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No Chinese company is an independent company, Norbert Rttgen, a former government minister from Ms. Merkels party, said recently, adding that Huaweis involvement was an imminent question of national security.

Yet one German telecommunication company, Telefonica Deutschland, has announced that it intends to contract Huawei for its 5G development.

European Union rules make it difficult to target individual companies for political reasons. The bloc could impose stringent standards of conduct and openness for 5G contractors that could be used to restrict Huawei but, as yet, has simply let each member country to decide how to proceed.

Distrust toward the Trump administration is also a significant factor, as European policymakers worry that American sanctions on Huawei are simply a bargaining chip in the United States broader trade war with China and might be reversed.

There is a fear that if you take what potentially are quite expensive decisions with regards to 5G because the Americans have told you that they are a security problem, and then President Trump gets a trade deal with China and suddenly Huawei is all O.K. again, then youll feel like the earth has moved under your feet, said Ian Bond, director of foreign policy at the Center for European Reform, a policy group in London.

Years before the advent of 5G, Huawei was establishing a major presence in Europe, where it ranks third in mobile phone sales, behind Samsung and Apple. The company says it has 12,000 employees, and 23 research and development centers in Europe, a way of building favor and familiarity with policymakers.

And it has moved boldly to position itself in Brussels.

Huawei has spent more than $3 million this year on advertising and lobbying, according to its disclosures in the European Union lobbying registry. That is more than the combined spending of its European 5G competitors, Ericsson and Nokia, and far more than its American rival, Qualcomm.

Original post:
Blocked in U.S., Huawei Touts Shared Values to Compete in Europe - The New York Times

Polands Supreme Court warned this week the eastern European country could be forced to leave the ... [+] bloc if the proposals were voted through. Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Armed with European flags in hand, thousands of protesters have marched across Poland this week in opposition of a law that could allow the government the power to fire and control the judiciary if it disagrees with its court reforms.

On Friday, Polands parliament defied Brussels by voting in favor of the controversial bill even after European Commission Vice President Vera Jourova asked authorities to hold off the vote and consult with external legal experts beforehand.

Polands ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has promised to continue reforming the countrys justice system since its re-election in Octoberbut its ideas for a judicial overhaul have caused it to clash repeatedly with Brussels.

And Polands Supreme Court warned this week the eastern European country could be forced to leave the bloc if the proposals were voted through.

Contradictions between Polish law and EU law will in all likelihood lead to an intervention by the EU institutions regarding an infringement of the EU treaties, and in the longer perspective (will lead to) the need to leave the European Union, Polands Supreme Court said in a statement on December 17.

Parliament slightly tweaked the proposals to remove a policy that would have required judges to give the names of social media accounts they use under a pseudonym.

But another controversial part of the bill was passed, which could see judges lose their jobs or face pay cuts if they question the competence of their peers appointed by a newly created court, whose impartiality has been called into question by the European Court of Justice.

The PiS, which has been in power since 2015, argues the changes are needed to tackle corruption and rid the judiciary of communist-era judges.

But the EU has continuously accused PiS of trying to politicize the judiciary. Last year, the EU forced Poland to abandon a law that lowered the retirement age for Supreme Court judges as it said it breached EU rules. And in 2017, Brussels trigged Article 7 against Polanda law that can suspend a members EU voting rightsdue to concerns about government influence on the judiciary.

Poland has become more of a distant EU member since it joined the bloc in 2004. It was the only country not to sign up to the European Commissions Green Deal and it is not a Eurozone member.

The EU has continuously accused PiS of trying to politicize the judiciary. (Photo by Beata ... [+] Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

"We [Poland] are leaving the EU step by step. It's not an exaggeration. This departs from all the norms on which the European Union is built," former EU Council president Donald Tusk, who is also a former Polish prime minister, told reporters this week.

The new law will pose a major test for the new Commission president as PiS voted for Ursula von der Leyen and was key to swaying the narrow vote in her favor.

But a Polish exit from the bloc looks unlikely, according to analysts.

