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Those who fear for the future of the European Union are confronting a painful paradox: Many of the strongest bids to tear apart the EU are being underwritten by EU cash.

France is careening towards a nail-biter presidential election this month that pits a crowded field against anti-EU titan Marine Le Pen. But EU funds pay her salary, fund her assistants and underwrite the conferences and books she churns out to attack the 28-nation bloc. Key British leaders of the successful Brexit campaign got their financial lifeline from Brussels euros. Elsewhere in Europe, self-identified fascists are paying for rallies to further the future of the "white race" by breaking up the EU all thanks to EU money.

With the European Union under threat as never before, lawmakers have been pushing to tighten generous rules that make it easy for fringe political parties to qualify for hundreds of thousands of euros every year. Bigger forces such as the European affiliate of Ms Le Pen's National Front party get millions because of their heft in elections for the European Parliament, an institution that is short on power but flush with cash.

Some groups, such as Ms Le Pen's, are backed by a wide range of voters. But others have done little to qualify for money other than showing a scattering of support across several European countries. Some lawmakers want to end funding for those organisations.

We have free speech, they can do lots of things, but they should not be financed by a union that is bound to totally different values, said Marita Ulvskog, a Swedish centre-left member of the European Parliament who is fighting to stop funding for extreme-right parties.

The group she has targeted, the Alliance for Peace and Freedom, is slated to receive $723,000 (577,000) this year. Last year, some of that money went toward a conference where a British National Party leader, Nick Griffin, said that white people have a catastrophically low birthrate.

We already in most of our countries have so few young girls of childbearing age or younger that even if they each had 20 children, it would take us 80 years to restore our numbers, said Griffin, a former member of the European Parliament.

Another member of the Alliance for Peace and Freedom, European Parliament member Udo Voigt, was convicted in Germany for inciting racial hatred by advocating that the national soccer team include only white players.

While the Alliance for Peace and Freedom takes just a tiny share of EU funding, bigger far-right beneficiaries of EU money also pose a far more potent threat.

As an elected member of European Parliament, Ms Le Pen can work full-time to undermine the EU because of her generous EU salary. Her EU-paid Eurosceptic assistants bolster her labour. Her pan-European party an alliance of anti-EU lawmakers from across Europe receives yet more EU money. And still more official funding funnels to an affiliated think tank that sponsors anti-EU conferences and policy papers.

As many as a third of the parliament's 751 members are Eurosceptic, including 23 members of Ms Le Pen's National Front party.

When like Marine you come in with 23 seats, you get these mandates and assistance, said Gerolf Annemans, who is a leader of Ms Le Pen's pan-European parliamentary group and a member of Belgium's Eurosceptic Flemish Interest party. The various possibilities and means that you get are splendid to develop your political message.

After decades at Europe's fringe, anti-EU parties blossomed during the 2014 elections that delivered a powerful if fractious contingent to the European Parliament, which has limited power but ample funding. Politicians benefited from a backlash to years of EU-driven austerity policies and a growing fear among voters that Europe's open borders were hurting their job prospects.

British members of the European Parliament as part of Ukip led the successful charge to pull their country out of the EU. Now Ms Le Pen is leading French members of the European Parliament to deliver the death blow if she wins France's presidency. European funding has been so critical to both groups that many politicians say the insurgents would never have threatened Europe's entrenched establishment without it.

Without the European Parliament, you wouldn't have a Ukip or a Front National as powerful and cohesive as they are now, said Giles Merritt, a longtime observer of the EU who leads the pro-European Friends of Europe think tank.

With only national elections to run in, they probably would have died on the vine, Mr Merritt said. But the fact they were able to get substantial numbers of people in parliament, and through that, funding, that has been significant in the whole populist tide.

In both France and Britain, a quirk of election law meant that small parties largely shut out of national politics could win big in the European Parliament. Ms Le Pen's National Front is the largest party in the French delegation to the European Parliament, but holds only two of 577 seats in France's National Assembly. Similarly, the Ukip is the largest British party in Brussels but has no seats in the House of Commons.

Eurosceptic leaders have long turned to the European Parliament as a ready source of funds and legitimacy. Ms Le Pen's father Jean-Marie, the founder of the National Front, has been elected to the body since 1984. Ukip leader Nigel Farage has held office since 1999. But only after the 2014 elections did the money truly start to expand, since it is tied to the number of lawmakers holding office.

The resources available to EU lawmakers are wide-ranging, starting with their $108,000 annual salaries plus daily stipends when parliament is in session. Each can hire up to three Brussels-based assistants, and more in their home nation. EU funds also pay for offices back home.

Additional resources go toward pan-European political parties and affiliated policy think tanks. Ms Le Pen's Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom is slated to receive $1.8 million this year. Its think tank, which funds publications such as Enough with the euro!and sponsors anti-EU conferences, will receive another $1.1 million.

Although the European Parliament's assistants and foundations are technically forbidden from political campaigning, the lines are blurry. Both mainstream and anti-EU leaders have been cited for mixing national politics with their legislative work.

The European Parliament is really important, because most of them at a national level, they don't get much. Because if you're not elected at national government it's difficult to get resources, said Nathalie Brack, a professor of political science at the Free University of Brussels who has studied Eurosceptic lawmakers in the European Parliament. It's an easy way to get the legitimacy they need. So they start with the European level and then they try to compete at the national level.

Eurosceptic lawmakers readily acknowledge the utility of being a member of the European Parliament, which is often abbreviated to MEP.

It creates a platform, said Roger Helmer, a senior leader of Ukipin the European Parliament. I could write a letter to the newspaper as a private citizen, and maybe it would get printed. But as an MEP I have a press officer and an office and a Twitter account, so I can do some campaigning.

Washington Post

Excerpt from:
Le Pen wants to kill the European Union. But it actually helps pay her bills - The Independent

Voters who are angry at the political establishment have said a civil war is on the cards if France does not break away from the European Union.

The French presidential election is fast approaching, with two candidates advocating a Frexit gaining the most ground in recent days.

Both left-wing Jean-Luc Melenchon and right-wing Marine Le Pen are pushing for a campaign to leave the European project.

Several voters in the historically industrial town of Amiens told German channel DW that they were backing Marine Le Pen so she could take back control over their borders.

GETTY

One young worker said he was voting for the Front Nationalbecause they were the only party with answers to France's growing unemployment, which sits just over 10 per cent.

But, he warned, the country may need to fight on the streets for their freedom from the European Union.

The young man told DW: "Leaving the euro will hurt at first and make a lot of people very angry. It could even trigger a civil war to get there.

"But, something has to be done, and that includes returning to the Franc."

Mrs Le Pen's political platform has called for protectionist policies in order to boost the French economy.

