Archive for the ‘European Union’ Category

Meeting highlights from the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC) 7 – 10 February 2022 | European Medicines Agency – European Medicines…

PRAC recommends suspending hydroxyethyl-starch solutions for infusion from the market

EMAs safety committee (PRAC) has recommended that marketing authorisations for hydroxyethyl-starch (HES) solutions for infusion should be suspended across the European Union (EU). These products were authorised as an addition to other treatments for plasma volume replacements following acute (sudden) blood loss.

The safety of HES solutions for infusion was reviewed in two separate procedures in 2013, and a number of restrictions and measures to minimise the risk of kidney injury and death in certain patients (those critically ill, with burn injuries or with sepsis, i.e. a bacterial infection in the blood) were put in place at the time.

As a result of a third review conducted in 2018, the use of HES solutions for infusion was further restricted to accredited hospitals, and healthcare professionals prescribing or administering the medicines had to be trained in their appropriate use. Companies marketing HES solutions for infusion were also requested to conduct a drug utilisation study to check that the restrictions were adhered to in clinical practice, and to submit the results of this study to EMA.

The PRAC has now reviewed the results from this study, which show that HES solutions for infusion are still being used outside the recommendations included in the product information. In view of the serious risks that certain patient populations are still exposed to, the PRAC has therefore recommended the suspension of the marketing authorisations for HES solutions for infusion in the EU.

More information is available inEMAspublic health communication.

The PRAC has started a review of the safety of Janus kinase (JAK) inhibitors used to treat several chronic inflammatory disorders (rheumatoid arthritis, psoriatic arthritis, juvenile idiopathic arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, ulcerative colitis and atopic dermatitis).

The review was prompted by the final results from a clinical trial (study A3921133) of the JAK inhibitor Xeljanz (tofacitinib). The results showed that patients taking Xeljanz for rheumatoid arthritis and who were at risk of heart disease were more likely to experience a major cardiovascular problem (such as heart attack, stroke or death due to cardiovascular disease) and had a higher risk of developing cancer than those treated with medicines belonging to the class of TNF-alpha inhibitors. The study also showed that compared with TNF-alpha inhibitors, Xeljanz was associated with a higher risk of death due to any cause, serious infections and blood clots in the lungs and in deep veins (venous thromboembolism VTE).

In addition, preliminary findings from an observational study involving another JAK inhibitor, Olumiant (baricitinib), also suggest an increased risk of major cardiovascular problems and VTE in patients with rheumatoid arthritis treated with Olumiant compared with those treated with TNF-alpha inhibitors.

In the treatment of inflammatory disorders, Olumiant and other JAK inhibitors work in a similar way to Xeljanz. PRAC will therefore carry out a review to determine whether these risks are associated with all JAK inhibitors authorised in the EU for the treatment of inflammatory disorders1 and whether the marketing authorisations for these medicines should be amended.

Some measures to minimise these risks are already in place for Xeljanz as a result of a review finalised in 2020, which analysed the interim results of study A3921133. In addition, the product information for Xeljanz was further updated in 2021 to reflect the increased risk of major cardiovascular problems and cancer observed after the release of additional data from this study.

More information is available inEMAspublic health communication.

The PRAC is assessing reported cases of heavy menstrual bleeding (heavy periods) and absence of menstruation (amenorrhea) with the COVID-19 vaccines Comirnaty and Spikevax.

The Committee had previously analysed reports of menstrual (period) disorders in the context of the safety summary reports for COVID-19 vaccines approved in the EU and concluded at the time that the evidence did not support a causal link between these vaccines and menstrual disorders.

In view of spontaneous reports of menstrual disorders with both vaccines and of findings from the literature, the PRAC decided to further assess occurrences of heavy periods or amenorrhea following vaccination.

Menstrual disorders are very common and can occur with a wide range of underlying medical conditions as well as from stress and tiredness. Cases of these disorders have also been reported following COVID-19 infection.

Heavy periods may be defined as bleeding characterised by a volume, which may interfere with the persons physical, social, emotional and material quality of life. Amenorrhea may be defined as the absence of menstrual bleeding for three or more months in a row.

After reviewing the available evidence, thePRACdecided to request an in-depth evaluation of all available data, including reports fromspontaneous reporting systems,clinical trialsand the published literature.

At this stage, it is not yet clear whether there is a causal link between the COVID-19 vaccines and the reports of heavy periods or amenorrhea. There is also no evidence to suggest that COVID-19 vaccines affect fertility.

EMA will communicate further when more information becomes available.

The PRAC has adopted updated guidance on core requirements for risk management plans (RMPs) of COVID-19 vaccines.

As for any medicinal product that is authorised in the EU, companies need to submit their RMP when applying for a marketing authorisation to detail their plan for the post-marketing surveillance and what measures they must put in place to further characterise and manage risks. In the context of the pandemic, EMA adopted specific RMP guidance for COVID-19 vaccines, which complements theexisting guidelines on the RMP format in the EUand guidance ongood pharmacovigilance practices.

