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BasicsState v. Smith, 172 Ohio App. 3d 735, 2007-Ohio-6355 Judges comments at sentencing indicated appellant received an increased sentence because he had chosen to testify against his brother. Reversed.

Chavez v. Martinez (2003), 123 S.Ct. 1994 -- Statements compelled by police interrogation may not be used against a defendant in a criminal trial, but the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until such use is intended. This means at least the commencement of legal proceedings. Victim of brutal interrogation at a hospital was not prosecuted, but sought damages in a 1983 action.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004), 124 S.Ct. 2451 -- Nevada statute requiring the subject of a Terry stop to furnish a name survives Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges. Unlike the Texas statute in Brown v. Texas (1979), 443 U.S. 47 there has to be reasonable suspicion the subject was involved in criminal activity. Unlike the statute in Kolender v. Lawson (1983), 461 U.S. 352 requiring "credible and reliable" identification, the subject only had to provide a name. The Fifth Amendment claim is fielded by reserving for another time how to address situations where "furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense."

State v. Echols (1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d 677, 701-702 -- The Fifth Amendment right to counsel guarantee rests on not being forced to become a witness against oneself. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is premised on the guarantee to the accused to have counsel for his defense.

Holt v. United States (1910), 218 U.S. 245 -- The Fifth Amendment does prevent a defendant being directed to put on a blouse for identification purposes. At p. 251: "...(T)he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."

United States v. Balsys (1998), 524 U.S. 666 -- Concern about possible prosecution in a foreign country is beyond the scope of the Fifth Amendment. Resident alien did not want to answer questions concerning WWII activities in Lithuania.

Lawn v. United States (1958), 355 U.S. 339 -- An indictment, valid on its face, is not subject to challenge on the basis that the grand jury acted on information obtained in violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. But see United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338 at 346: "...the grand jury may not force a witness to answer questions in violation of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness is granted immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States (406 U.S. 441) Similarly, a grand jury may not compel a person to produce books and papers that would incriminate him. Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 633-635 (1886). Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).

United States v. Licavoli (9th Cir. 1979), 604 F. 2d 613, 623 --Waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege when testifying before a grand jury does not constitute waiver of the privilege at trial or in other proceedings. Also see United States v. Cain (1st Cir. 1976), 544 F. 2d 113, 117; United States v. Housand (2d Cir. 1977), 550 F. 2d 818, 821 fn. 3; United States v. Johnson (1st Cir. 1973), 488 F. 2d 1206; United States v. Lawrenson (4th Cir. 1963), 315 F. 2d 612.

Shrader v. Equitable Life (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 277 -- (1) A party to a civil proceeding does not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege merely by bringing the action. (2) The privilege is waived to the extent questions on direct examination are answered, though when a party is called as on cross the extent of the waiver is more narrowly defined.

Marchetti v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 39 -- Defendant was prosecuted for failure to register and pay occupational tax on gambling proceeds. Compliance would have generated records which would have been incriminating. Fifth Amendment privilege available in these circumstances. Also see Grosso v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 62; Shapiro v. United States (1948), 335 U.S. 1.

State v. Wardlow (1985), 20 Ohio App. 3d 1 -- Prosecution of a mother under the endangering children statute for failure to report conduct amounting to a felony violation of other portions of the statute was constitutionally defective as it would have amounted to self-incrimination.

In re Knight (1999), 135 Ohio App. 3d 172 -- Child welfare agency called mother as its first witness in a neglect case. Held to be a Fifth Amendment violation as testimony she might provide could subject her to prosecution for child endangering.

McKune v. Lile (2002), 122 S.Ct. 2017 -- Inmate brought 1983 action contending his Fifth Amendment rights were abridged by worsening the terms of confinement upon refusal to admit prior offenses as a part of a prison rehabilitation program. No violation found, even though admissions might lead to further prosecution for uncharged incidents. Admission of responsibility serves a valid penological objective. Loss of privileges deemed not to be compulsion encumbering the constitutional right. 4-1-4 decision. Four dissenters and concurring justice believe compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes is broader than the "atypical and significant hardship" standard adopted in evaluating due process claims concerning prison conditions.