GETTY

GETTY

It could even trigger a civil war to get there. But, something has to be done

Marine Le Pen voter

Amiens has seen several companies move their operations abroad, such as Poland, in recent years.

One of the local union representatives, Frederic Chantrelle, said: "Tomorrow it will be Asia, then Bangladesh.

"Globalizationis always more for the big people and less for us little ones.

"We always have to tighten our belts, and some of us don't have any more belt."

On the upcoming election, Mr Chantrelle added: "We're working for nothing, and we're fed up. It will show in the vote.

"People will vote extreme in the first round."

Another local farmer said: "Europe means open borders and they need to be closed.

"It might not be easy to leave the EU but we have to close the border. It is the only way to protect this country."

GETTY

Jean Renie Cou, who has been a consistent campaigner for the Front National, said Frexit was the best answer to the country's problems.

He said: "30 percentof our farmers will go out of business due to unfair competition. We need intelligent protectionism.

"We must finally impose tariffs on products imported to France made elsewhere in Europe at a very low cost, without maintaining social or environmental standards."

Go here to read the rest:
Fed-up French voters warn 'CIVIL WAR' could be needed to liberate nation from EU - Express.co.uk

Current member states

This article is part of a series on the politicsandgovernment oftheEuropeanUnion

There are five recognised candidates for future membership of the European Union:[1]Turkey (applied in 1987), Macedonia (applied in 2004), Montenegro (applied in 2008), Albania (applied in 2009) and Serbia (applied in 2009). All except Albania and Macedonia have started accession negotiations.[3][4]Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, whose independence is not recognised by five EU member states,[5] are recognised as potential candidates for membership by the EU.[1]Bosnia-Herzegovina has formally submitted an application for membership, while Kosovo has a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which generally precedes the lodging of membership application. In July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker announced that the EU has no plans to expand in the next five years.[6]

The accession criteria are included in the Copenhagen criteria, agreed in 1993, and the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49). Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any "European state" that respects the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law", may apply to join the EU. Whether a country is European or not is subject to political assessment by the EU institutions.[7]

Past enlargement has brought membership to twenty-eight members since the foundation of the European Union (EU) as the European Economic Community[8] by the Inner Six states in 1958.

The three major western European countries that are not EU members, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, have all submitted membership applications in the past, but subsequently froze them. They do however, along with Liechtenstein, participate in the EU Single Market as well as the Schengen Area, which makes them closely aligned with the EU. According to an Eastern Partnership strategy, the EU is unlikely to invite any more of its post-Soviet neighbours to join the bloc before 2020.[9] However, in 2014 the EU signed Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine,[10] and the European Parliament passed a resolution recognising the "European perspective" of all three post-Soviet countries.[2]

Member states

Candidates negotiating membership

Candidates

Potential candidates which have submitted a membership application

Potential candidates which have not submitted a membership application

The EU Commission has stated, in the document Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013 (October 2012), that its enlargement policy promotes opportunities for business and for citizens of prospective accessor states, and demonstrates the EU as a "global actor".[11] A policy paper of March 2013 concluded that the EU needs to persevere with commitment to supporting reforms, strengthening political association, and greater economic integration.[12]

The present enlargement agenda of the European Union regards Turkey and the Western Balkans. Turkey has a long-standing application with the EU, but their negotiations are expected to take until at least 2023.[13] As for the Western Balkan states, the EU had pledged to include them after their civil wars: in fact, two states have entered, four are candidates and the others have pre-accession agreements.

There are, however, other states in Europe which either seek membership or could potentially apply if their present foreign policy changes, or the EU gives a signal that they might now be included on the enlargement agenda. However, these are not formally part of the current agenda, which is already delayed due to bilateral disputes in the Balkans and difficulty in fully implementing the acquis communautaire (the accepted body of EU law).

There are at present five "candidate countries", who have applied to the EU and been accepted in principle.[18] These states have begun, or will begin shortly, the accession process by adopting EU law to bring the states in line with the rest of the Union. While most of these countries have applied only recently, Turkey is a long-standing candidate, having applied in 1987 and gaining candidate status in 1999.[19] This is due to the political issues surrounding the accession of the country.[20]

Albania applied for EU membership on 28 April 2009. Officially recognized by the EU as a "potential candidate country", Albania started negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2003. The SAA was signed on 12 June 2006 and entered force on 1 April 2009, thus completing the first major step towards EU membership.

Following the same path as the recently admitted Central European and Mediterranean countries in 2004 and 2007, Albania has been extensively engaged with EU institutions, and joined NATO as a full member in 2009. It has also maintained its position as a stability factor and a strong ally of the European Union and the United States in the troubled and divided region of the Balkans.[21]

After the application for EU membership was sent by the Albanian Government, on 16 November 2009 the Council of the European Union asked the European Commission (EC) to prepare an assessment concerning the readiness of the Republic of Albania to start accession negotiations, a process lasting about a year usually.[22] On 16 December 2009 the EC submitted the questionnaire on accessing preparation to the Albanian Government. Albania returned the questionnaire's answers to the EC on 14 April 2010.[23] Candidacy status was not recognised by the EU along with Montenegro in December 2010, due to the long-lasting political row in the country.[24][25][26] In December 2010, Albanian citizens were given the right by the European Union to travel without visas to the Schengen area.[27]

On 10 October 2012, the European Commission evaluated Albania's compliance with the twelve key priorities that were defined in November 2010 as necessary to be met before the country could be approved as an EU candidate and start negotiations for accession. Of these, four were found to be met, while two were well in progress and the remaining six were in moderate progress.[28] The Commission recommended in its assessment conclusions that Albania:

should be granted an official EU candidate status subject to completion of key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform and the revision of the parliamentary rules of procedures are revised. In order to be able to move to the next stage and open accession negotiations, Albania will have in particular to demonstrate sustained implementation of commitments already undertaken and completion of the remaining key priorities which have not been met in full. The focus should be on the rule of law and fundamental rights. Sustainable political dialogue will remain essential for a successful reform process. The conduct of the 2013 parliamentary elections will be a crucial test in this regard and a pre-condition for any recommendation to open negotiations.[29]

On 16 October 2013 the European Commission released its annual report which concluded that the Albanian election was held in an "orderly manner" and that progress had been made in meeting other conditions; as such it recommended granting Albania candidate status.[30] However, several states, including Denmark and the Netherlands, remained opposed to granting Albania candidate status until it demonstrates that its recent progress can be sustained.[31] Consequently, the Council of the European Union at its meeting in December 2013, agreed to postpone the decision on candidate status until June 2014.[32]

On 24 June 2014 the Council of the European Union agreed to grant Albania candidate status,[3] which was endorsed by the European Council a few days later.[33]

