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European Union leaders agree on top officials who will be the face of world's largest trading bloc - Citrus County Chronicle

On May 14, 2024, the United States announced tariffs for thirteen imports from China, the most notable of these being the 100 percent duties imposed on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs). Prior to this, in October 2023, the European Union started an anti-subsidy investigation against Chinese EVs, sampling three large EV manufacturers: BYD, Geely, and SAIC. Approximately a month after the publication of the U.S. tariffs, on June 12, 2024, the European Commission preannounced that the investigation had been concluded and that tariffs will be imposed on EV imports from China. Preliminary tariffs will be imposed from July 4, and then permanent tariffs, which normally stay in place for five years, will have to be voted on in November.

The time proximity of the imposition of tariffs on Chinese EVs by both the United States and the European Union triggers an unavoidable yet premature connection between the two. Yet, the two types of tariffs could not be more different. They do not only differ in content but also and especially in purpose, and they are a good reflection of the different Transatlantic approaches to the issues China poses. Additionally, for the European Union the imposition of tariffs on EVs may present a pivotal moment in its relationship with China, which is not the case for the United States. To avoid an unnecessary escalation, it is important to clarify that the European Unions tariffs are not about geopolitical competition, nor about protectionism or containment, but are about the good old search for the level playing field, a longstanding pillar of the European Unions approach toward Chinaeven before the two became systemic rivals. The clarification will not be a guarantee against an escalation but highlights a fundamental distinction in purpose and thus in what it is the European Union is seeking. Considering that the European Commission has made clear that it is open to solving the issue via negotiations with China, that distinction deeply affects how the situation can be solved and what China and the European Union can do to address the core issue currently on the table: the lack of a level playing field.

Before diving into what differentiates U.S. and EU tariffs, it is, however, worth noticing three points of connection between the U.S. and EU tariffs. The first is that albeit with different motivations, they both adopted tariffsin the case of the European Union, it announced the intention to adopt tariffs. The second point concerns the imposition of tariffs following processes of investigation. The United States imposed new tariffs following the review of the tariffs imposed during the Trump administration, and the European Union may impose tariffs following an investigation into nonmarket practices adopted by China. Yet, the processes in the United States and the European Union clearly differ: in the United States, 13 tariffs have been imposed all together. In the European Union, each open investigation has a different angle as different tools are implemented, from trade defense instruments to the new foreign subsidies regulation. Thus, each investigation will provide its own result, which may or may not lead to tariffs against the items investigated. The European Unions process will also trigger different types of tariffs depending on the type of investigation. All in all, albeit differently, both the United States and the European Union did their homework before reaching a decision.

The third contact point between the two is the preemptive approach that both tariffs embody. True, there are nuances in the preemption related to imports of EVs. The United States only imports about 2 percent of total EV imports from China, while the European Union imports about 37 percent. Additionally, the European Union has seen a growth in imports in the past years that the United States has not. If Chinese EVs are left undisturbed, their market share in the European Union will be set to grow further. That is not a given for the U.S. market. That said, both the European Union and the United States are attempting to prevent a future where Chinese EVs will have occupied their respective markets that is not here yet. In a previous piece, the author highlighted how prevention rather than response is the new guiding principle in economic security, and the United States approach to EVs, but also the European Unions approach, has proven that to be right.

The United States imposed 100 percent tariffs on EVs along with a much longer list of 13 items, spanning from raw materials to components and final products. None of the other items have tariffs as high as those imposed on EVs, but the list is long and may grow in the future. The European Union, on the other hand, has announced much lower tariffs, and, for the moment, it has only announced tariffs on EVs without officially imposing them yet. The European Commission announced the imposition of 38.1 percent tariffs to be added to the 10 percent already in place. The tariffs are higher than expected for an anti-subsidy investigation, which normally imposes tariffs between around 15 and 25 percent. There are, however, some caveats. A lower tariff, 21 percent, will be imposed on companies that have collaborated during the investigation. Tesla is undergoing a separate investigation and different thresholds have been proposed for the three sampled companies: 17.4 percent for BYD, 20 percent for Geely, and that same 38.1 percent for SAIC.