Mitchell v. United States (1999), 526 U.S. 314 -- Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, entry of a guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. Nor may the defendant's silence provide the basis for adverse inferences in determining factual issues at the sentencing hearing.

State v. Cook (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 237 -- When a potential defendant is called to testify before a grand jury, Miranda type warnings must be given. If during questioning the witness asserts his privilege against self-incrimination, that decision must be honored unless immunity is granted or an effective waiver is obtained. Grand jury testimony received from a putative defendant without such warning may not be used against him in a subsequent prosecution.

State v. Jackson (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 29, 31-32 -- "The right against self-incrimination applies differently depending upon whether it is the witness or the defendant who invokes the Fifth Amendment...Once the defendant has elected to waive the privilege, he may be questioned regarding all matters that were covered on direct and may be subject to searching examination for impeachment purposes...The accused may be cross-examined as to the facts in issue, including his connection with other similar transactions...Although the defendant has taken the stand, he has not entirely waived his Fifth Amendment rights...However, the mere questioning which elicits the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights is not error. Error occurs when the questioning is persistent and the answers are preordained..." (citations omitted)

State v. Taylor (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 601 -- At initial appearance defendant was told counsel would be appointed. Subsequently, he mistook a detective for appointed counsel and made admissions. Held that regardless of the defendant's or detective's claims concerning this contact, any interrogation once the right to counsel had been invoked was improper unless initiated by the defendant. Minnick v. Mississippi (1990), 498 U.S. 146, applied.

United States v. Kordel (1970), 397 U.S. 1 -- A corporation does not have a Fifth Amendment privilege, thought its officers and employees may exercise their privilege as individuals.

State v. Lackey (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 239 -- Where police officers relying on broadcast would have been entitled to conduct a Terry frisk for weapons, asking the subject first where the gun was did not violate privilege against self-incrimination.

Ohio v. Reiner (2001), 532 U.S. 17 -- A witness has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, even though they maintain innocence of any wrongdoing. "...(T)ruthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth."

State v. Childress (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 491 -- Constitutional (Miranda type) warnings are sometimes required when a witness appears before a grand jury. Witness called before the same grand jury a second time, and charged with perjury on that basis, should have been advised of her privilege to refuse to answer questions which might further incriminate her.

State v. Dinsio (1964), 176 Ohio St. 460 -- Syllabus: "In a criminal case, where a claim of a witness that he can not be compelled to testify as a witness because of the privilege of immunity from self-incrimination is properly established, it is error prejudicial to the defendant for the court to permit counsel for the state, by continued questioning of the witness, which questions go unanswered, to get before the jury innuendoes and inferences of facts, conditions and circumstances which the state could not get before the jury by direct testimony of the witness."

State v. Kirk (1995), 72 Ohio St. 3d 564 -- The right to compulsory process is not denied when the court prevents a witness who intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege from taking the stand, if that witness will exercise the privilege and offer no testimony. Columbus v. Cooper (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 42, limited. The defendant is entitled to a an instruction that the jury is to draw no inference from the absence of the witness because the witness was not available to either side. Also see State v. Branham (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 355, 360-361.

United States v. Smith (C.A.D.C. 1973), 478 F. 2d 976 -- It was improper for the prosecutor to advise a defense witness that he should confer with independent counsel before testifying to determine whether to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, since if he testified as indicated by others, he might be prosecuted for carrying a concealed weapon, obstructing justice and as an accessory. If advice as to the privilege was required, it should have come from the bench. Compare State v, Schaub (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 25.

State v. Miller (1997), 122 Ohio App. 3d 111 -- Trial court erroneously refused to allow the defendant to reopen his case when a subpoenaed witness appeared at the courthouse after the jury had been instructed, but before deliberations had begun. Though the witness indicated she would exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege to any question other than her name, the trial had evolved in such a manner that her nonappearance created strong inferences against the defense.

Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609 -- The prosecutor may not comment upon a defendant's failure to testify as to matters which he could reasonably be expected to deny or explain. Compare Article I, Sec. 10 of the Ohio Constitution which allows the parties to comment upon the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination by a witness. Except as applied to defendants, this continues in effect.

United States v. Robinson (1988), 485 U.S. 25 -- There is no violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege when a prosecutor's assertion in argument that the defendant could have taken the stand was a "fair response" to assertions by defense counsel that the government had unfairly denied him an opportunity to explain his actions. Also see State v. Washington (June 20, 1978), Franklin Co. App. No. 77AP-947, unreported (1978 Opinions 1619, 1627-1630); State v. Auerbach (1923), 108 Ohio St. 96; United States v. Tasto (5th Cir. 1978), 586 F. 2d 1068.

Carter v. Kentucky (1981), 450 U.S. 288 -- A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from his exercise of his right not to testify. Also see State v. Fannings (1982), 1 Ohio St. 3d 19.

State v. Lane (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 77, 86 -- Griffin viewed as prohibiting only direct comment upon the accused's failure to testify.

State v. Neal (January 23, 1996), Franklin Co. App. No. 95APA05-542, unreported (1996 Opinions 177, 203) -- Mention in voir dire that defendant might or might not testify not found to be a Griffin violation.

Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610 -- Use of post arrest silence for impeachment purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For additional cases see Admissions and Confessions.

State v. Nichols (June 26, 1979), Franklin Co. App. No. 79AP-57, unreported (1979 Opinions 1699) -- It is improper to ask a defendant why he refused to sign a constitutional rights waiver form. Also see State v. Stephens (1970), 24 Ohio St. 2d 76; Gillison v. United States (1968), 399 F. 2d 586. Compare State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 14, 20 -- Waiver made, but privilege asserted after detectives told defendant what co-conspirators had said.

State v. Saunders (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 355 -- Comment that the defendant did not tell the police she acted in self-defense found to be a Fifth Amendment violation. See Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610. Since was first mentioned in closing argument, do not reach issue whether or not defendant had been advised of Miranda rights before elected to remain silent. See Fletcher v. Weir (1982), 455 U.S. 603.

In re Billman (1993), 92 Ohio App. 3d 279 -- Juvenile Court dependency finding reversed and remanded where parent had been compelled to testify despite asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege.

In re Johnson (1996), 106 Ohio App. 3d 38 -- Error to permit prosecutor to ask unrepresented juvenile if he would stipulate prior conviction without first advising him of his Miranda rights.

Doe v. United States (1988), 487 U.S. 201 -- Order directing suspect to sign forms consenting to release of foreign bank documents not contrary to the Fifth Amendment. Signing was not the equivalent of testimonial communication.

Andressen v. Maryland (1976), 427 U.S. 463 -- Seizure of business records containing statements defendant had voluntarily reduced to writing was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

State v. Aronson (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 714 -- Indicted defendants successfully moved to quash grand jury subpoenas for business records of bingo operation which had not been located during the execution of search warrants. While as custodians of the records they could be compelled to produce them, the state was required to first make some showing that the requested documents were in the subpoenaed party's possession or subject to his control. Otherwise, compliance with the subpoena could amount to self-incrimination.

Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 -- The Fifth Amendment privilege does not extend to the drawing of a blood sample for purposes of chemical analysis. Also see State v. Sapsford (1983), 22 Ohio App. 3d 1 (dental casts, photos, wax impressions).

South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553 -- Admission of evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a blood alcohol test did not violate the Fifth Amendment, though the defendant had only been warned that under the state's implied consent law, refusal could lead to a loss of his license. Also see State v. Starnes (1970), 21 Ohio St. 3d 38 -- Implied consent law does not violate Fourth or Fifth Amendments.

United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 -- Compelling an accused to participate in a lineup does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.

Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263 -- Handwriting exemplars are not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Also see State v. Flinn (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 294; United States v. Mara (1973), 410 U.S. 19 (exemplar may be compelled pursuant to grand jury subpoena).