In March 2015, at the fifth "High Level Dialogue meeting" between Albania and EU, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement (Johannes Hahn) notified Albania the setting of a start date for accession negotiations to begin still required the following two conditions to be met: 1) The government need to reopen political dialogue with the parliamentary opposition, 2) Albania must deliver quality reforms for all 5 earlier identified key areas not yet complied with (public administration, rule of law, corruption, organised crime, fundamental rights[34]).[35] This official stance, was fully supported by the European Parliament through its pass of a Resolution comment in April 2015,[36] which basically agreed with all conclusions drawn by the Commission's latest 2014 Progress Report on Albania.[37] The Albanian Prime Minister outlined the next step of his government would be to submit a detailed progress report on the implementation of the 5 key reforms to the Commission in Autumn 2015, and then he expected the accession negotiations should start shortly afterwards - before the end of 2015.[35]

Albania is currently receiving EUR 1.2bn of developmental aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

Macedonia applied to become an official candidate on 22 March 2004. On 9 November 2005, the European Commission recommended that it attain candidate status. EU leaders agreed to this recommendation on 17 December, formally naming the country an official candidate. However, no starting date for negotiations has been announced yet.[when?]

Peace is maintained with underlying ethnic tensions over Albanians in the west of the country, who achieved greater autonomy through the implementation of the Ohrid Accords. Unlike Serbia, Macedonia has maintained sovereignty over all its territory. In 2006, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski suggested that the country could join the EU in 2012 or 2013.[38] However, the EU never recognised this suggested time period.

On 17 December 2005, the European Council welcomed and congratulated the country's achievements in implementing multiple reforms and agreements (Copenhagen criteria, Stabilisation and Association process, Ohrid Agreement).[39]

The country has a dispute over its name with its southern neighbour and current EU member Greece. Greece rejects the name "Macedonia" because it says it implies territorial ambitions towards Greece's own northern province of Macedonia (see: Macedonia naming dispute). Because of this, the EU refers to the country only by the provisional appellation "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYRoM). The resolution of the name issue has become a precondition for accession,[40] since Greece has repeatedly confirmed it would use its right to block accession without a prior settlement.[41] Concerns over the country's difficulties in reaching European standards on the rule of law and the economy[42] and over violence and irregularities in the 2008 parliamentary elections[43] have also cast doubts on the country's candidacy. The European Commission has recommended that Macedonia begin accession talks in three successive meetings since 2009.[44]

A solution for the long-lasting naming dispute however moved considerably closer, when the Greek foreign minister on 4 October 2012 forwarded a draft for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to settle the question. According to the EurActiv site, the proposal was answered positively by the Macedonian foreign minister on 8 November 2012.[45] For Macedonia to begin accession negotiations, the country however still besides solving the issue with Greece needs to convince Bulgaria about removing their veto and block of negotiations.[46] On 11 December 2012, the Council of the European Union concluded that Macedonia could start accession negotiations as early as the second quarter of 2013, conditional on reaching an agreement on its dispute with Bulgaria and Greece. The Council was encouraged that progress on the latter dispute had recently been made by a UN mediator.[47]

In early 2013, political instability stemming from the Macedonian parliament's approval of its 2013 fiscal budget through an undemocratic procedure threatened to derail the country's request to start accession negotiations with the EU. However, the crisis was resolved when EU brokered a compromise between Macedonia's political parties on 1 March 2013.[48] At the most recent meeting of the Council of the European Union in December 2013, the Council for the fifth consecutive year concluded that "the political criteria continue to be sufficiently met", but in regards to making the final decision to open accession negotiations it was only agreed to revisit the issue in 2014. The decision whether or not to start accession negotiations will be made "on the basis of an update by the Commission on further implementation of reforms in the context of the High Level Accession Dialogue, including the implementation of the 1 March 2013 political agreement and on tangible steps taken to promote good neighbourly relations and to reach a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue".[32]

The UN mediator, Matthew Nimetz, invited Greece and Macedonia to a new round of "name dispute" negotiations to begin on 26 March 2014.[49] In February 2014, the European Parliament passed a resolution stating that according to its assessment, the Copenhagen criteria have been sufficiently fulfilled for Macedonia to begin negotiations for EU accession, and called on the Council of the European Union to confirm the date for the launch of accession negotiations straight away, as bilateral disputes must not be an obstacle for the start of talks although they must be solved before the accession.[50] As of May 2014 the name dispute was still unresolved,[51] but it was announced that negotiations were to be resumed after the Greek EP election and local elections on 25 May.[52] At the Council meeting in June 2014, the fixing of a start date for Macedonia's accession negotiations was not on the agenda.[53]

Macedonia is currently receiving EUR 1.3bn of development aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

In the independence referendum of 21 May 2006, the Montenegrin people voted for Montenegro to leave the state union of Serbia and Montenegro and become an independent state. After obtaining independence, Montenegro officially submitted its EU membership application to the European Commission (EC) on 15 December 2008.[54] However, Montenegro has been experiencing ecological, judicial and crime-related problems that could slow or hinder its bid.

Montenegro unilaterally adopted the euro as its currency at its launch in 2002, having previously used the German mark. Negotiations over the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) started in September 2006.[55] SAA was officially signed on 15 October 2007 and came into force on 1 May 2010, after all the 27 member-states of EU had ratified it.[56][57]

On 22 July 2009, a questionnaire to assess Montenegro's application was presented to the Montenegrin Government by the EC. On 9 December 2009, Montenegro delivered its answers to the EC questionnaire. On 9 November 2010, the European Commission recommended that the Council of the European Union grant Montenegro the status of candidate country.[58] On 17 December 2010, Montenegro became an official EU candidate country.[59]

In 2011 Montenegro's population was overwhelmingly for joining the EU, 76.2% being in favour according to polling and only 9.8% against.[60]

Montenegro is currently receiving EUR 507mn of developmental aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

Negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement started in November 2005.[61] Serbia's candidacy has been hindered by its relations with the breakaway state of the Republic of Kosovo. Serbia has made numerous concessions on this to achieve candidate status, such as allowing Kosovo to participate in regional forums, and jointly managing their border.[62]

On 29 April 2008, Serbian officials signed an SAA with the EU,[63] and the Serbian President sought official candidate status by the end of 2008.[64] The Dutch government refused to ratify the agreement while Ratko Mladi was not captured. He was captured in Serbia on 26 May 2011, removing the main obstacle for obtaining candidate status. As of January 2009, the Serbian government has started to implement its obligations under the agreement unilaterally.[65] The effects remain to be evaluated by the European Commission. Despite its setbacks in the political field, on 7 December 2009, EU unfroze the trade agreement with Serbia.[66] Serbian citizens gained visa-free travel to the Schengen zone on 19 December 2009,[67] and Serbia officially applied for the EU membership on 22 December 2009.[68]

