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The European Unions International Promotion of LGBTI Rights: Promises and PitfallsBy Markus ThielRoutledge, 2021

Activists and political leaders in the Global North have turned to LGBT rights as a key agenda item in foreign policy as part of the liberal order, both normatively and in the provision of aid. This is despite the lack of cohesive policy or consistent and binding change on LGBT rights in their own jurisdictions. At the same time, scholars have been increasingly critical about these interventions, as have some sexual and gender minority activists in the Global South. In my own work I have documented the preemptive emergence of state homophobia in Uganda and the sociopathic dynamic of sovereign states in general (Bosia 2015) to criticize these foreign policy initiatives. And since the publication of Development, Sexual Rights, and Global Governance (Lind 2010), scholars including Rahman (2014), Mason (2018), and Rao (2020) have pioneered critical and decolonizing approaches in the study of global LGBT rights. Referencing this scholarship, The European Unions International Promotion of LGBTI Rights offers the first examination of the elaboration and effectiveness of EU foreign policy on LGBT rights, both through EU institutions and those of member states, and particularly hones in on the dynamics that challenge LGBT rights interventions. EU scholar Markus Thiels innovation includes a thoroughly researched description of international policy processes and initiatives on LGBT rights to examine their implementation, reception, and effectiveness in accession states in Europe, neighboring states not considered available for a direct EU embrace, and states liberated from European colonial empires.

Thiel places the challenge to the EUs foreign policy on LGBT rights within the context of an insufficiently realized European normative power, despite the foundation of the EU in values. He lays out the challenge thus: In that sense, Normative Power Europe (NPE) is constituted of both the somewhat autonomous common institutions (such as the European Commission or the Parliament) which in a regular manner vocally pronounce normative ideas and expectations and the member governments, which may be more or less normatively motivated (p.35). Within this context of limited sovereign or norms-bounded power at the regional or national levels, Thiel notes that the EU meets a variety of internal and external pressures. These include the Potemkin nature of pro-LGBT policies adopted by candidate states, abandoned or outright reversed soon after admission to the EU; the admixture of homophobic and xenophobic policies within the EU that make NPE hectoring at best and neocolonial and racist at worst; and the transformation of once radical sexual and gender minority demands to be consistent with the heteronormative and neoliberal agenda central to EU policy making.

The text is organized across four institutional dimensions. First, Thiel examines the inconsistent embrace of LGBT rights within member states themselves. These differences are most obvious between the old democracies of Western Europe who founded the EU and the new members in Central and Eastern Europe, but they also divide older Europe along a North-South axis, with Italy and Greece lagging on measures like full marriage equality (not accounted for are the lag in extending marriage in Germany and Northern Ireland). Of particular concern are the opposition of some member states, including Poland and Hungary, to the centrality of LGBT rights to European values. Next, Thiel turns to EU interventions in the arena where Brussels (the EU capital) has been the most effective: accession to the union itself. LGBT rights were on the agenda for institutional reform within the mandate to implement democratic decision-making processes prior to admission, with the EU providing expertise and support for these transformations. Consequently, the wave of admissions in the first decade of the 21st century was characterized by the elimination of impediments to citizenship such as criminalization of sexual conduct. Later, however, the effect of these Potemkin changes, as Thiel describes them, was reversed in states central to the expanded EU. Hungary and Poland specifically have targeted LGBT+ citizens in rhetoric and policy. The application of such standards also have been variously exploited by candidate states as well as being undermined by the EUs own geopolitical priorities as other issues associated with accession came to dominate over LGBT inclusion.

Finally, Thiel turns to the EUs role in the world, focusing on development aid and conditionality in relationship to once colonial states, and on the role of the EU within international institutions such as the UN. Through the former, the text lays out evidence of suboptimal policy making as it arrives through the same colonial ideologies about civilization that the EU is hoping to suppress. From the perspective of sexual and gender minorities, Thiel notes that moves to condition aid on EU normative priorities has been opposed by activists in the Global South, as it included aid in civil society as well. At the same time, some recipient governments have characterized the EUs approach as colonial domination. Political leaders in the Global South have used opposition to the EUs agenda to solidify their own standing as leaders of an ongoing struggle for National Liberation from colonial rule, noting the distinctiveness of the national values they are constructing in confrontation with the dangers of Europes decadence.

We might read the book under review to imply that the EU has been most successful in achieving change at the level of Inter-Governmental Organizations. At the UN in particular, Thiel identifies the key role of the EU and its member states in placing LGBT rights on the institutions normative agenda, including the appointment of an Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Thiel, however, also calls our attention to the limitations of the EU approach, including the inconsistent support among EU states and an emerging coalition of hostile states within the EU.