The instrument chosen by the European Union to investigate Chinese EVs encapsulates the purpose of the European Unions action. The official issue is the subsidies that the Chinese EV sector has been receiving from the Chinese state. The argument is that those subsidies have allowed Chinese companies to produce cheaper items and, to a certain extent, granted those companies the global success that they are witnessing. By this reasoning, had China not provided the EV sector with state subsidies that facilitated its success, and had Chinese EVs been successful and widely present in the EU market anyway, the European Union would not have adopted the recently announced additional duties. This is, perhaps, a counterfactual that is difficult to imagine for a China so embedded in a system that promotes industrial sectors via state subsidies. But a thought exercise is needed to understand where the European Union is coming from with these tariffsessentially, not geopolitical competition, not protectionism, but the issue of the lack of a level playing field. And that alone puts miles between the motivations of the United States and the European Union with regard to the adoption of tariffs.

Opinions within the European Union, and even within EU institutions, may differ, and some may seek and perceive more protective goals rather than a level playing field in the duties against EVs. After all, concerns about the prosperity of the EU automotive sector have triggered the thinking around the issue and its investigation. However, ultimately, the importance of respect for the rules in the European Union trumps the more protective drives that may emerge more prominently in the United States actions. Additional proof of the fact that this is hardly a protectionist move lays in the quantity of the new tariffs. Unlike U.S. 100 percent tariffs, the maximum imposable tariff of 38.1 percent plus the 10 percent tariffs that already exist will still not shied European car manufacturers from Chinas competition, as proven in a report by the Rhodium Group.

To avoid tariffs, China has used a mix of carrots and sticks, offering to find a solution to the European Unions concerns while warning it of the consequences of its actions. The threats as well as the offers have been mostly directed to the European Union not only because, unlike in the case of the United States, China saw the possibility to change the outcome in the European Union, but also because the EU market is already an important one for Chinese EVs, and losing it would be painful. This is despite the fact that, again, the tariffs imposed by the European Union are unlikely to amount to a loss of the EU market for Chinese EV producers; rather, the tariffs will make production more expensive.

Nonetheless, the fear is that this will start a trade war between the European Union and China in a tit-for-tat, retaliatory exchange. That is why the European Union has made quite clear in its announcement of the tariffs that it is open to negotiate with China. This is quite the challenge and at the same time an important test of the relationship between the European Union and China. The European Union has explained what its concerns arenamely, that Chinese EV manufacturers have been receiving unfair advantages that damage the European industry. China has expressed openness to the idea of addressing the European Unions concerns; if this expression is sincere, then there is space to negotiate a solution. Unfortunately, two major obstacles persist. The first is setting up a process that would somewhat guarantee that China implements whatever agreement is settled upon. The second relates to the European Union spelling out what it needs from China; after all, we are speaking of advantages in EV production built over decades. Would a temporary suspension of those advantages and/or a temporary imposition of tariffs by the European Union, alongside a clear plan on how to progressively lift them, suffice, for example? Or does the European Commission want China to impose higher costs on its EV producers? Considering the already emerging calls to use investment screening mechanisms for greenfield investments in the EV sector, it seems unlikely that the European Union is after a solution that views Chinese automakers investing in the production of EVs inside the EU single market. However, Chinese EV manufacturers are already considering localization in the EU market as an option.

Ultimately, U.S. and EU tariffs differ not only in quantity and intent; perhaps most importantly, compared to the United States, the announcement and potential imposition of tariffs is a much more pivotal moment for the European Unions approach to this issue and for the future of its relationship with China.

Francesca Ghiretti is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Excerpt from:
Not All Tariffs Are the Same: The Core Differences between U.S. and EU Tariffs against Chinese EVs - CSIS | Center for Strategic and International...

