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DUBLIN--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The "European Union: Thermometers Market" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.

This report presents a strategic analysis of the thermomers market in the European Union and a forecast for its development in the medium term. It provides a comprehensive overview of the market, its dynamics, structure, characteristics, main players, growth and demand drivers, etc.

The purpose of the report is to describe the state of the thermomers market in the European Union, to present actual and retrospective information about the volumes, dynamics, structure and characteristics of production, imports, exports and consumption and to build a forecast for the market in the next five years. In addition, the report presents an elaborate analysis of the main market participants, price fluctuations, growth and demand drivers of the market and all other factors, influencing its development.

This research report has been prepared using the publisher's unique methodology, including a blend of qualitative and quantitative data. The information comes from official sources and insights from market experts (representatives of the main market participants), gathered by semi-structured interviews.

The report on the thermomers market in the European Union covers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The report includes:

This report will allow you to:

Key Topics Covered

1. Introduction

1.1. Report description

1.2. Research methodology

2. Executive summary

3. Characteristics of Thermometers

4. Characteristics and analysis of raw materials base

5. State of the economy of the European Union

5.1. Characteristics of the economy of the European Union in 2014-2018

5.2. Forecast for the development of the economy of the European Union for 2019-2021

6. Overview and analysis of the Thermometers market in the European Union

6.1. Volume, value and dynamics of the Thermometers market in the European Union in 2014-2018

6.2. Structure of the Thermometers market in the European Union in 2014-2018: production, imports, exports, consumption

6.3. Structure of the Thermometers market in the European Union by types of Thermometers

6.4. Structure of the Thermometers market in the European Union by origin

6.5. Structure of the Thermometers market in the European Union by country

6.6. Key recent trends on the Thermometers market in the European Union

6.7. Competitive landscape of the market

6.8. Country opportunity analysis

6.9. Key drivers and restraints for the market development in the medium term

6.10. Forecast for development of the Thermometers market in the European Union for 2019-2024

7. Overview and analysis of the domestic production of Thermometers in the European Union

7.1. Volume, value and dynamics of the domestic production of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018

7.2. Structure of the domestic production of Thermometers by types of Thermometers

7.3. Structure of the EU production of Thermometers by countries

7.4. Characteristics of the main producers of Thermometers in the European Union

8. Characteristics and analysis of the prices of Thermometers in the European Union

8.1. Value chain analysis

8.2. Structure of price formation

8.3. Characteristics of the producer prices of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018

8.4. Characteristics of other prices of Thermometers

9. Foreign trade operations of Thermometers in the European Union

9.1. Foreign trade operations of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018

10. Overview and analysis of the imports of Thermometers to the EU market

10.1. Volume, value and dynamics of the imports of Thermometers to the European Union in 2014-2018

10.2. Major trade inflows of Thermometers imports to the European Union

10.3. Structure of the imports of Thermometers by types of products

10.4. Prices of imported Thermometers in the European Union

11. Overview and analysis of the EU exports of Thermometers

11.1. Volume, value and dynamics of the EU exports of Thermometers in 2014-2018

11.2. Major trade outflows of Thermometers exports from the European Union

11.3. Structure of the EU exports of Thermometers by types of products

11.4. Prices of EU exports of Thermometers

12. Characteristics of the consumption of Thermometers in the European Union

12.1. Volume, value and dynamics of the consumption of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018

12.2. Structure of the consumption of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018 (by origin, by channel, by type of Thermometers)

12.3. Structure of the consumption of Thermometers in the European Union by country

12.4. Volume, value and dynamics of the per capita consumption of Thermometers in the European Union in 2014-2018

12.5. Balance between supply and demand on the Thermometers market in the European Union in 2014-2018 and forecast for 2019-2024

13. Forecast for development of the Thermometers market in the European Union for 2019-2024

13.1. Factors, influencing the development of the Thermometers market in the European Union in the medium term

13.2. Forecast for market development in the medium term under three possible scenarios

For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/n6liud

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Analysis of Thermometers Markets in the European Union, 2014-2024 - ResearchAndMarkets.com - Business Wire

Today the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) published its updated Risk Dashboard based on the first quarter of 2020 Solvency II data.

