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The delegation comprised of envoys from Europe, Africa, South America and Asia

A delegation of 24 ambassadors to India, including those from France, European Union and Malaysia, arrived in Srinagar on a two-day visit to Jammu and Kashmir for making an assessment of the situation post the scrapping of the erstwhile state's special status in 2019.

The delegation, which comprised envoys from Europe, Africa, South America and Asia, were taken to a government college in Budgam in central Kashmir where they were received by the administration and briefed about the strengthening of local bodies, including panchayat, officials said.

The envoys from the EU, France, Malaysia, Brazil, Italy, Finland, Bangladesh, Cuba, Chile, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Senegal, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ireland, Ghana, Estonia, Bolivia, Malawi, Eritrea and Ivory Coast arrived amid heightened security arrangements in the city and elsewhere in the Valley, the officials said.

After a customary address, the envoys were seen moving freely with the panch and sarpanch, and understanding their issues and it was a free flow of ideas from both sides, officials said.

During their stay in the Valley, the delegation members are scheduled to meet the district development council members and civil society representatives, the officials said, adding they are scheduled to visit the revered Hazratbal shrine on the banks of Dal Lake as well.

The delegation is scheduled to visit Jammu tomorrow, where they are likely to meet the officials of the Union territory.

Parts of Srinagar observed a shutdown to mark the arrival of the envoys' delegation to Jammu and Kashmir. Shops in Lal Chowk and surrounding areas of the city remained shut as authorities deployed extra security personnel to ensure that the visit of the envoys passes off without any incident.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

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Foreign Envoys, Including From European Union, Visit J&K To Assess Situation - NDTV

Introduction

Migration policy has been at the centre of the political debate within and outside the European Union in recent years. It has been used as a rallying call for nationalists and rightwing movements, parties and governments, has threatened the integrity of the EU and put the solidarity among member states to the test. In the meantime, migrants are caught in the cross fire. During the peak of migration flows to the EU in 2015 the massive shortcomings and deep loopholes of the migration management system were exposed in the most tragic way. These deficiencies remain and have in many ways deepened since. The inhumane conditions of migrants in camps within and at the doorstep of the Union and the continued deadly traffic on the Mediterranean are evident examples of this. More recently, the Covid-19 pandemic rendered migrants conditions even more critical, especially for those in detention.

If migrants manage to enter the EU, they face huge challenges, of inclusion, acceptance, and access to rights. In terms of education, employment and access to essential services they are well behind EU citizens. This situation of structural inequality affects migrants first and foremost, but it also hampers the wellfunctioning of our economies and societies contributing to increased tensions, misuse of human capital, missed development opportunities, and fiscal gains.

The migration policy and the inclusion policy of the EU are two sides of the same coin, they need to complement and support each other to effectively fulfil their function. In this paper the frameworks of the two policy areas will be briefly introduced. Subsequently, the most recent developments at the EU level will be presented: the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027. To conclude, SOLIDARs stance will be laid out.

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Briefing Paper 97: The New Pact on Migration and Asylum & the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 - World - ReliefWeb

It was by design that Joe Biden deployed the term "inflection point" three times in his most significant foreign policy speech as president on Friday. He wanted to ensure the historic weight of his words was not missed.

Above all, he wanted his virtual audience at the Munich Security Conference to hear that global democracies faced a defining moment in their accelerating contest with authoritarianism, and that they dare not underestimate the stakes. It is an argument I have made frequently in this space, but one that had not yet been so clearly articulated by a U.S. president.

"We are in the midst of a fundamental debate about the future and direction of our world," Biden said to a receptive audience, though it was also an audience unsettled by the sudden, if welcome, shift from the cold shower of President Trump's America First to the global embrace of his successor.

"We are at an inflection point," Biden said, "between those who argue that, given all the challenges we face, from the fourth industrial revolution to a global pandemic, that autocracy is the best way forward and those who understand that democracy is essential, essential to meeting those challenges."