Nearly 30 asylum seekers are stuck in the United Nations-controlled buffer zone between the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus and the internationally recognized south amid a crackdown by the Cypriot authorities on undocumented migration following a steep uptick in Syrians arriving from Lebanon.

The groups 13 people from Syria and 14 from elsewhere in the Middle East, plus Africa and Asia are in different locations in the buffer zone, which extends about 112 miles across Cyprus, a Mediterranean nation that is a member of the European Union, and bisects the capital, Nicosia. They arrived in the area, known as the Green Line, on foot from the occupied north.

If the migrants return to the north, an area that covers about a third of the island and is recognized only by Turkey, they face deportation, because the administration there has no legal infrastructure for providing asylum. Crossing into the buffer zone from the occupied north would also constitute a crime of trespassing under that administration and would be likely to lead to their deportation.

President Nikos Christodoulides of Cyprus said last week that the authorities there would provide migrants currently in the buffer zone with humanitarian aid but would not permit them to enter the south for fear of setting a precedent. We will not allow the creation of a new route for illegal migration, he told reporters last Tuesday.

As a member of the European Union, Cyprus is responsible for regulating entry into the bloc, and Konstantinos Letymbiotis, a government spokesman, said last month that the country would continue its effective supervision along the length of the buffer zone.

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Seeking Safety in Cyprus, They're Stuck in Island's U.N. Buffer Zone - The New York Times

The European Union said on Wednesday that it would impose additional tariffs of up to 38 percent on electric cars built in China, a move it said would help level the playing field for automakers in Europe.

The tariffs, which have been expected for months, come on top of existing 10 percent duties, but the level of their impact has been disputed. Some European automakers argue they will set off a trade war, but other experts have said they will not stop Chinas dominance in the industry.

Instead, they argue that incentives to make low-emission cars more attractive to drivers are needed instead, if the European Union hopes to meet its goal to ban the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles in 2035.

Industry experts predict that the increased duties on electric vehicles from China will hurt consumers more than they do Chinese automakers, by increasing the price of the most affordable electric cars on the market.

But according to an investigation by the European Union, the entire supply chain of Chinese electric cars enjoys government subsidies that allow automakers there to drastically reduce their production costs. This gives Chinese producers an unfair competitive edge over their European rivals, the European investigation found.

BYDs Dolphin model, for example, sells in Europe for about 32,400 euros, or about $34,900, compared with nearly 40,000 for a Tesla Model Y and 37,000 for a Volkswagen ID.4.

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What to Know About Europe's Extra Tariffs on Chinese Electric Cars - The New York Times

The European Union will place an additional tariff on vehicles imported from China starting next month, the commission announced on Wednesday. The extra tariffs go as high as 38 percent, adding to the existing 10 percent duty the EU imposes on foreign vehicles.

The move comes after a monthslong investigation concluded that Chinese EV makers benefit from unfair state-backed subsidization, allowing them to sell their vehicles for cheaper than rivals. China-made EVs accounted for around 37 percent of all EV imports in the EU, according to a recent study from independent research provider Rhodium Group.

The European Commission says its imposing the new tariffs to remove the substantial unfair competitive advantage of Chinese EVs and to ensure they compete on a level playing field. The tariffs vary by company, with BYD facing a 17.4 percent duty, Geely at 20 percent, and SAIC at 38.1 percent.

Chinas Ministry of Commerce isnt happy with the changes. The EU ignored the facts and WTO [World Trade Organization] rules, ignored repeated strong objections from China, and ignored the appeals and dissuasions of many EU member states governments and industries, the agency said in a statement.

President Joe Biden made a similar move in the US last month, increasing tariffs on Chinese EVs from 25 percent to 100 percent. This is in response to fear in the industry that Chinas cheap EVs could flood the markets and potentially put domestic automakers out of business.

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The EU slaps additional tariffs on Chinese EV imports - The Verge