The results show that the risk exposures of the European Union insurance sector remain generally high compared to April as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemics continued to cause disruptions in all financial sectors and economic activities. Insurers are particularly exposed to very high levels of macro risk, while market, credit, profitability and solvency risks are at high level.

With regard to macro risk, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth as well as inflation forecasts have been revised significantly downwards for all geographical areas. The unemployment rate increased following a steep fall of business activities. Fiscal balances are expected to deteriorate. As a response to the crisis, the governments announced their interventions to sustain the halted economies.

Credit risk remains at high level, as the risk of credit events persist elevated going forward. Profitability and solvency risks remain at high level. Following the COVID-19 impact, the expected deterioration is already reflected in asset over liabilities and in weakening of Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) ratios for groups and non-life undertakings. A further drop of SCR ratios for both life and non-life undertakings is expected for the next quarter, with the depreciation of assets in the context of COVID-19 as well as effects of already pre-existing low yield environment. The net combined ratio improved for non-life insurance undertakings.

Insurance risks decreased to medium level. On one hand, year-on-year premium growth for life undertakings significantly declined indicating already a negative impact from the COVID-19 outbreak. On the other hand, year-on-year premium growth for non-life undertakings and loss ratio show a slight improvement. Catastrophe loss ratio continues increasing following the significant events occurred during 2019 and 2020.

Market perceptions remained stable at medium level. Stocks of life and non-life insurance undertakings continued to underperform relative to the market, which in contrast experienced an unexpected increase. Insurers Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads returned to lower level, with insurers external outlooks showing a net increase in negative revision as of June 2020.

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EIOPA's Risk Dashboard: European insurers remain exposed to high risks since the outbreak of COVID-19 - EU News

The aim of this document is to describe COVID-19 clusters and outbreaks in the EU/EEA and the UK linked to occupational settings, including healthcare and non-healthcare settings, and to identify possible factors contributing to transmission in these settings.

Outbreaks and clusters of COVID-19 in a variety of occupational settings have been reported since the start of the pandemic in the European Union, the European Economic Area (EU/EEA) and the United Kingdom (UK). Fifteen EU/EEA countries and the UK reported 1 376 clusters of COVID-19 in occupational settings which occurred between March and early July 2020.

Workers in occupations which bring them in close physical proximity to other people (co-workers, patients, customers, etc.), particularly when working in indoor settings or with shared transport or accommodation, are more exposed to and at higher risk of COVID-19 in the absence of mitigation measures.

The majority of occupational COVID-19 clusters reported were from the health sector, however testing of healthcare workers has been prioritised in all EU/EEA countries and the UK. Large numbers of clusters were also reported from the food packaging and processing sectors, in factories and manufacturing, and in office settings. Fewer clusters were reported from the mining sector, however some of these clusters have been large.

Occupations are commonly linked to socio-economic status which can also affect the individuals risk of COVID-19. Moreover, workers in many essential sectors cannot work from home, which may explain why certain occupations have been shown to have a higher risk of COVID-19 infection and mortality than others.

Increased focus on testing for COVID-19 in workplace settings, combined with robust polices on physical distancing, hygiene and cleaning, appropriate use of personal protective equipment (PPE) where necessary and hand hygiene, particularly in closed settings and situations where workers have extended contact or share transportation and accommodation, will help prevent further COVID-19 outbreaks.

Robust surveillance and contact tracing are essential, as are clear protocols on how to address outbreaks when they are detected.

Within the EU there is a body of occupational safety and health legislation in place, including legislation on the protection of workers from biological agents at work. This legislation sets out technical and organisational measures to be implemented by employers at work places following a workplace risk assessment. Specific guidance is available at EU and national level on how to protect workers and this includes the sectors and occupations where clusters have occurred.

Collaboration between public health and occupational health and safety agencies at local and national level will help with communication and mitigation of the spread of COVID-19 in occupational settings and communities in the EU/EEA and the UK.