United States v. Dionisio (1973), 410 U.S. 1 -- The compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. A person may be subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury and furnish a voice exemplar. Also see State v. Sutton (1979), 64 Ohio App. 2d 105.

State v. Naylor (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 233 -- Headnote: "Where the defendant is required to repeat, over objection, words and sentences used during the progress of a crime by one of the perpetrators of that criminal act, and where the defendant is required to speak those words and sentences in the presence of the jury for the express purpose of allowing the victim of the crime to arrive at an in-court identification of the speaker, such a requirement is violative of the defendant's rights under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."

In re Grand Jury Directive to Creager (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 672 -- Defendant was properly found in contempt for refusal to provide a handwriting exemplar. The privilege against self-incrimination under the Ohio Constitution is identical to that found in the Fifth Amendment.

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Karina Soto-Garcia(Photo: Submitted by the Waynesboro Police Department)

WAYNESBORO - It was a family affair the night of Sept. 23, 2018, whena Colorado woman and her husband, with their two young children in tow, brought nearly $200,000 worth of methamphetamine into the area.

Their arrests would eventually rip the family apart.

Tipped off by a confidential informant,police tracked the couple's SUV to the Chili's restaurant on Richmond Avenue in Staunton. The SUV made its way to Waynesboro, where it was followed by police and pulled over on West Main Street just inside the city limits.

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After a drug dog alert, authorities seized four pounds of meth from a grocery bag in the back of the SUV. Prior to the bust, almost two additional pounds of meth were reportedly delivered by the couple to a man in the Walmart parking lot on Richmond Avenue in Staunton, evidence at Soto-Garcia's trial showed.

In September of 2019, the husband, 32-year-oldJose Edwardo Basurto Munoz, pleaded guilty to two felony drug charges and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.

On Friday in Waynesboro Circuit Court, his wife,Karina Soto-Garcia, 30, was also sentenced to 13years in prison on charges oftransporting one ounce or more of a Schedule I or II drug with intent to distribute in Virginia and possessing 100 or more grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.

The couple were working ascouriers for a Mexico-based drug ring in Chihuahua that has been under investigation the past few years by the Waynesboro Police Department's Special Operations Division, resulting in numerous convictions and lengthy prison sentences for some suspects.

Soto-Garcia, a former teacher's aide, speaksEnglish and helped her husband arrange the drug delivery, according to Waynesboro Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Will Flory.

More: Girls in Kentucky and Staunton were victims, prosecutor said

At her trial, Soto-Garcia claimedshe was unaware of her husband's ties to the drug trade organization in Mexico. The drug ring smuggles meth across the border to the Four Corners region of the United States (Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado and Utah). From there, the drugs are shipped to Waynesboro, Flory said.

Circuit Judge Paul Dryer said Soto-Garcia's explanations for the trip to Virginia didn't add up, including one where she said her husband was pursuinga business opportunity to open up a mechanic's shop on the east coast. The judge wondered why the issue couldn't be discussed by phone or through email. Dryer also noted that Soto-Garcia's husband, who testified at her trial, didn't know the name of the man who was offering the supposed business opportunity.

Soto-Garcia was also wired $300 from Virginia to Colorado through the confidential informant after vehicle troubles threatened the drug delivery, evidence showed.

The drugs brought into the area had a street value of more than $180,000, Flory said.

Some of the meth was allegedly delivered toLouis M. Goulet at the Staunton Walmart. Goulet, arrested about a month later in Augusta County,facesa drug distribution charge. Exercising his Fifth Amendment right during Soto-Garcia's trial, Goulet did not testify when called to the stand as a witness.

He is set for trial on Feb. 27.

Others connected to the Mexican-based drug ring that are currently doing prison time include Manuel Lopez Garcia, convicted last year and sentenced to three years in prison; Robin Nicole Forrester, aWaynesboro woman who is currently serving 15 years; Nancy Martinez, a Waynesboro woman sentenced in April to 3 1/2 years; and Manuel Loya Chavez,sentenced to 15 years behind bars in May.

