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This article is about the totality of military cooperation between member states of the European Union, as well as national capabilities. For a more narrow presentation of the present structure of cooperation within the legal framework of the union, see Common Security and Defence Policy. European Union

This article is part of a series on the politicsandgovernment oftheEuropeanUnion

The military of the European Union comprises the various cooperative structures that have been established between the armed forces of the member states, both intergovernmentally and within the institutional framework of the union; the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) branch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The policy area of defence is traditionally the domain of nation states. The main military alliance in Europe remains the intergovernmental North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which presently includes 22 EU member states together with four non-EU European countries, Albania, Iceland, Turkey and Norway, as well as the United States and Canada. The development of the CSDP is a contentious issue, in particular with regard to the existing role of NATO. The military form of European integration has however intensified in the beginning of the 21st century, bringing about the deployment of numerous CSDP operations and the establishment of EU battlegroups. The latter have however never been engaged in operations, and other, recent initiatives of military integration, such as the European corps, gendarmerie force and air transport command are intergovernmental and outside the CFSP framework of the union.

Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union provides for substantial military integration within the institutional framework of the union:[2]

However the debate has intensified by the standoff between the EU and Russia over Ukraine, Brexit and the presidency of Donald Trump in the US. With new calls for an EU military by EU commission president Jean-Claude Juncker and by other European leaders and policy makers like the head of the German parliament's foreign policy committee Norbert Rttgen, saying an EU army was "a European vision whose time has come".[6][7] The mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, was invoked for the first time in November 2015 following the terrorist attacks in Paris, which were described by French President Franois Hollande as an attack against Europe as a whole.[8][9]

Following the end of World War II and the defeat of the Axis Powers, the Dunkirk Treaty was signed by France and the United Kingdom on 4 March 1947 as a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance against a possible German attack in the aftermath of World War II. The Dunkirk Treaty entered into force on 8 September 1947. The 1948 Treaty of Brussels established the military Western Union Defence Organisation with an allied European command structure under Field Marshal Montgomery. Western European powers, except for Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, signed the North Atlantic Treaty alongside the United States and Canada which only created a passive defence association until 1951 when, during the Korean War, the existing and fully functioning Western Union Defence Organisation was augmented to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO.

In the early 1950s, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries made an attempt to integrate the militaries of mainland western Europe, through the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). This scheme did not enter into force, however, as it failed to obtain approval for ratification in the French National Assembly, where Gaullists feared for national sovereignty and Communists opposed a European military consolidation that could rival the Soviet Union. The failure to establish the EDC resulted in the 1954 amendment of the Treaty of Brussels at the London and Paris Conferences which, in replacement of EDC, established the political Western European Union (WEU) out of the earlier established military Western Union Defence Organisation and included West Germany and Italy in both WEU and NATO as the conference ended the occupation of West Germany and the defence aims had shifted from Germany to the Soviet Union.

EU member only

NATO member only

Member of both

Out of the 28 EU member states, 22 are also members of NATO. Another two NATO members are EU applicantsAlbania and Turkey. Two othersIceland and Norwayhave opted to remain outside of the EU, however participate in the EU's single market. In 1996, the Western European Union (WEU) was tasked by NATO to implement a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which later was passed over to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy as all Western European Union functions were transferred to the European Union through the Lisbon Treaty. The memberships of the EU and NATO are distinct, and some EU member states are traditionally neutral on defence issues. Several of the new EU member states were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact. The Berlin Plus agreement is a comprehensive package of agreements made between NATO and the EU in 2002; it allows the EU to draw on some of NATO's assets in its own peacekeeping operations, subject to a "right of first refusal" in that NATO must first decline to intervene in a given crisis.

Following the Kosovo War in 1999, the European Council agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO". To that end, a number of efforts were made to increase the EU's military capability, notably the Helsinki Headline Goal process. After much discussion, the most concrete result was the EU Battlegroups initiative, each of which is planned to be able to quickly deploy about 1,500personnel.[10]

The EU currently has a limited mandate over defence issues, with a role to explore the issue of European defence agreed to in the Amsterdam Treaty, as well as oversight of the Helsinki Headline Goal Force Catalogue (the 'European Rapid Reaction Force') processes. However, some EU states may and do make multilateral agreements about defence issues outside of the EU structures.

