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The spread of the coronavirus, COVID-19, continues to be a challenge for all states around the globe. The Member States of the European Union have experienced first-hand how deadly the risks of the virus can be and how important it is to be prepared and mitigate the risk of any type of emergency. Since the start of the pandemic in the first quarter of 2020, the European Union has been in close touch with all the international development partners to stem the spread of COVID-19, provide medical care, and mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic. The European Union has helped communities at large in effective preparedness and disaster response to shocks -- be it economic, natural disasters, health pandemics, or man-made crises.

While COVID-19 keeps challenging all five countries of Central Asia at an unprecedented scale, through existing programs, the European Union supports both resilient and sustainable political and economic frameworks that can prepare governments for future emergencies. One such programs of the European Union is the action for Strengthening Financial Resilience and Accelerating Risk Reduction in Central Asia (EU Central Asia Initiative), which started its implementation in July 2019. The indicative span of the Initiative is almost 4 years with the overall objective to strengthen Central Asian countries' resilience to disasters and climate risks by enhancing financial resilience, risk identification capacity, and improved risk management. Even though the Initiative strongly contributes to the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and supports Central Asia's efforts in achieving selected Sustainable Development Goals, when COVID-19 hit Central Asian countries -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- it was decided to expand the scope and integrate risk of health emergencies more prominently into the original framework of the program.

The EU Central Asia Initiative is divided into two result areas. In collaboration with a number of partners, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) supports the countries of the Central Asia region to build resilience and disaster risk reduction (DRR) through one of the result areas of the Initiative. This result area builds the foundation for greater resilience in Central Asia through data, capacity, governance, and cooperation at regional, national and local levels. The European Union also appointed the World Bank under the management of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) to implement a second result area focussed on strengthening the evidence and capacity for financial resilience and risk reduction at national and regional levels in Central Asia. Both result areas are implemented in close collaboration with the Almaty-based Centre for Emergency Situations and Disaster Risk Reduction (CESDRR).

The global shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and its disastrous socio-economic impacts have underlined the importance of foreseeing new emerging risks, having solid disaster risk management and disaster risk finance strategies in place, better preparing for mitigating their impact and for reconstructing with better capacities and higher resilience. Beneficiaries still pay great attention to natural hazards and most of the work under the EU *Central Asia Initiative *can be applied to responding to health or pandemic crises.

The International Disaster Database, EM-DAT[1], reports that since the start of 2020, more than 113,000 people in Central Asia were affected by different types of disasters. Climate change is exacerbating the intensity of disasters and the COVID-19 crisis worsens the impact on the communities, especially the most vulnerable and the poor. One of the main side-effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is that it has further deepened existing vulnerabilities and challenges in terms of disaster and risk management. This shows that governments and societies need to better understand risks to manage them, especially when looking at how they can cascade or multiply with unexpected and potentially severe consequences. This aspect is vital to the countries of Central Asia, where often one hazard rapidly leads to another, making disaster management an even more urgent matter.

Thus, as a response to the pandemic through the EU *Central Asia Initiative, *UNDRR has already contributed to reducing disaster risk especially at the national level by training many national technical officers in DRR, collecting, and managing disaster loss information, and building resilience at the local level. The EU *Central Asia Initiative *is implemented by the UNDRR in collaboration with a number of partners, including the Center for Emergency Situations and Disaster Risk Reduction, (CESDRR), CIMA Foundation, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). It is carried out in each country of the region and the activities are adapted to the unique disaster risk background.

As all countries seek to recover from the pandemic, UNDRR continues to support capacity building activities of national and local partners in Central Asia, building in a transformational approach to DRR. The COVID-19 pandemic and growing climate change impacts have demonstrated the need for reassessing the approach in DRR across the countries. There is a need to increase resilience at all levels and sectors, with strategies to address a large range of hazards and socio-economic factors. Furthermore, strengthened dialogue between Central Asian states continues to support closer cooperation in the region to better prepare for the cascading impacts of the pandemic and to reduce existing and future risks.