While Thiel provides a clear outline of EU policy making in a way that takes account of sequences and competing perspectives, his analysis of responses to EU policy in his three cases in the Global South Uganda, Indonesia, Jamaica are less clear. For example, with regards to Uganda he troubles the consequences of US and Evangelical interventions just after 2000 and their direct participation in networks and extensive financial assistance for AIDS programing. Far from reacting to LGBT activism globally or locally or embracing cultural homophobia, as the text implies, Ugandas political leadership after 2000 espoused the goals of these US actors to target and marginalize sexual and gender minorities in ways that created a gay peril and a homophobia that did not exist prior, spurring local activism and global attention. But shifts in EU and especially US intervention after 2012 also prevented the reintroduction of a draconian anti-LGBT bill and provided more extensive direct financial aid to programs that supported sexual and gender minority organizing.

Thiels text is a valuable resource for scholars of LGBT rights generally and the EU normative agenda in particular, and despite the brevity of its three Global South case studies, it provides one of the best researched descriptions of the policy process and challenges faced by the EU as a regional and global actor. For those whose interest in activist strategies and responses is piqued by this texts focus on EU policy, critical readings of EU and US global interventions on LGBTQI+ rights from Eastern European, migrant, and Global South perspectives, trans, nonbinary, and queer scholars, and women and scholars of color include the collection Murderous Inclusions, organized for the Feminist Journal of International Politics by Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco (2013); the contributions of Rahman, Grey and Attai, Stevens and Chaudhry, and others in The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics (2020), as well as Rahmans 2014 book; Masons collection on queer development studies (2018); Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth (Lennox and Waites 2018); EU Enlargement and Gay Politics (Slootmaekers, Touquet, and Vermeersch 2016); and the work of Dean Cooper-Cunningham in Security Dialogue (2022) and elsewhere that focuses on the activist response to what he calls Putins Heteronormative Internationalism.

In conclusion, Thiels scholarship points to the importance of sexual and gender identity politics as central to, and not on the margins of, global and international politics. Unique in studying the EU as a global and not just regional development actor, Thiel ties together questions of institutional leverage and mixed sovereignty with processes of western domination and decolonization, centering LGBT rights as a complex site of intervention where the liberal order comes undone.

References

Bosia, M.J. (2015). To Love or to Loathe: Modernity, Homophobia, and LGBT Rights. M.L. Picq and M. Thiel, eds, Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ Claims Shape International Relations. Routledge, New York and London.

Bosia, M.J., S. McEvoy, and M. Rahman (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics. Oxford University Press, New York.

Cooper-Cunningham, D. (2022). Security, Sexuality, and the Gay Clown Putin meme: Queer Theory and International Responses to Political Homophobia. Security Dialogue, online first.

Haritaworn, J., A. Kuntsman, and S. Posocco, eds. (2013). Murderous Inclusions. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15:4.

Lennox, C., and M. Waites (2018). Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth. Human Rights Consortium, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Institute of Advanced Studies, University of London, London.

Lind, A. ed. (2010). Development, Sexual Rights, and Global Governance. Routledge, New York.

Mason, C.L., ed. (2018). Routledge Handbook of Queer Development Studies. Routledge, New York and London.

Rahman, M. (2014). Homosexualities, Muslim Cultures and Modernity. Palgrave, London.

Rao, R (2020). Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality. Oxford University Press, New York.

Slootmaekers, K., H. Touquet, and P. Vermeersch, eds. (2016). EU Enlargement and Gay Politics. Palgrave McMillan, London.

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Spanish Minister for the Ecological Transition Teresa Ribera speaks as she takes part in an extraordinary meeting of European Union energy ministers in Brussels, Belgium July 26, 2022. REUTERS/Johanna Geron/File Photo

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MADRID, Aug 25 (Reuters) - Spanish lawmakersratifiedthe minority government's energy-saving decree on Thursday, but whether the unpopular measure will help Spain meet its European commitment to cut gas usage by 7% remains to be seen.

Introduced on Aug. 10 as part of the European Union's push to wean itself off Russian gas, the emergency energy savings range from mandatory temperature limits for air-conditioning or heating to turning off lights in public buildings and shop windows. More measures are likely to be announced in September.

Parliament, where the ruling leftist coalition lacks a working majority and has to rely on smaller regional parties to pass legislation, backed the decree by 187-161 votes - a sizeable margin for this legislature.