The European Defence Initiative is a proposal for enhanced European Union defence cooperation presented by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in Brussels on 29 April 2003. It was based on the reinforced cooperation principle and aimed for better reactivity under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Some critics felt that this intra-European process would be a source of tension in the transatlantic arena with NATO and some felt that this was a duplication of existing means with the call for a distinct European headquarters. There were also some concerns about a multi-speed Europe. Britain was initially opposed to the concept but subsequently modified its position in favour.[11]

It is sometimes referred to as the "Initiative of the Four".

On 20 February 2009 the European Parliament voted in favour of the creation of Synchronised Armed Forces Europe (SAFE) as a first step towards a true European military force. SAFE will be directed by an EU directorate, with its own training standards and operational doctrine. There are also plans to create an EU "Council of Defence Ministers" and "a European statute for soldiers within the framework of Safe governing training standards, operational doctrine and freedom of operational action".[12]EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from middle and northern Africa to Western Balkans and western Asia.[13] EU military operations are supported by a number of bodies, including the European Defence Agency, European Union Satellite Centre and the European Union Military Staff.[14] In an EU consisting of 28 members, substantial security and defence co-operation is increasingly relying on great power co-operation.[15]

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon triggered member states of the Western European Union (WEU) to scrap the organisation, which had largely become dormant, but they have kept the mutual defence clause of the Treaty of Brussels as the basis for the EU mutual defence arrangement.

The defence arrangements which have been established under the EU institutions are part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a branch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It should be noted that Denmark has an opt-out from the CSDP.[1]

The European Security Strategy is the document in which the European Union clarifies its security strategy which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.[16] The European security strategy was for the first time drawn up in 2003 under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12 and 13 December 2003.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is an agency of the union based in Brussels. Set up on 12 July 2004, it is a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) body reporting to the Council of the European Union. Its primary role is to foster European defence cooperation.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the body of the European External Action Service (EEAS) led by a Director General a General Officer, Admiral, or Air Officer of three-star level that supervises operations carried out by the union. The EUMS is overseen by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The EUMC is chaired by a General Officer, Admiral, or Air Officer of four-star level.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is a Paris-based agency of the European Union. The EUISS evolved from Western European Union Institute for Security Studies following a gradual transfer of powers from the Western European Union (WEU) to the EU. It now operates under the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The EUISS is an autonomous agency with full intellectual freedom. As a think tank it researches security issues of relevance for the EU and provides a forum for debate. In its capacity as an EU agency, it also offers analyses and forecasting to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini.

The battle groups adhere to the CSDP, and are based on contributions from a coalition of member states. Each of the eighteen Battlegroups consists of a battalion-sized force (1,500 troops) reinforced with combat support elements.[17][18] The groups rotate actively, so that two are ready for deployment at all times. The forces are under the direct control of the Council of the European Union.

The Battlegroups reached full operational capacity on 1 January 2007, although, as of January 2013 they are yet to see any military action.[19] They are based on existing ad hoc missions that the European Union (EU) has undertaken and has been described by some as a new "standing army" for Europe.[18] The troops and equipment are drawn from the EU member states under a "lead nation". In 2004, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed the plans and emphasised the value and importance of the Battlegroups in helping the UN deal with troublespots.[20]

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is a virtual institution for strategic level training within the area of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). ESDC was created in 2005 by a decision of the Council of the European Union,[21] and takes the form of a network of various national institutions of the European Union member states, such as defence colleges, and the European Union Institute for Security Studies.[22]

The Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue is a listing of rapid reaction forces composed of 60,000 troops managed by the European Union, but under control of the countries who deliver troops for it.