According to John Hill, Soto-Garcia's attorney, the couple's children are in foster care with her family members.

More: Andrew Rowsey proving doubters wrong again in NBA G League

Have questions or a tip? Email Brad Zinn at bzinn@newsleader.com. You can also follow him on Twitter.

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Woman was caught with pounds of meth in Waynesboro - The News Leader

OAKLAND One of the two jurors who voted to acquit Ghost Ship fire defendant Derick Almena told reporters Friday in an impromptu interview she didnt think he would have knowingly put his family in harms way if he thought the warehouse was dangerous.

Along with a couple dozen artists, Almena, his wife and three children lived inside the warehouse before it was destroyed in a blaze Dec. 2, 2016 that claimed the lives of 36 people during a dance party.

He made a mistake, we all make mistakes. He has to live with this the rest of his life, and to me thats a horrible sentence, Betty Parker, aka Juror Number 5, said after a court hearing at the Rene C. Davidson courthouse.

He has to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And there was a lot of reasonable doubt as far as Im concerned, Parker said.

When asked what advice she has for the next jury during the retrial, scheduled to begin in April, she said they should take everything into account, and think with both your mind and your heart.

After her statements to reporters, Parker was seen hugging Almenas wife, Micah Allison, inside the courthouse. Allison attended Fridays hearing with a friend.

In September, a jury deadlocked 10-2 in favor of convicting Almena, 49, who was charged with 36 counts of involuntary manslaughter one for each of the three dozen people who perished in the warehouse fire.

The prosecution alleged that Almena, the main leaseholder for the Ghost Ship warehouse, was criminally negligent in allowing a collective of artists to illegally inhabit the East Oakland warehouse, which he turned into a fire trap by filling it from floor to ceiling with art, pianos, RVs and other combustible items.

During Fridays court hearing, Almenas attorney, Tony Serra, made a motion requesting that jurors information be unsealed so the defense team could possibly speak with them in preparation for the retrial.

Alameda County Superior Court Judge Trina Thompson said four jurors consented to have their information released. At least five former jurors, including Parker, attended the hearing.

Pretrial motions are set to begin on April 1 and jury selection on April 6 almost exactly a year after jurors were being selected for the first trial. A jury found former co-defendant Max Harris not guilty in September of the same charges Almena faced.

Serra said Harris may testify in the trial on behalf of Almena, although he hasnt yet committed.

Hes out there, hes free, hes enjoying life, hes an artist, hes beautiful, Serra said.

Serra indicated the owners of the warehouse, the Ng family, will also be called to testify in the new trial. Now that the statute of limitations to file criminal charges for them ran out in December, they wont be able to plead the Fifth Amendment as before to avoid testifying.

They dont have the Fifth, they cant shut up. Were going to serve them and Im going to grill them Serra said. And thats going to make all the difference in the world.

Serra said he and his team are ready to go and expect this trial to last about half as long as the first one, which stretched out over four months.

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There was a lot of reasonable doubt, Ghost Ship juror says about why she voted to acquit manslaughter defendant - East Bay Times

ANDERSON Dylan Tate, wearing a green striped jail uniform and handcuffs, was sitting in the witness chair when jurors returned from their lunch break on Thursday.

Tate was called to testify against his former girlfriend, Jennifer Harris, 29, who is on trial for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in the death and Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury following the death of her 18-month-old son Harlan Haines.

Tate, 28, did not testify in his trial and was found guilty of murdering Harlan on June 14, 2019, and ordered to serve life without parole. He is currently serving his sentence at the Miami Correctional Facility.

On Thursday, Tate told jurors he was in a relationship with Harris in 2017, but then he stopped the questioning by Madison County Chief Deputy Prosecutor Steve Koester.

I dont want to answer any more questions, Tate said.

Jurors were excused from the courtroom and outside of their presence, Koester told Tate he could be found in contempt by the court for refusing to answer the questions.

Koester said Tate did not have a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer the questions because he had been convicted of killing Harlan.