It would be the EUs exit from Poland, not the other way around, said Pawel Zerka, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Zerka believes despite the new law bringing inevitable tensions between the EU and Poland, a more likely outcome would be less EU funds being allocated to Poland and increasing frustration from Brussels.

He says while the reforms are very dangerous, they are mostly meant for internal politics.

Leader of Poland's ruling party Jaroslaw Kaczynski is facing a tight presidential election next year ... [+] (AP Photo)

The Senate will now vote on the new law for it to come into force. But PiS lost control of the upper house to the opposition in November.

And the election for the presidency next year is also looking close for PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

In theory, even if the senate vetoes the judicial reforms, the president would have a final say.

But Zerka said the president could then vote against the reforms, saying he is an homme dtat" to boost his image.

Read the original post:
Could Poland Be Next To Exit The European Union Due To Judicial Overhauls? - Forbes

Now that we know that Boris Johnson will get Brexit done by the end of January 2020, what are the implications for English as an official language of the European Union and in the European parliament? Could it stop being used when Britain leaves?

In 2016 Danuta Hbner, an MEP and chair of the European parliaments constitutional affairs committee, was quoted as saying, If we dont have the UK, we dont have English. But is it as simple as that?

Until the 1990s, the dominant language of the EU was French. When the EU was the EC (European Community) and the official language policy was defined, Dutch, French, German and Italian were identified as the working languages. However, as more countries joined, many of which had English as a second or additional language, the number of English speakers grew until English became the majority common language.

Currently, the EU lists 24 official and working languages. The UK is the only member country that gives English as its official language. There are a few member countries that commonly use English but have nominated a different language as their EU official language. For instance, the Republic of Ireland gives Irish Gaelic as its official language, and Malta gives Maltese.

When Britain withdraws from the EU (and leaving aside possible negotiations with Scotland or other territories), in order to remove English as an official language, as clarified in a statement on behalf of the European commission in Ireland dated 27 June 2016, there would have to be a unanimous vote in the European parliament in favour of doing so. Speaking at the time of the referendum, in 2016, the German EU commissioner Gnther Oettinger explained, We have a series of member states that speak English, and English is the world language which we all accept. So, even if there was the will to do so, getting rid of English wouldnt be straightfoward.

Even if it did come to that, would it be a knock-down blow for the language? Historically, English has weathered a number of storms. When colonies of the British empire sought to gain their independence, it may have seemed logical for English the language of the oppressors to be rejected at the same time. The fact that this did not happen, and that English is used as an official first or second language in more than 70 countries worldwide, points in part to its developing socioeconomic and political status during the 20th century. The number of speakers for whom English is an unofficial second or foreign language is greater than all other English language speakers, and continues to grow. With the decline of the British empire came the rise of the United States, which has English as its official language. Prof Lynne Murphy from the University of Sussex believes the US saved the English language. From the perspective of its use as a global lingua franca, she has got a point.

In fact, in some postcolonial situations, English is regarded as a more or less neutral language. In India, for example, English was supposed to be phased out post-independence in 1947 in favour of Hindi. However, as not everyone in India speaks Hindi, and many do not want to for various cultural and political reasons, English continued to be used, and is now an official language of India. In Hong Kong, English is still an official language despite the return of the territory to the Peoples Republic of China in 1997. As Hong Kong is an international hub for trade and finance, this makes pragmatic sense, but there is also evidence that Hong Kong people feel that the English language is part of their identity something that makes Hong Kong distinctive from mainland China. Singapore has speakers of Malay, Chinese (various dialects) and Tamil, among others; in this context, English is a unifying language.

But these Englishes are not British English, or even American English. The Englishes spoken around the world have developed their own vocabulary and grammar; Euro-English is no exception. English simply does not belong to traditional native English speakers any more: it belongs to everyone who speaks it, and it will develop and change depending on the communicative needs of speech communities. Brits and Americans need to bear this in mind when using English in international settings, as they cannot assume they will be understood by every English speaker.

So, will English cease to be a language of the EU? Probably not in the short to medium term, either in conversations between EU member countries, MEPs, or in EU interaction with other countries around the world. One Swedish MEP even suggested that communications in the EU could be fairer in English, as it will be everyones second language.

