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It is a well-established principle of international law that the state is obligated to fulfill its treaty obligations in good faith. This is and will remain the guiding principle in the UKs approach to international relations. However, in the extremely difficult and exceptional circumstances in which we find ourselves, it is important to remember the basic principle of parliamentary supremacy.

Parliament is sovereign in terms of domestic law and can pass legislation that violates the UKs treaty obligations. Parliament will not act unconstitutionally in enacting such legislation. This two-way approach is shared by other similar legal systems such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Under this approach, treaty obligations become binding only to the extent required by domestic legislation. Whether the enactment of legislation or its repeal, the content of that legislation is for Parliament and Parliament alone. This principle was recently approved unanimously by the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.

Legislation implementing the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Northern Ireland Protocol, is expressly governed by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliaments ability to pass provisions that would take precedence over the withdrawal agreement is explicitly affirmed in Section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act of 2020, with specific reference to the EU law concept of direct effect.

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Brexit: The European Union threatens to take legal action against the United Kingdom unless it rewrites the internal market bill - Mubasher | Policy -...

Third. In the discourse of the European Union, the link between stress resistance and external threats has become stronger. At the same time, terrorism and the energy supply have faded into the background, and disinformation and threats in the cyber environment have come to the fore. Russia in the discourse of the European Union has retained its (leading) position as the main source of these threats, but the topic of the dangers emanating from China has also become more active. The need to ensure the EU's stress tolerance in relation to disinformation and cybersecurity was clearly expressed in the European Council's statement in March of this year, and in the Communique from the European Commission in June this year, as well as in the programme of the troika of Presidents of the Council of Ministers.

Moreover, the Accounts Chamber has assessed the effectiveness of the EU's actions in the field of disinformation as an important aspect of ensuring the EU's stress resistance. Disinformation manifests itself in the context of how to more effectively combat the pandemic with medical means, and trust in the official authorities in general. The topic of cyber-threat turned out to be in demand due to the increased importance of telecommunication structures in politics and economics, especially given the growing importance of remote forms of interaction. But there were also accusations of attempts to steal the scientific results on vaccines from the EU.

Fourth, the EU focuses both on the development of citizens and public resources, as well as on official structures becoming more active. The latter were key during the course of the pandemic, but the EU discourse is now shifting in favour of giving more responsibility to citizens and public structures. In other words, the question of the resources of resilience remains open.

Finally, the term "resilience" has been voiced in recent weeks in the context of the EU's intention to ensure greater independence in the world arena. This is not directly related to the pandemic. The impetus was the restrictive new US measures against Nord Stream 2 and the desire to protect EU companies from secondary US sanctions. But from the point of view of the discourse on stress resistance, this is confirmed by the increasingly active use of this concept in relation to the integration association, and not to countries outside the Union, and the emphasis is on threats. Actions in this direction, if successful, can restore the effectiveness of the most powerful instrument of the EU's external action, its trade policy and economic ties. In recent years, their effectiveness has been reduced by the activity of the United States in the imposition of sanctions and its legislation, and the practice of applying secondary sanctions against all companies throughout the world.

Thus, the pandemic has contributed to a significant transformation of the EU's discourse on resilience to stress.

What significance can this have for Russia? First, the priority of internal problems also means the preservation of the deplorable state of relations between Moscow and Brussels. The appetite for drastic changes in foreign policy in Brussels was limited, even before, and has now almost disappeared. At the same time, the emphasis on the Green Deal as the basis for enhancing the EU's stress resistance threatens the closeness of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the energy sector: the fate of this interaction depends on whether gas finds a place in the process of the decarbonisation of the EU economy.

Second, the decline in normative rhetoric due to the transformation of the discourse on stress resistance does not mean that these values should be abandoned in the context of external relations.

Third, maintaining an emphasis on the threats to the EU's resistance to stress and perceptions of Russia as one of their sources is also negative, not only for official contacts, but also for the dialogue among civic groups, in which Brussels has seen an opportunity to compensate for stingy contacts with the Russian state officials. The general mistrust of Russia extends to the effectiveness of its fight against the pandemic, as it blocked the opening of its borders. And this, in turn, continues the trend of a catastrophic decline in the mutual socialisation of partners. Well, the vast benefits from strengthening the EU's stress resistance in terms of countering secondary US sanctions can hardly be expected, except the completion of the long-suffering Nord Stream 2.