Biden's image, beamed to Munich from the White House, was symbolically framed on the large screens of the main stage beside German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron. After each of their three 15-minute speeches, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who had just finished chairing a virtual meeting of G-7 leaders, joined them for the Kumbaya moment.

Wolfgang Ischinger, chair of the Munich Security Conference, had every reason for satisfaction as he convened this reunion of the four allies who had done so much to repair Europe after World War II's devastation. Working with partners, those four countries took the lead in creating the rules-based institutions that have been at the center of global governance for the past 75 years.

Yet what lurked beneath this powerful moment was a growing recognition among senior Biden administration officials and their European counterparts of just how hard it will be to slow China's authoritarian momentum, particularly as it emerges as the first major economy to escape Covid-19, to restore growth, to engage in vaccine diplomacy and to offer the enticement of its some 1.4 billion consumers.

Thus, the Biden administration will need to develop a far more creative, far more intensive, and far more collaborative, give-and-take approach to its Asian and European allies than perhaps ever before. Galvanizing international common cause has seldom been this important, but it also perhaps has never been this difficult.

There are several reasons for that.

First, any U.S. policy must factor in China's role as the leading trading partner for most of America's key partners, including dethroning the United States in 2020 for the first time ever as the European Union's leading trade partner.

That will make most European countries, and in particular Germany, unwilling to consider any thoughts of decoupling from the Chinese economy or entering a new Cold War. The United States must be careful to consider the political and economic needs of its partnersand recognize they are unlikely to adopt a common, coordinated position on China without a cold-hearted calculation of their own national interests.

President Biden usefully factored that into his speech. "We cannot and must not return to the reflexive opposition and rigid blocs of the Cold War," he said. "Competition must not lock our cooperation on issues that affect us all. For example, we must cooperate if we're going to defeat Covid-19 everywhere."

Second, European doubts will persist for some time about the reliability of the American partnership, particularly given former President Trump's continued popularity, the political attraction of his "America First" policies, and his enduring role in Republican politics following his Senate acquittal.

That may result in many European officials hedging their bets.

A new survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations showed that although 57% of respondents saw Biden's victory as beneficial for the European Union, some 60% believe China will become more powerful than the U.S. over the next decade and 32% feel the U.S. can no longer be trusted.

Third, the Biden administration and its European partners must work to solve or head off strains across unsolved issues so that they don't sour the chance of a fresh start. These range from continued Trump administration tariffs and sanctions to Airbus-Boeing trade disputes to German-U.S. fights over the completion of the North Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Western Europe.

Work on completing the pipeline from Russia stopped last year, though $10 billion has been invested and the project is 94% complete, due to U.S. secondary sanctions.

In particular, the Biden administration must work proactively with EU leaders to head off looming fights over how best to manage and regulate the influence of America's technology giants, including questions of competition policy, of data management, of privacy and of digital taxation.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told CNBC that President Biden would be an "ally" in fighting disinformation online and stepping up the rules on how tech firms operate. However, growing EU talk about "digital sovereignty" underscores the potential for digital conflict across the Atlantic.

Finally, the Biden administration's reluctance to engage in new trade negotiationsand a lack of a sufficient Democratic or Republican constituency for such dealswill leave the United States competing with Beijing with a hand tied behind its back.

In the meantime, China has been reaching out to Asian partners through the 15-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a new EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI).

The thing about historic inflection points is they can turn in positive or negative directions with generational consequences. President Biden has usefully alerted us to our defining moment. So, there can be no excuse now if the U.S. and its global partners fail to engage in the hard work required in rising to this epochal challenge.

Frederick Kempe is a best-selling author, prize-winning journalist and president & CEO of the Atlantic Council, one of the United States' most influential think tanks on global affairs. He worked at The Wall Street Journal for more than 25 years as a foreign correspondent, assistant managing editor and as the longest-serving editor of the paper's European edition. His latest book "Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth" was a New York Times best-seller and has been published in more than a dozen languages. Follow him on Twitter@FredKempeand subscribe hereto Inflection Points, his look each Saturday at the past week's top stories and trends.