Following discussion at the PRAC, this guidance has been updated in light of the experience accrued during the pandemic to include specific considerations on:

The new version of the guidance is available on EMAs website.

As part of its advice on safety-related aspects to other EMA committees, thePRACdiscussed a direct healthcare professional communication (DHPC) containing important safety information for infliximab.

Advice to postpone use of live vaccines in infants exposed to infliximab during pregnancy or via breastfeeding

This DHPC informs healthcare professionals on the need to postpone the use of live vaccines in infants who are exposed to infliximab during pregnancy or via breastfeeding.

Infliximab is an anti-inflammatory medicine authorised for the treatment of adults with rheumatoid arthritis (an immune system disease causing inflammation of the joints), Crohns disease (a disease causing inflammation of the digestive tract), ulcerative colitis (a disease causing inflammation and ulcers in the lining of the gut), ankylosing spondylitis (a disease causing inflammation and pain in the joints of the spine), psoriatic arthritis (a disease causing red, scaly patches on the skin and inflammation of the joints) or psoriasis (a disease causing red, scaly patches on the skin). Infliximab is also authorised in patients aged between 6 and 17 years with severe, active Crohns disease or severely active ulcerative colitis, when they have not responded to or cannot take other medicines or treatments.

Following treatment during pregnancy, it has been reported that infliximab crosses the placenta and it has been detected in infants up to 12 months after birth. Live vaccines should not be given to infants for 12 months after birth if they have been exposed to infliximab during pregnancy. If infant infliximab serum levels are undetectable or infliximab administration was limited to the first trimester of pregnancy, administration of a live vaccine might be considered at an earlier time point if there is a clear clinical benefit for the individual infant.

Infliximab has also been detected at low levels in breast milk, therefore, administration of a live vaccine to a breastfed infant while the mother is receiving the medicine is not recommended unless infant infliximab serum levels are undetectable.

It is important that women treated with infliximab who become pregnant or who breastfeed their infant inform the healthcare professional responsible for vaccination of their infant about their treatment with infliximab.

The DHPC for infliximab will be forwarded to EMAs human medicines committee, theCHMP.

Following theCHMP decision, the DHPC will be disseminated to healthcare professionals by themarketing authorisation holders according to an agreed communication plan, and published on theDirect healthcare professional communicationspage and innational registersin the EU Member States.

1 Cibinqo (abrocitinib), Jyseleca (filgotinib), Olumiant (baricitinib), Rinvoq (upadacitinib) and Xeljanz (tofacitinib).

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Meeting highlights from the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC) 7 - 10 February 2022 | European Medicines Agency - European Medicines...

European Commission declares nuclear and gas to be green – DW (English)

European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyencannot repeat often enough how close stepping up climate action is to her heart.

She described the European Green Deal as "Europe's man on the moon moment."She has called climate neutrality "our European destiny."And she solemnly proclaimed that no effort will be spared for Europe to become the world's first continent with net-zero emissions.

But as often, the devil is in the detail.

The big question is how exactly the European Union intends to achieve its goals.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen paints herself as a friend of the climate

One measure being put into place is a so-called taxonomy, "a classification system, establishing a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities,"according to the EuropeanCommission.

This taxonomy could be described as the EU's green investment rulebook, intended to serve the goal of allowing the continent to become climate neutral by 2050.

Critics say the objective of climate neutrality could be under threat, as the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, decided to give nuclear energy and natural gas a green label under this taxonomy.

In a proposal presented this Wednesday, the EU Commission stated that certain strings remained attached. For example, gas plants could only be considered green if the facility switched to low-carbon or renewable gases, such as biomass or hydrogen produced with renewable energy,by 2035.

Nuclear power plants would be deemed green if the sites can manage to safely dispose of radioactive waste. So far, worldwide, no permanent disposal site, has gone into operation though.

At a news conference in Brussels, Mairead McGuinness, the EU commissioner responsible for financial services, said her institution was not guilty of "greenwashing," as gas and nuclear were labeled as "transitional" energy sources in the taxonomy. "Our credibility is still strong," McGuinness added.

Natural gas can be liquified, allowing it to be shipped relatively easily via tanker

Environmental organizations most certainly see this critically, saying the proposal could jeopardize the EU's aim to reach climate neutrality by 2050. The Climate Action Network Europe wrote that theEU Commission"sacrifices the scientific integrity of the taxonomy on the altar of fossil gas and nuclear lobbies"and failed to "reorient financial flows towards genuinely climate-positive investments."

And it's not justclimate activists: Also a group of experts advising the EU on the matter had announced how they are worried about "the environmental impacts that may result," for example the consequences of a nuclear accident. Building new nuclear plants would also take too long to contribute to the 2050 neutrality goals, they believe.