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The Concept of Resilience in the European Union amid the Pandenic Era - Valdai Discussion Club

The European Union aims to impose economic sanctions on 31 senior Belarus officials including the countrys interior minister by mid-September, three EU diplomats said, in response to an August 9 election that the West says was rigged.

Almost a month into mass demonstrations against the outcome of the contest, in which President Alexander Lukashenko claimed victory to prolong his 26-year-old rule, the EU aims to punish the government crackdown and support calls for fresh elections.

We initially agreed on 14 names but many states felt that was not sufficient. We have now reached consensus on another 17, one EU diplomat said. These are senior officials responsible for the election, for violence and for the crackdown.

EU foreign ministers gave their broad political approval for the sanctions EU travel bans and asset freezes at a meeting in Berlin late last month but did not decide who to target.

As repression continued against the opposition on Monday, the European Commission said EU sanctions would be imposed very soon, but did not give details.

There is the political will and determination to have (sanctions) concluded as soon as possible, a spokesman for the EU executive told a news briefing. Its not a question of whether, only when.

Greece and Cyprus, which are pushing for separate sanctions on Turkey in a dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, still need to give their support to the Belarus blacklist.

All 27 EU countries must agree on such measures and Athens and Nicosia could use their support for the Belarus blacklist to obtain tough measures on Turkey, the diplomats said.

Names could still be added or taken off the list, but the diplomats said formal agreement is likely to come on Sept. 21, when EU foreign ministers hold their next scheduled meeting. The sanctions coming into effect on September 22.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia imposed their own sanctions on Belarus officials in late August. EU diplomats declined to say how closely the Baltic and the EU lists are, for fear of alerting those in question to move assets out of banks.

Interior Minister Yuri Karaev and his deputy are expected to be on the EU list, along with senior election commission, security and justice officials and ministers.

Unlike the Baltic lists, Lukashenko will not be sanctioned. Germany, who holds the six-month presidency of the EU, wants more time for dialogue and to leave open the possibility of adding the presidents name at a later stage.

The EU, which has an arms embargo on Belarus, in 2015 eased economic sanctions on Belarus that were first imposed in 2004, seeking better relations with Lukashenko, but now hopes to move quickly to reintroduce so-called restrictive measures.

The EU has been cautious about moving too quickly on punishing officials, wary of an intervention from Russia.

Belarus is the ally closest to Russia of all former Sovietrepublics, and Lukashenkos fate lies in the hands of the Kremlin, which must decide whether to stick with him as his authority has ebbed. Lukashenko has threatened to retaliate with reciprocal measures should any EU sanctions be imposed against Belarus.

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European Union to blacklist 31 Belarus senior officials over election, say diplomats - India Today

The European Union would likely be a productive mediator and not an antagonist as it is now. But it's not too late for the bloc to play a positive role.

After German mediation efforts were torpedoed by Greece signing a maritime delimitation deal with Egypt a day before the planned joint Turkish-Greek declaration, Turkey decided to continue its drilling activities within its continental shelf.

Greece, pushed by France, continues to escalate the rhetoric and threatens Turkey with European sanctions if Turkey does not stop its activities. The escalation between the neighbours has led to minor incidents in the sea and the airspace over the eastern Mediterranean.

What currently is being described as a major escalation, can be resolved. To find a path forward, one can speculate over the hypothetical: how might the disagreement have evolved if Turkey was a member of the European Union?

In the early years of the AK Party government, Ankara's relationship with the EU was flourishing, and the acceleration process came to a point where the EU membership seemed well within reach for Turkey.

However, the leadership in Europe proved unwilling to accept Turkey as a member state. Since then, both sides drifted apart but have tried to preserve the relationship as much as possible. If Turkey had become a member, today's escalation in the eastern Mediterranean would seem less intractable.

In such a scenario, the EU would be within an equal distance from both of its member states, the possible oil and gas resources would be seen as a common interest to minimise Turkey's and southern Europe's dependence on Russian gas. The disagreement over maritime boundaries would be discussed in a fair manner, and most likely EU member states would argue based on international law and equity.

