats of arriving migrants to Turkey. The Aegean Boat Report, a not-for-profit monitoring refugee boats, reported that over 14,000 people were forcibly towed back to Turkey in 2021. These turnbacks are supplemented with sound cannons to drive arrivals away on land borders, as well as large steel walls built to block crossing points between Greece and Turkey.

This reveals the sinister reality of how E.U. member states are increasingly dealing with irregular migration.

The E.U., where human rights law originated, prides itself on freedom of movement within its borders. However, these rights and freedoms are clearly not extended to vulnerable people fleeing persecution or famine from war-torn countries. This needs to change. All members of the European Union, including Italy and Greece, ratified the Refugee Convention long ago, agreeing to prohibit the penalization of refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence. Current E.U. policies disregard both that Convention and the idea of a progressive and welcoming Europe. The E.U. has an obligation to adhere to international law by providing the safe havens and timely processing for all arrivals laid out in the Convention and to accept any legitimate refugees.

Over 150 countries, including most E.U. member states, additionally adopted the (non-binding) Global Compact on Migration in 2018, which commits signatories to save lives and prevent migrant deaths by providing search and rescue assistance and ensuring policies dont raise or create risk for migrants. However, 5 of the 29 countries who refused or abstained from adopting the compact, including Italy, are E.U. member states, and most E.U. countries have now adopted irregular migration policies and legislation that are endangering lives. Signatories to the Compact have an additional duty to ensure that their obligations are met by protecting arrivals through search and rescue operations, suspending turnbacks, and providing healthcare and support to arrivals while their claims are processed.

It should be noted that irregular migration is a complex problem because of hard-to-solve issues elsewhere, including poor economic conditions; social, cultural and religious persecution; and conflict. But there are steps that the E.U. can take to find solutions that are responsible, humane and consistent with the obligations under international law.

The first is to boost levels of legal migration to allow economic migrants to apply through formal channels instead of risking their lives crossing war-torn countries, crowding on leaky rafts, and risking open water. Economic migrants are proven to be good citizens when they are given adequate support, and European countries, particularly those with ageing populations, should encourage their arrival. Information campaigns in economic migrants countries of origin can reduce irregular migration by outlining the risks. This can be rolled out in collaboration with meaningful partnerships between European and developing countries to support potential migrants at home and to provide necessary support if they wish to migrate through formal channels. This will reduce the number of economic migrants taking dangerous routes to Europe and will enable E.U. countries to focus on the welfare and processing of legitimate refugees.

Refugee pathways should also be increased in transit countries, such as Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan, to provide support and opportunities to process asylum claims in an orderly and timely manner. This will help prevent desperate refugees from getting on boats or taking dangerous land routes to Europe.

Increasing aid to countries which contribute heavily to migration, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Afghanistan, Syria, and Bangladesh, can mitigate these countries problems and help them to develop, thereby reducing displacement. Most importantly, however, E.U. countries need to process and take in any legitimate refugees that arrive on their shores, including those found in E.U. waters, to save lives and give people a chance at better circumstances, as per their rights under international law. This is a more humane approach that will lead to better outcomes for both Europe and the developing world.

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The European Union Must Embrace A More Humane Response To Irregular Migration - The Organization for World Peace