In the long term, however, the continued dominance of English as a global language may depend on its political and socioeconomic fortunes. As it is so well-established and widespread, I believe it is likely to be used as a global lingua franca for some time. But situations and languages change. I think it was Andy Hamilton who pointed out that, once Latin was everyones second language, it was no longer anyones first.

Jane Setter is professor of phonetics at the University of Reading

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Will Brexit spell the end of English as an official EU language? - The Guardian

Another European Union summit for the Western Balkans is set to take place in Zagreb in May 2020. Officially speaking, the European Council's decision in October on EU accession for North Macedonia and Albania was only a postponement. The veto from French President Emmanuel Macron backtracked on an earlier promise and was met with shock in the region and around the EU. Germany was particularly critical, saying the hasty rejection cost the bloc essential leverage to support pro-Western reformers in southeastern Europe's six non-EU states.

The hope, no matter how dim, is that the May summit in Zagreb can undo the decision in October. The summit is being prepared by the new European Commission, whose report is the responsibility of new Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi. Varhelyi is a steadfast backer of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his support for EU enlargement towards the southeast. However, Orban's agenda is quite different from Germany's. Rather than concern for Balkan democracy, Orban saved North Macedonia's corrupt and authoritarian ex-prime minister from prison. The more Hungary advocates for the Balkans, the more skepticism is likely to grow in France, the Netherlands and even Germany. They fear that Hungary is using the Western Balkan states to create its own zone of influence, in part to keep refugees at bay.

Read more: 'Little Schengen' Western Balkan nations agree to boost ties for EU bid

North Macedonia: Zaev goes all in on EU, and loses

North Macedonia goes to the polls on April 12. Reformer Prime Minister Zoran Zaev has positioned the country towards the EU, going as far as to support changing his country's name. He went all in on the EU and appears to have lost to the French veto. If Zaev loses the election to the more authoritarian, nationalist and pro-Russian opposition, it will deal a major blow to pro-European voices in the region. "Accession for reforms" is a promise they are having difficulty showing they can keep, and it would be ironic if the Zagreb summit pushes ahead with accession talks after a win by anti-European forces.

Albanaia's Rama, Serbia's Vucic and North Macedonia's Zaev face different paths to EU accession

Serbia: Eternal elections, public mobilization

Serbia is also likely to face elections in 2020, as it did in 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2017. For the country's strongman president, Aleksandar Vucic, eternal elections are an effective means of keeping the public mobilized and the opposition on its heels. France's accession veto gave Vucic an opportunity to relativize Serbia's position with the West and keep his people on a permanent tightrope between the EU, Russia, China and a host of foreign investors. That is a logical consequence of EU retreat. There's little further reason for either side to rush accession talks.

It's the same for Montenegro. Like its Serbian neighbor, the small country has been in accession talks for seven years, ignoring mild EU admonishments regarding corruption and intimidation of journalists and the opposition.

Read more: Doctors flee hopelessness, nepotism in Western Balkans

Albania: What now after EU's empty promise?

No one can say if Albania can overcome crisis in 2020. It's been locked in stalemate since a local election boycott and the opposition's withdrawal from parliament. Prime Minister Edi Rama has taken on his country's crime networks, confronted the drug trade and earned the EU's respect. But he is lacking international support, both due to the obstacle now in the path to EU accession and the desire by some EU countries, namely the Netherlands, to stick with the opposition.

Rama is no stranger to power and is unlikely to yield. He could, like Serbia's Vucic, veer away from the EU and its broken promises.

Albana PM Rama faces significant obstacles in his country's path to EU accession

The least likely development in 2020, meanwhile, is Bosnia-Herzegovina waking up from its political coma. As regional hopes decrease, emigration increases, something Germany's own skilled worker immigration law is bound to exacerbate when it comes into force in March.

