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Almost a decade ago, the European Union proposed a novel strategy to cap greenhouse-gas emissions from the airline sector. Foreign airlines using the EUs airports would be forced to either cut emissions or buy carbon credits. It didnt work. The proposal raised the fury of the US and China, who feared billions in charges. Facing angry trading partners, the EU backed down. Today, aviation is one of the worlds fastest-growing sources of emissions.

Last week, the EU announced its intention to bend the trajectory of the worlds emissions down yet again. That wasnt the headline: It was the EUs Green Deal, a slate of 50 or so proposed policies to make the bloc net carbon-neutral by 2050. But deep inside the measures was something called a carbon border adjustment mechanism,according to leaked European Commission documents. Proposed for the steel, cement, and aluminum sectors in 2021, the de facto border tax (pdf) would force importers to buy allowances of CO2 emissions in the EU (now priced around 25 per tonne).

Its designed to put domestic producers of goods on the same playing field as foreign manufacturers. A steel maker in Europe, for example, must pay for credits to emit carbon dioxide from the EU Emission Trading System after it has surpassed its allotted emission credits. Foreign firms do not. The carbon adjustment cost reflects the carbon price had the goods been made domestically. Analysts estimate such credit costs could account for about 5% to 10% of the gross cost of steel and more for cement.

If the EU succeeds at imposing what is effectively a carbon border tax, it will have achieved something significant: A global incentive for firms to cut emissions without ever signing a climate deal. In theory, companies in targeted sectors that wish to sell into the 28-nation bloc, the worlds largest economy by some measures, will have to meet the EUs own standards or pay up. It may even expand to shipping and, yes, aviation.

Why would a carbon border tax succeed today when a very similar strategy failed with airlines in 2014? The geopolitics are different, says Michael Mehling, a researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technologys Energy Initiative. The question is whether the EU will be more resolute, and smarter about the process, Mehling told Quartz.

The EU had a few things working against it before: Free trade was ascendant, the US was a diplomatic powerhouse, and America led climate talks. None of that is true today. The Trump administration has escalated global trade wars. American diplomacy has been hollowed out by an exodus of career diplomats from Foggy Bottom and abroad. The White House, which has promised to yank the US out of the Paris climate accords as soon as possible, sent no high-ranking officials to the climate talks in Madrid this month. Without its trading partners unified against it, the EU may find it easier to implement its latest program.

The mood has shifted as well. A decade ago, when carbon border adjustments were formally floated, the benefits werent as clear, and political costs were real. Obama signaled his disapproval of a 2009 climate bill over free-trade worries.

Things have evolved a fair amount since then, says Carolyn Fischer, a senior fellow with Resources for the Future. The topic is much less controversial. Legal scholars feel the EU ison solid footing to comply with World Trade Organization rules. The EU carbon price has climbed five-fold since 2017. Theres also a flood of new data: About 50 different efforts around the world (paywall) now price carbon in schemes that account for about 15% of annual global greenhouse-gas emissions.

But the devil is in the details. In a 2019 paper Fischer co-authored, she called a carbon border tax one of the most efficient unilateral actions to curb global emissionsbut also one of the most challenging to get right. Designed well, says Fischer, it should not have a problem.

Even if a carbon border tax levels the playing fieldfor nowEurope cant get there alone. Eventually, the world will need to strike a deal to realize the net-zero decarbonization targets recommended by scientists by 2050. Without it, carbon-intensive export industries may concentrate in a few unaccountable countries, while the rest of the world claims cuts.

This is already happening. Switzerland and Sweden, for example, already import more greenhouse-gas emissions in the form of goods than they produce domestically, says Mehling. In the future, you can get a handful of countries left in the world emitting while everyone else says, Were clean, were clean,' he says. It will become more and more of an issue if we are not able to get all countries moving in this direction.

Originally posted here:
A border tax in the EU Green Deal might force global carbon cuts - Quartz

The European Parliament could block Boris Johnson's Brexit deal over the UK's treatment of EU citizens, its Brexit coordinator said this morning. Guy Verhofstadt called for the "remaining problems" with citizens' rights to be solved before consent could be given by the parliament, which is yet to vote on the deal. MEPs are worried that problems with the UK's settlement scheme for EU nationals could leave some citizens with no immigration status.