The proposal was preceded by a heated debate among EU countries. While some consider nuclear to be agood bridging technology, others are strongly opposed, andprefer gas instead.

Germany has opted to use gas as a bridge away from more polluting fossil fuels and toward zero-carbon energy sources

France, which derives about 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear plants, is unsurprisingly heading up the pro-nuclear fraction. It is supported by a group of EU states including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Finland.

Especially France wants to invest in new nuclear power plants, particularly innew generation, so-called small modular reactors.

Energy expert Nicolas Mazzucchi,who works for the Foundation of Strategic Research think tank in Paris, supports the French government's plans. "These reactors can be produced on an industrial level at factories, as automated as possible, to make it cheaper and guarantee quality,"Mazzucchi toldDW.

Germany, however, has argued against nuclear power also unsurprisingly, as it decided to shut down all its nuclear power plants by the end of 2022 following the Fukushima disaster in 2011.

Denmark, Austria and Luxembourg share this view, highlighting the controversial point ofwhere to safely store highly radioactive nuclear waste.

In a letter to the EuropeanCommission, Germany's current governing coalition hasclearly said that gas is needed as an interim energy sourceuntil enough renewables are available.

To avoid a clash with its EU neighbor France, German Chancellor Olaf Scholzdownplayed the importance of the taxonomy at an EU leaders' meeting last year, saying the debate was "completely overrated."

Georg Zachmann, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank, has been following the EU's energy and climate policy for years. He said that, in the end, he was relatively sure no decision would be taken in Brussels to prevent France, for example, from investing in and building new nuclear reactors.

The Commission is keen to have the taxonomyviewed as the "gold standard" forguidingprivate investmenttowardmeasures that help fight climate change.

But in Zachmann's view, no investor would be interested in nuclear or gasif the EU "invested political capital"in getting member states to substantially expand their renewable energy production.

"We know that onshore wind and solar power are not very costly in most European countries,"he pointed out.

Nuclear versus gas: French President Emmanuel Macron (left) and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz

The European Commission's taxonomy proposal will now be reviewed by the 27 EU member states and by the European Parliament.

As the EU's executive opted for a delegated act, a type of fast-track legislative procedure, only a total of 20 EU countries, or a majority of EU lawmakers at the European Parliament,would be able to reject it.

While EU states are not likely to turn down the taxonomy, a win in the European Parliament is not yet certain. Parliamentarians from across the political spectrum have expressed anger over the inclusion of fossil gas and nuclear power in the EU taxonomy.

Green lawmaker Rasmus Andresen said he was "disappointed" by the proposal, adding that the Green parliamentary fraction would fight hard to gather a majority against the taxonomy.

German Social Democrat Joachim Schuster told DW he thought it possible that the EuropeanParliament could vote against the act.

And even if lawmakers were to supportit, there is another threat looming:Austria and Luxembourg have already threatened to sue the European Commission over the taxonomy rules.

Edited by: Sonya Diehn

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European Commission declares nuclear and gas to be green - DW (English)

Italy joins other European Union member states to increase pledge of COVID-19 vaccines to Syria [EN/AR] – Syrian Arab Republic – ReliefWeb

DAMASCUS, 1 February 2022 3,996,000 doses of the Johnson & Johnsons Janssen COVID-19 vaccine arrived on 26 of January to Syria donated by Italy through the COVAX facility.

In May last year, as chair of the G20, Italy hosted The Global Health Summit alongside the European Commission, which saw many European countries pledge to share millions of vaccine doses to priority countries like Syria, boosting short-term supplies.

EU and its Member States are so far the biggest donor of COVID-19 vaccines in the world, having shared over 350 million doses for donation to countries around the world, via COVAX (around 300 million) and bilaterally (over 45 million).

Italy is donating doses to COVAX on top of the USD 470 million it has pledged to the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (Gavi COVAX AMC) and this donation in particular will allow a large number of people in Syria to access vaccines now, said the Italian Charge dAffaires a.i., Massimiliano DAntuono. Italy stands by the Syrian population and, in cooperation with the EU humanitarian aid, UNICEF and WHO, supports the efforts in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and in general the consequences of the dire humanitarian situation across the country, he continued.

The roll out of the vaccines donated by Italy and the awareness campaign will be funded by EU humanitarian aid and implemented by WHO. The EU, in particular, is providing humanitarian support to WHO in Syria to help the health system deal with the ongoing pandemic and reach the target of 70% people vaccinated by mid-2022. EU humanitarian funding allows for vaccine roll-out and the deployment of vaccination teams. Humanitarian aid is essential at a time when vulnerable Syrians and caregivers are not only threatened by COVID-19, but also by the consequences of continued conflict, economic decline and harsh winter conditions.