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The main opposition parties have criticised the measures, that can now remain in force,as improvised, inefficient and harmful for the economy.

Touted by the government as showing solidarity with the rest of Europe, the measures have been a hard sell in a country that does not depend on Russian gas and has suffered from brutal summer heatwaves in its worst drought in decades.

"(The measures) imply a saving for those who apply them," Energy Minister Teresa Ribera said before the vote. "They also are an inspiration for other European partners."

She has said the measures reduced electricity use by 6% during their first week.

But as the drought has limited hydro-electric output, power plants have burned twice as much gas so far this month than a year ago, pushing Spain's overall gas usage 4% higher, according to data from gas grid operator Enagas.

Marcel Coderch, head of the Barcelona-based Association of Energy Resources Studies, said there was an additional incentive for power utilities to use more gas due to a special cap on the input cost of gas and coal used by power plants.

Brussels authorised the scheme exclusively for Spain and Portugal in June to rein in soaring electricity retail prices in the Iberian peninsula that has little energy interconnection with the rest of Europe. Spain imports most of its gas from the United States and Algeria.

The lower price of Spanish electricity has also caused France to import more, Coderch added. Such imports tripled in July, according to Enagas.

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Reporting by Inti LandauroEditing by Andrei Khalip and Mark Potter

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Spain approves energy-saving plan, but will it cut gas use? - Reuters

ISTANBUL, Aug 26 (Reuters) - Turkish sports presenter Sinem Okten was surprised to see her visa application to Europe's Schengen area rejected twice, having visited often to cover matches and interview figures like Italian keeper Gianluigi Buffon and Liverpool's Juergen Klopp.

"I applied first to Germany then to France. Both rejected my application," she said. "I've travelled abroad numerous times to follow and film matches and interview people, maybe 50-60 times. This is the first time I am having this problem."

Turks applying for visas to the 26 Schengen countries are increasingly being rejected, data shows, and tours are being cancelled. Ankara said this week it was a deliberate effort to put President Tayyip Erdogan in a difficult position ahead of tight elections next year, a charge the European Union denies.

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According to data from schengenvisainfo.com, 16.5% of applicants from Turkey last year were denied a visa, up from 12.5% a year earlier. Schengen rejections were only 4% in 2015 and started ramping up in 2017 for Turks, it shows.

The visa costs - amounting to some 100 euros, or a third of Turkey's minimum wage - are not refundable whether a visa is issued or not.

"Overall, the rejection rates for Schengen visa applications have increased worldwide...however, when compared to other countries like Russia, Turkey's rejection rate growth is way bigger and consistent," said Shkurta Januzi, editor-in-chief at SchengenVisaInfo.com.

Okten said the German embassy gave no reason for rejecting her application. A document from the French embassy, seen by Reuters, said it did not see enough evidence that the TV presenter could finance her stay in France or return to Turkey.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said he believed the lengthy processing times and an increase observed in rejection rates were deliberate, adding that he raised the issue in meetings with his counterparts.

"Unfortunately, the U.S. and some EU and non-EU western countries give our citizens visa appointments one year, 6-7-8 months later. They also increased the rejection rate. This is planned and deliberate," he said on Tuesday.

Cavusoglu dismissed "excuses" related to coronavirus measures or personnel shortages, and said, without providing evidence, that the visa rejections were intended to give Erdogan a pre-election headache.

His ministry will warn ambassadors of some Western countries about the issue in September, he said. "If the situation does not improve after that we will take counter, restrictive measures."

Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, head of the EU delegation to Turkey, told Reuters the Schengen applications are treated on their merits and not on political grounds, adding relatively more incomplete and potentially fraudulent applications are seen from Turkey.

"No decisions are taken on political grounds but rather on objective grounds," he said, adding Turkey's rejection rate last year was near the global rate of 13-14% for Schengen visas.

Twenty-two of the 26 Schengen area members are EU states.

Turkey and the bloc enjoy good trade ties and decades of migration however relations are strained over issues including freedom of speech in Turkey and EU policies on refugees from Syria.

Before the coronavirus pandemic, Schengen states received more than 900,000 visa applications annually from Turkey but that figure had dropped to around 270,000 in 2021.

Citizens from all Schengen countries are exempt from visas when visiting Turkey, most for up to 90 days, and some can enter with only their ID cards, according to Turkey's foreign ministry website.

As more and more Turks are being rejected, tour operators have cancelled regular trips, Tur Andiamo chairman Cem Polatoglu said.