He said: "Everyone presumes the European Parliament will give automatically its consent to the Withdrawal Agreement. Not if the remaining problems with the citizens' rights are not solved first.

"Citizens can never become the victims of Brexit."

Mr Verhofstadt's speech comes almost a week after Mr Johnson won a thumping majority in the general election a result which undeniably gives him a "stonking mandate" to deliver on the result of the 2016 referendum.

Unlike the former Belgium Prime Minister, who strongly campaigned for the Liberal Democrats during the election campaign, the majority of EU leaders welcomed Mr Johnson's win.

Mr Verhofstadt's opposition, though, should not come as a surprise, as he was reportedly not too pleased when Theresa May called for a general election in 2017, either.

In 2019 book 'Blind Man's Brexit', documentary maker Lode Desmet and BBC broadcaster Edward Stourton provide the first in-depth fly-on-the-wall view of "how the negotiations slipped out of Britains hands" and recall how the European Parliament's Brexit Coordinator reacted to Theresa May's call for a 2017 general election.

The authors wrote: "Verhofstadt was scathing about Mrs Mays decision to call for a snap election.

"In an opinion piece in The Guardian, he wrote or rather co-wrote with his British spokesperson Nick Petre As a Belgian, I have a long standing appreciation of surrealism.

JUST IN:How John Bercow insisted: 'I am STILL right about Brexit'

"Having informed European leaders that Britain is leaving the European Union, and, after laying out the UKs negotiating position in a detailed notification letter, the Prime Minister is now asking the British people how they would like their full English Brexit served.

"In Brussels, we now wonder who will be joining us at the breakfast table after all.'"

Mr Desmet and Mr Stourton added that Mr Verhostadt had voiced the fear, widely shared within the EU, that the former Prime Minister was giving party management priority over national interest.

They quoted Mr Verhofstadt as saying in his Guardian piece: "With the referendum, which many European leaders saw as a Tory cat fight that got out of control, I have little doubt many on the continent see this election as again motivated by the internal machinations of the Tory party.

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EU contempt laid bare: Verhofstadt's 'scathing' reaction to general election revealed - Express

Nicola Sturgeon has insisted democracy must and will prevail as she confirmed she has now written to Boris Johnson formally requesting the power for Holyrood to hold a second independence referendum.

The SNP leader and Scottish First Minister said that following last weeks election victory in which her party took 47 of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster, the case for another referendum is unarguable.

Speaking at Bute House, her official residence in Edinburgh, Ms Sturgeon said: The alternative is a future that we have rejected being imposed upon us.

Scotland made it very clear last week it does not want a Tory Government led by Boris Johnson taking us out of the European Union.

That is the future we face if we do not have the opportunity to consider the alternative of independence.

The Prime Minister has repeatedly made clear his opposition to a second independence referendum.

Continue reading here:
Scotland doesnt want Tory Government taking us out of European Union Sturgeon demands indyref2 - The London Economic

by Vlad Mixich, EPHA Board Member, Romanian Health Observatory

The most influential European publication in the health policy area, POLITICO Europe, dedicated an entire panel to the East West Health Divide during their annual Health Care Summit in Amsterdam. Thats remarkable given the sensitivity of the topic for heavy political players at EU level.

Three of the biggest challenges for Eastern EU member states are partially caused by EU legislation failures or adverse effects of how the EU works (or does not work) in the health area.

Western EU countries are attracting the best physicians trained in Eastern EU countries without paying a penny for their training, which is covered by Eastern taxpayers. For example, Romania is today Europes physicians factory. Meanwhile, Romania and Poland has the lowest rate of medical practitioners, with tremendous problems in the rural areas. Solutions to compensate such a situation must be designed at EU level, without hindering the free movement of medical doctors.

The failure of current pharmaceutical legislation at EU level is today more and more obvious it creates for EU citizens living in Eastern EU countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania) recurrent problems of medicines availability caused by stock outs, pricing issues or product launch sequencing. Any solution designed at EU level to tackle shortages or pricing issues must consider root causes specific for Eastern member states.