In support of strengthening DRR dialogue, a Member State dialogue brought together National Emergency Management Organizations, Ministries of Health, Sendai Focal Points, International Health Regulations Focal Points, emergency response and risk reduction entities, representatives of the European Union and United Nations system organizations in September 2020. The discussion analysed best practices learnt from the ongoing COVID-19 response, the potential for cascading effects, and effective measures to recover and build back better. Together with on-going activities under the EU *Central Asia Initiative, *there is a new momentum in the region to increase action on DRR and resilience and to work collectively to overcome this crisis.

Focusing on a transformative approach to DRR in the face of the ongoing pandemic, the governments of Central Asia countries resolved to develop and strengthen coordination on DRR at a sub-regional level. The Forum of Heads of National Disaster Management Authorities convened in November 2021 to adopt the Regional DRR Strategy for 2022-2030 and the Roadmap for its implementation in 2022-2023. Preceded by a number of regional declarations and statements, the first-ever regional strategy for DRR in Central Asia aims to join efforts in strengthening the focus on transboundary hazards, including biological hazards and climate-related risks, improving investments in risk reduction, and enhancing preparedness for response. The Heads of NDMAs also adopted a draft Regional Risk Profile, which technical experts from the four countries will periodically update to reflect the changing risk landscape.

Through the global Making Cities Resilient initiative, known as MCR2030, UNDRR supports the five capital cities of the region to build disaster resilience with a special focus on health systems in the current COVID-19 context, and in line with priorities of the Socio-Economic Response and Recovery Plans at country level. This is especially important at a time when across the region, every single country is facing a real threat of COVID-19 resurgence, or already fighting it. COVID-19 has challenged health systems in particular and demonstrated the need for a whole-of-government approach that leverages the capacities of all relevant departments, with local government bodies responsible for disaster risk playing a crucial role. Thus, a number of Central Asian capital cities have taken significant steps forward in strengthening city resilience. Following the establishment of technical working groups, the cities undertook initial resilience assessments using Preliminary and Health System Resilience Scorecards to support the strategic development processes at the local level. The emphasis of the Health Systems Disaster Resilience Scorecard Assessment is on facilitating multi-sectoral approaches to integrating health issues in disaster risk reduction/resilience planning at the city level.

The World Bank and GFDRR, as part of the COVID-19 response within the Initiative, provides technical assistance to selected countries in the region -- Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - to develop a more effective preparedness and disaster response by strengthening the social protection system and its flexibility to scale up in response to different types of shocks. Activities focus on defining a framework for scaling up the social protection system in case of a disaster or other emergencies affecting the livelihoods of large groups of people in the country. The work relies on the ongoing dialogue on social protection delivery systems in the countries as well as on ongoing World Bank projects under implementation. Country-specific outputs will include institutional and operational assessments of the social protection delivery systems and a proposed scaled-up road map to set up to address future disasters or other shocks for each country's social assistance system. This technical assistance is linking social protection systems with disaster risk management systems in respective countries, providing capacity building for staff in the use of designed tools, improving understanding of the linkages between social protection and disaster response among key stakeholders.

As the COVID-19 crisis puts Central Asia's resilience to the test, under the EU Central Asia Initiative, leaders take this opportunity to re-evaluate the current governance and policies to improve the region's ability to build stronger preparedness and response to such symmetrical shocks. The pandemic has not changed the fact that the region continues to face climate change, environmental challenges, and disaster risks of unprecedented urgency, but it certainly gave a lesson to prioritise the preparedness and prevention of the risks in the future.

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The Central Asia Initiative of the European Union during the COVID-19 crisis: the way forward in preparing for and managing risks - Kazakhstan -...

The Draft Report sets out the Committees proposed amendments to the CBAM Proposal. While the Draft Report states that it welcomes the overall approach of the CBAM Proposal, several of the Committees amendments change some significant aspects of the CBAM Proposal.

