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On September 1, 2022, the European Union will officially open a new liaison office in Californias Silicon Valley. The new office coined the tech embassy follows the European Councils adoption of the Conclusions of EU Digital Diplomacy, which is a broad framework aimed to enhance the EUs regulatory capacity around the world. The office is aimed to liaise with Silicon Valley tech companies affected by the EUs two new technology regulations: the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA).

The DMA and DSA passed by the European Commission in March and April 2022 aim to create a safer digital space for internet users, and a more competitive digital marketplace for tech companies. Both pieces of legislation are set to go into effect this Fall, and are expected to have global implications on tech giants like Google, Apple, Meta, and Amazon.

Specifically, the DMA aims to restrict anti-competitive practices by large tech companies through new prohibitions and requirements for search engines, social networks, mobile apps, and online marketplaces. The DMA imposes, most notably, platform interoperability and data-portability requirements. For example, messaging apps from Apple, Google, and Meta platforms will be required to make end-to-end text messaging interoperable on request by competing services. The DMA also prohibits the use of non-public personal data for targeted advertising without user consent, and bars online marketplaces like Amazon from self-preferencing their own products and services over those of their competitors.

The DSA imposes new regulations on tech companies aimed to protect internet users. The DSA prohibits, among other things, advertising that targets children, and advertising that leverages sensitive personal data like race, religion, or sexual orientation. The DSA also requires online platforms to cooperate in the identification and removal of hate speech and illegal content. In addition, the act imposes heightened obligations for very large online platforms and search engines, defined to include those with more than 45 million active users in Europe. Under the DSA, the very large platforms and search engines must submit to independent audits, and facilitate access to their data and algorithms to authorities and vetted researchers. Both the DMA and DSA carry big fines for non-compliance up to 10% of worldwide sales for violating the DMA (20% for repeat offenders), and up to 6% for violating the DSA.

The DMA and DSA will transform the regulation of digital markets in the EU, and carry significant compliance risks in light of their global reach, broad scope, and the severe penalties for violations. The new legislation also raises significant data privacy and security concerns due to, most notably, the DMAs platform interoperability and data portability requirements.

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The European Union Opens Tech Embassy in Silicon Valley Ahead of New Technology Regulations - JD Supra

The relationship between the European Union and the Polisario Front is once again raising suspicions in the European Parliament. French MEP Nicola Bay, the right-hand man in Brussels of controversial far-right MEP Eric Zemmour and a former senior member of Le Pen's party, once again questioned the presence of Polisario representatives at the African Union-EU summit in Brussels in February 2022.

Bay presented on 25 August three questions addressed to the Vice-President of the European Commission and responsible for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, about a possible reconfiguration of the treatment of the Polisario by the European executive. Bay's questions coincide with the slip of the head of European diplomacy, who last week claimed that the European Union and Spain would support a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. A slip-up that earned him complaints from Rabat and even the cancellation of a meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita.

The question arises as to whether the questions registered by the French right-winger in the European Parliament are an attempt to pull the strings in Europe to get the Polisario Front to be considered a terrorist organisation. The first question registered by Bay, "Why did the VP/HR and EEAS agree to the Polisario Front attending the next AU-EU summit?", was already answered by Borrell when Tom Zdechovsk of the European People's Party raised the same question on 7 February 2022, a few days before the AU-EU summit was due to take place. "According to the agreed practice, the Summit was co-organised by the European Union and the African Union, with each organisation responsible for inviting its own members," Borrell replied in writing at the time. The self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has had a seat in the AU since 1982.