For more insight from CNBC contributors, follow @CNBCopinion on Twitter.

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Op-Ed: Biden sought to rally U.S. allies in Munich, but unity will prove difficult as China's influence grows - CNBC

18 February 2021

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On 24 December 2020, the EU and the UK reached a deal on theterms of their future free trade and cooperation agreement("TCA"). Comprising 1,200+ pages, the TCA was asignificant achievement in such a short timescale and avoided theUK leaving the EU without a deal at the end of the transitionperiod on 31 December 2020.

Although the TCA changes little of the immediate impact ofBrexit for product stakeholders in terms of new obligations (suchas using the UKCA mark, updating Declarations of Conformity andtraceability information), it does contain important implicationsfor the longer term, including:

It remains to be seen how the EU and UK will implement thesecommitments successfully as the regulatory requirements in the UKbegin to diverge from those in the EU. In the meantime, below isour summary of some of the key effects of the TCA for productstakeholders.

By way of background, from 1 January 2021, the UK has left theEU Single Market and Customs Union. This means that the UK nolonger benefits from the free movement of goods between the EU andGreat Britain (England, Scotland and Wales). However, the NorthernIreland Protocol, which is designed to avoid a hard border on theisland of Ireland, still allows for the free movement of goodsbetween Northern Ireland and the EU (and vice versa).

The EU and UK have the "right to regulate" goodsindependently within their own territories, subject to certainprovisions in the TCA which incorporates provisions from the WTOTechnical Barriers to Trade Agreement. These provisions aim toensure technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessmentprocedures are non-discriminatory and do not create unnecessaryobstacles to trade. The TCA does not contain mutual recognitionmeasures (apart from a limited number of provisions for certainproducts such as medicines and motor vehicles - which are discussedbelow). However, in reality the UK's freedom to regulate iscurrently fettered in respect of Northern Ireland as a result ofthe Northern Ireland Protocol, which requires products placed onthe Northern Irish market to continue to comply with the EU regime.As a result, for most products companies will now have to complywith two separate regulatory regimes for the EU (and NorthernIreland), and for Great Britain.

The TCA contains important provisions to try to ensure commonapproaches to future technical requirements for EU and UK goods andto simplify access to each other's markets. These include:

The TCA contains a framework for cooperation between the EU andUK, and in particular exchanging information on non-food productmarket surveillance and enforcement activities, risk assessmentmethods and product testing, and coordinated product recalls orother corrective actions.

An arrangement is to be set-up "preferably within sixmonths" for the regular exchange of information between the EUrapid alert system for unsafe non-food products ("RAPEX")and the new UK Product Safety Database.

There are some simplified measures to facilitate cooperation andtrade for certain products including motor vehicles, medicinalproducts and chemicals.

The TCA includes agreement on tariffs and rules of origin. Wewill be blogging separately on the details of these provisions, andon practical considerations to help businesses navigate the newproduct compliance, trade and customs rules.

The TCA was ratified by the UK Parliament on 30 December 2020and has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2021, pendingratification by the EU Parliament (this needs to be completed bythe end of February 2021, unless the parties agree to extend thisdate). On 10 February, the European Commission adopted a proposalto request an extension of this period until the end of April 2021,to allow time for the legal-linguistic revision of the TCA into 24languages of the EU Member States for its scrutiny by the EuropeanParliament and the Council.

The commitments by the EU and UK to cooperate and take commonapproaches to technical requirements for products will be welcomesigns for many product stakeholders. However, these provisions maybe difficult to implement if the UK starts to diverge significantlyfrom the EU regulatory position. We've already seen some signsthat the UK is willing to adopt its own approach outside the EU(for example in the context of construction products and medicaldevices).

