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In a recent discussion with Euronewsbulgaria, Rick de Oliveira, a Telf AG specialist, affirmed the European Unions readiness for the upcoming winter, citing ample gas reserves as the main reason. As Euronews pointed out the memory of the 2021 gas crisis and its high electricity prices, Oliveira expressed his guarded optimism for the crisiss end.

Oliveira attributed the EUs preparedness to its substantial investment in securing gas supplies ahead of the 2023 winter, an investment comparable to the spending on Covid recovery. He noted that the current gas situation appears far more stable than that of 2022, emphasizing the significant storage capacity filled across Europe, which exceeds the levels of 2022.

In a more in-depth analysis of the high-cost gas reserves and their impact on the private gas trading companies, Oliveira discussed the role of the International Monetary Funds loans. He stressed the importance of these credit lines, which could reach up to 2.4 billion euros in some countries, in assisting energy companies. He warned against the potential risk to end users, who would bear the brunt of the cost if these funds were not utilized properly.

Addressing the heightened prices of natural resources in the wake of the Ukraine war, Oliveira acknowledged the sharp increase but pointed out a recent return to lower price levels. He expressed hope for the continuation of this downward trend.

In response to the 30% decrease in EU gas consumption in 2022 compared to 2021, Oliveira linked it to high electricity prices and the introduction of consumption-reducing legislation. When asked about the potential continuation of this downward trend, he suggested it might persist until prices return to their previous levels.

In his view of the EU-Russia energy battle, Oliveira argued that conflicts between major economies rarely produce winners and often lead to widespread suffering.

In an interview with Euronews, Oliveira, a Telf AG expert, discussed the sharp rise in natural gas prices in Bulgaria, currently surpassing the European market average and potentially the highest in Europe. He pointed to a 108% increase in natural gas prices for Bulgarian households in the first half of 2022, marking the third-largest increase among EU member countries, and attributed it to the geopolitical situation.

In terms of securing cheaper natural gas, Oliveira suggested the need for intergovernmental coordination and alternative strategies, such as renewable energy investments and moves towards natural gas independence.

Reflecting on the winter of 2023-2024, Oliveira expressed optimism about the situation given the considerable gas reserves, but warned that factors might aggravate the situation and bring Europe back to a crisis state.

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Energy And Gas In The European Union Expert Telf AG - Business Manchester

To adapt Hamlets famous phrase, something is rotten in the state of Bulgaria. In particular, many deeply-rooted problems seem to stem from a single individual, Prosecutor General Ivan Geshev, who is facing substantial public and political backlash for his alleged involvement in the erosion of Bulgarias justice system.

Geshev, who took office in 2019 after an uncontested election, is now facing international scrutiny as reproaches mount that he is one of the worst impediments keeping Sofia from meaningful anti-graft efforts. US Congressman Warren Davidson called on the US Treasury Department to take action against Geshev for his corrupt actions threatening European security. Indeed, to external observers, it seems that Geshev has a fastidious tendency to pursue politically motivated prosecutions over corruption cases that actually need handling.

Geshev is an encapsulation of the political woes Bulgaria faces. Distinctly lacking political stability, the country is on its fifth parliamentary election in the last two years. While the pro-establishment party GERB was able to eke out a win in terms of percentage of votes cast, it has been unable to form a solid coalition so far, and is now facing further scrutiny as its leader Boyko Borisov and Geshev have become locked in a vocal demolition derby, complete with allegations of illicit political and judicial manoeuvring, covert recordings, and threats. Nor has Geshev limited himself to verbally sparring with his habitual ally Borisovhe has also taken aim at the countrys free press in recent weeks, even accusing leading investigative journalists of being involved in a questionable plot to attack him.

In a graft-ridden country like Bulgaria, uncovering corruption is not the hardest part of the job for independent journalists the biggest challenge for them is rather the near certainty of retribution. As Atanas Tchobanov, a leading investigative journalist in the country, argued: Normally, the findings of investigative reporting should trigger legal actions [against the perpetrators of alleged corruption], but in Bulgaria, they more often trigger institutional retaliation against journalists and their sources. This statement is endorsed by Geshev accusing journalists of conspiring with a laundry list of wrongdoers: criminals, businesses, and politicians, all in a plot against him and other high-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry.

Despite these recent attacks on the freedom of the Bulgarian press, ironically Sofias placement on the 2023 Media Press Freedom Index released earlier this month was better than expected. The country jumped considerably from 91 to 71. This is largely due, however, to the fact that for most of 2022, the country was ruled by Prime Minister Kiril Petkov and his pro-western government who ran on an anti-corruption ticket.