Whether you are a German, a Dutch or a Romanian citizen, the Cross-border Directive guarantees the same rights and quality of care for all EU citizens. The EU authorities must be more active in enforcing Cross-border Directives rules. Unfortunately, more often than not, national governments are raising all kind of bureaucratic barriers which make patients life difficult and violates their rights as EU citizens.

All these three topics have maximum relevance for any Eastern European citizen. I hope that MEPs from relevant commissions (and not only) will pay attention to them and will work to find good solutions. My Europe is not concerned only with highly incomprehensible bureacratic details, but takes care of each EU citizen, regardless their place of birth and even more when its about their health. Thats the Europe I love, respect and support.

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The East West Health Divide in the European Union - European Public Health Alliance

The amount of legislation a political system produces is an important indicator of its performance. Yet as Dimiter Toshkov explains, when it comes to the adoption of new legislation, the last European Parliament and Commission were among the least productive in recent history. He argues that a less political and more pragmatic Commission may be more successful in finding the scope for new agreements.

As November is drawing to a close, the new European Commission is still waiting for the approval of the new European Parliament (EP) to start its work. This prolonged interregnum provides a good opportunity to look back and assess the record of the previous 8th EP, which held its last session in April 2019, and the outgoing Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker, which entered office more than five years ago in November 2014.

One important indicator of the performance of any political system is its legislative output, or the amount of legislative acts it adopts over time. A focus on legislative output is especially relevant since the EU has no big army or large budget to exercise its influence, and must instead rely on the force of its laws and regulations. Hence, by looking at legislative output we can examine the health and prospects of the EU integration project more generally.

On this metric, the 8th EP and the Juncker Commission do not fare very well. In fact, the numbers show that these have been some of the least productive EPs and Commissions in recent history, ever since the introduction of co-decision in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht.

Declining EU legislative output

Let us first take a look at the number of directives adopted between 2004 and 2019. In the past, directives embodied most of the truly important legislative acts of the EU. Many of the EU laws that you might have heard about the Services directive, the Non-discrimination directive, the NATURA 2000 directive are, well, directives in the specific sense of a type of EU legal act. As we can clearly see from the figure below, there has been a significant drop in the number of directives adopted by the EP and/or the Council. The drop had started already in 2009, but it is especially pronounced between 2014 and 2019 during the term of the 8th EP. The total number of directives adopted by the EP and the Council during the 6th EP term is 175, which drops to 161 during the 7th EP term, and to 97 for the 8th EP term.

Part of the decline in the number of adopted directives can be explained by a switch to regulations as a favoured legal form for important new legislation. For example, the notorious General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) one of the few recent EU legal acts you might have head of is, as the name indicates, a regulation rather than a directive. This is an important shift, because directives provide the EU member states with more flexibility about how exactly to implement the EU rules.

But the shift from directives to regulations is not enough to account for the overall drop in legislative productivity. When we look at regulations (below), we also see a drop. The total number of regulations adopted by the Council and/or the EP in the period 2004-2009 is 852, which falls to 694 in the period 2014-2019 (the drop is due mostly to the decrease in the number of regulations adopted by the Council alone).

The pattern is more complex when it comes to decisions, which comprise a very diverse set of legal instruments under the same label some have general applicability and others have a specific addressee, many are limited in their duration, and a large part concern matters of rather narrow interest, such as the appointment of heads of EU agencies and the like.

The figure below shows two diverging developments: the number of Council-only decisions increases significantly (from 1,173 to 1,546 to 1,805 over the past three EP terms), but the number of decisions adopted with the involvement of the EP decreases (from 163 in the period 2009-2014 to 115 in the period 2014-2019).

All in all, the 8th EP has completed the adoption of 493 legal acts, a significant 23% decline from the 637 adopted by the 7th EP. This makes for less than two acts per plenary sitting1 and for less than one legal act per MEP over a period of five years! Of course, passing legislation is not all the EP does: it also adopts resolutions, negotiates the budget, asks written and oral questions (a total of 46,496 during its last term), and more. Still, legislatingremains the most important task of alegislature, and the last EP has not done a lot of that.

It is especially striking that in the past five years the EP has adopted only 59 new, rather than amending, directives and regulations (for 2009-2014, the number is 95). A new legal act indicates that the EU is legislating in a new area, while amending legislation only modifies rules in areas where the EU already has established its presence. In other words, the vast majority of legislative activity in the past five years has gone into maintaining and updating existing legislation rather than expanding the reach of the EU into new areas and issues.