In November 2010, The Economist stated that "EU Foreign Ministers have agreed to pass Serbia's request for membership to the European Commission".[69] The European Commission sent a legislative questionnaire of around 2,500 questions[70] and Serbia answered it on 31 January 2011. On 12 October 2011, the European Commission has recommended that Serbia should be granted an official EU candidate status following its successful application for the EU membership.[71]

A deal was reached with Romania in late February 2012 over the rights of the 30,000 'Vlachs' in Serbia, removing Romanian objections to candidacy.[62] On 28 February, Carl Bildt, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, confirmed that the EU foreign ministers agreed to grant green light for Serbia candidacy status. Candidacy status was granted by the European Council on 1 March 2012.[72] On 22 April 2013, the European Commission recommended the start of EU entry talks with Serbia.[73] On 28 June 2013 the European Council endorsed the Council of Ministers conclusions and recommendations to open accession negotiations with Serbia, and announced that they would commence by January 2014 at the latest.[74] The following day, the Head of the EU Delegation to Serbia, Vincent Degert, stated that the screening of the acquis had commenced.[75] Screening of the acquis started on 25 September 2013.[76]

In December 2013 the Council of the European Union approved opening negotiations on Serbia's accession in January 2014,[32] and the first Intergovernmental Conference was held on 21 January at the European Council in Brussels. Serbia was represented by Prime Minister Ivica Dai and his first deputy Aleksandar Vui, while the EU was represented by their Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Evangelos Venizelos.[17]

Serbia is currently receiving EUR 2.9bn of developmental aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

The status of Turkey with regard to the EU has become a matter of major significance and considerable controversy in recent years. Turkey was one of the founding members of the Council of Europe in 1949 and has been an "associate member" of the European Union and its predecessors since 1964, as a result of the EECTurkey Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) that was signed on 12 September 1963.[77] The country formally applied for full membership on 14 April 1987, but 12 years passed before it was recognised as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. After a summit in Brussels on 17 December 2004 (following the major 2004 enlargement), the European Council announced that membership negotiations with Turkey were officially opened on 3 October 2005. The screening process which began on 20 October 2005 was completed on 18 October 2006.

Turkey, with the seventh largest economy in the Council of Europe and the fifteenth largest economy in the world,[78] has been in a customs union with the EU since 31 December 1995. Turkey was a founding member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1961, a founding member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1973 and was an associate member of the Western European Union from 1992 until its dissolution in 2011. Turkey is also a founding member of the G-20 major economies (1999), which has close ties with the European Union.

Proponents of Turkey's membership argue that it is a key regional power[79][80] with a large economy and the second largest military force of NATO[81][82] that will enhance the EU's position as a global geostrategic player; given Turkey's geographic location and economic, political and cultural ties in regions with that are in the immediate vicinity of the EU's geopolitical sphere of influence; such as the East Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts, the Balkan peninsula, the Middle East, the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.[83][84]

According to Carl Bildt, Swedish foreign minister, "[The accession of Turkey] would give the EU a decisive role for stability in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which is clearly in the strategic interest of Europe."[85] One of Turkey's key supporters for its bid to join the EU is the United Kingdom. In May 2008, Queen Elizabeth II said during a visit to Turkey, that "Turkey is uniquely positioned as a bridge between the East and West at a crucial time for the European Union and the world in general."[86]

However others, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, maintain an opposition to Turkey's membership. Opponents argue that Turkey does not respect the key principles that are expected in a liberal democracy, such as the freedom of expression;[87] and because of the significant role of the army on the Turkish administrative foreground through the National Security Council; whose military-dominated structure was reformed on 23 July 2003, in line with the requests from the EU.[88] Turkey's large population would also alter the balance of power in the representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 70million inhabitants would bestow it the second largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament.[82] Demographic projections indicate that Turkey would surpass Germany in the number of seats by 2020.[82]

Other opponents to Turkey's membership state that it would also affect future enlargement plans, especially the number of nations seeking EU membership,[82] grounds by which Valry Giscard d'Estaing has opposed Turkey's admission. Giscard d'Estaing has suggested that it would lead to demands for accession by Morocco. Morocco's application was already rejected on geographic grounds, and Turkey, unlike Morocco, has territory in Europe. French President Nicolas Sarkozy (then a candidate) stated in January 2007 that "enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political union, and that I do not accept...I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union."[89] Only a small fraction of the Turkish territory (around 3%) lies in the present common geographical definition of Europe, with approximately 97% of its land mass being in Asia, including the capital Ankara. The vast majority of its population lives in the Asian side of the country. On the other hand, the country's largest city, Istanbul, lies mostly in Europe. The population in the commonly defined as European part of Turkey is approximately ten million inhabitants, which is larger than Sweden, Austria, or 15 out of the 28 present EU members. In addition, the EU already has a member state located entirely in AsiaCyprus to the south east of Anatolia and part of Anatolia's continental shelf.

Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis said in September 2013 that he believed prejudice by EU member states would ultimately prevent Turkey from ever joining the bloc, although he suggested it could have a "very closely aligned" relationship with the EU akin to Norway.[90]

Another concern is the Cyprus dispute. The northern third of the island of Cyprus is considered by the EU and most states in the world to be part of the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state, but is de facto controlled by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is recognised by Turkey. Turkey, for its part, does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus pending a resolution to the dispute under the auspices of the United Nations, and has 40,000 troops stationed on territory controlled by the Northern Cypriot government. The UN-backed Annan Plan for the re-unification of Cyprus was actively supported by the EU and Turkey. Separate referendums held in April 2004 produced different results on either side of the island: while accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in the north, the plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the south.

Turkey is currently receiving EUR 9.2bn of developmental aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

The EU's relations with the Western Balkans states were moved from the "External Relations" to the "Enlargement" policy segment in 2005. Those states which have not been recognised as candidate countries are considered "potential candidate countries".[91] The move to Enlargement directorate was a consequence of the advancement of the Stabilisation and Association process.

The 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki set integration of the Western Balkans as a priority of EU expansion.

