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By Lisa Vives, Global Information Network

NEW YORK | BRUSSELS (IDN) As Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni bore down on rights groups and the opposition, the European Union (EU) Parliament responded with the threat of sanctions against Ugandan individuals and organizations they hold responsible for abuses during the recent general election.

Museveni apparently sparked the EU backlash when he instructed the Ministry of Finance, in a letter dated January 1, to suspend the activities of the Democratic Governance Facility, a basket fund of European countries that bankroll most Ugandan civil society organizations that work on governance, rights and related themes.

The development is the latest in the fallout between the West and Uganda government that has seen President Museveni and a number of his senior officials castigating unnamed Western powers over what they call interference in the affairs of Uganda.

In a televised address about Ugandas security following several reports of operatives kidnapping citizens, especially opposition supporters, Museveni accused foreigners of interference in the countrys affairs.

"I read in the newspapers about the EU Parliament sanctioning some Ugandans from travelling. For anybody to think that Africans are dying to go to Europe is something that shows a lack of seriousness. Well, personally I need a lot of persuasion to leave Uganda. Why would I want to leave Uganda? he asked rhetorically.

On February 11, the European Parliament adopted a resolution deploring the January 14 elections which they called neither democratic nor transparent. They condemned the excessive use of force by the police and armed forces during the election and their growing interference in political affairs.

They called for all those arrested and detained for participating in peaceful political assemblies or for exercising their right to freedom of expression and association to be released immediately and unconditionally and have their charges dropped. The text was approved by 632 votes in favour, 15 against and 48 abstentions.

More than 50 people were killed in the melee that followed the arrest of presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine, on Nov. 18, according to the State. Hundreds more were injured and thousands arrested during the elections.

The imposition of sanctions would be a major blow to Uganda government operations since the EU is Ugandas biggest development partner and gives more than US$130,000 in aid annually. The EU individual members also give substantial funding to Uganda.

Early this week, the United Kingdom also cut funding to security forces and also promised to review aid to Uganda over what they called human rights abuses. [IDN-InDepthNews 16 February 2021]

Photo: Security forces stand outside a polling station in Kampala, Uganda, on January 14, 2021. Source: The African Report.

IDN is flagship agency of the Non-profit International Press Syndicate.

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Ugandan Election Rights Violations Elicit Threat of European Union Sanctions - IDN InDepthNews | Analysis That Matters

On 15 January 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/30[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Council added one person to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania[2], and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 15.01.2021 in the Official Journal of the European Union no L 12 I, p.3.[2] The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

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Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria -...

The 21st of February marks UN International Mother Language Day: a day that aims to remind us of the importance of safeguarding linguistic diversity and recognises the value of multilingualism at all levels of contemporary global society. Nowhere is this more important than in the regulation of that global society. The intense progress of globalisation in the latter half of the 20th century has led to a rapid increase in the production of international treaties and agreements, the creation of international courts, as well as reliance on international arbitration. Multilingualism underpins much of this globalised legal work. Many international organisations have multiple official languages, and carry out their functions through multilingual legal and political institutions. But can an institution be truly multilingual? And what implications might multilingualism have on the work of such institutions?

The phenomenon of multilingual law is particularly evident in the context of the European Union (EU), which produces law in 24 languages, for application throughout 27 Member States. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) produces case law in all 24 EU official languages. It is, in that sense, a truly multilingual institution. However, in order for it to actually function and produce its multilingual case law, the CJEU uses a single internal working language: French.

Cases can be brought before the CJEU in any of the 24 EU official languages. The language chosen by the applicant or referring court will be the language of procedure for the case in question. Documents that are submitted to the CJEU are translated into French, and the case is processed entirely in French. The final judgment is drafted in French, deliberated upon in secret deliberations and the final (French) version is agreed by the judges in the relevant Chamber. That judgment is then translated into the language of procedure and the other EU official languages. The version of the judgment in the language of procedure is considered the authentic version of the judgment.

Translation is thus key to the functioning of the CJEU, and consequently to the administration of justice in the European Union. The CJEU uses a mixed translation system. Where possible direct translation, from one EU official language into another, is used. However, given the sheer number of direct language combinations (552), a pivot translation system is also used: i.e. translation is pivoted through a third language (e.g CzechEnglishSwedish). The CJEU currently uses five official pivot languages: French, English, German, Spanish, Italian).