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COVID-19 clusters and outbreaks in occupational settings in the EU/EEA and the UK - EU News

DAVAO CITY: Twenty-two fish centers equipped with ice-maker cold storage and processing facilities located in some coastal provinces of Mindanao have been identified for funding under the European Union-funded Mindanao Peace and Development Program (Minpad). Mindanao Development Authority Chairman Emmanuel Pinol said the fish centers, estimated to cost about P200 million, would be interconnected through a digital platform that will monitor daily catch and establish market linkage. He added that the facilities were expected to boost fishery and aquaculture productivity in Mindanao while upgrading the fisheries sector to make it compliant with international standards against unreported and unregulated fishing. The Mindanao Fisheries and Aquaculture Development was identified as one of the critical programs that could address poverty in Mindanao, increase productivity and trigger the regions economic recovery post-coronavirus, Pinol said. The funding for the Minpad projects will come from the P2.1-billion EU Grant Fund that had been signed earlier between the EU Delegation to the Philippines and the Philippine government through the Department of Finance.

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European Union To Fund 22 Fish Centers In Mindanao The Manila Times - The Manila Times

On Tuesday last week, European Union leaders agreed to a pandemic recovery deal that marks a historic step forward for European integration. By Friday, cronies of Hungarys autocratic prime minister, Viktor Orban, had effectively shut down the largest remaining independent news website in Hungary. The timing was not a coincidence.

The EU pandemic recovery deal, which includes large-scale collective borrowing and offers grants to states hit hard by the pandemic, contains much for Europhiles to praise. As the French economist Shahin Valle wrote in the Guardian, common debt, common expenditure and the possibility of common taxationwhich all seemed out of reach over the last decadewere accepted this week unanimously.

But the deal also comes with a dark underbelly. Although it included some vague, watered-down language about plans to condition EU funds on respect for the rule of law, its main message to autocrats and aspiring autocrats in the bloc was one of appeasement: The EU would continue to hand them billions of euros in subsidies and not stand up to them for the time being. In short, the deal delivered a more deeply integrated EU, but one that still provides a comfortable home for hybrid authoritarian regimes.

Coming into the summit, there had been talk of explicitly linking the 750 billion euro ($880 billion) Next Generation EU recovery fund and the 1.074 trillion euro ($1.26 trillion) EU budget for 2021-2027 to a so-called rule of law conditionality that would explicitly authorize the EU to suspend funding to governments with generalised deficiencies in the rule of law. Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Ruttea leader of the so-called Frugal Four group of member states that resisted large pandemic-related bailouts and demanded that recipients commit to economic reformsinsisted that rule of law conditionality for EU funding was one of his governments red lines. In turn, Orban complained that the Dutch guy was blocking the budget deal and speculated that he must hate me or Hungary. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that EU money should not flow to rogue regimes, insisting on a new maxim: no rule of law, zero euros.

It turned out that they were not serious. The final text of the deal does require states to introduce economic reforms to access the recovery fund, but it barely mentions rule of law. The deal simply kicks the issue down the road by noting that a regime of conditionality to protect the budget and Next Generation EU will be introduced at some point in the future.

To be fair, the deal did at least open a small window for action: The European Council has spent the past two years blocking outright a proposal for a rule of law conditionality mechanism, and the deal did indicate that leaders may eventually give their blessing to a watered-down version of that proposal. But whether the EU will actually introduce a robust system tying its funding to respect for democratic valuesmuch less whether that system will ever lead to the actual suspension of fundsremains to be seen.

No one should be surprised that EU members backed down on rule of law. Southern members struggling most with the economic consequences of the pandemic were desperate for financial assistance. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Macron were determined to prevent a north-south split within the union and to show that, after initial missteps, the EU could deliver an effective response to the crisis. There was huge pressure to reach an agreement quickly, but that deal had to be agreed by unanimity in the European Council. And it is no surprise that Orban and the increasingly authoritarian government of Poland would have vetoed any plan they believed might lead to the suspension of their EU funds.

It would thus be unfair to view the pandemic rescue package as a new Faustian pact with the EUs pet autocrats, because in truth the union traded its democratic soul to them long ago. EU leaders real failures in defending the rule of law didnt occur at last weeks summit but over the past several years, when they persistently looked the other way as Hungary and Poland made a mockery of the EUs values. In a sense, the whole debate last week about the conditionality mechanism was a distraction. It offered yet another example of what the Middlesex University professor Laurent Pech has called the EU new-instrument creation cycle, in which Brussels excuses its failure to respond to democratic backsliding by member governments with the false claim that it lacks adequate tools for doing so and then calls for the introduction of new tools. As the old saying goes, a bad workman always blames his tools.

