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Were there not four horsemen of the Apocalypse? Just as the virus was spreading in China, Europe was having to deal with the border crisis with Turkey, a humanitarian crisis in Syria, a civil war in Libya, keeping Russia at bay and responding to instability and terrorism in the Sahel. At the same time, Europeans were scratching their heads about how to deal with President Trumps America First strategy. There was a little thing called Brexit, too. Of course, none of these problems have gone away and they will remain regardless of how many future waves of COVID-19 appear.

Several commentators believe that these issues are nothing in comparison to the epochal changes we are about to face because of the pandemic. Many are already talking about the end of or, at the very least, a reconfiguration of globalisation. Linked to this assumption is the idea that strategic competition between the US and China will likely intensify as both states try to readjust their economies, while exercising a form of social distancing in strategic terms. With this reading, it is as if the horses of plague and conquest are already upon us.

Yet, Newtons laws of motion may help us to at least frame what might be around the corner. On the one hand, there are centripetal trends that might be aggravated and give rise to security concerns a lot sooner than they might otherwise have been expected. On the other, centrifugal forces may result in unexpected problems, such as the collapse of regimes and governments, civil unrest and even war. Europe needs to be prepared for all of these events; COVID-19 shows that we no longer have the luxury of saying big events may never happen.

There may be some comfort in knowing that even before the pandemic, the European Union was already beginning to take its strategic autonomy more seriously in areas like defence, currency and technology. However, COVID-19 emphasises the necessity of European solutions to cross-border crises. This crisis may call for a bold step forward in EU integration underpinned by treaty change, but it may equally result in governments seeking solace in the seemingly comfortable, albeit insufficient, bosom of national sovereignty.

What about the other two horsemen: war and famine? As of today, it seems likely that the EU will emerge from the pandemic before Africa and the Middle East. As Europe implements its economic stimulus package, there will be neighbouring countries that simply lack the medical and sanitation infrastructure to flatten the curve. They will lack the financial resources to kick start their economies too. Many in the EUs wider neighbourhood are already stricken by war, conflict and the aggravating effects of climate change. The crisis could lead to greater poverty and exploitation.

The migration crisis could be exacerbated too, and put additional strain on Europes southern states. The perfect storm of the pandemic, war and human trafficking is already upon us in Libya. Populists inside and outside of the EU may well seize on this issue, too. Furthermore, despite historically low oil prices, the virus could nonetheless significantly damage global food supply chains and undermine much-needed state-backed food subsidies in the poorest countries.

Any fresh or aggravated instability in Europes near and wider neighbours obviously needs to be avoided. This is why in April, a package of 20 billion was put together to support the EUs most vulnerable neighbours. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, has also spoken about debt relief for Africa.

Beyond money, however, we should expect calls for greater EU support, with police and military advice and logistical medical support to intensify. The EU is already on the ground in places such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. EU personnel in Mali have even contracted the virus. Yet, COVID-19 could require the mobilisation of different capacities, such as the airlifting of medical equipment to vulnerable countries, the setting up of mobile field hospitals or sharing best practices on how to manage country-wide lockdowns. Fortunately, the EU is uniquely well-placed to handle these tasks, given its more than 20 years worth of the experience in deploying civil, development, humanitarian, diplomatic and military tools in vulnerable countries and regions.

Yet, in dealing with the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, the EU will be up against a number of difficulties. For example, European assistance to Africa will be deployed alongside China, who have the resources and a desire to make amends for being the country where the outbreak began. This will not make aid coordination on the ground any easier, especially as the EU has already warned that medical aid could be instrumentalised for propaganda purposes. Partnerships with NATO, the UN, Japan, South Korea and others will be essential in upholding a genuine multilateral approach to the crisis that beckons in Africa.

However, perhaps the most worrying challenge facing European security right now is rooted in the continents economic recovery. Even though the EU put a number of tools in place in 2016 to enhance security and defence cooperation, years of under-investment in defence capabilities have taken their toll. In this regard, national approaches will not help Europe, and with Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Governments just need to invest in European cooperation its that simple.

Europes armed forces are playing a heroic role at home, and the way they have repatriated citizens and delivered medical equipment has been truly extraordinary. Yet, the looming economic recovery may take its toll on Europes armed forces and civilian experts - they will be expected to do more with less money. This has to be avoided at all costs. Without well-resourced and motivated civil and military actors, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse could trample all over Europes security.

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The EU must not let the four horsemen of the Apocalypse weaken Europe's security View - Euronews

Several recent commentaries published on 38 North have addressed the much-needed evolution of the European Union and its member states policy towards North Korea. Some have argued it is time to talk to North Korea and to more strongly support South Koreas policy, while others have advocated multilateralizing US-DPRK negotiations and drafting a Borrell Peace Plan.