"We are having problems. Our tours are getting cancelled. We used to schedule tours to Italy every week, now we have to offer them every fortnight," Polatoglu said.

At a visa application centre in Istanbul, 57-year-old Hikmet Dogan said it was easier to get a visa in his previous trips to see his son in Sweden.

"I travelled 2-3 times but this time it is harder, the costs jumped too...Unfortunately young people are trying to leave the country as the Turkish economy is getting worse," Dogan said.

Beyond the Schengen area, the United States vowed on Wednesday to expand its visa processing capacity in Turkey after the foreign minister's public complaints. read more

Okten, the sports presenter, said she would continue her efforts to secure a visa.

"The season started and I need to cover some matches on site. I need to be able to travel abroad to do my job...I will apply again and try my chance through Greece this time," she said.

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Additional reporting by Ece Toksabay in Ankara and Jonathan Spicer in Istanbul;Writing by Ezgi Erkoyun;Editing by Daren Butler and Raissa Kasolowsky

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Turks frustrated by 'deliberate' increase in number of European visa rejections - Reuters

By Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri/London

Russias invasion of Ukraine in February was a watershed moment for European security. But relations between Nato and the European Union (EU) remain marred by mutual suspicion, institutional rivalry, and a lack of effective co-operation. The two organisations must set aside their differences and work together.Russia once again poses a long-term threat to European security. At the same time, the economic spillover from the war in Ukraine will intensify security challenges along Europes southern flank. And, as the current crisis involving Taiwan has shown, Chinas increasing assertiveness will loom progressively larger in Americas strategic thinking.The key European security challenge in the coming years will be to strengthen deterrence against Russia while retaining the ability to tackle other threats. When it comes to deterring Russia, Nato is clearly the indispensable organisation, because there is no viable alternative to its integrated command structure. The Ukraine war has reinvigorated Natos core mission of standing up to Russia and defending its members territory if deterrence fails. Under new defence plans, Natos rapid response force will increase from 40,000 to 300,000 troops. And Finland and Sweden will soon become members.Natos deterrent power is underpinned by the US forces stationed in Europe which have increased by around 20,000 since Russia invaded Ukraine, to over 100,000 and by Americas nuclear arsenal. But Europeans cannot expect the US to continue shouldering the bulk of their defence forever. Even before Donald Trumps presidency, US complaints about unfair burden-sharing were growing louder and more frequent. Americas increased focus on Asia means that the US contribution to Europes defence is likely to shrink over time. And Europeans cannot rule out the possibility that Trump or someone in his isolationist America First mould will become president in 2025 and walk away from the US commitment to Nato.So, Europeans have little choice but to contribute more to their own defence. Since the Ukraine conflict began, EU countries have announced an extra 200bn ($203bn) in military expenditure. But many countries could find implementing these commitments politically difficult given the economic downturn and competing budget demands.Moreover, the impact of the additional defence expenditure depends on an overall plan for determining the weapons systems, logistics, and munitions needed. But European defence spending remains uncoordinated, with little intergovernmental co-operation. According to the European Defence Agency, joint research and development is currently only 6% of total EU defence R&D, and joint procurement accounts for just 11% of total equipment orders.The EU has a key role to play in strengthening European security in a manner that complements Natos efforts. For starters, the Union needs to help member states manage the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine thereby helping to sustain a political consensus for sanctions against Russia.The EU can also help to prepare European armies better for conflict. The plan to establish a 5,000-strong rapid reaction force would push member states armed forces to co-operate more closely, contributing to their overall ability to deter threats. And the EU is better placed than Nato to confront security challenges such as disinformation and election interference, because it is through the Union that member states regulate the technology platforms through which misinformation spreads.But the EUs greatest potential contribution to European security lies in its ability to foster higher defence spending by member states. The EUs fiscal rules can encourage this by excluding defence investment from budget deficit limits, in the same way that investment in the green and digital transformations has been excluded since the start of the pandemic. Moreover, the Union can devise incentives to promote joint procurement and deeper co-operation among national military forces.Recent proposals from the European Commission, particularly a value-added tax exemption for joint defence procurement, could yield significant progress on defence spending, co-ordination, and efforts to strengthen European military capabilities. But European countries lack a truly collaborative mindset when it comes to developing, acquiring, and operating defence capabilities. Developing such an approach will require stronger political direction from national leaders.The EU and other Nato members should ensure that their national defence markets are as open to one another as possible, to ensure economies of scale. The EUs attempts to improve military capabilities should be guided by the principle of maximising effectiveness and should not unnecessarily damage long-standing relationships between EU defence firms and their non-EU partners.For its part, the US should continue to signal strong support for a greater EU role in European security and defence, particularly in developing the blocs military capabilities. At the same time, US policymakers can influence the elaboration of EU initiatives in ways that avoid duplication and strengthen European security.Russian President Vladimir Putins war of aggression against Ukraine has shown that defending European values and interests is a matter of life and death. Europe can no longer afford to treat quasi-theological arguments over EU and Nato primacy as more important than its own security. Project Syndicate* Ian Bond is Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform. Luigi Scazzieri is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