What's more, as the TCA does not include mutual recognitionprovisions for most products - or strong commitments in relation tofuture regulation - the real test will be how these provisions playout in practice, and especially the extent to which the UK willfollow the EU's lead when it comes to its ambitious program ofreforms of the existing EU product regulatory regime (such as therevision to the EU's General Product Safety Directive and newupcoming legislation on AI, among many other initiatives in thepipeline). At this stage, it remains to be seen to what extent theTCA simply pays lip service to the notion of a close relationshipbetween the EU and UK when it comes to product regulation, whetherthere will be continued future cooperation in these areas, orwhether we will see increasing divergence in Europe.

The content of this article is intended to provide a generalguide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be soughtabout your specific circumstances.

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On March 25, 1957, the six ECSC members signed the two Treaties of Rome that established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)which was designed to facilitate cooperation in atomic energy development, research, and utilizationand the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC created a common market that featured the elimination of most barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, the prohibition of most public policies or private agreements that inhibit market competition, a common agricultural policy (CAP), and a common external trade policy.

The treaty establishing the EEC required members to eliminate or revise important national laws and regulations. In particular, it fundamentally reformed tariff and trade policy by abolishing all internal tariffs by July 1968. It also required that governments eliminate national regulations favouring domestic industries and cooperate in areas in which they traditionally had acted independently, such as international trade (i.e., trade with countries outside the EEC). The treaty called for common rules on anticompetitive and monopolistic behaviour and for common inland transportation and regulatory standards. Recognizing social policy as a fundamental component of economic integration, the treaty also created the European Social Fund, which was designed to enhance job opportunities by facilitating workers geographic and occupational mobility.

Map showing the composition of the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1957, when it was formed by the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to 1993, when it was renamed the European Community (EC) and was subsumed under the European Union (EU).

Significantly, the treatys common market reforms did not extend to agriculture. The CAP, which was implemented in 1962 and which became the costliest and most controversial element of the EEC and later the EU, relied on state intervention to protect the living standards of farmers, to promote agricultural self-sufficiency, and to ensure a reliable supply of products at reasonable prices.

Like the ECSC, the EEC established four major governing institutions: a commission, a ministerial council, an assembly, and a court. To advise the Commission and the Council of Ministers on a broad range of social and economic policies, the treaty created an Economic and Social Committee. In 1965 members of the EEC signed the Brussels Treaty, which merged the commissions of the EEC and Euratom and the High Authority of the ECSC into a single commission. It also combined the councils of the three organizations into a common Council of Ministers. The EEC, Euratom, and the ECSCcollectively referred to as the European Communitieslater became the principal institutions of the EU.

The Commission (officially known as the European Commission) consists of a permanent civil service directed by commissioners. It has had three primary functions: to formulate community policies, to monitor compliance with community decisions, and to oversee the execution of community law. Initially, commissioners were appointed by members to renewable four-year terms, which were later extended to five years. The Commission is headed by a president, who is selected by the heads of state or heads of government of the organizations members. In consultation with member governments, the president appoints the heads of the Directorate-Generals, which manage specific areas such as agriculture, competition, the environment, and regional policy. The Commission has shared its agenda-setting role with the European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Europe, an organization that is not an EU body), which consists of the leaders of all member countries. Established in 1974, the European Council meets at least twice a year to define the long-term agenda for European political and economic integration. The European Council is led by a president, an office that originally rotated among the heads of state or heads of government of member countries every six months. Upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the presidency was made permanent, with the officeholder being selected by European Council members. The president of the European Council serves a term of two and a half yearsrenewable onceand functions as the face of the EU in policy matters. The first president of the EU, as the office came to be known, was former Belgian prime minister Herman Van Rompuy.