In this publication, we will look at some of those interesting amendments and reflect on the impact they may have on the sectors concerned by the CBAM.

Climate change is a global problem that needs global solutions. Because the level of climate ambition varies throughout jurisdictions, a risk of carbon leakage exists. This means that companies based in the EU could move carbon-intensive production abroad, or EU products could be replaced by more carbon-intensive imports. Such carbon leakage can shift emissions outside of the EU and could therefore weaken climate efforts. Although the existing EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) already provides protection against carbon leakage through free allocation of emission rights, the EUs ambitious Fit-for-55 targets have rendered this protection insufficient to protect sectors at risk. In order to increase protection against carbon leakage, the European Commission (EC) has therefore adopted a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). The aim of the CBAM is to equalise the price of carbon between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EUs climate objectives are not vitiated by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.4

In practice, under CBAM EU importers will need to buy carbon certificates corresponding to the carbon price that would have been paid, had the goods been produced under the EUs carbon pricing rules. Conversely, once a non-EU producer can show that they have already paid a price for the carbon used in the production of the imported goods in a third country, the EU importer will be able to fully deduct the corresponding cost. In short, the CBAM will help reduce the risk of carbon leakage by encouraging producers in non-EU countries to green their production processes.5 However, some difficulties concerning the principles and practical implementation of the CBAM still exist - these are discussed at length in this article on A&Os Countdown to COP26 blog.

CBAMs are already in place in some regions around the world, such as California, where an adjustment is applied to certain imports of electricity. Like the EU, a number of countries such as Canada and Japan are planning similar initiatives.6

Firstly, the Draft Report broadens the scope of the CBAM Proposal to cover organic chemicals, hydrogen and polymers by deleting the proposed Recital 32, which excluded the organic chemicals sector from the CBAM Proposal and adding a reference to hydrogen and polymers into the existing Recital 30 of the CBAM Proposal.7 This means the entire organic chemicals sector would also be subject to the CBAM, which is a significant extension of its scope.

Furthermore, the Committee extends the type of emissions covered by the CBAM Proposal by including indirect emissions (eg emissions generated from electricity used for manufacturing, heating or cooling) in the definition of embedded emissions in article 3, (16) of the CBAM Proposal.

In addition, the amendment not only covers the production processes of the goods themselves, but also those of its upstream products.8 This extension may have a significant knock-on effect, potentially involving additional (non-included) sectors in the proposed CBAM by association. It may also influence the carbon price (ie the amount paid in a third country in the form of a tax or emission allowances under a greenhouse gas emissions trading system, calculated on greenhouse gases covered by such a measure and released during the production of goods) seeing as embedded emissions in products imported into the EU will influence the amount of carbon certificates that will be required to import those products.

Additionally, the Committee notes that the implementation pace currently set out in the CBAM Proposal is too gradual to achieve the ambitious EU 2030 objective (ie the net emission reduction target of greenhouse gases of at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels)9. Therefore, it proposes to shorten the transitional period by one year, ending on 31 December 2024. The Committee also sets out an incremental phase-in of the CBAM factor as an alternative to the free allowances allocated under the EU ETS, so that it becomes compatible with the EU 2030 climate objective.10

The notable exception to this incremental phase-in is the cement sector, for which the Committee excludes certain categories of cement from this phase-in process entirely, because it considers this sector to be less exposed to carbon leakage. This means that the applicable CBAM factor for the cement sector will be 0% (meaning no CBAM mitigation factor would apply at all) from as early as 1 January 2025.

Moreover, the Committee considers that a central CBAM authority would be the most efficient, transparent and cost-effective instrument to ensure the proper implementation of the CBAM Proposal as opposed to a decentralised system with 27 competent national authorities. Practically, the Draft Report suggests that appeal against the decisions of the CBAM authority would be possible with an independent Board of Appeal, made up of three members, appointed by the Council, EP and Commission respectively.11 Decisions of the Board of Appeal could then be appealed with the General Court and ultimately, the Court of Justice.12 This begs the question, considering the caseload before the Court of Justice, whether these additional cases will not add significantly to the current processing times.