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How to boost co-operation between Nato and EU - Gulf Times

24 August 2022

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We're taking you on a journey through the history ofsoftware patents in Europe, through the lens of pop culture. Byzooming out and looking at the big picture of what the EPO hastaught us over the years, we'll be building up a clear visionon what you need to do to improve the success of your softwarepatents at the EPO. At each step along the way through history,we're stopping to see a case where the EPO redefined the lawin a way that is still applied today.

In Part I to Part IV of our journey, we've seen the EPOset out the foundational principles of how software patents aredealt with in Europe. Next, we'll build upon Part V:Cheating your way to the finish line to discover how the EPOreally cares about the purpose of your invention.

Our story now takes us to 2006, the year Silicon Valley darlingsFacebook, Twitter and YouTube were born (do you remember lifebefore them?), but we're not here to talk about them.Instead, we want to take you back to think PINK in2006.We're not talking about the American singer, eventhough her 2006 album I'm not dead was somewhatof a comeback for her. We're also not here to talk aboutSteve Martin's appalling resurrection of Peter Sellers'classic 60s film the Pink Panther. In fact, are we even allowed tomention a film that scores less than 25% on Rotten Tomatoes?We're also not even talking about Millennial Pink remember that? Well that term wasn't even coined for another8 years. No, we're here to get technical and talk about pinknoise.

What's pink noise you ask? And why was it significant in2006? Let's start with the second of those two questionsfirst.

In 2006, the EPO issued the Infineon decision, which dealt withthe question of the patentability of simulations the sameissue dealt with in the 2021 Enlarged Board of Appeal decision(G1/19). The case comes from the issue that when you'resimulating a technical process then arguably nothing technical ishappening as it is all the hypothetical simulation of reality.However, the result of a simulation is that you can make betterdrugs, improve performance of engines and better understand theimpact of a chemical process. So, at the time there weresuggestions that even though the simulation itself might not betechnical or produce a further technical effect, the fact that thesimulation takes place positively impacts something that is thendone in the real world. In other words, there is a resultanttechnical advantage to the simulation.

In the Infineon decision the EPO agreed. The EPO concluded thatsoftware inventions must have a technical purpose. The purpose ofthe simulation mattered. For example, according to the EPO,software for controlling a braking system is technical, whilstsimulating a financial transaction is not.

So let's go back to the first question what ispink noise? Pink noise, or 1/f noise, is a signal or process with afrequency spectrum such that the power spectral density isinversely proportional to the frequency of the signal. Still withme? Well, even if you're not, what was significant in theInfineon case was that the invention related to simulation of anelectronic circuit in relation to 1/f, or pink, noise. It was foundthat simulating test circuits, instead of testing on real circuits,significantly reduced the number of circuits that needed to beproduced, tested and ultimately wasted. Since the simulation was ofan electronic circuit it was deemed to have a technical purpose.Therefore it was not excluded from patentability under the EPC.

The Infineon case therefore taught us more about what Vicomfirst laid out back in 1986 that inventions were notexcluded if they are technical. Furthermore, as thesimulation was purely software, we then saw the application of theIBM case's further technical effect. Inparticular, the software, which was loaded onto a computer,provided for improved automatic simulation and evaluation ofnoise-affected circuits. It is nice seeing the law convergingin this way to a logical result.

In practice, the result of Infineon is that inventions in fieldswhere there is arguably not a technical purpose for the inventioncan be very difficult to protect at the EPO. Spoiler alert this general principle has now been confirmed at the highest levelin the 2021 Enlarged Board of Appeal decision (G1/19). Sadly,examiners can quickly point at the related section of theEPO's Guidelines to kill off a case early. Hence, care needsto be taken when drafting to ensure the invention is framed with aclear technical purpose, not simply with technical advantagesassociated with the software-implemented process.

The content of this article is intended to provide a generalguide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be soughtabout your specific circumstances.

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