Nicolas Bay adds two more questions, which raise the question of the look and tone with which the EU should treat Algeria's proxy group. "Will they hold the Polisario officials in question to account for the criminal acts of which they are accused?" and "Will they seriously examine the activities of the Polisario Front and adopt a firm diplomatic stance towards the group?", Bay wrote in writing on Thursday. Bay cites several reports accusing the separatist organisation of embezzling and diverting EU funding to the Tindouf camps, as well as re-emphasising the incentive for armed Islamist groups in the Sahel that Tindouf provides. The dangerous relationship between Sahel terrorists and the Polisario Front has already been accused by a report by the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels-based think tank headed by Claudo Moniquet (formerly of the French DGSE) in 2010. This is not the first time such doubts have arisen in the European Parliament, and for some voices among the Moroccan Hashemite people they could be a game changer for European dynamics.

"European elites, including the French parliamentarian Nicolas Bay, take a position on the reality of the separatist front as a terrorist organisation practising oppression against the inhabitants of the Moroccan Sahara. The Polisario leadership has been implicated in serious crimes. Rapes, torture, kidnappings and extrajudicial executions", Mohamed Salem Abdelfatah, president of the Saharawi Observatory for Media and Human Rights, told the Arabic daily Al-arab.

According to Abdelfatah, there is a growing trend in Brussels to support the strategic partnership with Morocco and condemn the Polisario Front. This trend is a perceptible reality through the European Commission's attempts to establish more and more strategic pacts and partnerships with Morocco in economic, security and illegal immigration regulation matters.

The signature condemnation of the Polisario Front, although part of the agenda of the largest parliamentary groups of the European right, has not yet caught on with the executive and its external action, which, as it responded to Joo Ferreira MEP (GUE/NGL) in 2019, considers that 'the Polisario Front, as well as other Saharawi civil society organisations, are some of the interlocutors that the EU turns to when it comes to discussing issues related to Western Sahara'.

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European right renews its assault on the Polisario Front - Atalayar

August 31, 2022 [ BRUEGEL ] Without Russian gas, the European Union would have to reduce demand by approximately 15%, with big differences between different parts of Europe

The share of the European Unions gas supply provided by Russia dropped from over 40% in 2021 to just 20% in June 2022. The gap of over 300 terawatt hours in the first six months of 2022 compared to 2021 has so far been filled mostly by 240 TWh of additional imports of liquified natural gas (LNG). Gazprom has broken several long-term supply contracts with its EU commercial partners, and the risk is high that Russia will cut all supplies to the EU ahead of the winter, if it deems this strategically beneficial.

Replacement of Russian gas by LNG has largely reached its limit. Lower imports from Russia can now only be met by reducing EU gas demand. Immediate deployment of a coordinated EU approach offers the best option to reduce substantially the overall gas demand-reduction cost. For the EU as a whole, a total demand reduction over the next 10 months of about 15% compared to average demand in 2019-2021 would be required to compensate for a complete stopping of Russian pipeline imports. For EU countries (arranged into regional groupings), we calculate the required reduction as ranging from zero to -54%.

The EU internal gas market is not perfectly connected, implying that certain country groups will require much steeper demand cuts. Winter temperatures are the key variable driving uncertainty: a long, cold winter would make steeper cuts necessary. We address this by assuming an average winter, and that that storage should not fall below 20% before 1 May 2023.

Countries are relatively well connected and will face similar demand disruptions. For each group we use historic (2019-2021) demand and own production, as well as current storage levels, to assess the development of storage filling throughout the winter. Each groups gas imports and exports are based on the observed gas flows in in the first half of 2022. To assess the impact of a stop to Russian supplies, we calculated the implied share of Russian gas in each groups import mix by aggregating the Russian shares in incoming flows (see here for the methodology). A complete stopping of Russian flows would reduce each intra-EU flow by each country groups calculated dependence on Russian gas.

A limitation is that we assume markets will operate in the same manner as they did in the first half of the year. While it is likely that markets will adjust, many areas of the grid are already running at full capacity and todays flows do offer a good indication. Gas demand and imports are also highly seasonal, but as the first half of the year contains a mix of winter and warmer months, seasonal interference should be reasonably compensated for. We do not include explicitly in our analysis the infrastructure planned to be built in the coming six months, but discuss consequences below.