Many observers agree that the strategy of critical engagement the European Union member states (EUMS) have pursued for the past several yearsa combination of both incentives and pressurehas been a partial failure. However, what is needed is not just dialogue or idealistic and impractical policies, but rather agreement on concrete and detailed actions that should be taken to advance common European interests. As James E. Hoare recently commented, recommendations should find support at a political level among EUMS, and to do so, addressing the EUMS main concerns is essential.

The EU needs to pivot from a strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, nonproliferation, implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, built on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of a European Union Special Representative on North Korea.

An Enduring Crisis but a Partly Failed Strategy

The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European Union and its member states currently face on the world stage. All phases of North Koreas nuclear weapons program are currently continuing and the country is increasing its tactical and strategic ballistic missile capabilities, mastering new technologies such as solid rocket propellant technology.

This increases the risk of proliferation of missiles and dissemination of technologies. If such capabilities were ever to be present in certain theatres of operations closer to Europe, European states would face unprecedented challenges in terms of force projection and military operations. Avoiding such proliferation is fundamental to the interests and security of Europe.

For sure, the EU strategy of critical engagement has partly failed, and the levers available to the EU and its member states have been considerably reduced along with their diplomatic influence. Thus, Europeans must remain pragmatic and realistic. Engagement is a diplomatic tool, not a strategy, and the key is to define feasible, realistic political objectives and to adopt a strategy to reach them.

On one side, engagement between the US and North Korea at the working level has been limited, and Seouls engagement with Pyongyang has come to a halt despite the Moon governments repeated attempts. On the other side, North Korea has been wary of engagement with the EU because it does not perceive Brussels as a neutral actor or a mediator. Rather than engage constructively with the EU and EUMS, the North has sometimes tried to divide it, openly criticizing some EUMS while sending more conciliatory signals to others.

Wanted: A More Pragmatic and Coordinated EU Strategy

It is essential that the EU gives the challenges on the Korean peninsula the high priority they deserve, recognizing that its contribution will be limited by its lack of leverage. Although coordination with regional partners is essential, coordination at the EU level must be a priority for implementing an independent, but not unilateral, European policy.

The main problem the EU and the EUMS face today is not a lack of resources, but a lack of both political awareness and coordination. Indeed, several initiatives exist at the EU level (at the Council, the Commission and the Parliament), the EUMS level, and among local European actors such as universities and think tanks. This renewed activism must be accompanied by increased coordination through the publication of a strategyusing the model of the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper for 20012004based on credible commitments to political engagement, nonproliferation, implementation of international sanctions and engagement with the North Korean people.

An EU Special Representative on North Korea should also be appointed to advance this agenda, raise awareness in Europe of the stake it has in peace, stability and nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula, and facilitate coordination within the EU among the different directorates, between EU member states and with the EUs partners in the region. Its creation would send a strong diplomatic signal that the EU is credibly and proactively committed to protecting its interests.

Political Engagement

The EU and its member states should renew its diplomatic and political engagement with and on North Korea. The EU should pull three levers:

Nonproliferation

Nonproliferation is a widely supported priority of the EU and its member states, a key objective of the EU Global Strategy and an area of internationally acknowledged EU expertise. Three near-term priorities should be:

Restrictive Measures

The European Union and its member states are key actors in the implementation of restrictive measures imposed by the UNSC on illicit North Korean activities. There are two priority areas:

Engagement with the North Korean People

The EU and its member states have a moral and political obligation to promote the well-being of the North Korean population. This can be fulfilled by continuing to:

Conclusion

It is time to adapt the European Union strategy to North Korea, while being aware a consensus must be achieved first among the EUMS. Indeed, convincing them is key, especially when disagreement persists between countriesnot so much on the long-term objectives but on the best implementation strategy. Opening a public debate in Brussels and in EUMS capitals is much needed and must be based on concrete and pragmatic policy recommendations to defend European interests.

This comment draws on a longer report published for the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium in February 2020: From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis.

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Reinvigorating the EU's Strategy Toward North Korea: From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments - 38 North

In the midst of theCOVID-19 pandemic, most governments take preventive measures for the benefit of their citizens. Enforcing social distancing and adding emergency procedures have become legitimate state responses to protect national populations.

Long forgotten, however, are those outside the parameters of national belonging, those lacking the right to have rights or the right to access the privileges of citizenship.

On February 27, following the conflict between Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed rebels in Syrias northern province ofIdlib, Turkey opened its border to allow Syrian refugees to travel to Europe. This act of political retaliation was aimed at forcing NATO, especially Europe, to backTurkeyspositionin the Syrian war.