Most likely, the Greek claims for the island of Meis (Kastellorizo) would not find any genuine support in the EU. The issue could quite easily be solved through an informal meeting of European leaders.

French, Italian, Turkish and energy companies of other nations would compete for lucrative opportunities in the eastern Mediterranean, and by rapidly solving the crisis and joining hands, the EU would reduce its dependency on foreign energy imports. With gas and oil discoveries and the growing trend of moving to renewable energy, the EU's energy policy would be more independent than ever before.

Even though this parallel world sounds idyllic, the realities right now are on the opposite end of the spectrum. Out of solidarity with Greece, the EU member states are putting their weight behind Athens' maximalist approach.

France, which itself rejected the same claims that Greece is making today, in its own dispute with the United Kingdom over the Channel Islands, is now Athens' strongest advocate. The animosity from Paris towards Ankara due to disagreements in Syria and Libya, and the idea of solidarity within the EU, is playing a destructive role.

France has become more visible, but the entirety of the European Union now backs the irrational Greek claims and is condemning Turkish drilling activities. This is despite the fact that current drilling activities are taking place in an area where Greek claims are the weakest.

At the moment, the EU has threatened Turkey with sanctions to be declared on the next official summit between the EU member states. European Council President Charles Michel stated that the EU will not only use sticks but also carrots to convince Turkey.

Although this approach by the EU is better than the 'only stick' approach by the US, it likely won't succeed. Contrary to the past, Turkey now also has sticks and carrots to use against the EU in general, and specific member states within the EU in particular.

Additionally, there seems to be no stick long enough, and no carrot big enough, to prevent Ankara from gaining energy independence a dream for Turks since the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

Turkey's threat perception in on high alert due to illegal Greek activities in the Aegean Sea, and the EU is ignoring that factor. In spite of several international treaties, the Greeks have militarised several islands and declared its intention to expand the territorial waters of its islands from 6 nautical miles to 12 miles.

Due to the high density of Greek islands, increasing the territorial waters regime in the Aegean Sea would cut off Turkey and its link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. This would be a massive blow to the economy of the region.

Despite the current escalation, it is still not too late to find a comprehensive solution, but for this, the EU has to change its attitude and act as a mediator and not a provocateur.

Imagining how different the EU would have reacted if Turkey had become an EU member state. Right now, the EU needs to build trust with Turkey and prove that it is willing to facilitate negotiations on an equal footing. For that purpose, the EU can organise an unofficial EU and Turkey meeting just as if Turkey was a member of the EU.

Genuine incorporation of Turkish interests on an equal basis into an informal discussion between EU states will help to solve the crisis without further escalation.

This major meeting can function as the framework for further Turkish-Greek negotiations to resolve the conflict and settle the disagreement. For this option to have any chance, more genuine actors such as Germany, Spain and Bulgaria could play a more active role instead of actors such as France and Austria who are partly motivated by domestic politics.

A joint unofficial meeting between the leaders or foreign ministers of the European Union and Turkey could change the entire atmosphere from one of antagonism and escalation to one geared towards resolution.

In the second step, depending on the terms of the agreement in the summit, an international court, direct negotiations, or mediation by the Swiss as a non-EU state could be a way forward to a win-win solution.

At the end of the day, the exploration of gas and oil in the Mediterranean would benefit both the EU and Turkey while undercutting Russia, Iran, and the Gulf states.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World.

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What would the eastern Mediterranean look like if Turkey was in the EU? - TRT World

The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the assassination attempt on Alexei Navalny, who was poisoned by a military chemical nerve agent of the Novichok group, similar to the one used in the assassination attempt on Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury on 4 March 2018.

The use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable under any circumstances, constitutes a serious breach of international law and international human rights standards. The European Union calls for a joint international response and reserves the right to take appropriate actions, including through restrictive measures.

This new assassination attempt on a Russian citizen took place on the territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian government must do its utmost to investigate this crime thoroughly in full transparency and bring those responsible to justice. Impunity must not and will not be tolerated. The European Union calls upon the Russian Federation to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to ensure an impartial international investigation.

We are grateful to the Charit Universittsmedizin hospital in Berlin for the treatment of Mr Navalny and wish him a prompt and full recovery.

The European Union will continue to closely follow the issue and consider its implications.

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Russia: Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the poisoning of Alexei Navalny - EU News