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Rendering of Intel's planned factories in Magdeburg, Germany.Source: Intel

Intel announced plans to invest as much as 80 billion into semiconductor initiatives within the European Union. The company's plans include an initial 17 billion investment to create a fab mega-site in Germany and will advance research and development and manufacturing across the EU. Intel will create a new R&D hub in France, expand its investment in its foundry services in Ireland, and increase its manufacturing and foundry services in Italy, Poland, and Spain.

It will take some time for the investment to yield results, but it should greatly expand Intel's production capabilities with Europe once completed.

Intel will build two semiconductor fabs in Magdeburg, Germany, which is the capital of Saxony-Anhalt. Planning will begin immediately, and construction should start in the first half of 2023. Those fabs should begin production in 2027, though that is pending European Commission approval.

The two new fabs in Germany will use Intel's Angstrom-era transistor technologies and be used for the company's foundry services and its own chip production.

"Our planned investments are a major step both for Intel and for Europe," said Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger. "The EU Chips Act will empower private companies and governments to work together to drastically advance Europe's position in the semiconductor sector. This broad initiative will boost Europe's R&D innovation and bring leading-edge manufacturing to the region for the benefit of our customers and partners around the world. We are committed to playing an essential role in shaping Europe's digital future for decades to come."

Intel will also spend 12 billion to double the manufacturing space and to bring Intel 4 process technology to its facilities in Leixlip, Ireland. After that expansion, Intel will have invested more than 30 billion in Ireland.

Italy and Intel have also entered negotiations to create a back-end manufacturing facility with an investment of up to 4.5 billion. If created, the factory will start operating between 2025 and 2027.

Intel also announced plans to build a new R&D hub near Plateau de Saclay, France. The company will also make France its European headquarters for high-performance computing and artificial intelligence design capabilities.

By the end of 2023, Intel will increase its lab space by 50% in Gdansk, Poland to focus on deep neural networks, audio, graphics, data center, and cloud computing.

Notably, this investment is being made by Intel within the European Union, not across a broader collection of European countries. The UK lost Intel chip factory consideration due to Brexit. That is now having a real-world impact in the form of Intel choosing to invest elsewhere in Europe.

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Intel to invest up to 80 billion in European Union to expand semiconductor manufacturing and development - Windows Central

How can digital technology then foster plurilingualism in European institutions, in their internal working and in their external communication? What are todays obstacles to the wider teaching of languages in Europe and the development of ambitious policies to promote linguistic diversity? What should be the broad lines of the training and mobility of European citizens and civil servants in terms of strengthening linguistic diversity in Europe? How can the economic sector play a role in this diversity and what are the positive gains for companies?

These are the questions that will be raised and discussed by the conferences participants. Representatives of European Union Member States and European institutions, contributors in the field, civil society leaders and those working to further Francophonie will be called upon to share their experiences. Their common goal is to develop and promote linguistic diversity as a way to build European citizenship.

The event will take the form of four successive round tables, after the session of introductory remarks moderated by French, European and international senior officials.

Following the Innovation, Technology and Plurilingualism Forum organized by the Ministry of Culture from 7 to 9 February 2022, the first round table will question the benefits of digital innovation. It will focus on the benefits of innovation both in terms of the implementation of multilingualism within the European institutions, and how it is communicated to citizens. It will focus on showing how we can strengthen visibility and facilitate access to plurilingual content online.

The language of Europe is translation

Umberto Eco.

The second round table will highlight the benefit for each European of learning a second foreign language. It will show how fluency in several languages fosters employment and mobility, especially through the Erasmus+ programme. It will emphasize the benefit of bilateral cooperation at local and regional levels to promote multilingualism in Europe. This sequence is aligned with the objective of building a European Education Area by 2025, where proficiency in several languages is a condition for studying and working abroad and discovering the cultural diversity of Europe.

"Being able to speak different languages is a condition for studying and working abroad, and fully discover Europes cultural diversity"

European Commission Communication of 30 September 2020 on achieving the European Education Area by 2025.