The Charg daffaires a.i. of the European Union to Syria, Dan Stoenescu, stated: "As part of our #TeamEurope humanitarian pledge to the Syrian people, the EU supports the vaccination efforts in Syria, where immunization against COVID-19 is lower than in other countries. The European Union is working hard with COVAX and vaccine manufacturers, with donors and other partners, to accelerate the delivery of doses worldwide, including in Syria. Our aim is to ensure that most of Syria's population is vaccinated by the end of this year. The generous donation of Italy is timely and will further help us reach this goal."

The vaccine coverage in Syria is among the lowest globally.

Vaccine supply to Syria has been slow. While we aimed to vaccinate 20 per cent of the population by end of December 2021, the available vaccines by then were only enough to cover 13 per cent of the population. This consignment generously donated by the Government of Italy will reach additional 20 per cent of the population with life-saving COVID-19 vaccines, said Akjemal Magtymova, Head of Mission and WHO Representative in Syria. Availability of vaccines is an important step in ensuring equitable vaccination, but so are vaccine administration and demand generation. We need to step up our concerted efforts to continue building public trust in COVID-19 vaccines to reach the national vaccination target of 40 per cent by April this year and at least 70 per cent by end of the year 2022, Dr Magtymova added.

The donated vaccines can be stored and transported using standard equipment for routine vaccines. This enables distribution to remote areas and provides an opportunity to the hardest to reach populations in the country to be protected with a single dose. Frontline workers, elderly, people with pre-existing conditions and eligible people continue to be prioritized with the vaccination.

This donation from the Government of Italy is incredibly timely and important in our fight against the pandemic. Unless we protect health workers and other frontline workers, health systems will continue to be overstretched and the most vulnerable women and children will lose access to life-saving services, jeopardizing years of progress and culminating in the poorest children falling behind, said UNICEF Syria Representative, Bo Viktor Nylund.

UNICEF and WHO will continue to support efforts to deliver the vaccines safely through cold chain management; supporting vaccinators in fixed facilities and mobile teams; increasing testing and lab capacity to detect COVID-19 cases and prevent the further spread of the pandemic; and boosting public knowledge and confidence in vaccines.

Notes to editors

Just over 2,2 million doses of vaccines against COVID-19 have been administered in Syria to date. As of 24 January 2022, only 5.1 per cent of the total population have been fully vaccinated, most with two doses, and 10 per cent have received at least one dose of the vaccine.

The numbers above do not include the figures from northwest of Syria. In the northwest, more than 287,000 people have received their first dose and nearly 146,500 people their second one.

For more information, please contact:

Press and Information team of the EU Delegation to Syria, DELEGATION-SYRIA-PRESS-INFO@eeas.europa.eu

Eva Hinds, UNICEF Syria, ehinds@unicef.org, +963 950 044 304

Gulalek Soltanova, WHO Syria, soltanovag@who.int, +963 953 888 477

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Italy joins other European Union member states to increase pledge of COVID-19 vaccines to Syria [EN/AR] - Syrian Arab Republic - ReliefWeb

Opinion The European Union’s Status in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis – E-International Relations

The EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, visited Ukraine in January 2022 amidst continuously soaring tensions along the Russia-Ukraine border, conveying a strong message of support to Kyiv. This came at a time when a series of security talks between Russia and the US, NATO, and the OSCE were scheduled to take place from January 10, 2022. The EU put forth its genuine concerns about its exclusion in the talks on the European security architecture and its portrayal as a neutral spectator. Borrell urged that any discussion about European security must happen in coordination with and participation of EU. After all, whatever happens in its neighbourhood affects the EU and its member-states security.

Since the crisis emerged at the Russia-Ukraine frontier in 2014, the EU has majorly assisted Ukraine in sharply reducing the latters economic dependence on its hostile neighbour Russia by supporting with over EUR 17 billion. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement of 2014 has resulted in the EU becoming Ukraines largest trading partner surpassing Russia. But, what has cast a shadow on the budding EU-Ukraine bonhomie is the EU-Russia economic equation.

The EU is Russias biggest trading partner with 37.3% of the countrys total trade in goods in 2020. Thus, to its advantage, the bloc has attempted to use instrument of economic sanctions to deter Russia from any further misadventures in Ukraine and its neighbourhood. This policy of hitting the bear where it hurts the most has not dissuaded Russia from lessening tensions on its border with Ukraine. Thus, the EU has vowed to impose further stricter sanctions in response by warning Russia: aggression comes with a price tag. Critics, including Ukraine, have not shied away from lambasting the EUs Russia appeasement policies for its failure to define this price tag.

The question remains what hinders a stronger economic response from the bloc to avert Moscows belligerence in its neighbourhood? The crisis in the EUs eastern neighbourhood is exacerbated by a deepening energy crisis at home. Both point towards a common cause: Russia, the main supplier of crude oil, natural gas, and solid fossil fuels to the bloc. The EUs energy dependence on Russia has soared in recent times and Kremlin attempts to exploit Brussels energy insecurity to its advantage. This geoeconomics of energy trade, largely in favour of Russia, makes Brussels position frail in dealing with Kremlin.