Read more: EU's 'no' to Western Balkans could spark conflict

Kosovo: A rebel against corruption

Where Kosovo goes is the exciting wild card in 2020. It has a new kind of leader with the victory of Albin Kurti in October. He's a rebel promising a concentrated effort against corruption and nepotism, pitting him against powerful networks, some of which are unafraid to use violence. Unlike his fellow Balkan reformers, the EU is more a part of the problem than the solution for Kurti. Previous leaders' show of loyalty to Brussels has been a cover for their own personal, usually financially motivated, agenda. That support has received the thanks of Western governments, but this time the West is holding back, including the US, which often doesn't hesitate to interfere. Washington is working on a new strategy for the Balkans. The details remain unclear, though as the warring years of the 1990s show, it's the Americans who step in when the Europeans are at an impasse.

Norbert Mappes-Niediek lives in Graz, Austria, and works as a southeastern European correspondent for a variety of German-language newspapers.

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EU's broken promises in the Balkans lead to rocky road in 2020 - DW (English)

WASHINGTON Though not a NATO member, Sweden is very much in the Western European sphere, as an active member of the European Union and a reliable military partner for the Pentagon. The nation expects to complete a new defense funding agreement in the coming year, which should set the tone for military modernization through 2025.

During a recent visit to Washington, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist shared his thoughts on the security situation in the region and what the next few years may bring.

You signed the trilateral agreement with the U.S. and Finland roughly 18 months ago. What has come out of it so far?

Its a strong platform for the cooperation that we have now and that well have in the future. What we have seen during this time is that we have exercised together, shared information and we are in a development process where we build stability in our part of Europe. Its very important [to have] U.S. presence in northern Europe because of the security situation and because of what we can see has happened in Russia. We have a history of Russian aggression against Europe, annexation of Crimea, ongoing war in Ukraine and upgrading of Russian military capabilities, and also behavior on the Baltic sea that from time to time we see as provocative.

Finland and Sweden are two nonaligned countries, but we cooperate inside the NATO partnership and we also cooperate directly with different countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis. We both see that the trans-Atlantic link is very important for the stability and threshold in our part of Europe.

Are exercises the biggest deliverable from the agreement?

Its a combination. Exercises and training is one thing. And exercise and cooperation to create interoperability, possibility of interoperability. When you are planning for exercises like this, you also share information. We have also our own relationship, our own materiel, so there are many things that [impact] each other, so we cannot talk only about one topic.

You mentioned information sharing, which has been a challenge for U.S. partners and allies in the past. How would you characterize info sharing among the three nations?

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I think we have a good relationship. From the Swedish side, we have high-level competence about our region, and what has happened in that region. So I think that can be also something that is very interesting for the United States. The information is also connected to what [we are doing].

What is your assessment of Russia right now? Same as the last few years, getting calmer or becoming more aggressive?

I can only see that they are ready to use military power to fulfill political goals. Thats No. 1. I also see a development, all these years, that they invest more and more in military capabilities. And I can also see that they exercise and operate in more and more complex levels. And they have an interest in the Arctic region and operate there with their resources they have in the Navy.

What is your impression of the security situation in the Baltics?

I think its very, very important for the Baltic states that the [NATO] Enhanced Forward Presence is represented there and working there. I think its very important for them, the U.S. participation in these countries. And I think that they also feel the pressure around different sorts of information operations from the Russian side. The threshold is very important for them and its very important for all the region because we are all in the same geographical area, and if something happens in the wrong place, it affects all of us.

Many of the nations in the region have talked about a constant barrage of cyberattacks. Where is Sweden on its cyber capabilities?

We are working on that. We have 100,000 activities toward Sweden in the cyber arena each year. That comes from private persons, that comes from organizations and also state actors. Its authorities, companies, governmental organizations. We [are developing] the organization to defend ourselves. We have a decision in parliament that in the defense forces [we] should develop active cyber.

But more and more we train ourselves to follow all this information operations and disinformation operations, and we are now preparing to build up an authority for local defense, a state authority for local defense.

How much of that mission falls under the Ministry of Defence?

Its not decided yet. We are only prepared for that. It has not been decided in which ministry that will be responsible. Everything about cyber in defense is under our ministry. We have reactivated conscription service, and some conscripts will do their service in cyber defense.