On 9 November 2005, the European Commission suggested in a strategy paper that the enlargement agenda of the time (Croatia, Turkey and the Western Balkans) could potentially block the possibility of a future accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.[92]Olli Rehn has said on occasion that the EU should "avoid overstretching our capacity, and instead consolidate our enlargement agenda," adding, "this is already a challenging agenda for our accession process."[93]

Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for membership of the EU on 15 February 2016.[94] The country faces many economic as well as political problems and meaningful progress is necessary for the EU to consider a membership application from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) required before applying for membership started in 2005 and were originally expected to be finalised in late 2007.[95] However, negotiations stalled due to a disagreement over police reform, which the EU insisted on centralising away from the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SAA was initialled on 4 December 2007, and, following the adoption of the police reforms in April 2008, was signed on 16 June 2008.[96][97] Following ratification, the SAA should have entered into effect in 2011, but was frozen since Bosnia had not complied with its previous obligations, which would have led to the immediate suspension of the SAA. The obligations to be met by Bosnia before the SAA can come into force include the adoption of a law on state aids and a national census, and implementation of the Finci and Sejdic ruling of the ECHR requiring an amendment to the Constitution to allow members of minorities to be elected to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to gain seats in the House of Peoples. The EU has also required that the country create a single unified body to manage their relations with the EU.[98] The GermanyUnited Kingdom Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, agreed to by the EU in late 2014, proposed that the SAA enter into force without first implementing the constitutional amendments required by Finci and Sejdic, provided that Bosnian authorities approve a declaration pledging their commitment to making the reforms required for European integration.[99] This was secured and the agreement entered into force on 1 June 2015.

Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina gained visa-free travel to the EU in December 2010.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently receiving EUR 822mn of developmental aid until 2020 from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.

As of July 2013[update], 5 of the 28 member states do not recognise the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. As a result, the European Union itself refers only to "Kosovo*", with an asterisked footnote containing the text agreed to by the BelgradePristina negotiations: "This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence."

A Stabilisation Tracking Mechanism (STM) was launched by EU for Kosovo on 6 November 2002. It is an association process specially devised to promote policy dialogue between the EU and the Kosovan authorities on EU approximation matters.[100] As confirmed by the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, Kosovo was through the initiated STM process now anchored in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, the EU policy which applies to the Western Balkans. On 20 April 2005 the European Commission adopted the Communication on Kosovo to the Council, "A European Future for Kosovo", which reinforces the Commissions commitment to Kosovo. Furthermore, on 20 January 2006, the Council adopted a European Partnership for Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo as defined by UNSCR1244. The European Partnership is a means to materialise the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries within the framework of the stabilisation and association process. The Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) adopted an Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnership in August 2006. The PISG regularly reports on the implementation of this action plan.[101]

The Republic of Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia was enacted on 17 February 2008 by a vote of members of the Assembly of Kosovo.[102][103] The fact that their independence was not recognised by Serbia, and consequently also not recognised by five EU member states (Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus), did not prevent the country from continuing its STM programme, which aimed to gradually integrate its national policies on legal, economic and social matters with EU, so that at some point in the future they would qualify for EU membership. Kosovo's politicians announced in April 2008 that they expected Kosovo to join the EU in 2015,[104] and the 15th STM meeting was successfully held between EU and Kosovo in December 2008.

Negotiations for EU membership will only start once the country becomes an official candidate for EU membership, and for that to happen Kosovo first needs to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU. Before becoming a member they will also likely need to be fully recognised as a sovereign state by all EU member states.[105][106][107] On 10 October 2012 the European Commission found that there were no legal obstacles to Kosovo signing a SAA with the EU, as full sovereignty is not required for such an agreement, and recommended that negotiations start as soon as Kosovo had made further progress on issues in four areas: "Rule of law", "Public administration", "Protection of minorities", and "Trade".[108] On 15 October 2012 this invitation was answered positively by the Prime Minister of Kosovo, who together with the Ministerial Council on European Integration agreed on a to-do list for public authorities to secure "Fulfillment in record time of the technical criteria for the start of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement".[109]

Several days after Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement further normalizing their relations, the European Commission recommended authorizing the launch of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo,[110] and on 28 June 2013 the European Council endorsed the Council of the European Union's conclusions on opening negotiations with Kosovo.[111][112] Negotiations were started on 28 October,[113] and were completed on 2 May 2014.[114] The agreement was initialled on 25 July.[115] Kosovo signed the SAA with EU on October 27, 2015, and it entered into force in 2016.[116]

It was previously the norm for enlargements to see multiple entrants join the Union at once. The only previous enlargements of a single state were the 1981 admission of Greece and the 2013 admission of Croatia.

However, the EU members have warned that, following the significant impact of the fifth enlargement in 2004, a more individual approach will be adopted in the future, although the entry of pairs or small groups of countries will most probably coincide.[117]

In July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President-elect of the European Commission, announced that the EU has no plans to expand in the next five years.[118]

(bracketed date): approximate and most probable nearest possible date

s screening of the chapter fs finished screening f frozen chapter o open chapter x closed chapter

generally already applies the acquis

no major difficulties expected

further efforts needed

non-acquis chapter - nothing to adopt

considerable efforts needed

very hard to adopt

situation totally incompatible with EU acquis

The Maastricht Treaty states that any European country that is committed to democracy may apply for membership in the European Union.[144] In addition to European states, other countries have also been speculated or proposed as future members of the EU.

Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are members of a free trade area (EFTA) developed in parallel to the EU. Most prior members of EFTA left to join the EU and the remaining countries, except Switzerland, formed the European Economic Area with the EU. None has current aspirations to join the EU, although they (except Liechtenstein) have applied for membership but withdrawn them. All four EFTA members participate in the EU Single Market with exceptions as well as the Schengen Area, which makes them closely aligned with the EU.

Iceland applied to join the EU in July 2009 following an economic crisis. Prior to that, its relations with the EU were defined by its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), which gave it access to the EU's single market and the Schengen Area. As a result of their EEA membership, Iceland already applies many major economic EU laws and negotiations were expected to proceed rapidly (although research by the EFTA Secretariat in 2005 found that only 6.5% of laws had actually been adopted;[145][146] see below for European Commission assessment).

As in Norway, Iceland's fear of losing control over its fishery resources in its territorial waters was the most important reason for its reluctance to join the EU. However the economic downturn in Iceland accelerated the debate, and the Independence Party, then the largest opposition party, agreed to the opening of accession negotiations after a referendum (and subject to a further referendum).[147] A proposal to begin negotiations with the EU was put before the Icelandic parliament in July 2009[148] and approved (without a pre-negotiation referendum) by a slim majority on 16 July 2009. Iceland submitted its application to the Swedish presidency in a letter dated 16 July, and the application was acknowledged by the Council of the European Union on 27 July.[149] On 8 September, the EU commission sent Iceland a list of 2,500 questions about its fulfilment of convergence criteria and adoption of EU law. Iceland replied to the commission on 22 October 2009. On 2 November, Iceland selected a chief negotiator for the membership negotiations with the EU: Stefan Haukur Johannesson, Iceland's Ambassador to Belgium. In February 2010, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy recommended to the Council of the European Union to start accession negotiations with Iceland. The European Council decided in June that negotiations should start,[150] and on 17 June 2010 the EU granted official candidate status to Iceland by formally approving the opening of membership talks.[151] On 26 July 2010, European Union foreign ministers formally gave the green light for negotiations to begin and agreed to start the talks on the following day.[152]