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the following in the founding treaties of the union:

The Treaty of Lisbon added the possibility for those members whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework (PSCD).[24]

Those states shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council then adopts, by qualified majority a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. Any other member state, that fulfills the criteria and wishes to participate, can join the PSCD following the same procedure, but in the voting for the decision will participate only the states already part of the PSCD. If a participating state no longer fulfills the criteria a decision suspending its participation is taken by the same procedure as for accepting new participants, but excluding the concerned state from the voting procedure. If a participating state wishes to withdraw from PSCD it just notifies the Council to remove it from the list of participants. All other decisions and recommendations of the Council concerning PSCD issues unrelated to the list of participants are taken by unanimity of the participating states.[24]

The criteria established in the PSCD Protocol are the following:[24]

As of October 2010 there is no announcement for PSCD establishment.[citation needed]

This section presents an incomplete list of forces and bodies established intergovernmentally outside the legal framework of the union amongst a subset of member states. The military forces that have been established are typically dedicated in priority to the European Union (EU), but may also be deployed either in a NATO environment, acting as part of the European branch of NATO, acting upon the mandate of the participating countries, or acting upon the mandate of other international organisations, such as United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or any other international entity.

Finabel is an organisation that promotes cooperation and interoperability between the armies of its participating nations.[25] Founded in 1953, Finabel has a small permanent secretariat, and is controlled by the army chiefs of staff of its participating nations. The organisation maintains working groups that publish studies relating to standardisation of equipment, procedures, testing methods and glossaries.

The European Corps, often shortened as Eurocorps, is an army corps of approximately 1,000 soldiers stationed in Strasbourg, France. Based in the French city of Strasbourg, the corps had its headquarters established in May 1992, activated in October 1993 and declared operational in 1995. The nucleus of the force is the Franco-German Brigade, established in 1987.[26]

I. German/Dutch Corps is a multinational formation consisting of units from the Dutch and German armies. The corps headquarters also takes part in NATO Response Force readiness rotations. The Corps' headquarters are situated in Mnster (Westphalia), formerly the headquarters of the German Army's I. Corps out of which 1 German/Netherlands Corps evolved. The corps has national and multinational operational responsibilities, and its commanding officer is the only one in Europe to have OPCON in peacetime.[27] Due to its role as a NATO High Readiness Forces Headquarters, soldiers from other NATO member states, the United States, Denmark, Norway, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom amongst others, are also stationed at Mnster.

The Multinational Corps Northeast was formed on 18 September 1999 at Szczecin, Poland, which became its headquarters. It evolved from what was for many years the only multinational corps in NATO, Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT) (in its turn, a part of Allied Forces Northern Europe). From 1962 LANDJUT had been responsible for the defence of the Baltic Approaches from a headquarters at Rendsburg, Germany. It comprised the 6th Panzergrenadier Division and the Danish Jutland Division.

The European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR or EGF) is an intervention force with militarised police functions and specialisation in crisis management, designed after the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Italian Carabinieri and its Multinational Specialized Units (M.S.U.).[28][29] The force was created in 2006, and had its status enshrined in the Treaty of Velsen, signed 18 October 2007.[30]

The European Air Group (EAG) an organisation that promotes cooperation and interoperability between the air forces of its participating nations. It was established in 1995 to promote collaboration between the British and French air forces in the first Gulf War and the subsequent Balkans operations.

The European Air Transport Command (EATC) is the command centre that exercises the operational control of the majority of the aerial refueling capabilities and military transport fleets of its participating nations. Located at Eindhoven Airbase in the Netherlands, the command also bears a limited responsibility for exercises, aircrew training and the harmonisation of relevant national air transport regulations.[32][33]

The command was established in 2010 with a view to provide a more efficient management of the participating nations' assets and resources in this field.

The European Maritime Force (Euromarfor or EMF) is a non-standing,[34] military force[35] that may carry out naval, air and amphibious operations, with an activation time of 5 days after an order is received.[36] The force was formed in 1995 to fulfill missions defined in the Petersberg Declaration, such as sea control, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, crisis response operations, and peace enforcement.

Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) is an organisation located at Eindhoven Airport in the Netherlands that aims to coordinate and optimise the use of airlift, sealift and land movement assets owned or leased by its participating nations. Established on 1 July 2007 when the earlier European Airlift Centre (EAC) and the Sealift Co-ordination Centre (SCC) merged, the MCCE was a response to the shortage of aerial and naval strategic lift capabilities reported by the EU and NATO in 1999. The centre is presently staffed by 30 military and civilians personnel from its participating nations. In addition to its EU members, the United States and Turkey participate in the MCCE.

The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (shortened OCCAR; the French acronym) is an organisation that facilitates and manages collaborative armament programmes through their lifecycle between its participating nations.

The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) is a Franco-British military force. It draws upon both the British Armed Forces and the French Armed Forces to field a deployable force with land, air and maritime components together with command and control and supporting logistics. It is distinct from the similarly named UK Joint Expeditionary Force.

The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (or CJEF) is envisaged as a deployable, combined Franco-British military force for use in a wide range of crisis scenarios, up to and including high intensity combat operations. As a joint force it involves all three armed Services: a land component composed of formations at national brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated Headquarters, together with logistics and support functions.

The CJEF is not conceived as a standing force but rather as available at notice for UK-French bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations. Combined air and land exercises commenced during 2011 with a view towards developing a full capability. The CJEF is also seen as a potential stimulus towards greater interoperability and coherence in military doctrine, training and equipment requirements.

Six EU states host nuclear weapons: France and the United Kingdom each have their own nuclear programmes, while Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands host US nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy. Combined, the EU possesses 525 warheads, and hosts between 90 and 130 US warheads. The EU has the third largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, after the United States and Russia.

The following table presents the military expenditures of the members of the European Union in euros (). The combined military expenditure of the member states amounts to just over 194,7 billion.[1] This represents 1.42% of European Union GDP.[1] European military expenditure includes spending on joint projects such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and joint procurement of equipment. The European Union's combined active military forces in 2014 totaled 1,423,097 personnel. According to the European Defence Agency, the European Union had an average of 31,570 land force personnel deployed around the world (or 2.2% of the total military personnel). In a major operation the EU could readily deploy up-to 417,180 land force personnel and sustain 79,352 of those during an enduring operation.[1]

In a speech in 2012, Swedish General Hkan Syrn criticised the spending levels of European Union countries, saying that in the future those countries' military capability will decrease, creating "critical shortfalls".[37]

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The combined component strength of the naval forces of member states is some 563 commissioned warships. Of those in service, 3 are fleet carriers, the largest of which is the 42,000 tonne Charles de Gaulle. However two 70,600 tonne Queen Elizabeth-class carriers are projected to enter service in the Royal Navy starting 2017. The EU also has 5 amphibious assault ships and 13 amphibious support ships in service. Of the EU's 58 submarines, 21 are nuclear-powered submarines (11 British and 10 French) while 37 are conventional attack submarines.

Operation Atalanta (formally European Union Naval Force Somalia) is the first ever (and still ongoing) naval operation of the European Union. It is part of a larger global action by the EU in the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis. As of January 2011 twenty-three EU nations participate in the operation.

UK, France, Italy and Spain have blue-water navies while the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Denmark and the rest have green-water navies.

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Combined, the member states of the European Union maintain large numbers of various land-based military vehicles and weaponry.

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The air forces of EU member states operate a wide range of military systems and hardware. This is primarily due to the independent requirements of each member state and also the national defence industries of some member states. However such programmes like the Eurofighter Typhoon and Eurocopter Tiger have seen many European nations design, build and operate a single weapons platform. 60% of overall combat fleet was developed and manufactured by member states, 32% are US-origin, but some of these were assembled in Europe, while remaining 8% are soviet-made aircraft. As of 2014, it is estimated that the European Union had around 2,000 serviceable combat aircraft (fighter aircraft and ground-attack aircraft).[59]

The EUs air-lift capabilities are evolving with the future introduction of the Airbus A400M (another example of EU defence cooperation). The A400M is a tactical airlifter with strategic capabilities.[60] Around 140 are initially expected to be operated by 6 member states (UK, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Spain and Belgium).

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Military of the European Union - Wikipedia

This essay examines the state of the European Union post-eurozone crisis, and assesses the European Union's prospects as a model for regional integration efforts around the globe.