The situation looks decidedly less rosy for next years Media Press Freedom Index. Petkovs government collapsed in the summer of 2022 after losing a no-confidence vote in parliament, with Reporters without Borders (RSF) blaming the loss in part due to Sofias particular challenge of the inverted role of certain high-ranking prosecutors.

Events have escalated past simple accusations of journalists with a vendetta, following the alleged car bombing that Geshev apparently escaped on May 1st. Many in Bulgaria consider the details and the timing of the incident to be questionable. The staged version should also be investigated, opposition politician and lawyer Atanas Atanasov warned. Based on the experience I have, it looks like a multi-purpose active operation. The purpose is to glorify the victim, the victim here is in quotes and divert public attention from the political crisis. This may be a warning to the participants in the political process, Atanasov cautioned.

Geshevs attempts to hold onto power range from dramatic to desperate. Beyond the zealous prosecutions of journalists who he believes are plotting against him, the aggressive prosecutor sees threats to his power everywhere and prosecutes accordingly. An elegant example comes from a press conference this week where he tore up his resignation letter on national television, named his opposition trash and said he would finish his mandate.

While the decision to prosecute is a competency that Geshev has alone, his choice of whom to prosecute or not to prosecute appears to be deeply coloured by personal interests and motivations rather than the rule of law. For example, in a shocking turn of events, in March 2022 Borisov himself, along with his Finance Minister Vladislav Goranovnow sanctioned under the Magnitsky Actwere arrested in connection with apparent extortion involving prominent gambling tycoon Vasil Bozhkov.

Their rapid release, however, soon cast doubt on Geshevs impartiality. Despite the Ministry of Interior apparently having gathered significant evidence against Borisov and his associates, the prosecution opted not to press charges and even accused the ministry of compromising the ongoing investigation. Responding to these allegations, former Minister of the Interior Boyko Rashkov and former Prime Minister Kiril Petkov fired back, accusing the prosecutors office of deliberately obstructing the investigation and failing to verify Bozhkovs claims of having made substantial bribes to Borisov.

Amidst accusations and counteraccusations, trust in the Bulgarian authorities has taken a severe hit, and Geshev is digging the hole ever deeper. In January of this year, for example, he launched a probe into alleged financial improprieties at FinTech company Nexo. Not only did the concrete allegations lack key supporting evidence, as several Bulgarian institutions have noted, it seems likely that, for Geshev, the true crime was rather the fact that several Nexo employees made publicly registered donations to the opposition party Democratic Bulgaria. Prior to the Nexo probe, the pro-European opposition party was well-positioned to receive a mandate to form a government.

From taking on journalists for doing their job, for attacking individuals and companies for their personal political donations, and refusing to prosecute those who have been condemned by international organizations, Geshevs behaviour highlights the serious rule of law crisis in which Bulgaria currently finds itself.

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Bulgaria: The Achilles' Heel of the European Union's Rule of Law? - European Views

On May 21, in Republic of Moldova's capital, Chiinu,will take place theNational Assembly "Moldova European." This presidential initiative aims to engage all citizens with pro-European views and foster a sense of unity and commitment towards Moldova's European integration. Following this event, on June 1st 2023, Moldova will be the host country for the Summit of the European Political Community which will bring together 47 heads of states, governments as well as European Union leaders. These events aim to reinforce Moldova's aspirations for EU membership and demonstrate its compatibility with European values.

The creation of the European Political Community in the region was prompted by the Russian Federation's unwarranted aggression in Ukraine. Due to security concerns, organizing a summit in Ukraine was not feasible. Instead, Moldova, as a non-EU country, situated in the Eastern Neighborhood, emerged as the most accessible location to convene the Summit. Moldova's commitment to its European course has been evident ever since the election of President Maia Sandu (a staunch pro-European advocate) in November 2020, as well as the overwhelming pro-European majority in Parliament. Moreover, Moldova swiftly obtained the candidate country status for EU accession, primarily influenced by the war in Ukraine.

The upcoming Summit of the European Political Community, carries an adamant message to the Russian Federation: "Hands off the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Western Balkans." This message reflects the collective determination of not just the European Union, but all European states, to safeguard countries aspiring for reforms, values, and freedom against any unwanted interference from Russia.

The participation of 47 heads of states and governments in this summit marks a momentous occasion for the Republic of Moldova, an ex-Soviet republic that has grappled with geopolitical uncertainties since gaining independence more than three decades ago. The country's foreign policy stands out as a significant asset, providing a solid foundation for its resilience amidst the economic challenges resulting from the war in Ukraine.

The visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Chisinau on June 15, 2022, held significant importance in the context of the European Union applications of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It took place prior to the examination of these applications and played a crucial role due to the close relationship between President Macron and the Moldovan President. It's worth noting that France, along with Romania and Germany, has been a key advocate for Chisinau in advancing the European integration process for the country.

The upcoming Summit of the European Political Community, carries an adamant message to the Russian Federation: "Hands off the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.

The collaboration among France, Romania and Germany has been instrumental in championing the interests of the Republic of Moldova and advancing its path towards European integration. President Macron's visit served to reaffirm this alliance and highlight the importance attached to Moldova's European journey.

Specifically, during his visit to Chisinau in June 2022, Emmanuel Macron announced the establishment of a new dialogue platform and provided assurances that this European Political Community is not intended to replace the process of accession to the European Union. The joint initiative of France, Germany and Romania yielded significant success in organizing donor conferences, resulting in a financial support package exceeding 1.43 billion euros. During the conferences held in Berlin, Bucharest, and Paris, Republic of Moldova's budget received funding amounts of 700 million euros, 600 million euros, and 130 million euros, respectively, in the specified order.

The international community's timely assistance to the Republic of Moldova came at a critical moment, when the country was struggling with multiple challenges. These challenges included an economic crisis marked by an inflation rate of over 35%, a security crisis due to remnants of missiles dropped on its territory, a gas energy crisis resulting from exorbitant prices and limited supply of Russian gas, as well as an electricity crisis caused by the termination of the energy supply contract from the MGRES plant located in the area controlled by the self-declared Transnistria.

This financial support made a substantial contribution in addressing the pressing issues faced by Moldova and demonstrated the commitment of the international community in assisting the country in its time of need. It helped addressing the economic, security, and energy-related challenges, fostering stability and resilience in the Republic of Moldova.

The allocation of a budget for the European Community Summit signifies the tangible implementation of this concept as a functioning institution. It is essential to recognize the security concerns surrounding the Summit, particularly considering that Moldova has also experienced missile incidents caused by the Russian aggression. The event is taking place in the village of Bulboaca, a mere 30 km from the so-called capital of the separatist regime, Transnistria, further emphasizing the need for solid security measures.

It is probable that the European leaders will arrive bearing gifts, as they are expected to announce new grants aimed at supporting development efforts and mitigating the impacts of the war. Ukraine, the country that is defending its sovereignty, and the Republic of Moldova, being the second most affected country due to the war in Ukraine, stand to benefit from these initiatives first of all. The provision of financial assistance will not only aid in addressing the immediate consequences of the conflict, but will also contribute to long-term stability and recovery in these regions.

The hosting of this event presents as well an exceptional opportunity for the Republic of Moldova to gain significant international visibility.

The selection of security and energy as the main topics for the European Political Community (ECP) Summit is of utmost importance, given their significance as vulnerable areas for the Republic of Moldova. It is worth mentioning that the EU recently established a civilian mission in April of this year, aimed at enhancing the resilience of Moldova's security sector and countering cyber and hybrid attacks. This mission marks the second EU civilian mission after the war, the first being the civilian mission in Armenia, which strives for peacefully resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These initiatives reflect EU's efforts to strengthen its influence in security and foreign policies, as outlined in the priorities of the European Commission for the 2019-2024 mandate.

The hosting of this event presents as well an exceptional opportunity for the Republic of Moldova to gain significant international visibility.Despite its limited resources, Moldova has proved to be a true European country to the European community due to its impeccable management of over 100,000 Ukrainian refugees.The country's exemplary response to the refugee crisis (receiving the most Ukrainian refugees per capita compared to rest of Europe) including the provision of food, shelter, and medical services by its mobilized civil society, has not only enhanced Moldova's reputation, but has also showcased its unwavering commitment to the European values. It's significant to point out that this support extended to Ukraine was accompanied by the implementation of Western sanctions against Russia and a clear condemnation of the war, emphasizing Moldova's alignment with the international community's position.

Furthermore, for the European Political Community (ECP) to transcend from its current role as a mere dialogue platform, it needs to adopt a more proactive approach. This requires taking concrete steps, particularly with the involvement of Eastern European states that have historically experienced hostility from the Russian Federation. The ECP provides a valuable platform for countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to contribute their perspectives on the thinking of the Russian Federation. This, in turn, enables Western European states to enhance their vigilance and undertake a comprehensive reassessment of their approach in a pragmatic manner that duly recognizes the post-war realities.