Moreover, Nord Stream 2, an offshore natural gas Baltic Sea pipeline running between Russia and Germany, has further added to the question of the EUs dependence on Russia for energy security. If German regulators approve the project, the pipeline would transport 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia to Europe each year. With this development, possibilities of abandoning the existing Russian energy supply routes to the EU energy market, namely the Ukrainian transit line and the Belarusian-Polish gas pipeline, cannot be denied. This carries a huge economic cost for transit countries like Ukraine and Poland that fear losing out on revenues along with jeopardising their national security.

Nord Stream 2, to see the light of the day, remains in Russias economic interests. Whether Germany, to the EUs advantage, should play the Nord Stream 2 card and list it down overtly as the price for further Russian aggression have divided the member-states.

The EU has fallen short of projecting its influence in the conflict zone in its neighbourhood. In December 2014, the bloc had initiated a civilian support mission, the EUAM Ukraine, aimed to reform law-enforcement and rule of law institutions. On the security front, Brussels plans to support Ukraines armed forces with EUR 31 billion in times to come through the instrument of the European Peace Facility.

But what remains missing is an EU-led military support mission to Ukraine even after almost eight years of the Russian annexation of Crimea and escalating tensions on the Russia-Ukraine border in the blocs neighbourhood. As the crisis is predominantly military, Ukraine has been calling for NATO assistance in case of attempts of invasion from its eastern border, seldom relying on EU military help.

The centrality of the bloc in European security has been questioned by its absence from any meaningful dialogue on the European security architecture surrounding the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The EUs response is still taking shape when Russia is further amassing troops on its western border. Thus, for Brussels, the question should not be what if Russia invades Ukraine?, but how to deter Russia from further misadventures in Ukraine?. Unless it has a strong deterrence package against Moscow, Brussels would continue to be seen as an uninvolved spectator.

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Opinion The European Union's Status in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis - E-International Relations

More Representation But Not Influence: Women in the European Parliament – German Marshall Fund

Introduction

The imbalance between men and women in political empowerment and in political office is a worldwide phenomenon. In Europe, equality in this regard is still not achieved. Even if in all EU member states women have acquired the right to vote and to engage in political life, they continue to be underrepresented in politics and more broadly in public life, including in national parliaments and governments, local assemblies, and the European Parliament. Besides the attention paid to women during election cycles, actions taken toward sustainable change remain disorganized and inconsistent. Representing more than 447 million people across 27 countries, it may seem that the European Parliament is the poster child for the European Unions united in diversity motto. It should be representative of the fact that just over half of the EU population consists of women, but the representation of women in the parliament and its key positions remains weak and change is slow.

The European Parliament claims to be an early advocate of gender mainstreaming in policymaking to tackle the barriers faced by women in being visible and recognized. In adopting the UN Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995, it stated its intention to improve the gender balance in the leadership of its committees and delegations as well as in the appointment of external experts for panels or as authors of studies. The parliament launched gender-mainstreaming initiativesincluding the creation of the Womens Rights and Gender Equality committee (FEMM) in 1984that were supposed to ensure integration of the gender dimension in its work. In 1996, the High-Level Group on Gender Equality and Diversity was created to focus on the promotion of diversity and equal representation of women and men at all levels in the parliament. In 2020, the EUs first Gender Equality Strategy set out a vision of gender mainstreaming and aimed to tackle issues such as gender-based violence, gender pay gaps, healthcare, and decision-making. In 2021, the European Parliament adopted a roadmap to achieve gender equality in political processes and its administration and stated its intention to become a front-runner in terms of gender equality among EU bodies with the creation of a gender-balanced Europe by 2025.

However, all of this hides the reality of an institution that is more discriminatory than meets the eye. A closer look reveals that the European Parliament lags on meeting its own goals. Not only does gender equality vary drastically across its country and political groupings, the informal structures and power plays within the institution and in interactions with stakeholders in other EU institutions demonstrate that it is not always living up to its claims.

In order to understand why gender representation in the European Parliament remains imbalanced, it is necessary to unpack and analyze the institution, including its committees and subcommittees, and country and political groupings.

The increase in the number of women in the European Parliament over the years has not been fully reflected in the composition of its committees. For example, in May 2021, the #SHEcurity campaign pointed out that women accounted for less than 20% of the Foreign Affairs Committee between 2000 and 2019, and that between 2004 and 2019 the Subcommittee on Security and Defense had the lowest proportion of women of all the committees.

In order to understand why gender representation in the European Parliament remains imbalanced, it is necessary to unpack and analyze the institution, including its committees and subcommittees, and country and political groupings. With the mid-term rotation in committee chairs due in early 2022, now is a good time to look more closely at the gender balance in this institution.