Attorney Paul J. Podlejski then addressed the court saying he was representing Tate on the appeal of Tates murder conviction and had spoke with Tate about being found in contempt if he refused to answer questions.

Tate told Podlejski he was aware of the repercussions.

Judge Angela Warner Sims immediately found Tate in contempt and sentenced him to an additional six months in prison.

Take him, she ordered law enforcement in the room.

Jurors were brought back into the courtroom to hear testimony from a Marion County deputy coroner after Tate was removed from the courtroom.

The court adjourned just before 2:30 p.m. with testimony scheduled to resume Friday morning.

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Dylan Tate refuses judge's order to testify against former girlfriend in neglect death case - The Herald Bulletin

Assange would be held in darkest corner of the prison system if extradited to the US By Oscar Grenfell 1 February 2020

Representatives of the Dont Extradite Assange (DEA) organisation revealed last week that if Julian Assange is extradited from Britain to the US, he will be held in almost total isolation and subjected to draconian conditions usually inflicted on those convicted of terror offences.

The information, which was sourced from official US court filings, was relayed in a statement by John Rees outside Westminster Magistrates Court after Assanges most recent case management hearing on January 22. Rees said that Assange would be placed under Special Administrative Measures as soon as he arrives in the US and prior to any trial.

WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Kristinn Hraffnsson said the US State Department had indicated that the First Amendmentthe central US constitutional protection for free speech and freedom of the presswould not apply to Assange, despite the fact that he has been charged under domestic American law.

Taken together, the revelations damn the attempt to extradite Assange to the US as an extraordinary rendition operation, where he faces espionage charges and the prospect of life imprisonment, or even the death penalty, for exposing US war crimes. In violation of fundamental precepts of international law, Assange, a journalist and publisher, will be treated as a national security threat and deprived of his fundamental democratic rights.

Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) were introduced by the Democratic Party administration of Bill Clinton in 1996. They were legislated with bipartisan support in the wake of the right-wing terrorist Oklahoma City bombing.

SAMs provide for the intensive monitoring and isolation of prisoners already in solitary confinement, on the pretext of preventing any threats to national security, including violent acts and disclosures of classified information. The already draconian measures were expanded in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, including providing authorities the right to spy on prisoners privileged attorney-client conversations.

A 2017 report by the Allard K. Lowenstein Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) described SAMs as the darkest corner of the US federal prison system.

The report explained that SAMs combine the brutality and isolation of maximum security units with additional restrictions that deny individuals almost any connection to the human world. They prohibit prisoners who live under them from contact or communication with all but a handful of approved individuals, and impose a second gag on even those few individuals. The net effect is to shield this form of torture in our prisons from any real public scrutiny.

Underscoring the intensity of the US-vendetta against Assange, there were just 51 SAMs prisoners in 2017 out of a federal prison population of more than 183,000. Most had been convicted of terror-related offences and were held at ADX Florence, a supermax prison in the Colorado Desert. The facility has been described as a clean version of hell by one of its former wardens, Robert Hood.

Prisoners held under SAMs are denied even the narrow avenues of indirect communicationthrough sink drains or air ventsavailable to prisoners in solitary confinement. They are generally held in single cells for all but 10 hours a week. Their recreation hours are spent alone in a confined space with few or no amenities.

SAMs detainees are only allowed to communicate with lawyers and relatives who have been screened by authorities, including the intelligence agencies. All outbound and incoming mail is read by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

The Yale-CCR report presented case studies of prisoners at ADX Florence who had to wait months before their letters to relatives were cleared for sending. Visitation rights are also extremely curtailed and are monitored by the FBI.

The reports authors bluntly stated that pretrial prisoners were placed under SAMs with the aim of compelling them to plead guilty, fundamentally undermining the presumption of innocence.

The coercive nature and harsh conditions placed on pretrial SAMs detainees was no accident: experience shows that the DOJ uses total isolation as a tool to break people, just as the CIA did during its foray into detention, the report states.

Because SAMs prisoners are barred from communicating with the outside world, and are denied any information, they are effectively prevented from participating in their own defence.