Firstly, the European Political Community (ECP) should serve as a catalyst to expedite EU enlargement policies and revitalize the neighborhood policy, which has witnessed significant stagnation in recent years. It is noteworthy that the most recent accession to the European Union was Croatia in 2013, resulting in a ten-year gap during which these policies failed to address the aspirations of countries such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and those in the Western Balkans. Regrettably, this inaction has created an opportunity for Russia's propaganda to undermine the stability of these states, consequently fostering Eurosceptic sentiments within the region.

Secondly, to become a truly institutionalized entity, the ECP should establish bureaucratic structures, including a dedicated budget and governing bodies. This will ensure a clearer understanding of its functions and differentiate it from institutions such as the European Union, the European Council, and the Council of Europe. Without proper institutionalization, the ECP may appear as nothing more than a dialogue platform, duplicating the efforts that can be undertaken within existing institutions like the Council of Europe, which shares identical member states with the ECP.

Thirdly, given its focus on security and energy, the ECP should initiate a comprehensive work plan aimed at safeguarding the European states involved from the potential risks of dependence on and influence by Russia. Concrete solutions must be devised to counteract the adverse effects of complete reliance on Russian gas, especially for non-EU states that are more vulnerable than EU member states. By adopting such a proactive approach, the region can fortify itself against potential vulnerabilities and effectively mitigate the risks associated with Russia's energy dominance.

In conclusion, it is crucial for the European Political Community to reposition the Republic of Moldova as a "success story" and a compelling case study for aspiring integration into the European Union, emphasizing the challenges encountered on the path to necessary European reforms. The upcoming Summit presents an opportunity to establish a more determined accession perspective, addressing the previous lack of clarity. President Maia Sandu's firm declaration of a strong desire to integrate the Republic of Moldova into the European Union by 2030, along with a concrete action plan, calls for an assessment of the European states' willingness to enlarge the European Union and the need for more focused discussions on specific issues regarding the future of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.

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Assessing the Implications for Moldova in Hosting the European ... - German Marshall Fund

The European Parliaments committees for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and for Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted a report setting out the Parliaments vision for the proposed EU Regulation for artificial intelligence (the AI Act) on 11 May 2023.

The proposed AI Act has already been recognised as the first of its kind and as landmark piece of legislation that would tackle the risks arising around the creation and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. However, it has also been criticised for having the potential consequence of stifling innovation in the EU and putting the EU technologically behind other world economies. The European Parliament aims to address these concerns and ensure that AI is trustworthy, human-centric and respects fundamental rights and values.

Allen & Overy's summary of the European Commission's original proposal is available here.

The European Parliament proposes stepping away from defining AI as software, as in the original text of the AI Act. It instead proposes adopting a universal, technology-neutral and future-proof definition. It defines an AI system as a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions that influence physical or virtual environments. This definition better aligns with the OECD approach, but deviates from the definition proposed by the Council of the European Union.

The European Parliament also proposes substituting the term user (that counter-intuitively means an entity or person under whose authority the AI system is operated) to deployer, which should create clarity in interpreting the provisions of the AI Act.

Article 3 of the AI Act includes other new definitions, for instance:

Under new Article 4a, operators (including developers and deployers) in scope of the AI Act are required to use best efforts to develop and use AI systems or foundation models in accordance with a number of general principles to promote ethical and trustworthy AI, such as:

Article 4a explains that these general principles are in turn translated into specific requirements set out in the Act as applicable to AI systems and foundation models

The report maintains the European Commission's risk-based approach, which classifies AI systems depending on the level of risk the AI can generate, but expands the list of prohibited AI practices significantly and introduces significant changes to the categorisation of high-risk AI. New prohibitions concern, among others, placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system for:

In relation to high-risk AI systems, the Annex III listing high-risk AI systems has been fine-tuned and expanded. For instance, biometric-based systems, including systems for biometric identification or for inferences about personal characteristics of individuals based on biometric and biometric-based data (eg emotion recognition systems) are designated as high-risk, with some narrow exceptions. One exception from the high-risk AI list exists for AI systems used for detecting financial fraud. Annex III has also been expanded to include new instances of high-risk AI, for instance, AI systems used for public elections or AI-based content recommender systems of very large online platforms (VLOPs) under the Digital Services Act.