Editor's Note: This essay is part of the collection Crisis in the Eurozone.

While the European Union (EU) has long been the most developed model of regional integration, it was severely shaken by the recent economic crisis, causing increasing doubts about the integration process. The lack of a timely and coherent response to the euro crisis called into question the integrity of the eurozone, whose structural and institutional fault lines have been revealed by the financial crisis. These doubts coincide with dramatic changes in the global economic order involving the relative decline of the EU and United States and the rise of Asia. The likely economic adjustments are already threatening social cohesion and political stability in Europe. The crisis has temporarily weakened the EU's status as a model for regional integration, but as the EU recovers its confidence, as it always has after previous crises, it will continue to be the leading example for other efforts at regional integration.

Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in regional integration. The most important principles underlying the success of the EU project include:

These four tenets have guided the EU well over the years and enabled the institutions to survive many crises, from French president Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair" tactic of withdrawing French representatives from EU political bodies in protest of moves to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) to failed referendums on new treaties in a number of member states, including rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland in 2008. More recently, the EU has adopted a more flexible approach resulting in a multi-speed Europe with several tiers of integration. For example, not all member states are in the eurozone, or in the Schengen passport-free zone; this arrangement has allowed some of the more Euro-skeptic countries such as the United Kingdom to opt out of certain obligations. Nevertheless, the core tenet of the EU is readiness to share sovereignty and operate through strong common institutions.

There have been several attempts to achieve regional integration outside of Europeincluding the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union (AU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Mercosur in South Americabut they have all failed to achieve anything resembling the progress of the EU. ASEAN is the most advanced of these efforts and regularly sends delegations to Brussels to seek ideas from the EU experience; however, ASEAN remains a strictly inter-governmental body and there is no indication of interest in sovereignty sharing. It is a similar story elsewhere: no other regional body is anywhere near the EU in terms of political or economic cooperation, let alone integration. Indeed, no other grouping has even gotten to first base in terms of the basic requirements of integration, namely dealing with historical reconciliation and developing the necessary political will. There have been innumerable declarations from groupings in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central America about the desirability of closer cooperation and even integration, but the record shows that the rhetoric has not been matched by action. Although the EU is also guilty of exaggerated rhetoric, it has steadily moved forwardeven if on occasion it seems to take two steps forward, one step back.

As the EU's experience demonstrates, historical reconciliation is a critical element in developing the necessary political will for cooperation and, ultimately, integration. The fundamental basis for the success of the EU is the historical reconciliation between France and Germany, achieved by years of sustained political effort from the leaders of both countries. In stark contrast, there has been no such effort in many other parts of the word where there are ambitions of regional integration. In East Asia, for example, there can be no integration without genuine reconciliation between Japan and China, and Japan and Korea. The East Asia experience is replicated elsewhere with unresolved problems and deep suspicions between, for example, Brazil and Argentina, India and Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. Only after historical reconciliation can countries proceed gradually along the various steps required to create a regional community such as a free trade area, a customs union, a single market, a single currency, a common passport area, and a common foreign policy.

Compared to most other regions of the world, the EU is a haven of peace, prosperity, and security. Following the global economic crisis, however, there are several major challenges facing the EU that, if not tackled with urgency and determination, could threaten the entire European project. Namely, the EU has grown and integrated rapidly without commensurate strengthening of its political and economic institutions. The emerging gap between necessary coordination and institutional capacity in the EU suggests a lesson for other regional groupings if and when they arrive at later stages of the integration process.

The first challenge is increased fiscal coordination amid a worsening economic outlook. The EU needs to cleanse the financial system and follow through on austerity measures introduced by almost all member states. The situation in late summer 2010 is less critical than it appeared in the spring, when many doomsayers were predicting the collapse of the euro and even suggesting the EU might break up. The major risk today is the continuing fragility of the economies of some eurozone member states such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and the possibility of renewed speculation in the financial markets. Although there are some positive signs of economic recovery in Europe, many economists continue to warn of a possible "double dip" recession and the likely impact of the ongoing problems of many European banks. While most passed the "stress tests" at the end of July 2010, there was broad agreement that these tests were not as strenuous as they could have been.