The third round table will discuss the link between language proficiency, training and mobility in the HR strategies of national and European administrations. It will be an opportunity to talk about language-learning throughout ones career, both for European civil servants and public sector employees who work in the permanent representations of Member States.

The final round table will aim to illustrate that linguistic diversity in Europe contributes to economic growth, the creation of jobs and the employment of European citizens in all businesses. Personal accounts will illustrate the benefits of plurilingualism for Europeans and initiatives in cross-border areas will be highlighted.

Professor Christian Lequesne, author of a report in 2021 on linguistic diversity in the European institutions and within Member States, will oversee the feedback from round tables. The Minister Delegate for Tourism, French Nationals Abroad, Francophonie and for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, MrJean-Baptiste Lemoyne, and the Minister of State for European Affairs will close the conference and hold a joint press conference.

Key figures Around 4,000 interpreters work in Brussels for the European institutions, and more than 2.5 million pages are translated into the 24 official languages every year.

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Conference on Linguistic Diversity and the French language in the European Union (15 Mar. 22) - France Diplomatie

The European Unions 25 February wave of sanctions build on, and significantly expand, its existing sanctions on Russia, imposing wide-ranging restrictions on the Russian economyincluding in respect of Russias access to financial and capital marketsand the oil refining, aviation, and space sectors. More sanctions from the European Union are expected in the coming days, along with announcements on the disconnection of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT system.

The February 25 sanctions package was adopted by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 and came into effect on 26 February 2022. These sanctions build on the regime imposed on Russia by the European Union in 2014 (Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014), together with those adopted by the European Union on 23 February 2022. The new sanctions both strengthen existing restrictions and impose additional restrictions on the trade in goods and associated services to significant sectors of the Russian economy. The new trade sanctions apply irrespective of whether the goods or technology originate in the European Union.

The European Union has imposed new prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer, or export to any Russian person or entity or for use in Russia (directly or indirectly) of specific goods and technologies suited for use in oil refining, together with restrictions on the provision of certain related services and financing. A list of the specified items is set out at the new Annex X to Regulation 833/2014.

There is a temporary exemption (or wind-down period) that effectively allows EU persons to continue to perform a contract (or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of that contract) until 27 May 2022, provided that the contract was entered into before 26 February 2022. Furthermore, specific licences can be sought for the prevention or mitigation of events likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

These new restrictions are in addition to the previous restrictions imposed on Russias energy sector in relation to oil exploration and production and associated services, which restrictions remain fully in effect.

A number of new restrictions have been introduced in relation to Russias aviation and space sector, including prohibitions on

A carve-out has been included which is intended to allow a short window (until 28 March 2022) within which EU persons and entities can execute contracts concluded before 26 February 2022 (and ancillary contracts necessary for the executions of such contracts) that are otherwise prohibited by paragraphs (i) and (iii) above. Notably, the carve-out does not extend to the insurance and reinsurance provisions or the activities in paragraph (ii) above.

A new prohibition introduced on 28 February 2022 pursuant to Regulation 2022/334 prohibits any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements; any Russian-registered aircraft; or any non-Russian-registered aircraft which is owned or chartered, or otherwise controlled by, any Russian person or entity from landing in, taking off from, or overflying the territory of the European Union. A member state may provide a licence on humanitarian grounds or for a purpose that is consistent with the objectives of Regulation 833/2014.

The European Union has expanded the pre-existing restrictions on the export of controlled dual-use items to Russia by removing the previous requirement that the item be intended for military use and/or a military end user, i.e., there is now a blanket ban on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items (and certain associated services) to any Russian person or for use in Russia (subject to certain derogations). Dual-use goods are items that have both a civilian and a military application; they are identified in Council Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

The new sanctions further prohibit the sale, supply, transfer or export of items (and certain associated services) to Russian persons, or for use in Russia, that may contribute to Russias military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector. An extensive list of these items is included at the new Annex VII to Regulation 833/2014 and includes items related to encryption, electronics, telecoms, lasers, navigation and avionics, and computers/electronics.