In sum, the directive is almost disappearing from the legislative output of the EU, the numbers of regulations and EP decisions are also down, and there have been very few new, rather than amending, legal acts adopted over the past five years.

The perils of a more political Commission

The important question is, of course, why. There are multiple possible answers, and none that are fully satisfactory. First, the Juncker Commission focused its activities on ten priority areas, not all of which required legislative action. Second, the decline in legislative output can be related to the Better Regulation programme of the European Commission, which aims to reduce the regulatory burden and simplify legislation. However, the number of legislative proposals that have been scrapped as a direct result of the programme is very small, and even these might have been blocked for political reasons before being abandoned in the name of better regulation. Moreover, regulatory simplification often demands legislative action in order to amend existing acts or adopt new legislation. And some critics see the Better Regulation initiative as a justification for the EUs failure to maintain and expand its regulatory reach rather than the reason for its declining legislative productivity.

It is unlikely that falling legislative productivity is a direct result of the Eastern enlargement of the EU: the decline is more recent and there is no systematic data that member states from Eastern Europe have been the ones putting the brakes on the EU legislative process. But increasing diversity of preferences and interests in the EU between countries, but also between political parties and electorates certainly plays some role in accounting for the decline in legislative output.

The 8th EP featured more Eurosceptic, nationalist and populist parties and MEPs than before, though not in numbers that could have blocked, on their own, a large share of the EUs legislative activities. Yet, in combination with the increasing presence of Eurosceptic, nationalist and populist parties in government at the national level (and by extension in the Council of Ministers in Brussels), they do limit the range and scope of new laws that can gain approval in the complex decision-making procedures of the EU.

Yet, diversity of preferences and interests is not sufficient to explain the decline in legislative productivity, especially when we consider it next to the increasing number of legislative proposals made by the European Commission that failed to get approval.2 The combination of falling legislative output and a higher share of failed proposals hints at another reason for the decline in legislative output: the politicisation of the Commission.

During the past five years, the Juncker Commission has not shied away from political conflicts with some member states, most notably in the field of migration. The Commission deliberately pushed proposals forward in the presence of strong, vocal and committed opposition in order to make political points, by exposing certain member states, such as Hungary, for the views that they hold. No matter whether we consider this to be a good political strategy from the Commission, it is certainly not a very good way of getting things done.

In other cases, the Commission seems to have lost its ability to anticipate the reactions of the member states and the strength of their resistance. Instead of going for minimal changes to the status quo that would have been feasible and made small but tangible progress, it has overplayed its hand by pushing for more radical changes that never made it into law (at least within the limits of its term). The mobility (road transport) package that is still stuck in the EP or the failed regulation of lobbying activities at the EU institutions are two cases in point. The lack of anticipation, adjustment and lost political capital in fruitless negotiations all contribute to the rising share of failed legislative proposals. Ultimately, the declining legislative productivity of the EU can be seen as a result of the more political Commission that Jean-Claude Juncker promoted.

What does the future hold for the legislative output of the EU? The new, 9th EP will have to accommodate an even larger number of Eurosceptic members, though in absolute terms they are still not numerous enough to block the legislative process in the EP. But they, and Eurosceptic ministers sitting in the Council, do limit what it is possible to achieve and the areas where European integration can move forward. At the same time, there is urgent action needed in many policy areas from asylum and climate to transport and welfare. A less political and more pragmatic Commission might be more successful in finding the scope for new agreements. Instead of antagonising member states with bold but ultimately doomed policy initiatives, the Commission might focus on what it used to do best: finding common ground in the face of diverse interests to push European integration slowly and gradually, but forward nonetheless.

Further information and access to the data used in this article can be found here

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Note: This article gives the views of theauthor, not the position of EUROPP European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit:CC BY 4.0: European Union 2019 Source: EP

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About the author

Dimiter Toshkov Leiden UniversityDimiter Toshkov is Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Administration, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Netherlands. He is on Twitter @DToshkov

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Is the legislative expansion of the European Union grinding to a halt? - EUROPP - European Politics and Policy