The truth is that the EU has plenty of tools at its disposal, but that for political reasons it simply refuses to make robust use of them. Consider first the European Commission. As the Princeton University professor Kim Lane Scheppele and I have argued, the commission already has the authority under the EUs structural funds regulations to suspend money to member states if they dont follow the unions rules and norms. But it has refused to do this. The commission could also make much more robust use of its standard law-enforcement toolinfringement proceedings before the European Court of Justiceto defend democratic values. But the current commission has brought no new infringement proceedings against the Orban government relating to the Treaty on European Unions Article 2 values and has slow-pedaled existing infringements against the Polish government, even as Polish authorities openly defy European Court of Justice rulings against it. The commission has also refused to use other powerful tools in its arsenal, such as its power to investigate and sanction violations of EU competition law, which could provide a basis for legal action against the Orban regimes manipulation of media markets.

The passivity of the commission should come as no surprise, given that its president, Ursula von der Leyen, depended on votes from the governing parties in Poland and Hungary to become president and thatas a politician from Germanys center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU)she is herself a member of the same European political party (the European Peoples Party, or EPP) as Orban. When she came to office, she promised to take the heat out of political clashes with the regimes in Poland and Hungary. Since then she has failed to crack down on those governments, even putting a political ally of Orban, Oliver Varhelyi, in charge of the EU enlargement policy. In that role, he is in charge of promoting in candidate states the very democratic values his political boss has systematically undermined in Hungary.

If the commission has failed in its duties as guardian of the EUs values, the failure of national leaders in the European Council to react to the rise of authoritarian governments in their ranks is even more inexcusable. Many apologists claim that the council is paralyzed by the fact that, under Article 7 of the EU treaty, sanctions require a unanimous vote among member governments, and that Poland and Hungary have pledged to veto sanctions against each other. There is a kernel of truth to this (even if there might be a way to prevent those two states from shielding each other from sanctions). But the surrender to autocracy by the council is about far more than a supposed Polish-Hungarian mutual protection pact. The council has consistently refused to take a vote on even the first stage of Article 7, which would require the support of only four-fifths of the member states to declare the risk of a serious breach of EU values.

Indeed, the councils real problems run far deeper. First, there are strong norms of deference between leaders in the councilparticularly when it comes to what are seen as domestic political affairs. Clearly, northern Frugals make an exception when it comes to their willingness to intervene and impose economic conditions on southern states, but more generally governments avoid openly criticizing one another or trying to enforce EU legal obligations against one another. Second, the governments of Poland and even more so of Hungary can count on other allies in the council. States with their own problems with kleptocracy or democratic backsliding including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Malta understand that any tool that can be used against Hungary or Poland might one day be used against them. Other governments that are exemplars of democracy and the rule of law may side with Hungary or Poland for purely partisan reasons. Orbans party, Fidesz, remains a member of the EPP, and Merkels CDU has been a crucial player in blocking his expulsion from the party. Indeed, shortly before the EU summit, CDU leaders hosted leaders of Orbans party in Berlin, reaffirming their alliance and stating that they aimed to restore a sensible tone in discussions about the Hungarian regime within the EPP.

The erosion of the rule of law and of democracy itself in Hungary and Poland is not the fault of the EU, and ultimately it will be up to Hungarians and Poles to mobilize for functioning liberal democracy. But EU funding is crucial to sustaining these regimes and the patronage networks that support them, and the new recovery package promises to keep that money flowing to them, at least for now.

The fight is not over, and defenders of the rule of law in the European Parliament are promising to strengthen the rule-of-law conditions in the deal. One wise move might be for the parliament to demand that the council adopt the commissions 2018 proposal on rule of law conditionality before they approve the new EU budget. But even if that new tool is introduced, it may simply end up sitting on the shelf, alongside all of the EUs other unused tools. Ultimately, EU leaders in the commission and council will only use the EUs enormous political and economic leverageand its ample tools for defending democracyif more of them decide that it is in their interest to do so. Until then, the EUs authoritarian equilibrium will endure, and the authoritarian rot will likely spread to other member states.

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The European Union's Recent Budget Deal Shows That the Club Long Ago Gave Up on Rule of Law in Hungary and Poland - Foreign Policy