Certain exemptions apply, including for humanitarian, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes; non-governmental cybersecurity; software updates; temporary use by news media; and personal use. Licences will not normally be required where the exemptions apply. However, it may be necessary in some circumstances to declare any impacted items on customs declaration forms and to inform the competent authority/authorities of the reliance on an exemption.

Specific licences may also be available depending on the items and purpose for which they are intended.

The European Union has imposed additional restrictions on Russias access to capital marketsincluding extending restrictions on dealings involving transferable securities and money market instruments and/or new loans or credit to four additional Russian banks (Alfa Bank, Bank Otkritie, Bank Rossiya, and Promsvyazbank) and to eight state-owned companies (Almaz-Antey, Kamaz, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, Rostec, Russian Railways, JSC PO Sevmash, Sovcomflot, and United Shipbuilding Corporation). These entities are identified at new Annexes XII and XIII of Regulation 833/2014.

Furthermore, the existing measures have been strengthened so that there will be no minimum maturity limit in respect of (i) transferable securities and money market instruments issued after 12 April 2022; and (ii) new loans and credit after 26 February 2022.

From 12 April 2022, it will also be prohibited to list and provide services on trading venues registered or recognized in the European Union for the transferable securities of any entity established in Russia and with more than 50% public ownership.

The new sanctions package also contains further prohibitions relating to transferable securities.

EU financial institutions are prohibited from accepting deposits of more than EUR 100,000 euros (approximately $112,000) from Russian nationals, residents, or entities. In addition, they must report any deposits in excess of these limits by no later than 27 May 2022 and will be required to provide an update every 12 months.

Certain exemptions apply, including deposits necessary for lawful trade in goods and services between the European Union and Russia, as well as individuals basic needs, civil society activities, humanitarian purposes, reasonable legal/professional fees, and certain extraordinary expenses (although licences will need to be obtained in relation to most of the above).

Further, while nationals and residents of EU member states are exempt from these measures, financial institutions must provide details of deposits exceeding these limits held by Russian nationals or residents who have acquired EU member state citizenship or EU residence rights through an investor citizenship or residence scheme.

The European Union has prohibited the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Russia.

Exemptions are available for (i) binding financing or financial assistance commitments established prior to 26 February 2022; (ii) the provision of public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of 10,000,000 euros (approximately $11,200,000) per project to small and medium-sized enterprises established in the European Union; and (iii) the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade in food and for agricultural, medical, or humanitarian purposes.

In addition to the restrictions above, following Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/331, the European Union has also designated an additional 99 individuals, including the Russian president and the foreign minister. This list also includes certain Belarusian persons identified as having participated in or supported Russias military activities in Ukraine.

It is already anticipated that the European Union will impose further sanctions against Russia in the coming weeks, including significant further designations against those seen as either benefiting from or supporting those deemed responsible for Russias actions in Ukraine.

[View source.]

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Update: European Union Agrees on Further Sanctions on Russia - JD Supra

Other avenues are available to the EU if it wishes or needs to reduce reliance on Russian gas even more quickly but with notable trade-offs.5 The main near-term option would involve switching away from gas use in the power sector via an increased call on Europes coal-fired fleet or by using alternative fuels primarily liquid fuels within existing gas-fired power plants.

Given that these alternatives to gas use would raise the EUs emissions, they are not included in the 10-Point Plan described above. However, they could displace large volumes of gas relatively quickly. We estimate that a temporary shift from gas to coal- or oil-fired generation could reduce gas demand for power by some 28 bcm before there was an overall increase in the EUs energy-related emissions.

The larger share of this potential decrease in gas demand would be possible through gas-to-coal switching: an additional 120 TWh in coal-fired generation could cut gas demand by 22 bcm in one year. In addition to opportunities to run on biomethane, nearly a quarter of the EUs fleet of gas-fired power plants is capable of using alternative fuels nearly all in the form of liquid fuels. Taking advantage of this capability could displace another 6 bcm of natural gas demand a year, depending on sufficient financial incentives to switch fuels and the availability of those fuels.