The first annual report on the negotiations was published in November 2010;[153] the main issues at stake remained the fisheries sector and whale hunting, while progress had been made concerning the Icesave dispute.[154]

In February 2013, the Icelandic chief negotiator stated that the main driving force for Iceland joining the EU was the benefit to the country of adopting the euro to replace the inflation-plagued Icelandic krna. Iceland's HICP inflation and related long-term government interest rates were both recorded to be around 6% on average for 2012. Most importantly, however, while the country retained the Icelandic kronur, it was unable to lift the capital controls recently introduced in the turmoil of the economic crisis. Introduction of the euro, a far stronger currency, would allow the country to lift these capital controls and achieve an increased inward flow of foreign economic capital, which ultimately would ensure higher and more stable economic growth. To be eligible to adopt the euro, Iceland would need to join the EU, as unilateral euro adoption had previously been refused by the EU.[155]

On 14 January 2013, the two governing parties of Iceland, the Social Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement, announced that because it was no longer possible to complete EU accession negotiations before the parliamentary elections in April 2013, they had decided to slow down the process and the six remaining unopened chapters would not be opened until after the election. However, negotiations would continue for the 16 chapters currently open.[156] The new party Bright Future supports the completion of negotiations,[157] while the other two opposition parties, Independence Party and Progressive Party, argue that negotiations should be completely stopped.[158][159] In February 2013, the national congress of both the Independence Party and Progressive Party reconfirmed their policy that further membership negotiations with the EU should be stopped and not resumed unless they are first approved by a national referendum,[160][161] while the national congresses of the Social Democratic Alliance, Bright Future and Left-Green Movement reiterated their support for the completion of EU accession negotiations.[162] Iceland's current chief negotiator stated in an interview in February 2013 that if the newly elected parliament supported the continuation of EU membership negotiations, it would be possible to complete negotiations by the spring of 2015, with a referendum on membership to be held after that.[155][163]

Following the April 2013 Icelandic election, the new Icelandic government announced that they were indefinitely extending the previous government's freeze on EU accession talks, pending a national referendum on the application.[164] On 13 June, Iceland's Foreign Minister Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson informed the European Commission that the newly elected government intended to "put negotiations on hold".[165] European Commission President Manuel Barroso responded on 16 July 2013 by requesting that the new Icelandic Prime Minister make a decision on the continuation of their accession bid "without further delay".[166] Iceland has subsequently dissolved its accession negotiations team.[167] On 12 March 2015, Foreign Minister of Iceland Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson stated that he had sent a letter to the EU withdrawing the application for membership, without the approval of the Althing, though the European Union stated that Iceland had not formally withdrawn the application.[168]

Liechtenstein is, like Norway and Iceland, a member of the European Economic Area and hence is already heavily integrated with the EU.[169] Seeking to join is not current policy.[169]

Norway is not an EU member state, but adopts most EU legislation as a result of its participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Additionally, Norway has chosen to opt into some of the Union's programmes, institutions and activities.[170] Whether or not the country should apply for full membership has been a dominant and divisive issue. Division within the governing redgreen coalition (20052013) has blocked the issue since the 2005 parliamentary elections.[citation needed] Norway has applied four times for EEC and EU membership. In 1962 and 1967 France effectively vetoed Norway's entry,[171] while the later 1972 referendum and the 1994 referendum were both lost by the government.[171][172]

Norway's application for EU membership has been frozen but not withdrawn. It could be resumed at any time following renewed domestic political will, as happened in the case of Malta.

A major issue for Norway is its fishing resources, which are a significant part of the national economy and which would come under the Common Fisheries Policy if Norway were to accede to the EU.

Norway has high GNP per capita, and would have to pay a high membership fee. The country has a limited amount of agriculture, and few underdeveloped areas, which means that Norway would receive little economic support from the EU. However, as of 2009[update], Norway has chosen to opt into many EU projects and since its total financial contribution linked to the EEA agreement consists of contributions related to the participation in these projects, and a part made available to development projects for reducing social and economic disparities in the EU (EEA and Norway Grants),[170][173] its participation is on an equal footing with that of EU member states. The total EEA EFTA commitment amounts to 2.4% of the overall EU programme budget.

Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (the EU common market), the Schengen treaty (and was an associate member of the Western European Union until the organisation terminated in 2011), as well as other treaties and agreements normally considered as under the EU umbrella. Norway was a founding member of NATO in 1949.

Switzerland took part in negotiating the EEA agreement with the EU and signed the agreement on 2 May 1992 and submitted an application for accession to the EU on 20 May 1992. A Swiss referendum held on 6 December 1992 rejected EEA membership. As a consequence, the Swiss Government suspended negotiations for EU accession until further notice, though its application remained open until it was formally withdrawn in 2016. The popular initiative entitled "Yes to Europe!", calling for the opening of immediate negotiations for EU membership, was rejected in a 4 March 2001 referendum. The Swiss Federal Council, which is in favour of EU membership, had advised the population to vote against this referendum since the preconditions for the opening of negotiations had not been met. It is thought that the fear of a loss of neutrality and independence is the key issue against membership among eurosceptics. Switzerland has relatively little amount of land area with agriculture, on which a large part of the EU budget is spent.

EU membership continued to be the objective of the government and is a "long-term aim" of the Federal Council. Furthermore, the Swiss population agreed to their country's participation in the Schengen Agreement. As a result of that, Switzerland joined the area in December 2008.[174]

The Swiss federal government has recently undergone several substantial U-turns in policy, however, concerning specific agreements with the EU on freedom of movement for people, workers and areas concerning tax evasion have been addressed within the Swiss banking system. This was a result of the first SwitzerlandEU summit in May 2004 where nine bilateral agreements were signed. Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, said the agreements "moved Switzerland closer to Europe." Joseph Deiss of the Swiss Federal Council said, "We might not be at the very centre of Europe but we're definitely at the heart of Europe". He continued, "We're beginning a new era of relations between our two entities."[175]

The Swiss government declared in September 2009 that bilateral treaties are not solutions and the membership debate has to be examined again.[176]

In the Swiss immigration referendum, February 2014, a federal popular initiative "against mass immigration", Swiss voters narrowly approved measures limiting the freedom of movement of foreign citizens to Switzerland. The European Commission said it would have to examine the implications of the result on EUSwiss relations.[177] Due to the refusal of Switzerland to grant Croatia free movement of persons, the EU accepted Switzerland's access to the Erasmus+ student mobility program only as a "partner country", as opposed to a "programme country", and the EU froze negotiations on access to the EU electricity market. On March 4, 2016, Switzerland and the EU signed a treaty that extends the accord of the free movement of people to Croatia, something which lead to Switzerland's full readmission into Horizon 2020, a European funding framework for research and development.[178][179] The treaty was ratified by the National Council on April 26[180] on the condition that a solution be found to an impass on implementing the 2014 referendum.[181] The treaty was passed in December 2016.[181] This allowed Switzerland to rejoin Horizons 2020 on January 1, 2017.