Interestingly, while the original article 26 of the CBAM Proposal contained a penalty provision in case declarants failed to surrender the required number of CBAM certificates amounting to the excess emissions penalty of article 16 (3) of the ETS Directive13 (ie EUR 100 for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted for which the operator has not surrendered allowances), the amended article 26a changes the calculation method of the penalty to three times the average price of CBAM certificates in the previous year for each CBAM certificate that the authorised declarant did not surrender. Therefore, the Committees suggestion for article 26a allows the height of the penalty to fluctuate according to the price of CBAM certificates as opposed to a fixed penalty price depending on the excess amount of carbon dioxide emitted.

Overall, the Committees Draft Report contains some amendments that significantly extend the CBAM by including the organic chemicals sector in its scope, as well as including indirect emissions and emissions from upstream products into the definition of embedded emissions in the CBAM Proposal. These extensions of the CBAMs scope may have a significant knock-on effect on non-included sectors as well as the amount of carbon certificates declarants would be required to surrender.

Furthermore, the Committees indication that the current pace of implementation as set out in the CBAM Proposal is too slow seems characteristic of the EUs overall climate ambition as well as its desire to bring the CBAM in sync with the EU ETS and its free allocation rules. The ultimate objective is to ensure the CBAM becomes a fully developed alternative to the free allowances currently allocated to installations at risk of carbon leakage under the EU ETS. Nevertheless, the notable exception to this rule is the cement industry, which the Committee completely cuts out of these benefits, stating as justification that the cement sector has the lowest trade intensity among goods covered by the CBAM and the risk of carbon leakage is therefore correspondingly low. Indeed, certain categories of cement would not benefit from any CBAM factor from as early as 1 January 2025.

The Committees suggestions to change the approach toward authorisation of import of products into the single market under the CBAM from a Member State approach through competent national authorities to a single EU-level CBAM authority is remarkable as well. Considering that the import of goods happens at Member State level, one may suggest that national authorities could have a better view on the activities on the ground and the practical and logistical adoption of the future CBAM as opposed to a single authority managing the import goods at all entry points into the single market at once. That being said, an argument in favour of legal certainty and consistency while avoiding the risk of uneven implementation of the CBAM and its implementing measures and delegated acts across Member States and potentially, forum shopping, can also be made.

In addition, a potentially uneven implementation at Member State level could also result in trade distortions if certain national authorities would function more efficiently than others. It appears that the Committee has considered the latter view more convincing by introducing the idea of a single CBAM authority. Furthermore, the appeal process of CBAM authority decisions with an independent Board of Appeal and ultimately, the Court of Justice, does raise some questions concerning the current caseload before the Court and whether the development of the CBAM could be hindered by its relatively long processing times.

Finally, the Committee has also changed the CBAM Proposals approach toward the calculation of penalties. Instead of a fixed penalty per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted in excess of carbon certificates surrendered by a declarant, the penalty would now be calculated based on the price of the carbon certificates themselves. Depending on the price of the future carbon certificates, this penalty could be more burdensome than the initial approach set out by the Commission. However, it is still unclear at this point how the carbon certificates will be priced and how heavily those prices may fluctuate in the future.