The main decision-making institution of the EEC and the European Community (as the EEC was renamed in 1993) and the EU has been the Council of the European Union (originally the Council of Ministers), which consists of ministerial representatives. The composition of the council changes frequently, as governments send different representatives depending on the policy area under discussion. All community legislation requires the approval of the council. The president of the council, whose office rotates among council members every six months, manages the legislative agenda. Council meetings are chaired by a minister from the country that currently holds the presidency. The exception to this rule is the Foreign Affairs Council, which, since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, is under the permanent supervision of the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy.

The Common Assembly, renamed the European Parliament in 1962, originally consisted of delegates from national parliaments. Beginning in 1979, members were elected directly to five-year terms. The size of members delegations varies depending on population. The Parliament is organized into transnational party groups based on political ideologye.g., the Party of European Socialists, the European Peoples Party, the European Federation of Green Parties, and the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party. Until 1987 the legislature served only as a consultative body, though in 1970 it was given joint decision-making power (with the Council of Ministers) over community expenditures.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets community law, settles conflicts between the organizations institutions, and determines whether members have fulfilled their treaty obligations. Each member selects one judge, who serves a renewable six-year term; to increase efficiency, after the accession of 10 additional countries in 2004 the ECJ was allowed to sit in a grand chamber of only 13 judges. Eight impartial advocates-general assist the ECJ by presenting opinions on cases before the court. In 1989 an additional court, the Court of First Instance, was established to assist with the communitys increasing caseload. The ECJ has established two important legal doctrines. First, European law has direct effect, which means that treaty provisions and legislation are directly binding on individual citizens, regardless of whether their governments have modified national laws accordingly. Second, community law has supremacy over national law in cases where the two conflict. The promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty signaled the acceptance of these legal doctrines by national courts, and the ECJ has acquired a supranational legal authority.

Throughout the 1970s and 80s the EEC gradually expanded both its membership and its scope. In 1973 the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were admitted, followed by Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. (The United Kingdom had applied for membership in the EEC in 1963 and in 1966, but its application was vetoed by French Pres. Charles de Gaulle.) The communitys common external trade policy generated pressure for common foreign and development policies, and in the early 1970s the European Political Cooperation (EPC; renamed the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Maastricht Treaty), consisting of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of each country, was established to coordinate foreign policy. In 1975 the European Regional Development Fund was created to address regional economic disparities and to provide additional resources to Europes most deprived areas. In the same year, members endorsed the Lom Convention, a development-assistance package and preferential-trade agreement with numerous African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Members also made several attempts to manage their exchange rates collectively, resulting in the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1979.

The Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force on July 1, 1987, significantly expanded the EECs scope. It gave the meetings of the EPC a legal basis, and it called for more intensive coordination of foreign policy among members, though foreign policy decisions were made outside community institutions. The agreement brought the European Regional Development Fund formally into the communitys treaties as part of a new section on economic and social cohesion that aimed to encourage the development of economically depressed areas. As a result of the act, there was a substantial increase in funding for social and regional programs. The SEA also required the communitys economic policies to incorporate provisions for the protection of the environment, and it provided for a common research and technological-development policy, which was aimed primarily at funding transnational research efforts.

More generally, the SEA set out a timetable for the completion of a common market. A variety of legal, technical, fiscal, and physical barriers continued to limit the free movement of goods, labour, capital, and services. For example, differences in national health and safety standards for consumer goods were a potential impediment to trade. To facilitate the completion of the common market by 1992, the communitys legislative process was modified. Originally, the Commission proposed legislation, the Parliament was consulted, and the Council of Ministers made a final decision. The councils decisions generally needed unanimity, a requirement that gave each member a veto over all legislation. The SEA introduced qualified majority voting for all legislation related to the completion of the common market. Under this system, each member was given multiple votes, the number of which depended on national population, and approval of legislation required roughly two-thirds of the votes of all members. The new procedure also increased the role of the European Parliament. Specifically, legislative proposals that were rejected by the Parliament could be adopted by the Council of Ministers only by a unanimous vote.

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