In March 2016, the Swiss National Council voted to withdraw its suspended application for EU membership.[182][183][184] The motion was passed by the Council of States,[185][186][187][188] and in a letter dated 27 July the Federal Council informed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union that it was withdrawing its application.[189]

Within western Europe, there are five microstates: Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican City, and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein is a member of EFTA (see section EFTA states for its details). The other non-EFTA microstates have signed agreements allowing them not only to use the euro, but also to mint their own coins. The non-EFTA microstates are also de facto part of the Schengen agreement or have a largely open border with the EU and have close relations with their neighbouring state. For example, Monaco is a full part of the EU's customs territory via France, and applies most EU measures relating to VAT and excise duties.[190]

Close cooperation and inclusion in systems like the Eurozone are offered to them. This does not come without conditions. For example, the EU requires cooperation in tax control in return. Monaco has already implemented the EU Directive on the taxation of savings interest.

In Andorra (the largest European microstate), the government has said that "for the time being" there is no need to join the EU;[191] however, the opposition Social Democratic Party is in favour.

Monaco joined the Council of Europe in 2004,[192] a move that required it to renegotiate its relations with France, which previously had the right to nominate various ministers. This was seen as part of a general move toward Europe.[193] One concern is that, unlike the constitutional monarchies within the EU, the Prince of Monaco has considerable executive powers and is not merely a figurehead.

See the rest here:
Future enlargement of the European Union - Wikipedia

Natalie Matthews-Ramo

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union has been falling apart. Creditor countries in northern Europe forced austerity on Mediterranean nations, polarizing the continent between center and periphery. Then, an unprecedented refugee crisis hit, endangering the foundational goal of borderless Europe promised by the Schengen Agreement. Last year, Britain left. Although the U.K. was always the least connected segment, separated by the English Channel and an imperial history that made federation distasteful, this bode badly for the mission of European integration. Stir terrorism and ethno-nationalist populism into the mix and the EU currently looks less like a laboratory for democratic innovation and more like a meth lab ready to blow.

Now, the EU is also being measured by an older and more sinister barometer for concern: anti-Semitism. In the new book, The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age, James Kirchick sounds the alarm over the fate of Europe for some 280 pages. The focus moves from East to West but finds its center of gravity in a chapter called France without Jews. He analyzes the rebirth of anti-Semitism in Europe, adding it to his broader argument that the 1945 political consensuses of pax europaea is in jeopardy. The book plainly states its mission: to deliver 20th century European history to its readers lest they be forced to repeat it. The simplicity of this goal would seem underambitious if the EU was in better health. But with Marine Le Pen, a far-right nationalist with strong support from Putin, poised to take the reins of the French government, scrutinizing recent European history for answers is a critical task.

Kirchick, a journalist with experience working in Eastern Europe, comes to the role of doctor diagnosing the EUs malady from the center-right rather than the more familiar center-left. His primary interest is geopolitical alignments and statecraft rather than economics. Unlike the arguments of economists like Paul Krugman or Joseph Stiglitz, Kirchick believes that the 2008 crisis and subsequent austerity are not to blame for the EUs current state of disarray. Rather, he defends the European Union against charges of mismanaging the crisis while insisting that both the left and the right have been too unforgiving with Brussels.

EU institutions, Kirchick argues, are struggling toward a complex and noble goal: federating 28 countries. The historical circumstances of WWII and the Cold War gave Western Europe few other options. Through historical necessity, the EU produced a laudable experiment in post-national government, free trade, and however weakly, cosmopolitan society. Despite two generations of planning and intricate institutional architecture, the Union is now caught off guard by crises of immigration, transnational finance, and resurgent nationalism. These problems outstrip the EUs worst-case scenarios by an order of magnitude but, at the same time, they are familiar. They are based on the political realities the EU faced when it came together with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Like the 1930s and 1940s, Russia is ruled by an autocrat with irredentist ambitions, and a weak economy fuels religious and ethnic tensions. Unlike the time period when the EU was born, European countries now have no internal consensus on what to do in a world in which political authority is coming apart.

For Kirchick, the alarm sounding Europes demise is most frightening in the grim new reality that is the life of French Jews. Attacked in acts of terrorism, harassed on the street when wearing yarmulkes, and constantly equated with Israel by virtue of their religion, many French Jews have chosen to make aliyah and resettle in Israel. Kirchick sees French anti-Semitism as a sign of its existential failure. It exhumes a specifically French struggle between communal identity and ethnic difference, kindled by the Dreyfus Affair a century ago. Yet it also pertains to all European countries that have backtracked on the Libert component of Libert, Egalit, and Fraternit.

Kirchick maintains that Jews have been singled out for particularly bad treatment despite their historical suffering and relative integration into French society:

The plight of French Jews should be a crucial sign of the destructiveness of ethno-nationalism. Kirchick argues that it has produced no such reaction: Not only have fleeing French Jews failed to elicit sympathy or action but many, including some members of the secular Jewish community, have excused animosity toward Jews as a natural response to Israeli land-grabbing and human rights abuses. Kirchick tells us that 20th century history has been willfully forgotten in Eastern Europe, where countries like Hungary have built WWII memorials that fail to mention the Holocaust at all. At the same time, Germany has become over-sensitive to both surveillance and, more problematically, humanitarian assistance to refugees. Historical guilt for the crimes of Nazism inspired an open-door refugee policy as ill considered as it was well intentioned, the negative consequences of which will be felt for generations, Kirchick writes.

But while he is an immigration realist who worries about mass integration, he is also troublingly sympathetic to political arguments in Europe that Muslim migration will irrevocably change European culture. He veers in the direction of pathologizing Muslims for gang rape: So prevalent is mass, participatory sexual assault in [the Arab world], Kirchick informs us, that there is a word for it, taharrush, one with which Europeans have become painfully acquainted as this distinctly Arabian pathology has been imported to their streets. He believes the European left prohibited frank discussion of the downside to immigration, leaving many citizens ill-prepared to find a suitable language to discuss the challenges of integration for fear of being labeled racists. Seeing this political chasm, he argues, groups such as the Greek Golden Dawn Party, Pegida in Germany, and the anti-Semitic nationalist party Jobbik in Hungary leapt into the void, providing a harsh and simplistic language to talk about immigrants and minorities.