In conclusion, although it is not certain that the Committees amendments will make it into the final CBAM Regulation, it is nevertheless interesting to see how the Committees vision differs on some significant points to that of the Commission. Seeing as the CBAM Proposal has been submitted under the ordinary legislative procedure, the amendments will be debated in the EP plenary, after which the EP will vote on the amended CBAM Proposal. If the EP adopts the (amended) CBAM Proposal, it will subsequently be sent to the Council, which can accept the EPs position (and thus, adopt the legislative act) or amend the EPs position and then send it back to the EP for a second reading. The vast majority of proposals are adopted during the first reading.14

If the CBAM Proposal fails to be adopted during the second reading by both the EP and the Council, a Conciliation Committee made up of members of the EP and Council representatives will attempt to reach an agreement on a joint text. If this is the case, the agreed text is sent around to the EP and the Council for a third reading. If both the EP and the Council approve the joint text, the CBAM Proposal will be adopted. If not, the CBAM Proposal will not enter into force and the procedure is ended. The average time for an EC proposal to be adopted on the first reading was just below 18 months in the 2014-2019 legislative period.15 Furthermore, certain Member States (eg France, which holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union since 1 January 2022 until 30 June 2022 and has flagged the adoption of the CBAM as a priority topic) are pushing towards its swift adoption, which may accelerate the legislative process. One thing is certain: this is not the last word on the CBAM Proposal.

1European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, Draft Report on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, 21 December 2021, available here (the Draft Report).

2Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, 14 July 2021, available here (the CBAM Proposal).

3A&Os Countdown to COP26 blog already features a deep-dive analysis of the functioning of the CBAM, contributed by Arthur Sauzay. The full article is available here.

4European Commission, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Q&A, 14 July 2021, see here.

5European Commission, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Q&A, 14 July 2021, see here.

6European Commission, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Q&A, 14 July 2021, see here.

7Draft Report, Amendment 13.

8Draft Report, Amendment 33.

9This target was adopted under the EU Climate Law. More information is available here.

10Draft Report, Amendment 105.

11Draft Report, Amendment 94.

12Draft Report, Amendment 96.

13Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas allowance trading within the Union and amending Directive 96/61/EC, available here.

14Source: see here.

15Source: here.

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The European Parliaments wish list on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) - JD Supra

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In his New Years Reflection on January 1, 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida focused on two major issues: realization of a new form of capitalism to revive the Japanese economy, and advancement of realism diplomacy for a new era. This expert maneuvering of diplomacy and national security, which includes efforts to propagate universal values, navigate global challenges, and safeguard the lives and livelihoods of the Japanese people, will shape Japans economic diplomacy under Kishidanomics.

Japan has been strengthening economic diplomacy since Shinzo Abe came into power through his much-lauded Abenomics (launched in 2013). In 2016, the Abe government approved the Japan Revitalization Strategy 2016 (or Growth Strategy) to attract the global flow of people, goods, and money into Japan and turn the virtuous economic cycle into sustainable economic growth. Kishidas new capitalism vision echoes the latter.

Based on the Growth Strategy, since 2016 Japan has undertaken economic diplomacy through the following three aspects:

Abes successor, Yoshihide Suga, cemented this foreign policy outlook through Suganomics. Kishidas economic diplomacy, too, is centered on the above-mentioned three areas, with slight additions.

Under this outlook, Japan gives prime importance to economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) because they help capture the vitality of the growing market overseas and strengthen the basis of the Japanese economy. In this context, its partnership with the European Union (EU) is gaining credence, particularly over shared interest in strengthening and reforming the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and rejecting protectionism.

The EU and Japan are strong economic partners not only due to their alignment over free trade values, but also the volume of trade between them.

In 2002, East Asia, North America, and Europe together accounted for 80 percent of Japans trade a trend that has largely continued over time. Currently, Japanis theEUssecond-largest Asiantradingpartner after China, accounting for almost a quarter of global gross domestic product (GDP).

In 2001, the EU-Japan Action Plan, which laid out the framework for their political and economic linkages in the 21st Century, came to an end. Japan released an impact assessment report in 2012, which proposed entering into an FTA, as part of its free trade focus in economic diplomacy. Formal FTA negotiations began in 2013, and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was signed in 2018 (coming into effect in 2019).

This FTA created an open trade zone covering over 600 million people, and formed an integral part of Japans plan to use FTAs to achieve its economic fortification.