The economic troubles of the past few years come amid major, secular shifts of wealth toward Asia. The EU's share of global GDP declined from 24 percent to 22 percent between 1990 and 2010. In addition to sluggish economic growth compared to emerging markets like Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the EU is losing competitiveness. The European labor force is aging and increasingly prefers leisure to work. There are insufficient resources devoted to innovation. The Lisbon Strategy that sought to make the EU the most competitive region in the world by 2010 was a conspicuous failure. The latest 2020 plan, with its similarly lofty ambitions, is likely to fare no better. Rising energy and commodity prices have a negative impact on growth in Europe. Going forward, it is difficult to see how Europe, with its largely immobile and aging population, can compete with the labor markets of Asia, which are unburdened by health or unemployment costs. The Asian development model not only poses challenges to the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model but also to the creation of a reformed, rules-based system of global governance. Few Asian nations are willing to accept EU and U.S. pressure on social, labor, and environmental issues, arguing that they would be disadvantaged at a critical stage in their development.

The response of Europe to these troubling circumstances should be obvious: the eurozone will be safe only when discipline is matched by solidarity between the member states of the zone, a very serious challenge for the balance between Germany and the other eurozone countries. A single European voice is needed in all forums of global economic governance, including discussions on climate change and energy security. But this will not be easy to achieve given the continuing attachment most EU member states have to their own seats or shared constituencies in the international financial institutions. The Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009 also revealed the EU's weakness as an international actor. Though it reached a consensus and promoted climate change to the top of the global agenda, the EU was unable to assert itself at the most critical juncture.

The second challenge is resolving the EU's long-standing identity crisis. Member states have never been able to agree on the finalit politique, making the European experiment a journey to an unknown destination. Academics have described the debate as one between widening and deepening. On the one hand, the EU has progressed from a customs union to a single market and a eurozone of currently sixteen (soon seventeen) countries; on the other hand, it has gradually extended its membership from six to twenty-seven countrieswith more to joincovering almost the whole continent. The EU, however, has proved unable to strengthen its political institutions at a pace and with a depth consistent with the needs of its integration, as well as the number and heterogeneity of its membership. Faced with widespread public skepticism about the EU, European capitals remain attached to national sovereignty and reluctant to give great powers to Brussels. Furthermore, France and Germany remain divided on the issue of economic governance, and questions linger over the EU's final eastern borders.

Many hoped that the Lisbon Treaty would provide the impetus for a further deepening of the EU, but the long struggle to achieve ratification of the treaty and the shattering impact of the financial crisis has revealed little appetite for further institutional changes. As noted above, there is little public appetite for "more Europe," and national politicians seem increasingly reluctant to make the case for a strong EU. Germany is the most noticeable examplepreviously the strongest champion of closer integration, it has moved into the skeptic camp mainly due to public doubts about the euro, reflected also in judgments of the supreme court. There are, however, some experts and politicians, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France, and Guy Verhofstad, the former Belgian prime minister and current leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, who argue that the best response to the crisis is indeed a radical step forward toward a form of economic governance in Europe. They believe that the EU is severely handicapped by the eurozone's weak central institutions and the insufficient regulation of its financial and energy markets. Unfortunately, Sarkozy and Verhofstad's recommendations have met with a lukewarm response from Germany and other member states.

There is little doubt that the recent crisis has affected the EU as a model for regional integration, but the fallout will be temporary. Historically, the EU has rebounded from previous crises and often leveraged adversity to move to the next stage of integration: the failed plan for a European defense community in 1954 led to the creation of the European Economic Community three years later; the empty chair crisis of 1965 led to de facto acceptance of QMV and later de jure acceptance as a result of the 1986 Single European Act; the currency tribulations of the 1980s led to the European Monetary System and ultimately the euro; and the collapse of communism in Europe led to agreement on establishing a common foreign and security policy and the widest enlargement in the EU's history.