The End of Europe is strongest in its analysis of Eastern European populism, the war in Ukraine, and the tug-of-war between the Russian and EU spheres of influence in countries like Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Kirchick corrects the proclivity of the general American public to dismiss Eastern Europe as the other Europe, forever destined to follow the charismatic authority of iron-fisted kleptocrats. He explains why much of the populist nationalism, previously seen as native only to the region, is spreading west. The days of tsk-tsking Macedonians for their treatment of Roma from the safety of NGO forums in London are over. Now, Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen crib their talking points from ethno-nationalists who, a decade ago, would have been limited to an audience of young men with shaved heads and white shoelaces.

In general, though, while The End of Europe offers a detailed account of the recent past, its diagnostic powers are more limited. Kirchick rightly observes that the original EU was not only about utopian dreams of defeating petty nationalism or building a heterogeneous society: It was a trade bloc. The EU is, at heart, a utilitarian project, Kirchick writes. Countries ultimately join not out of a sense of war guilt or a belief that they owe something to poorer Europeans, but because membership brings quantifiable material benefits. Many countries also joined because they saw it as the lesser evil in the era of globalization. The sales pitch was one unified welfare state or 28 broken ones, yet Kirchick does not explore this social dimension of the economic compromise. He quickly labels the 2008 crisis as the result of the unsustainability of the old social welfare state model but does not give us any glimpse of peoples lives trapped in that socioeconomic arrangement and currently in grave danger.

Particularly in his treatment of Southern European countries, like Spain and Greece, that suffer 40 percent youth unemployment, unpayable debt, and an erosion of domestic political power, Kirchick takes up the prevalent line of cultural fecklessness. Rather than acknowledge that many loans were made to Mediterranean countries with full knowledge of their economic weaknesses, he exoticizes their politicians as stuck in a semi-European culture of bribes and nepotism that resembles the baksheesh practices of the Ottomans. Because of his lack of interest in the long-term effects of debt and austerity, he is not well positioned to explain social movements that grew out of this experience. He consigns SYRIZA and Jeremy Corbyn to the far-left fringe, despite both groups many political compromises and lack of violence or hateful language. He warns that left populism portends the rise of a European hard left exuding the same authoritarian populism of the extreme right, but beyond anarchists throwing a few rocks in Athens he never explains the source of this danger or its similarity to right-wing militias that prey on people of color.

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Despite the fact that much of The End of Europe was surely written before the rise of the TrumpBannon white nationalist White House, it does still feel like an urgent SOS from across the ocean about how worthy institutions can unravel with alarming speed. Kirchick lauds the spirit of compromise in the formation of the EU as well as in the deeds of a previous generation of European politicians, including Margaret Thatcher, Vaclav Havel, and Francois Mitterrand. Indeed, the EU was a project that transcended political divisions: The right liked its free market potential and the left supported it as a means to transnationalize the protections of the welfare state. Today, it is held in contempt by both anti-austerity socialists as well as ethnic nationalists. Kirchick convincingly argues that anti-EU sentiment has been whipped up by jingoistic Kremlin internet trolls, opportunistic fringe racists, and charlatans like Nigel Farage and Steve Bannon who made a bundle of money as financiers before sounding off against globalism.

The EU was born out of a banal French-German deal to cooperate on steel production; the aspirations of the federation have always outpaced its capacities. Despite his own ideological blind spots, Kirchick recognizes that the most glaring gap between rhetoric and reality is in the EUs botched grappling with racial and ethnic tensions. He shows that the vainglorious promise of post-national society overshadowed small, but real, achievements. And he ultimately imparts the idea that the EU is worth fighting for. Those who want to leave are deluded by micro-issues and cynical manipulations, such as U.K. fishing regulations or sausage packaging. But those who truly understand the necessity of the European Union, Kirchick argues, are students of history who have not forgotten where the idea came from and what it was a reaction against.

More:
The Scary Reality of the European Union's Demise - Slate Magazine

Bloomberg/Getty Images

Malta was among the ten countries that joined the European Union in 2004.

When the European Union expanded in the 2000s, it had a negative impact on scientific collaborations between researchers in new member countries and elsewhere, a study has found.

Membership in the EU gives countries access to the blocs huge science-funding schemes and to the European Research Area (ERA), which strives for a border-free, well-funded, pan-European system of science. But according to a paper published on 12 April in Science Advances1, countries that joined in two waves of expansion ten new members in 2004 and two more in 2007, all but three of them part of the former Soviet bloc would have had more cross-border collaboration between scientists if they had not joined.

The findings challenge central tenets underlying ERA integration policies, write the authors.

In the paper, Alexander Petersen, a computational social scientist at the University of California, Merced, and his co-authors assess the collaboration rates of countries based on publication involving authors from more than one nation.

They found a much slower increase in Eastern European rates of collaboration per publication in the decade after 2004 than in previous ones (see Inter-EU brain drain). They also modelled what the cross-border publication rate might have been, had those 12 countries not joined the EU. According to the teams results, nations that joined in 2004 such as Poland and Lithuania saw 9% fewer cross-border publications than they might have expected given their scientific and economic metrics, such as spending on research and development.

When countries join the EU, their citizens generally also gain the automatic right to work in any other EU member state, which raises the risk of a brain drain. Petersen says that promising young academics who work in their home states often establish cross-border collaborations. But if those same researchers move west, their countries of origin lose not only their human capital, but also their bridges with the rest of the world. And this process naturally explains what we found in our paper Eastern European countries would have been more integrated within science had they never integrated within the EU, he says.

Petersen thinks that the ERA is great for multiple reasons, including that it brings together countries with different innovation systems. He also says that the EU is doing a good job of dealing with the problems identified in this paper, for instance through programmes that pair Eastern-European institutions with Western ones. The latest paper shows, however, that Eastern European countries should invest in collaboration with Western countries, but should also implement home-return conditions to make sure scientists come back at some point, he says.

The research comes at a crucial time for scientific collaboration in the EU, given that one of its major players the United Kingdom is about to leave the bloc. Several groups, including the League of European Research Universities (LERU) and the European University Association, called last month for new momentum to be given to the ERA, by setting more ambitious goals and expanding beyond Europe.

Of course there has been brain drain, says Kurt Deketelaere, secretary-general of LERU and a professor of law at the University of Leuven in Belgium. But it did not have to happen, he says. Deketelaere faults the new member states for not strengthening their own research systems in line with the ERA aims.

If they had done that, they would have experienced brain circulation, much less brain drain and have a much better-performing research system, he says.

Commenting on the paper, a European Commission spokesperson said in a statement, In recent years, transnational cooperation between member states has grown by 7.8% an encouraging sign that ERA is working. But it is now up to member states in particular to further improve the implementation of ERA.

The commission will assist with this by helping lower-performing countries improve their scientific efforts, the spokesperson added.

Read more:
Joining the European Union leads to less cross-border collaboration - Nature.com