The EU holds immense importance for Japan in trade. As of March 2020, the EU accounted for about 12 percent of Japans total trade. Japan is also a major market for EU exports: about 58 billion EUR ($66.2 billion USD) in goods and 28 billion EUR ($32 billion USD) in services are exported to Japan every year.

Initially, the trade ties between the two were characterized by big trade surpluses in favor of Japan. However, during 2009-2019, the trade became more balanced, as the EUs trade in goods deficit with Japan decreased from 18 billion EUR ($20.5 billion USD) in 2009 to 2 billion EUR ($2.3 billion USD) in 2019. This relationship endured despite Japans trade barriers on EU firms.

Since the implementation of the EPA, trade has been expanding between the two sides. Within merely 10 months after the EPA was implemented, the EUs exports to Japan went up by 6.6 percent and Japans to the EU by 6.3 percent, compared to the same period a year before.

From a geo-economic security lens, the EPA allowed the EU and Japan to shape worldwide exchange rules in line with their high standards and shared values of democracy and the rule of law, especially in light of an increasingly economically aggressive China. The EPA conveyed a strong message about rejection of protectionism by two of the worlds biggest economies.

Moreover, the EPA has allowed Japan to strengthen the multilateral trading system, which ranks as one of Tokyos biggest priorities. Its implementation has helped Tokyo strengthen its trade outlook with individual European states like France and Italy.

It has also enabled the application of shared standards, such as for sustainable development with a specific commitment toward the Paris Agreement on climate change. In a broader sense, Tokyo has advocated those agreements, such as the EU-Japan EPA, serve as building blocks to higher trade liberalization at the multilateral level because they include a commitment to institution-building in addition to free trade.

Thus, Japan has chosen to enhance economic dialogue using the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which has led to better mutual understanding between the two regions on various economic issues and better coordination on economic issues of mutual concern in international platforms such as the WTO.

The Japan-EU FTA is certainly a critical variable in Indo-Pacific politics as a lynchpin of EU-Japan diplomacy that has a significant impact on regional players. At the time of signing, the EPA was termed a light in the increasing darkness of international politics referring to Chinas increased assertiveness, Donald Trumps inward-looking trade policies, and the escalating trade war between China and the US. Former PM Abe notably called the signatories the flag bearers of free trade.

Therefore, as an agreement between like-minded powers, the Japan-EU EPA also complements both actors Indo-Pacific outlooks. Japan and the EU share an understanding that the Sino-United States conflict is damaging to both their interests. Their positions and interests converge not only via their EPA, but also in their strategic partnership and connectivity agreements, indicating their willingness to use economic diplomacy to counter China.

The EPAs stand against regional protectionism, which led to strong concerns in China, built mutual grounds of economic synergy between Tokyo and Brussels. This was later reflected in the EUs Indo-Pacific strategy (launched in 2021), which aimed to defend and strengthen the current rules-based order (threatened by China) by working with partners with aligned economic and security interests in the region.

The EU strategy will execute a number of actions, including resuming or completing trade and investment negotiations with India, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, etc. and building resilient supply chains with these allies.

For example, the resumption of FTA talks between India and the EU in 2021 after an eight-year hiatus has given a new impetus to the Indo-Pacific balance. Given that the EU signed a connectivity partnership with India (just two years after the one with Japan), it is likely that the FTA with India may be realized in the near future.

Greater EU-Japan-India cooperation will be an important feature for enhancing the EUs strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, their trilateral relations in the Indo-Pacific are presently constrained by economic dependence on China, which makes them somewhat unwilling to provoke Beijing despite their security concerns. Nonetheless, the India-Japan-Australia-led Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) is a potential avenue that could strengthen both Tokyos relationship with the EU and the EUs integration into Asia.