Information from the websites of the European Parliament and the political groups in it, as well from individual contacts in committee secretariats, was used to compile the data for this paper. The analysis of committees includes full and substitute members. The data is broken down to analyze the situation regarding chairs, vice-chairs, and members of committees as well as the nationalities and political group affiliation of members. For each committee and subcommittee included the proportion of women to men, the leadership positions they hold, and their nationalities and parties were analyzed.

Over the past years, more women have entered the European Parliament. In 2019, 308 were elected to it, taking womens representation to its highest level of 41%, a figure that with Brexit dropped to 39.5%. However, even if womens representation in the parliament today is higher than the global average (25.5%) and the average for the national parliaments of EU countries (30.4%), men are still overrepresented at 60.5%. This is a slight improvement from the previous parliamentary term when this figure was 63%.

Only Finland and Sweden have a majority of women MEPs, while Denmark, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia have achieved parity. (See Figure 1.) At the opposite end of the spectrum, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania have the lowest proportions of women while Cyprus has no women MEP.

Contrary to what might be expected, the countries that have the highest share of women in their representationFinland and Swedendo not have gender quotas for European Parliament elections. Those countries that have some form of quota or restrictions against single-gender lists for European Parliament elections have significantly varying shares of women in their representation, with some far from achieving parity: Luxembourg (50%), Slovenia (50%), France (49%), Portugal (48%), Spain (42%), Croatia (42%), Italy (39%), Belgium (38%), Poland (33%), Greece (24%) and Romania (16%). This is probably due to the differing types of quotas or restrictions in place as well as disparate equal representation standards.

These figures show that gender mainstreaming is not fully internalized at the member-state level, making it more difficult for the least equal countries to follow the EUs standards toward gender equality in their European Parliament representation. Since 2003, gender-mainstreaming initiatives monitored by the FEMM committee have come with recommendations for member states. However, there are discrepancies among them when it comes to capacity to act upon these recommendations, with some lacking tracking systems or initiatives for institutional gender mainstreaming. For example, the promotion of gender equality through policy and legislation is a relatively recent phenomenon in Cyprus. By contrast, in Denmark, which claims to have a culture of equality, women represent 40% of members of the national parliament and the government has a minister of equality, whose duties include to initiate and to monitor gender-representation initiatives.

Figure 1. Men and Women MEPs by Country, 2021

The representation of women differs across the political groups in the European Parliament, with an average of 39.5% in 2021. (See Figure 2.) The most gender-equal one is the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) group with 49% of its MEPs being women. Next come The Left (formerly the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left), Renew Europe (formerly the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for EuropeALDE), and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) with 44% each.

There is a left-right divide, with the more right-wing groupsIdentity and Democracy (ID), the European Peoples Party (EPP), and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)having higher male representation.

Figure 2. Men and Women MEPs by Political Group, 2021

When looking at each political groups share of the number of women MEPs, The Left and the non-attached accounted for the lowest share in the previous and current parliament, and the S&D group the largest. (See Figures 3 and 4.) The Greens group and the ID group (the successor to the Europe of Nations and Freedom group) account for a greater share of women MEPs compared to in the previous parliament as their overall number of MEPs increased (Table 1). In comparison to 2014, the EPP group accounts for 1% more of women MEPs, the ID group for 7% more and The Greens for 5% more. By contrast, the S&D, ECR, and ALDE/Renew Europe groups now account for a smaller share of women MEPs than they did in the previous parliament, despite accounting for the same or a greater share of MEPs. (See Table 1.) The ECR group today has a higher proportion but a much reduced one of women MEPs as a result of the change in the groups composition due to Brexit.

Figures 3 and 4. Political Groups Share of Women MEPs, 2014 and 2019.

Table 1. Political Groups Share of MEPs.

Womens representation in the European Parliaments committees has increased from an average of 37% in the previous term to one of 39.5% in the current term. While no committee has gender parity, three come close to this goal. Women make up 49% of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), up from 42% in the previous term. The Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) and the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT), which are new ones, are both made up by 48% of women. However, all these committees have a greater percentage of women than the average for all the committees.

Some committees have an overrepresentation of women. In the previous parliamentary term, women made up the majority of only the FEMM committee. By contrast, in the current term, women are a majority in three: the Committee on Development (DEVE) with 53%, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) with 54%, and the Committee on Womens Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) with 89%.

In comparison to the previous term, womens representation has increased by between 10% and 30% across all committees in the current term. (See Figures 5 and 6.) During the previous term, the proportion of women in FEMM was significantly higher than that of men (70%), and it has increased in the current term (89%). The most significant shift in gender composition of any committee has been in DEVE, with womens representation increasing from a minority of 20% to a majority of 54%. Other committees that have seen a significant increase (more than five points) in the representation of women include the ENVI committee, from 43% to 49%, the EMPL Committee from 47% to 54%, the REGI Committee from 32% to 44%, and the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) from 40% to 43%. Meanwhile, the proportion of women in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) dropped from 20% to 18%, in the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) from 26% to 23%, in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) from 31% to 30% and in the Committee on Transport (TRAN) from 38% to 37%.