With regional blocs dominating the globalized economic and financial system, EU member states acting alone will be unable to achieve the results that could be gained through a 500-million-strong bloc. Already the United States is pressing for a reduced number of EU seats in the Group of 20 (G20) and global financial institutions. Over time these changes are likely to give a further impulse to the integration process. Meanwhile, a "multi-speed Europe" is inevitable for the foreseeable future, with a strengthened eurozone increasing the gap between the EU's hard core and its outer periphery.

How do other regions view the EU post-crisis? While there has been some unfavorable media attention, governments and other regional bodies have retained faith in the union. Significantly, neither China nor Russia attempted to sell their substantial holdings of euros. Between April and August 2010, the euro fell from over $1.40 to $1.15 before recovering to settle above $1.30. To most European exporters this is a reasonable exchange rateat $1.50 they were finding it difficult to sell abroad.

The EU's problems did not affect the plans of other regional groupings to move forward with cooperation. ASEAN, for example, went ahead with proposals to establish an ambassadorial steering committee, similar to the one in Brussels, which is known as Coreper. Japan, China, and Korea have intensified their trilateral ministerial meetings with a view to establishing closer East Asian cooperation. While the GCC has postponed plans for monetary cooperation, this decision resulted more from regional rivalries than any knock-on effect from the problems of the eurozone.

What are the lessons for other regional integration efforts? There is much that can be learned from the EU and its responses to various crises, including that of spring 2010. At the same time, the EU is a sui generis organization and how its members deal with a crisis may not be relevant to other less-advanced groupings. For example, if one were to take monetary union as an objective, then it would seem clear in hindsight that a more integrated political and economic structure would be necessary to monitor public debt and help prevent speculation. But no other grouping is anywhere close to a customs union or single market, let alone a common currency.

Integration is a difficult process and there will invariably be setbacks and crises. Nevertheless, in the EU case, the Cassandras are nearly always proven wrong. The EU has an excellent record of recovering from crises and moving ahead even stronger than before due to firm political will. The resounding lesson of the EU model, then, is the necessity of genuine investment by member states in the goal of regional integration. While not always politically expedient, national governments would be wise to put the long-term goal of cooperation above more immediate domestic priorities. More importantly, if integration is to succeed, governments and publics should believe that it is in their vital national interest. Without such commitment, regional groupings will crumble at the first bump in the long road to integration.

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The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration ...

The European Unionon Wednesdayrevealed a new defense fund it said it will be used to build advanced technologies like drones or robotics, following pressure from the United States to increase military spending,The Associated Pressreported.

The fund would put $563 million of the EUs money in 2019 and 2020 toward buying and developing military equipment, and double the amount to$1.13 billion annually after 2020, according to the European Commission.

The money would only be granted if a minimum of three companies from at least two EU member countries take part, but the commission says it expects the money to generate about five times the amount it puts in once contributions are made.

The new fund comes after President Trump last month scolded NATO members for not paying their fair share on defense during a ceremony at the alliances new headquarters in Brussels.

NATO members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their financial obligations, he said to a crowd that included other European leaders.

Trump has repeatedly called out NATO allies to boost their military budgets, demanding that the countries meet their pledges to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.

The commission said the problem is that defense budgets are not well spent and more than$28 billion is lost every year through poor cooperation.

Two percent of GDP spent separately provides less security than if part of the money is used jointly, European Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen told reporters.

As important as the amount of money, is how to use it.

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European Union launches new defense fund - The Hill

The European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini presented today how the European Union aims to support states, societies, communities and individuals in adapting to growing and increasingly long-term pressures. This is one the priorities guiding the EU's external action as presented by the EU Global Strategy.

The European Union's unique contribution to stability in the Sahel region is a good example of this resilience approach: European humanitarian aid helps to manage the immediate crisis of displaced people, while our development cooperation tackles the longer-term root causes of poverty, by supporting complementary actions for job creation, access to education, governance, health and climate mitigation. In addition, the EU is a security provider to the region. The HR/VP just announced 50 million of support to the G5 Sahel Joint force, with the aim to fight terrorism and enhance cross-border cooperation. All of these actions support the resilience of the region.