The EUs Indo-Pacific strategy particularly emphasizes increased outreach to regional bodies and mechanisms for enhanced cooperation in the region. Brussels growing focus means that furthering its economic interests in the region is not only essential, but also increasingly possible particularly with its expanding dynamics with India, Japan, and Australia.

The EU-Japan EPA could aid the expansion of the SCRI to promote collaboration between these states and create a mutually beneficial trading environment. The SCRI would also allow Brussels to diversify supply chains away from China, which is a priority for the EUs post-COVID-19 industrial plan.

The UK has also recognized the potential of the SCRI and free trade with Asian partners in its Global Britain agenda and could now, post-Brexit, also emerge as a strong partner.

In 2019, Japan signed an FTA with the United States (US-Japan Trade Agreement) too, which came into force in 2020. Japans FTAs with the US and the EU, together with the renewed trilateral partnership between them (November 2021) to address challenges posed by the non-market policies and practices of third countries, sends a strong signal to China against its unfair trade practices and coercive behavior.

This trilateral will only strengthen if the Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is expanded to include the European Union and the United States. Following Chinas CPTPP bid (soon after the announcement of the Australia-US-UK AUKUS defense deal) there were renewed calls for both the EU and the US to join the pact, even though the US had pulled out in 2017.

The pact has also piqued the interest of countries like the United Kingdom and South Korea, ensuring immense potential for economic growth for all parties concerned.

Further, as Japan faces several social, political, and economic problems amid todays very fragile world order, its economic and defense security go hand in hand. Therefore, supporting economic multilateralism has become imperative to fuel Japans shrinking economy post-pandemic, which was given a boost in late December 2021 when Japans Cabinet approved a 107.60 trillion JPY ($940 billion USD) draft budget for the fiscal year 2022-2023.

Prime Minister Kishidas pursuit of economic sustainability by giving rise to a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution will be incomplete without building Japans multilateral economic diplomacy with the European Union, India, Australia, and the United States. Japans EPA with the EU is an ideal first step in consolidating their partnership, and continued focus on strengthening bilateral economic and security ties will help both actors achieve their respective objectives and vision for the Indo-Pacific region.

Author: Dr. Jagannath Panda

Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Center Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Dr. Panda is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.

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[Asias Next Page] Consolidating Japans Economic Diplomacy with the European Union - JAPAN Forward

January 19, 2022 - Ottawa, Canada - Global Affairs Canada

Yesterday, the Honourable Mary Ng, Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development, met virtually with Valdis Dombrovskis, European Commission Executive Vice-President and European Union Commissioner for Trade.

Minister Ng extended her appreciation of the EU's ongoing engagement in the Ottawa Group and support to advance work on WTO reform priorities. The ministers agreed to continue the momentum to address key issues, including trade and health, fisheries subsidies negotiations, agriculture negotiations, and WTO reform.

Minister Ng and Minister Dombrovskis committed to further strengthen bilateral commercial relations, including the full implementation of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Minister Ng also discussed the importance of working together to address trade-distorting subsidies while also avoiding the creation of new barriers to trade and investments between Canada and the EU.

Disclaimer

Public Health Agency of Canada published this content on 19 January 2022 and is solely responsible for the information contained therein. Distributed by Public, unedited and unaltered, on 20 January 2022 00:45:10 UTC.

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Minister Ng speaks with European Commission Executive Vice-President and European Union Commissioner for Trade - marketscreener.com

John Rapley is a professor at the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study. His most recent book is Twilight of the Money Gods.

The EUs dying, boasted Nigel Farage the morning after the 2016 Brexit referendum. Declaring, weve knocked the first brick out of the wall, he predicted a domino effect across Europe. Indeed, within days, far-right leaders across the continent were hailing the result and calling for referendums in their own countries, with Frances Marine Le Pen promising a Frexit vote within six months if she won the following years presidential election. Brexit, they all said, would make Britain great again and destroy the European Union.

Six years on, it seems Europe still hasnt got the memo. For that matter, neither has Britain. The United Kingdom, rather than leaping boldly into a brave new future, is imploding. Europe, meanwhile, seems to have found a new sense of purpose.