A closer look at the groups

Portugal, Spain and France are effectively isolated from the wider European market because of limited connections between Spain and France, and France and the north and east. These countries supplies are not vulnerable to a Russian disruption, although weak French nuclear power generation places a strain its neighbours power supply and hence gas demand. Cooperation might allow Algerian gas to be re-routed from Spain to Italy, putting the Spanish spare capacity to better use in a European context.

The Baltics have historically been highly dependent on Russia. The region is now heavily reliant on imports via the Klaipeda LNG terminal in Lithuania, while a new interconnection (Santaka) with Poland is important because it connects the region to the wider European market. For now, the connection is used to supply Poland, but allows for flexibility in terms of reductions in Poland and the Baltics. A Floating Storage and Regasification Unit under construction in Estonia might provide an extra 2 TWh/month. The Baltics have so far achieved the largest demand response in Europe, while also experiencing some of the highest energy price increases. Finlands ability to switch fuels has led to a more than halving of national gas demand.

Poland relies on eastward flows from Germany to complement imports from the big LNG terminal in winoujcie (6 TWh/month). Polish storage at time of writing is full and reasonably large. By the end of 2022, the Baltic pipe should allow direct imports of 8 TWh/month from Norway. This cannot all be attributed to Poland as flows will potentially transit Poland into the Baltics via the new Santaka connection (1.5 TWh/month), to Germany or possibly even south to Slovakia via a new interconnector.

Denmark and Sweden form a joint balancing zone. Normally the countries would be largely self-sufficient for gas but the Danish Tyro field is under maintenance until June 2023, creating a dependence on imports from Germany, which are exposed to Russian disruptions.

Romania has substantial own production capacities. However sizeable imports come from Ukraine and Bulgaria (both based on Russian gas). There might be options for re-routing through Bulgaria other gas (LNG arriving in Turkey or Greece, or other gas transited through Turkey). However, Bulgaria serves as a key transit country into the south-east European region, being the point of entry for Turkstream. Thus if flows through the pipeline slow, many countries will look to Bulgaria for gas transit.

Czechia, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia will depend heavily on Germany should Russian flows through Ukraine stop. A key variable will be how demand responds in southern Germany and whether sufficient gas continues to pass through into Czechia and Austria. Austrian storage is relatively large, meaning the country group has a major opportunity to prepare for the winter over the next couple of months.

Croatia and Greeces LNG terminals are key points of entry into the market. Some Azeri gas imported through Greece might be diverted northward to feed Bulgaria. If Italian demand for Azeri gas were reduced, more might be freed up to head into Bulgaria. An expansion of the Croatian KrK terminal later in the year might bring another 0.3TWh/month capacity, which would be welcome for a terminal currently running at very high capacity. A newly operational interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria (2.5TWh/month) also improves the situation. With Serbia signing a new deal for more Russian gas in recent days, and Hungarys negotiated exemption from the oil embargo, it is likely that Turkstream will anyway be the last Russian pipe still operating.

Italys dependence on Russia comes via imports through Austria. The slowing of these flows will be felt particularly in the north of Italy, while Italy overall has quite substantial options for diversification. A key variable, not only for Italy but also for Italys ability to help neighbouring countries, is the ability to transmit gas from the south to the north of the country. Another particularity is the high share of gas in power generation in Italy (43%). Reducing power consumption or tapping into alternative electricity sources would thus substantially reduce gas consumption, currently standing at 22 TWh of gas in power generation per month.

For Belgium, the Zeebrugge LNG terminal will remain vital, as will imports from the UK which might be at risk in case of a cold winter in the UK. Some gas passes from France to Belgium. The Netherlands has significant own-production capacities, and good LNG import capacities. Exports to neighbouring countries drives the need for lower consumption in the Netherlands, where a large share of power generation is also gas-fired. In the first four months of 2022, Dutch gas-fired power consumption was 33% below 2021 levels (2.5 TWh/month).