While the importance of a formal translation process to the functioning of the CJEU is clear, translation at that court cannot be isolated to specific points in the procedure. Owing to the fact that the CJEU is a multilingual and multicultural institution, which uses a single internal language, translation is, in a broad sense, embedded throughout the process and indeed in the culture of that court. French is the working language of the Court. Yet, the staff within the CJEU is linguistically diverse. This means that judges and their legal clerks (known as rfrendaires) are often working in a language that is not their mother tongue. This necessarily has an impact on the work that they produce: CJEU judgments.

One implication of the multilingual nature of the CJEU involves the type of reasoning developed at that court. Empirical research has demonstrated that although they work in French, the thinking process behind that work, for many judges and rfrendaires, is done in their own mother tongue. Consequently the legal reasoning applied is a hybrid one: grounded in EU law of course, but based on the legal reasoning embedded in the national legal system(s), or the legal system(s) of the state(s) in which they received their legal education. Such legal reasoning and its associated concepts are developed through intellectual reasoning processes in a particular cultural context, and then expressed in a legal language that develops along with a particular legal order. It is almost impossible to separate a particular type of legal reasoning from the legal language in which that reasoning is embedded.

The CJEU is thus a linguistically hybrid institution. It is multilingual and multicultural, but operates by embracing a single working language internally, at least at surface level. In this manner, the CJEU functions by way of linguistic cultural compromises:

Whether or not an institution can be truly multilingual, it is important to acknowledge the impact that multilingualism has on the culture of such institutions. CJEU case law is infused with linguistic complexity; we need to take account of issues of language and multilingualism, if we we are to fully understand how it functions.

Read more information on Karen McAuliffe's research on multilingualism at the CJEU.

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Multilingualism in International Institutions: The Court of Justice of the European Union - University of Birmingham

The 1994 International Treaty protects investors in the energy sector from States policy changes. This firmly blocks the EUs available spending towards its long term goal of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.

Europes Ambition?

In December 2019, the European Commission presented its goal to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 an ambitious goal presented with a roadmap to make the EUs economy sustainable, the European Green Deal.

In other words, this represents the worlds second-largest economy no longer adding to the earths stock of greenhouse gases within 30 years. In the 24-page report, the EU described the steps to this urgent new challenge. Among other points, the EU has presented the need to change current policies in order for the economy to modernise and transform. Because, if between 1990 and 2018, the EU was able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 23%, and have economic growth by 61%, current policies will only reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050. Therefore, to ensure that all policies contribute to this goal, a proposal for the first European Climate Law was submitted to the other EU institutions by the Commission to write into law this new goal. However, many challenges remain for the EU, among others the little-known Energy Charter Treaty.

What is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)?

Signed over two decades ago, the treaty currently has fifty-three Signatories and Contracting Parties, including the European Union and Euratom. It was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral legal framework for international cooperation in the domain of energy. More importantly, the Treaty was created at the end of the Cold War to facilitate East-West cooperation over energy. On one side, the West would give access to its markets, capital and technology, while the East, to its natural resources. There was a need to reverse the decline of the then Soviet economy by attracting foreign capital, by reducing political risk and strengthening security through close co-operation in a critical economic sector. With the fall of the USSR, new objectives appeared. The first one was the need to set new standards for the energy market economy. The second was to create a basis for the rule of law to facilitate, in particular, activities of smaller companies which could not negotiate individual agreements with governments. Finally, the third objective argued for a new foundation for contractual and trade relations to replace the broken-down system. This binding international treaty was, therefore, both a necessity and an economic success as it contributed to the development of energy trade in Europe at the end of the Cold War.

The EUs environmental ambition blocked by the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty.

In a statement issued by the Commission, the Institution stated that the little-known Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is threatening the climate ambition of the EU domestically and internationally. The EU argues that the Treatys original mission of reuniting both sides of Europe became obsolete after Russias withdrawal in 2009. Therefore, while still protecting investors, it undermines the Institutions mission. Another issue comes from the lack of information about the Treaty. EU citizens have supported the EUs move towards a greener region, but are unknowingly funding the life insurance that the ECT provides to fossil fuels investors.

The EU illustrates the need to modernise the Treaty and the urgency of the situation with telling statistics. In November 2020, the EU agreed that 30% of its 1.8 trillion budget land recovery plan for 2021-2027 would be made available for the green transition.

However, the Commission estimates that if fossil fuels are not phased-out from the ECT binding investment protection, traded fossil fuel-assets protected by the ECT would potentially reach at least 2.15 trillion by 2050. However, it is also estimated that the potential cost of Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS) claims enacted through the ECT could reach at least 1.3 trillion by 2050 out of which 42% will be paid by EU taxpayers.