One attorney cited in the report stated that SAMs dehumanise defendants and create a situation where they cannot exist in a defiant posture to fight the case, serving to eliminate them as participants in their defence. Another noted that SAMs prisoners are expected to give testimony before a jury, after having been prevented from speaking to anyone for months, or even years.

SAMs prisoners have no access to the internet and when they receive newspapers, weeks after publication, they arrive with substantial redactions. In many cases, they are arbitrarily prevented from receiving reading materials. In one incident recounted in the report, the authorities prevented a prisoner at ADX Florence from getting books by former President Barack Obama, on the grounds that it would threaten national security.

SAMs prisoners are also barred from speaking to reporters, or anyone other than their attorney and FBI-approved family visitors. Lawyers are also gagged from relaying anything said by their client, or even talking about the conditions they face. If they violate these draconian conditions, which are aimed at suppressing any discussion of their clients plight or attempting to win public support, they face criminal prosecution.

In 2005, famous civil rights attorney Lynne Stewart and her Arabic interpreter were convicted of conspiracy and of providing material support to terrorists, after publicly-releasing statements from her client, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman. Lynne Stewart was sentenced to a decade in prison and was only released early on compassionate grounds in the late stages of her terminal cancer.

The authorities can also spy on private communications between lawyers and their SAMs clients. Under official regulations, this material supposedly cannot be provided to prosecuting authorities. However the ability of the state to monitor defence strategies effectively erodes the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Lawyers quoted by the Yale-CCR report, moreover, disclosed they had been placed under pervasive government surveillance while representing SAMs prisoners, including being placed on airport watch lists. Such measures are aimed at intimidating attorneys and preventing SAMs inmates from receiving legal counsel.

The report documents the harrowing conditions faced by convicted inmates, who are afflicted with psychological disorders after years of isolation under SAMs. In a number of cases, prisoners had entered an almost catatonic state, which prevented them from communicating, or carrying out any activities, including reading.

The report continues, Physical conditions are similarly inhumane at pre-trial facilities where SAMs detainees are heldthat is, facilities designed to hold individuals who have been charged, but not convicted, of a crime. Conditions at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in Manhattan, where defendants charged with terrorism-related offenses are often held pre-trial, are particularly harsh. Detainees in the MCCs 10 South, where high-level defendantsincluding those under SAMsare held, have little natural light and no possibility for outdoor recreation. Recreational time is provided in a closed room identical to the detainees cell. Unable to open windows or spend time outdoors, detainees in 10 South have no access to fresh air.

The SAMs measures would be compounded by the fact that Assange would appear before the Eastern District Court of Virginia, the preferred government venue for national security cases because it is located close to the Pentagon and CIA, with the largest concentration of intelligence agency employees in the US. It has registered a conviction rate in such trials of more than 98 percent.

Assange has already endured almost a decade of US-led persecution. He was arbitrarily detained in Ecuadors London embassy for almost seven years, as a result of British threats to arrest him if he set foot outside the tiny building. Since being dragged out of the embassy by British police on April 11, Assange has been held in the maximum-security Belmarsh Prison, where his health has continued to deteriorate, to the point that the UN Rapporteur on Torture has warned that he might die.

The revelation that Assange would be placed under SAMs makes clear that his extradition to the US would be nothing less than a death sentence. In a 2015 interview, Assange himself warned that if extradited, he would likely be subjected to SAMS, which he described as a sort of living death.

The lawless character of the US attempt to prosecute Assange underscores the necessity for workers, students, young people and all defenders of democratic rights to prevent his extradition. The Socialist Equality Parties in Britain and Australia have announced meetings and rallies next month, coinciding with the beginning of the extradition hearing, to galvanise the widespread support for Assange into a political movement to secure his freedom.

2019 has been a year of mass social upheaval. We need you to help the WSWS and ICFI make 2020 the year of international socialist revival. We must expand our work and our influence in the international working class. If you agree, donate today. Thank you.

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Assange would be held in darkest corner of the prison system if extradited to the US - World Socialist Web Site