Germany will rely on flows from Norway, domestic gas from the Netherlands and LNG imports via Belgium. As an important transit country, the volume of re-exported gas is a key variable. The German government has already initiated phase 2 (out of 3) of its emergency gas-rationing plan. Emergency plans are also in place to bring a new LNG terminal on line in Wilhelmshaven (8TWh/month).

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European Union Demand Reduction Needs to Cope with Russian Gas Cuts - TankTerminals.com

During the first half of 2022, EU imports of fruit and vegetables from Morocco increased by 9% in volume, amounting to 1,021,743 tons, and by 21% in value, which rose to 1,563 million euros.

Spanish imports from Morocco also grew by 6% in volume, amounting to 368,946 tons and 15% in value, totaling 654 million euros. "The growth is observed in a wide group of products that fully coincide with the Spanish campaigns, such as tomatoes, peppers, beans, and zucchini in vegetables and raspberries, blueberries, watermelons, and avocados in fruits," FEPEX said in a statement.

Moroccan exports to the United Kingdom in the first half of the year grew by 10% to 179,074 tons. Moroccan tomato exports to the UK grew sharply (+15%), totaling 74,519 tons, displacing the Spanish sector as the main supplier, and its berry exports totaled 27,851 tons (+33%).

According to FEPEX, the increase in Morocco's exports in a period in which Spanish exports fell by 5.4% highlights the urgency of implementing a policy to improve the Spanish sector's competitiveness, which requires urgent measures in different areas, mainly in the field of innovative and phytosanitary investments.

Source: fepex.es

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Moroccan fruit and vegetable exports to the European Union increase - FreshPlaza.com

The European Union is readying measures to impose trade sanctions on the UK in retaliation to any potential move by Conservative leadership favourite Liz Truss to override the Northern Ireland Protocol.

embers in the European Parliament debated the issue on Wednesday as a result of reports emerging in recent weeks that Ms Truss would be willing to trigger the Article 16 mechanism in the post-Brexit withdrawal agreement.

MEPs in Brussels debated the draft legislation which would give them the power to take retaliatory measures, including tariffs and restrictions on UK exports.

Reported by The Times newspaper, David McAllister, the German chairman of the foreign affairs committee, said that the UK had not reciprocated the European Unions goodwill to find practical and flexible solutions to the issues caused by the type of Brexit the UK government has chosen.

The UK government has once again gone down the slope of unilateral action. It is clear that the European Union needs mechanisms to protect our interests, he added.

Meanwhile Sean Kelly, who is the Irish lead negotiator for the trade committee said any measures being considered would facilitate the imposition of restrictions on trade, investment or other activities falling within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Co-operation Agreement.

Last week it was briefed that the Foreign Secretary would trigger Article 16 of the protocol before current easing arrangements for checks on goods expire on September 15, just ten days after she potentially takes up the role of Prime Minister.

The Northern Ireland Protocol is an arrangement governing trade across the Irish Sea post-Brexit. Negotiated between the UK and EU as part of the Withdrawal Agreement, it was how both sides overcame the main log-jam in the Brexit divorce talks the Irish land border.

However, unionists here are strongly opposed to the agreement and the DUP leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson has said his party will not return to the institutions at Stormont until legislation to override it has progressed fully through Westminster.

The UK Governments Bill will allow them to potentially override parts of the agreement. It is due to come before the House of Lords in early October where peers could potentially force changes to the legislation or delay it.

Northern Ireland Secretary of State Shailesh Vara told the Daily Telegraph newspaper those in the Lords should consider the benefit of passing the legislation as he also claimed the door remains open for [a] negotiated settlement with the European Union.

I very much hope that, as the Bill progresses through the Lords, they will be mindful of the importance of bringing certainty as soon as possible, he added.

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European Union readying retaliatory trade sanctions if Liz Truss moves to override Northern Ireland Protocol - Belfast Telegraph