There is a need for a new balance between the protection of investments and investors, which represents the primary goal of the ECT today, and the minimisation of fossil fuels leading to greenhouse gas emissions.

What can we expect?

Today, the protection of fossil fuels investments prevents the Member States from implementing the necessary legal framework to encourage an energy transition, a pivotal step to achieve the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deals targets. The cost needed to implement the European Green Deal is impossible to cover if the ECT remains as it is. Therefore, if the ECT was enacted with values that resonated with the EU and its members several decades ago, this has now changed. The modernization process, which would delete those lines in the ECT protecting fossil fuel investors, started in 2018 and is still ongoing without any deadlines to the negotiations.

However, without a successful outcome to reform the ECT, a unilateral withdrawal of the EU and the Member States from an unreformed ECT would trigger the sunset clause, whereby the ECT would continue to apply to existing investments during 20 years. This could result in new investor-to-state disputes under the unreformed rules, including in existing investments in fossil fuels. The alternative of a withdrawal presents an unlikely outcome at this moment.

The three rounds of negotiations, started in July 2020, regarding a reforming of the ECT have been led by the European Commission. The European Parliament has submitted questions regarding the negotiations deadline, which remains to be determined, and the possibility of considering a withdrawal before November 2021. The EU is bound to submit its enhanced determined contribution to the Paris Agreement on that date, toward which the Commission was unfavourable. The European Court of Justice has been asked to opine on the compatibility of Energy Charter Treatys investor-State arbitration provisions with EU law.

It is in the EUs institutions and citizens best interest to work towards reforming the Treaty so that it once again resonates with its values and moves forward towards a Greener region.

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The Energy Charter Treaty: a Threat to the European Unions Climate Ambition - Global Risk Insights

The European Commission presented its Winter 2021 Economic forecast. The resurgence of the pandemic delayed the recovery process. The GDP growth projections show that the EU economy will grow by 3.7 per cent in 2021 and 3.9 per cent in 2022. The European Commission forecast projects a higher growth for Slovenia in 2021 than the EU average, i.e. a 4.7per cent GDP growth, and a 5.2-per cent growth in 2022, which is an improvement compared to the autumn forecast that anticipated a 3.8-per cent growth in 2022.

In order to kick-start the recovery, the Member States are focusing on preparing national recovery and resilience plans based on the guidelines by the European Commission. The Slovenian National Recovery and Resilience Plan is also being prepared. The primary objective of the Recovery and Resilience Facility is to assist the Member States with their recovery, which is why it is imperative to focus on a prompt approval of national plans and an expedient and efficient allocation of funds. Administrative and bureaucratic burdens that could slow down the kick-start of the recovery should be reduced as well.

The ministers also confirmed the recommendation on the discharge to the European Commission for the implementation of the 2019 budget and budget guidelines for 2022, which will be adopted by written procedure. They also exchanged views on the EUs Global Recovery Initiative, which deals with financing the recovery in developing countries and low-income countries.

On Monday, 15 February, Minister ircelj attended the video conference of the Eurogroup. The ministers exchanged views on macroeconomic developments and policy prospects in the euro area based on the European Commission's Winter 2021 Forecast.

"Uncertainties remain high. Hence, its important that the fiscal policy remains supportive. The impact of the COVID-19 crisis will differ, and some sectors will be affected more than others. The recovery will be long, but policies focused on support, structural changes, and promoting investments can contribute to it the forthcoming years. In addition to this, we must also take into consideration the green and digital transition," said Minister ircelj.

The ministers also discussed the international role of the euro. In its January communication, "The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience", the European Commission highlights the importance of enhancing the international role of the euro as an element of the EUs open strategic autonomy and resilience. Measures, such as promoting the use of the euro, developing eurodenominated instruments and benchmarks, and fostering its status as an international reference currency, will enhance the European financial system and simultaneously support the European economy.

The ministers further discussed the solvency of the corporate sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a strong impact on the corporate sector, leading governments to help companies tackling the pandemic with guarantee schemes and deferred payments of loans. The ministers agreed that the situation in the corporate sector must be carefully monitored and that the support should not be withdrawn too soon. They also discussed how to transition from emergency measures to supportive and more targeted measures.

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Finance ministers discuss the economic recovery in the European Union | GOV.SI - Gov.si