In addition, an AI system will no longer automatically be high risk if listed in Annex III; the AI system will also have to pose a significant risk to peoples safety, health or fundamental rights or in some cases a significant risk of harm to the environment.

The new Article 29a provides for a fundamental rights impact assessment prior to putting a high-risk AI system into use for the first time. It includes requirements for what the impact assessment must cover and, other than where the deployer is an SME, requires the deployer to notify national supervisory authorities and relevant stakeholders (for example, equality bodies, consumer protection agencies, social partners and data protection agencies) and, to the extent possible, obtain their input (a six week period for response is to be allowed). Certain entities deploying AI will be required to publish the summary of the results of this impact assessment. The Article also provides that if a data protection impact assessment is required to be conducted under the GDPR, it should be done in parallel with the fundamental rights assessment and attached as an addendum.

The European Parliament included new obligations on the providers of AI foundation models (AI foundation models being in essence pre-trained AI systems that can be used as a basis for developing other AI systems). The new article 28b requires the providers of foundation models to register these models in an EU database; to ensure that the models comply with comprehensive requirements for their design and development; to produce and keep for 10 years certain documentation; to draw up extensive technical documentation and intelligible instructions for downstream providers, and to provide information on the characteristics, limitations, assumptions and risks of the model or its use.

A new Article 4d will require the providers and deployers of AI systems to ensure a sufficient level of AI literacy of their staff and other persons dealing with AI systems on their behalf, taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education and training and the context the AI systems are to be used in.The proposal explains that AI literacy refers to skills, knowledge and understanding that allows various stakeholders to make an informed deployment of AI systems and gain awareness about the opportunities and risks of AI and its possible harms. Such literacy measures could include learning notions and skills required to ensure compliance with the AI Act.

The report amends the provisions on the proposed European Artificial Intelligence Board, which was modelled on the example of the European Data Protection Board under the GDPR, to introduce an EU AI Office. The EU AI Office would still have a wide range of powers to monitor implementation of the AI Act, provide guidance and coordinate of cross-border issues.

The European Parliament is expected to vote on the report in a plenary session (currently scheduled for 12-16 June 2023), then the trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission can commence. The Council of the EU adopted its position in December 2022, which we summarised in a blog post here. These negotiations usually take several months.

The press release is available here and the preliminary consolidated version of the adopted report here.

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European Parliament committees adopt their vision on the AI Act ... - JD Supra

TheEuropean Commission is having objections to the proposed acquisition ofAsiana Airlines by Korean Air. Although it hasnt made a final decision, the EC says in a Statement of Objections that the merger of the two airlines will reduce competition in the passenger and cargo market in certain countries. European Commission objects to Korean Air/Asiana merger.

Already in February, Brussels raised concerns about the proposed merger, which is pending since Korean Air formally announced the acquisition in November 2020. Since February, the European Commission has completed an in-depth investigation into the effects of the merger on competition. Specifically, if a combination of Korean Air and Asiana will restrict competition between Europe and South Korea. Korean Air intends to take a 63.9 percent share in Asiana.

The investigation concludes that the merger will result in reduced competition for passenger transport services on four routes between South Korea and France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Competition in the provision of cargo transport services between all of Europe and South Korea will also be affected.

Korean Air and Asiana compete head-to-head in carrying passengers and cargo between the EEA and South Korea. Together, they would be by far the largest carriers of passengers and cargo on these routes and the merger may remove an important alternative for customers, the European Commission said in a media statement on May 17.

Other competitors face regulatory and other barriers to expanding their services and may be unlikely to exert sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity. The merger may therefore lead to increased prices or decreased quality of passenger and air transport services.

The EC says that the Statement of Objections is a formal step in an investigation and does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. Korean Air now has the opportunity to reply to the Commissions Statement of Objections, to consult the Commissions case file, and to request an oral hearing. The Commission has until August 3 to make a final decision.

The acquisition proposal needs approval from various countries. Turkey, Taiwan, and Vietnam already granted mandatory approval in 2021, followed by South Korea in February 2022, and China in December 2022. Mandatory approval from the US, European Union, and Japan is still pending.

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Active as a journalist since 1987, with a background in newspapers, magazines, and a regional news station, Richard has been covering commercial aviation on a freelance basis since late 2016.In 2022, he has gone full-time freelance. Richard has been contributing to AirInsight since December 2018. He is also writing for Airliner World and Aviation News. From January 2023, he will add a part-time role with Dutch website and magazine Luchtvaartnieuws. Twitter: @rschuur_aero.

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European Commission objects to Korean Air/Asiana merger - AirInsight