Within days, hundreds of migrants startedmarchingtowards Greece. By February 29, as many as4,000people had tried to cross the border. Three days later, the number had jumped to10,000. Underthe newly formedgovernment of the right-wing New Democracy party, whose law and order approach led to theeviction of several migrant squats in Athens in the summer of 2019, Greece was less keen on welcoming foreigners with open arms.

Some weretear-gassedwhile others were beaten after beingstripped naked. Abuses by Greek security forces were compounded by Greeces decision tosuspendasylum applications for a month. This decision hadlittle or no legal validity,contravening not only the 1951 U.N. Refugee Conventionbut alsoArticle 78(3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, which states that provisional measures undertaken when states are confronted with a sudden inflow of third-country nationals are to be adopted by the European Council and not by individual states.

By mid-March, with the COVID-19 pandemic in full force, Turkeyreducedits movement of people towards Greece and began transporting migrants back to Istanbul. While the turmoil at the Turkey-Greece frontier is at a halt for now, it will most likely return in the near future: after all, the 2015 refugee crisis had never come to a complete stop.

A zero-sum game that blames either Turkey or Greece for last months events is derisory. Instead, the situation is under the ethical and legal auspices of the European Union.

In 2015, thenumber of migrants in need of internationalprotectionin the Mediterraneanregionreached record levels, totaling over1,015,000, a546 percentincrease over 2014. Since then, the E.U.s concern has mainly been how to put a lid on the problem.

The 2016E.U.-Turkey Deal specified that in return for 6 billion euros and the promise of the waiving of visa requirements for Turkish nationals, Turkey would take back all the irregular migrants arriving on the Greek islands by sea.

In other words, Brussels paid Turkey to confine migrants to its territory. Apart from the humanitarian issues it raises, from a political and logistical perspective, this decision will be impossible to abide by in the long term. Not only are there over4 million refugeesin Turkey, but given the countys active involvement in Syria, the E.U.-Turkey statement put far too much power in the hands of a state that could easily manipulate the situation when it is convenient. Any time Turkey is displeased with the E.U., PresidentRecep Tayyip Erdogancould pull the open the borders cardfrom his sleeve.

And for anyone following the news, the so-called refugee crisis is hardly a crisis. The volatility at the Turkey-Greece frontier was highly predictable. Erdogan has been consistentlythreateningto open the bordersforyears.

The core of the problem lies less with Erdogan, and more withthe highly contestedDublin Agreement. Taken as the backbone of the E.U.s shared responsibility in asylum matters, theregulationwas adopted in 2003 to determine theresponsiblemember state for asylum applications.

The regulation binds asylum claims to the state of entry. If a migrant enters the E.U. through Greece, they need to claim asylum there and cannot continue to Germany or Norway, for example. It is a practical way in which Northern Europes wealthy states have been protecting themselves from having to accommodate a surge of migrant entries.

Activists, academics, and policymakers havecalled the Dublin regulationunfairfor years. By making geographical location the main criterion for assigning responsibility for asylum, the agreement not only has increased the pressure on the states located at the E.U.s external borders and on the asylum claimants entering those states but also has led to bureaucratic abuses, with people sent back to their country of entry even when the Dublin scheme wasdeferred, as in 2015.

Greece is definitely to blame for how its border forces have treated migrants. But isnt the E.U. also at fault for leaving Greece to deal with the crisis on its own? Wouldnt it be much easier for the Dublin Treaty to be suspended so people can freely move within the E.U. once they have entered and their asylum claims have been processed?

Brussels is fully aware that migrants do not want to settle on its periphery in countries like Greece, which have suffered steepeconomic downturns, where unemployment is still high, and where the systems of refugee reception and integration leave much to be desired. This is why the E.U. seems willing to provide cash payments for border operations rather than assist the countries facing higher entries by equitably dispersing asylum claimants across member states.

To do that, however, would mean that the wealthier states of Northern and Western Europe and those with a higher capacity to absorb migrants and well-established systems of migrant integration, such as Sweden, Finland, and France, would receive more migrants than what they see as their fair share.

The European Union needs to stop treating migrants as political pawns. These are people who have fled wars, people with children and families, and people who have left their entire lives behind. If this is how they are treated at Europes borders, it is perhaps time to ask what European civilization is all about.

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Dont Make Refugees Political Pawns in Turkey-EU Game - The Globe Post

In March 2020 the European Commission presented its New Industrial Strategy for Europe, which proposes to move the European Union towards climate neutrality and digital leadership. As part of this overarching approach, which includes measures to keep the EU at the leading edge of innovation, including in healthcare, the Commission is expected to publish a Pharmaceutical Strategy in Q4 2020. This will focus on the availability, sustainability and security of the supply of pharmaceuticals, a need highlighted by challenges around COVID-19. The Pharmaceutical Strategy is likely to include innovation-boosting measures and plans to revise the EU Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products (OMP Regulation).