The committees with the highest proportion of men are the AFCO committee (82%), the BUDG committee (77%), and the Committee for Foreign Affairs (AFET) (75%). (See Figure 6.) BUDG carries significant weight as the parliament can stop the EU budget process. AFET has less direct impact on EU legislation and budgets, but its members have plenty of media opportunities. It is a sought-after committee among MEPs who formerly held high positions in their countries. AFCO is often more important than BUDG on internal matters as it deals with institutional and constitutional matters.

Figure 5. Proportion of Men and Women in Committees, 2014.

Figure 6. Proportion of Men and Women in Committees, 2021.

Among the three subcommittees, women make up 36% of the Human Rights Committee (DROI), making it the closest of the three to gender parity and relatively close to the overall proportion of women in parliament. The subcommittees on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Tax Matters (FISC) have 29% women each. (See Figure 7.) The difference between SEDE and DROI is interesting, as both are subcommittees to AFET, which has one of highest proportion of men among committees.

Figure 7. Proportion of Men and Women in Subcommittees, 2021.

Womens representation is higher, and above the overall parliament average, in the special committees on Beating Cancer (BECA) at 50% and on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) at 45%. The Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation has 34% women members. This is perhaps no surprise as it evaluates threats of domestic and foreign interference in the democratic process, which often use societal issues around womens rights to polarize societies.

While there was in increase with regard to women MEPs between 2014 and 2021, the share of women committee chairs in the same period dropped significantly, from 55% to 43%. (Figure 8.) But, while women are less represented among the committee chairs than before, at this level they are slightly overrepresented compared to the level of women as MEPs.

Figure 8. Proportion of Men and Women Committee Chairs.

No clear trend can be distinguished in terms of which committees are chaired by women, with a mix between monetary, social, and defense policy areas. (See Table 2.) There were not many major changes between the previous and current terms, with women retaining the chairs of five committees and one subcommittee. Women lost the chair of committees relating to the environment and development, such as ENVI, DEVE, and REGI. The change in the chair of DEVE is noteworthy due to the significant increase in the number of women on the committee. Half of the committees with a woman chair in 2014 also had one in 2021.

Table 2. Committee and Subcommittees Chaired by Women, 2014 and 2021.

There is a similar picture of gender imbalance in terms of political groups. (See Table 3.) Among those groups with more than one committee chair, The Greens stand out for having only women committee chairs. The political group nearest to gender parity is S&D, with 43% of its chairs being women, a figure also closely reflecting the gender composition of the group in the parliament. One-third of the EPP chairs are women (the figure for Renew Europe was originally 20%, suggesting that the group has not had a policy in place to ensure proportionality at this level). This means the EPP group has a close match with its overall gender composition while Renew Europe, even with the addition of another female chair, does not. Until May 2021, Renew Europe had the most unequal representation, having half the female representation among its chairs as they should have if proportionality had been considered. This changed, however, when Slovakian MEP Lucia Nicholsonov left the ECR group to join Renew.

Table 3. Men and Women Chairs by Political Group, 2021.

While the European Parliament has seen a steady increase in the proportion of female MEPs over the years, from 16% in 1979 to 39.5% in 2021, this is far from the whole picture when it comes to womens representation. When looking behind the numbers, important nuances become visible.

Although there are more women MEPs in the parliament today than in the previous term, the number of women chairing committees has decreased from 11 to 9 while the number of male chairs rose from 9 to 12. An overall increase in women in the parliament therefore does not automatically mean a consequent increase in the proportion of women chairs, which raises questions relating to the impact of greater representation on womens influence. It will be interesting to observe if this pattern continues, or if it changes with the coming rotation in early 2022.

The rules on the gender composition of a committees leadership state that at least one of the chair and vice-chairs (thus, at least 20%) should be from the other gender than the majority in the committee. The same could in theory be applied to overall committee composition but this is not the case. One possible reason is that the appointment of female committee chairs and vice-chairs by a political group diverts attention from the gender imbalance in that committee. This could apply, for example, to the parliaments fourth most male-dominated committee, SEDE, which has a committee leadership that is predominantly female (see below).

A mix of external and internal factors is at play when it comes to questions of gender balance in the European Parliament. The external factors shape its overall composition and there is little it could do to address them.

First, how well represented women are in the parliament varies across member state. Only a few countries have complete or nearly equal gender balance in their representation in the parliament. They raise the average, since other member states have only fewor in one case nowomen among their MEPs. In this regard, a significant geographical divide can be identified.