Handling disruptive pressures and shocks has become the new normal across the world. It is beyond the power of any individual state to confront today's demographic, climate change, environmental or migratory challenges, as well as the unpredictable consequences of economic shocks, conflict and violent extremism.

High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini said: "One fourth of the world's population lives in fragile States or societies. We want to prevent these fragile situations from turning into new wars, new humanitarian catastrophes, or new refugee crises. This is what we call resilience. This Communication will help us coordinate an impressive set of different tools, that only the European Union can mobilise: from humanitarian aid to incentives for private investments, from climate action to military missions. It is a forward-looking, truly integrated approach - the only one that can work, in the complex world of today. It is the European way to peace, security and human development".

There is a pressing need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural and long-term approach to vulnerabilities. The strategy puts a strong emphasis on anticipation, prevention and preparedness, aiming to work along three linked lines:

- Expanded assistance for partner countries' resilience The EU will continue to support domestic efforts of partner countries to become more resilient, with the help of broadened political, development and humanitarian support. This includes strengthening inclusive and participatory societies, alleviating long-lasting crises or preventing violent conflict. It will also take into account the vulnerabilities and needs of forcibly displaced people, while also recognising the positive contribution of migrants to inclusive growth and sustainable development.

- Policy dialogue and bilateral initiatives: The EU can draw upon significant experience of addressing complex domestic policy challenges and enhancing resilience. Examples of this include its work on energy security, climate adaptation, economic and social policy or addressing global health risks. Having invested heavily in research on resilience, the European Union is ready to share these insights with its international partners.

- Resilience and the security of the Union : Internal and external security dimensions of EU policy have to be closely integrated, in order to strengthen our response to hybrid threats, cyber-security, the security of critical infrastructure, terrorism and violent extremism. The European Union proposes to strengthen work on countering external disinformation strategies, as well as to further develop cooperation with NATO and the OSCE. In line with these priorities, the EU has for example stepped up its funding to 300 million for projects aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism and has deployed counter-terrorism experts in a number of key countries.

The European Union and its Member States are subject to many of the same pressures, which also challenge the resilience of its external partners and expose their vulnerabilities. European external policy has a strong role to play also in ensuring the resilience within the borders of the EU. This comes at a time when the Union has a greater responsibility than ever before to contribute to the security of its citizens.

Background:

The EU has over the past few years established an ambitious and transformative agenda for its external action. These include the foreign and security policy aims set out in the EU Global Strategy, international development and humanitarian goals agreed under the UN's Agenda 2030, and commitments under the Paris Climate accord.

The Joint Communication is part of the follow-up to the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, which Federica Mogherini presented to European leaders in June last year. The High Representative will present a report on the first year of implementation of the Strategy to EU Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers later in June.

For more information:

Factsheet: Joint Communication on "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action"

Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action"

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EU presents its strategy for more resilient states and societies around the world - EU News

ZAGREB - European Union could face great political and economic consequences after Brexit, but it would also be able to increase the connectivity among 27 remaining states while trying to resolve the issues of migrant and debt crisis which has a severe impact on the south of Europe.

How will the EU be able to answer these questions and how will they affect the Croatias position in the EU, will be topics of the roundtable Future of the European Union after Brexit.

Speakers at the panel EU after Brexit: more or less Europe will be Head of the European Commission in Croatia Branko Barievi, MEP Tonino Picula, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Parliament of Croatia Miro Kova, Minister Assistant at the Directorate for European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia Zrinka Ujevi and professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb Luka Brki.

Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Zdravka Bui, MEP eljana Zovko, Chief Political Adviser to the Prime Minister of Montenegro Aleksandar Erakovi and Professor of Political Science at the University of Zagreb Zoran Kureli will speak at the panel regarding the relations between Croatia and the Western Balkans.

The roundtable will be held at the Representation of the European Commission in Zagreb on Wednesday, June 8. The event is organised by the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) and the Representation of the European Commission in Croatia.

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Roundtable Future of the European Union after Brexit to be held in Zagreb - European Western Balkans (press release)