If this fuel-switching option were to be fully exercised in addition to the complete implementation of the 10-Point Plan described above, it would result in a total annual reduction in EU imports of gas from Russia of more than 80 bcm, or well over half, while still resulting in a modest decline in overall emissions.

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A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas Analysis - IEA - IEA

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Mikhail Svetlov | Getty Images News | Getty Images

Hungary's Viktor Orban, a longtime ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and thorn in the side of fellow EU leaders, has had a week of sharp reversals and swift political retreats.

After Russia last week formally recognized Luhansk and Donetsk as Russian-backed separatist-controlled regions in Ukraine, the EU started work on an initial round of sanctions against Moscow. But there was one major concern in Brussels: Will Hungary and its nationalist leader Orban approve them?

An EU official, who preferred to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the discussions, told CNBC last week that it was a key moment for Orban to show whether he was loyal to Russia, or the EU.

Fast forward a couple of days and the response from Hungary's prime minister has surprised many political experts and has been welcomed in Brussels.

"It is important that Hungary has joined and fostered EU unity," another EU official, who also preferred to remain anonymous, told CNBC Tuesday.

Orban has often boasted of his close relationship with Putin. Speaking at a joint news conference in early February, Orban referenced how they had worked together for the last 13 years, while adding that the two "have the longest memory of the European Union and Russia's leadership," according to Politico.

Their close links were seen during the coronavirus pandemic, for example. Hungary became the first EU nation to buy a Russian-made Covid vaccine even though it wasn't approved by European regulators.

There have been commercial and energy deals, too. Over the last decade, Hungary has increased its share of imports of Russian natural gas, from 9.070 million cubic meters in 2010 to a high of 17.715 million cubic meters in 2019, according to Eurostat.

But Orban has, so far, chosen the EU in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has turned his back on Putin.

His government announced that Hungary will welcome Ukrainian refugees and is also supportive of Ukraine's membership application to the EU. This is on top of having approved, together with the other EU member states, tough sanctions against Russian oligarchs and the Russian economy.

"Orban is an opportunist. He would get very little out of siding with Russia these days.Future support from Putin is very uncertain and might not play well with his own electorate.This is why he goes along with the sanctions," Daniel Gros, distinguished fellow at the think tank CEPS, told CNBC via email.

Orban's office was not immediately available when contacted by CNBC on Tuesday.

"He wants to be a respected leader and senses that his population does not want to have a fight with the EU," Gros said.

Orban is facing an election on April 3 and opinion polls show the race will be tight against the opposition party.

Katalin Cseh, a Hungarian lawmaker at the European Parliament, told CNBC Wednesday that Orban is in a "very difficult" position because he "has tried to sell the idea that Russia is a friend, but Russia is not a friend."

At the same time, Hungarians seem to be in favor of the EU. A poll released in January showed that more than 70% of the respondents consider "disadvantageous" if they were to leave the EU, according to Statista.

Cseh added it is unclear what sort of path Orban would take toward Russia if reelected.

Andrius Tursa, Central and Eastern Europe advisor at consultancy Teneo, told CNBC that those voting for Orban's party in Hungary hadn't previously minded his close links to Russia, but said it would now be interesting to see if public opinion switches in the aftermath of the invasion.

Tursa also said that "pressure from the Europeans" and the "unexpected size" of the Russian aggression likely influenced Orban's decision to support the EU. However, he cautioned that Hungary is against the transit of weapons to Ukraine through its borders.

Hungary's government spokesperson tweeted Tuesday that the country is not sending soldiers or weapons to Ukraine "because that'd put Hungarian lives into jeopardy."

Germany, for example, is among the EU nations sending weapons to Ukraine in what represents a massive shift in policy for the nation.

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Putin loses his key ally in the EU as Hungary's Orban turns on the Russian leader - CNBC