American officials have raised a number of concerns about the EUs Permanent Structured Cooperation program, or PESCO, in particular over how it could impact NATO planning and non-EU firms. As a non-NATO country, how do you look at PESCO?

I think that around PESCO we have a very clear position: We say that we do not want any discrimination of companies that are owned by, for example, the U.S. or U.K. interests. We have those sort of companies in Sweden, and we try to fight for regulations that do not discriminate. There is no final solution about how to deal with this in the European Union, but we have our position and we try to get some sort of respect for it. So we are in that process now, but we have no suggestion that we can agree upon, all of us.

How effective are you finding PESCO?

Its a possibility for different countries and companies to cooperate around material projects that can be useful inside the European Union. I think that can be, from a point of view, good and interesting, but then you need rules. You [should] not have any discrimination of companies that work in different countries for many, many years, and are rooted in these countries and also are part of their defense industry, with direct connection to their own forces in that country.

So from our perspective, we will have no discrimination around this. We are in an early stage. If you want to go somewhere, you must start somewhere, so it is a process we can develop in the coming years.

What are your thoughts on the idea of an EU military force?

We have a agreement between NATO and the EU that we are going to cooperate around hybrid and cyber, and we should be complementary to each other. And I think that is a good agreement, so we have to work from that position. We are not competitors.

Do you think everyone in the EU agrees with that? The idea seems to pop up consistently.

That is the agreement that we have. Form time to time it is popping up that the European Union should build some sort armed forces, but it is not what we have said in the agreement between the countries. So in an open arena you can have your ideas, you can express them. But that is not the same as the organization accepting it. You see these sort of ideas from time to time, but what is agreed upon is that we have to cooperate and be complementary to each other.

While the U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies both Russia and China as competitors, the actions and statements of defense officials show a prioritization of dealing with China. Does it make you nervous that the U.S. is shifting focus eastward?

I think we need to handle both of these challenges. I think Russia will not change. Its very important to uphold the European Union sanctions because of what is happening in Crimea, and to be clear when we see upgrading of their military capability and their activities, I think this is something we have to handle for many years now. So I dont see any major change in anything. The weapon systems they have equipped last year and in the coming years, it is weapon systems they can use for many, many years in the future. So I think they are upgrading their military capabilities in our part of Europe, and I think what we are doing now with a deeper cooperation between the countries in Scandinavia and the Baltic states and Poland the United States, Great Britain, it is a way to balance and a way to also make the threshold higher. So we must continue with what we are doing today.

But are you worried that the U.S. will shift attention and resources away from Europe and toward the Pacific?

What I know is that there are deliverances from the U.S. side to Europe. New bases there. So today there is deliverance to Europe. From my perspective, I dont see any debate about if the U.S. is not ready to support Europe because what we see until now and also we see in the plans for the future, we see deliverances. You can always discuss different sort of levels and everything, but I see the relationship with the Pentagon, the armed forces of the United States we see deliverances.

Looking to 2020, are there any major milestones or issues for Swedish defense on which you need to keep an eye?

I think its very important for us to get an agreement and decision about defense, a defense decision, for 2021 until 2025. We have also a big amount of money for that. So I think we can have a defense decision that guarantees developing new military capability between 2021 and 2025, and we will be better in 2025 than we were in 2020, and in 2020 we are better than we were in 2015. So we are in a trend of upgrading military capability, and we are ready to invest in that.

What are those investment priorities?

I think we need a bigger organization, we need more soldiers in the Army, for example. We also have technological challenges [around cyber], and soon we enter a new generation of Gripen, deliverances of new submarines, deliverance of the Patriot system. We need to have more conscripts, we need to develop the brigades in the Swedish Armed Forces, we need to invest more in the island of Gotland.

Gotland has been a focus for a few years. How is that development going?

Weve taken the first step. We have inaugurated a regiment there, and its a mechanized company, a tank company, air defense capabilities. I think we need to invest more and develop that. Thats very important because the island of Gotland is very central from a military [perspective].

See the original post:
Sweden's defense minister on relations with America, Russian threats and the European Union - DefenseNews.com