Second, the distribution of women in the parliament across political groups is also skewed. Some groups have higher numbers of women, although none reaches parity, while others have fewer. To a considerable extent, this shows a left-right divide, with political groups located at the right end of the political spectrum having a lower proportion of women. However, the only two women to have been president of the European Parliament have been from the conservative EPP and the liberal ALDE (now Renew Europe) groups.

The internal factors relate to the workings of the European Parliament, its composition, and the political groups. Therefore, the parliament, and in many cases individual political groups, could address and remedy them if they decided to do so.

While women make up almost four out of every ten MEPs, they are distributed unevenly among the different committees and subcommittees. In several of the committees, women are underrepresented relative to their numbers in the parliament, making up less than 39.5% of the committee members, and in others they are overrepresented.

While women make up almost four out of every ten MEPs, they are distributed unevenly among the different committees and subcommittees. In several of the committees, women are underrepresented relative to their numbers in the parliament, making up less than 39.5% of the committee members, and in others they are overrepresented. While in some cases this overrepresentation or underrepresentation is minor, in others the composition of a committee is severely skewed. This can happen with a significant overrepresentation of men, as in the case of the AFCO committee, with 85% men, or of women, as in the FEMM committee with 89% women.

Committees such as AFET, SEDE, and ECON have a significant overrepresentation of men, while FEMM, DEVE, and EMPL have one of women. Looking at the committee composition in the previous parliament reveals that, to a considerable extent, the problem is not new. Committees like FEMM and EMPL also had significant female overrepresentation, and this has grown. For example, the female membership of FEMM has gone from 70% to 89% and EMPL from 47% to 54%. The DEVE committee, on the other hand, has gone from women being underrepresented (20%), to being overrepresented (53%). This clearly shows that not only change occurs, but that it can also be significant. While each political party has the possibility to bring a gendered lens to committee composition, not doing so could mean that such a lens is not applied coherently.

The second internal factor is womens leadership within the parliament, referring here to committee chairs and vice-chairs.17 While the parliament has seen an increase in women MEPs, there are fewer committees chaired by women today. In the previous parliament, women accounted for 55% of chairs, making them overrepresented in absolute terms and relative to womens share of MEPs. In the current parliament, however, the proportion of women committee chairs is almost equal to that of women in the parliament.

Today, several of the women chairs head committees dominated by men. This is, for instance, the case for the CONT and ECON committees that have 23% and 24% of women members, respectively. The traditionally male-dominated SEDE committee has not only its second woman chair in a row, but also two women vice-chairs out four. This means that, with about a quarter of its members being women, it has a leadership that is 60% female. What is clear from these observations is that no clear pattern is identifiable. Women chair some male-dominated committees, but they also chair committees with a disproportionately high number of women members.

Questions that remain to be answered relate to the reasons behind the unequal distribution of male and female MEPs in the different committees. Is it because of clear differences in choices or priorities made by male and female MEPs, or is it also influenced by the priorities of the political groups? Since MEPs are not necessarily members of all the committees they might have aspired to, it could be a combination of the two. The reasons behind the drop the number of female committee chairs warrants further investigation, yet the secret nature in which many of the appointment decisions are taken makes this a difficult task.

Another important question is why more is not done to address the poor gender balance in committees. The European Parliament has had gender mainstreaming on its agenda in various forms for many years, yet this does not seem to have led political groups to ensure policies are in place to avoid the unbalanced composition of committees. The same goes for the leaderships of the committees, an area where policies should be easy to put in place, especially by the larger groups.

All of this paints a picture of a European Parliament where the truth of womens representation means going beyond the numbers. There are important nuances at play, and significant geographical and political differences makes the issue more complex, but not impossible to change. It will be interesting to see if there is political will to change things, if the existing situation will be reproduced, or if certain issues will be further exacerbated in the midterm rotation in the parliament due in early 2022.

While there has been an increase in the proportion of women MEPs between the previous and current European Parliament, there has been a decrease in the proportion of female committee chairs. Women used to make up 55% of chairs, an overrepresentation given they made up 37% of MEPs; now a 41% proportion of chairs is more in line with a proportion of MEPs at 39.5%.

As the proportion of female MEPs has increased, the distribution of men and women in committees remained relatively unchanged, albeit with significant differences, with committees such as AFET remaining predominantly made up of men, others such as DEVE widely increasing the proportion of women, and others such as FEMM increasing the overrepresentation of women. As noted, several of the committees chaired by women have a disproportionate number of men, as in the case of the ECON committee and the SEDE subcommittee.

In conclusion, the data presented in this paper raises several questions for further analysis. These include:

The question also remains as to how the European Parliament will achieve its own gender mainstreaming, either in the current term or the next. As its research service has concluded, despite good progress in gender mainstreaming over the past years, its work in this regard remains far from finished.

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More Representation But Not Influence: Women in the European Parliament - German Marshall Fund