The British government calculates Brexit has knocked about 4 per cent off its long-term growth, with the U.K. now forecast to be the worst-performing economy in Europe relative to where it was before the pandemic. This surprises nobody except the Brexiters: Europe is the much larger economy and consequently took a much smaller hit from the loss of market access. The Brexit vote was thus akin to Canada leaving the North American trading bloc to stick it to the United States.

The economic squeeze has resulted in an annual loss of 32-billion ($55-billion) in tax revenue as it happens, about twice the amount Boris Johnsons infamous campaign bus said Brexit would yield for the countrys National Health Service. Instead, just to keep the NHS from collapsing under the weight of its backlogs, the same Tory government that promised to use the supposed Brexit bonus to cut taxes has instead jacked them up to levels last seen in the 1950s. Meanwhile, the vast trove of new trade deals that Brexiters promised the newly liberated country have amounted to, well, almost nothing. When Justin Trudeau said Britain lacked bandwidth for negotiating trade agreements, he knew what he was talking about.

It should hardly surprise anyone that, amid all this, support for Brexit has weakened. Polls now show that among Britons who have formed opinions on the topic, a clear majority not only believe the vote to leave the EU was a mistake but would, given the opportunity, reverse it.

European voters largely agree, their support for the union having mostly increased since the referendum.

And why not? Britain offers a salutary lesson. The country is cracking up not with laughter, but literally. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, both Brexit and the subsequent ascent of the Boris Johnson government have driven new supporters into the arms of the secessionists.

In Scotland, the Scottish National Party has found no more potent a campaigner for independence than Mr. Johnson himself, a man who apparently boosts support for secession each time he appears north of the border which, mystifyingly, he didnt even know existed, rather as if Mr. Trudeau had wondered why there was a sign outside Hawkesbury that read, Welcome to Quebec. Scotland voted strongly to remain in the EU in 2016, and many Scots see the Brexit vote as little more than odious English nationalism.

To a lesser degree, the same goes for Wales. Nationalism there has always been more a cultural than a political phenomenon, but since the 2016 referendum, support for independence has been rising there as well. As for Northern Ireland, while a majority still oppose reunification with the republic, Mr. Johnsons post-Brexit trade agreement with the EU has created a curious dynamic. Because the Good Friday Agreement required London to accept a deal that kept Northern Ireland effectively within the EU, its economy has taken less of a hit than the rest of the countrys. Over time, the pragmatic centre of the six counties could thus lean toward reunification on the grounds that they might as well secure the full benefits of Europe.

Oh sure, the EU remains a messy, often incoherent work-in-progress. It still struggles to produce common positions on how to deal with China or Russia, which is why the recent U.S.-Soviet summit largely bypassed European capitals. And competition among European capitals has meant, for instance, that the EU hasnt exploited the opportunities Brexit gave them to supplant London as Europes financial capital.

Still, the situation is a far cry from the fever dreams of people such as Mr. Farage. Shaken by the British fiasco, Europes far-right parties have not only struggled to build on their earlier gains but have largely abandoned their Euroskepticism, with Ms. Le Pen now saying she favours staying in the union. And the continents centrifugal tendencies, which during the 2011 euro crisis caused such deep splits between richer northern countries and southern Europe, waned considerably during the pandemic. Europes governments have agreed to an ambitious postpandemic investment program, to be funded by Brussels, a stark contrast to the cutbacks that are descending on Britain.

Today, as leading Brexiters fall over themselves to say this wasnt their idea, Brexit illustrates that old adage that victory has a thousand parents but defeat is an orphan. Brexit did yield a big bonus to Europe. Its now a safe bet that the European Union wont break up any time soon. But Britain? Place your bets. Were in for a ride.

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Opinion: Brexit hasn't ended the European Union - it's given it a new sense of purpose - The Globe and Mail