EU Pharmaceutical Strategy

The details of the Strategy are still unclear, with a Commission roadmap keenly awaited.

The potential legislation and initiatives have been hotly debated. The European pharma industry body, EFPIA, wants the Commission to support the industry to remain an innovator and world leader. The European Confederation of Pharmaceutical Entrepreneurs (EUCOPE) has highlighted funding the role of small and medium-sized pharmaceutical and medical technology companies, and a supportive legal and regulatory framework as top priorities.

EU OMP Regulation Review

The OMP Regulation is widely expected to be included in the Commissions plans. Member states and others have pressed the Commission to amend the current rules due to the perceived impact on prices. Last August, a Dutch health minister threatened to name companies that cannot offer a sensible and transparent explanation for the high prices of OMPs. Bruno Bruins said that OMP prices over 100,000 per year are no longer the exception not because the prices are justified, but because the rules allow them.

Leading voices in healthcare have highlighted incentives intended to stimulate innovation in medicine development as a whole and the perceived link to high prices. The European Public Health Alliance says the current rules delay competition for long periods, allowing companies to set prices as high as the market will bear. In 2017, two serving Dutch ministers wrote in The Lancet that the system is broken companies can ask the price they like.

The Commission is currently evaluating the OMP Regulation. An internal analysis is planned for Spring 2020, ahead of any publication of new OMP proposals. An internal Commission discussion has highlighted concerns with the current Regulation, especially regarding incentives and the diversity of authorised products.

If the OMP Regulation is reopened, we may see a new law proposed by 2021. Meanwhile, the industry and other stakeholders have a window to shape the proposal and say what it should or should not include.

A recent document prepared for the EUs advisory Pharmaceutical Committee gives clues on the Commissions thoughts.

The document undermines claims from industry and others that the Regulation has been a huge success, stating that of 142 OMPs authorised in the EU to 2017, only around 20 can be directly attributed to the OMP Regulation. The briefing questions the impact of the 1bn the EU has invested into rare disease research in the past decade. An assessment of the market exclusivity (ME) provision concludes that the mechanism is fair for OMPs with annual European sales of less than 50m, but OMPs with sales over 100m may have been overcompensated.

The Pharmaceutical Committee is exploring solutions to these challenges, including measures to direct R&D towards unmet needs (such as establishing a list of priority therapeutic areas and amending the definition of orphan diseases). Increasing transparency of R&D costs is being considered, to enable better analysis.

The criteria for OMP designation is also being considered and the Committee has been asked to consider mechanisms to improve access to therapies.

Conclusion

It is always easier to shape EU plans before publication than try to change them afterwards. The Commission values early industry alignment and proactivity rather than defensiveness and criticism of draft proposals.

Companies and the industry must take up this opportunity and tell the compelling OMP story. They must educate decision-makers about OMPs and use data to highlight the wider value of the OMP sector in the EU.

Working together with patients, industry and other stakeholders, the rare disease community has a once-in-a-decade chance to shape the direction of EU and possibly global orphan medicine regulation. Its time to seize it.

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Industry needs an aligned position on the future of the EU OMP Regulation - PMLiVE

European Union spokesman Peter Stano has said that the European Union will respond with more sanctions against Turkey if it continues illegal energy drilling in Cyprus exclusive economic zone (EEZ), according to the Cyprus News Agency.

There has been a break, but there has been no change in the EU`s position on illegal Turkish actions in the eastern Mediterranean, so the EU`s position is clear, unchanging, Stano told CNA.

We have reiterated many times that we express our concern and the strong condemnation of the continuing Turkish activity associated with illegal drilling in the eastern Mediterranean, we stand strong together with Cyprus, he added.

The European Union already has targeted sanctions on Turkey for it illegal attempts to extract energy from Cyprus EEZ, but this has not deterred further attempts.

This is something that the Member States are closely monitoring, and indeed, if the illegal activities continue, the EU will continue to act as it has been described, the spokesman said.

On Wednesday, Turkey issued its intentions to illegally drill for energy in Cypriot waters with the Yavuz drillship from April 20 to July 18.

Cyprus government spokesman, Kyriakos Koushos said Turkeys policy is worsening an already tense situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially as the world is trying to fight the coronavirus pandemic, according to the Cyprus News Agency.

Turkey continues to follow a policy that ignores even the pandemic and does not respect the difficulties which countries are facing, he said, adding We condemn Turkeys actions and we continue in a consistent manner to implement our policy which is based on the international law and the sovereign.

Turkey has been implementing gunboat diplomacy, and acting as the pirate of the Eastern Mediterranean, breaching and violating the international law and interfering with the sovereign rights of third countries, including Cyprus, he concluded.

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EU threatens more sanctions against Turkey if it continues illegal drilling in Cypriot waters - Greek City Times